MID STATES STEEL PRODUCTS COMPANY v. THE UNIVERSITY OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: May 5, 2006; 2:00 P.M.
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Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2003-CA-002509-MR
MID STATES STEEL PRODUCTS COMPANY
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM FRANKLIN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE WILLIAM L. GRAHAM, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 00-CI-00430
THE UNIVERSITY OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
AND:
NO. 2003-CA-002694-MR
UNIVERSITY OF KENTUCKY
v.
CROSS-APPELLANT
CROSS-APPEAL FROM FRANKLIN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE WILLIAM L. GRAHAM, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 00-CI-00430
MID STATES STEEL PRODUCTS COMPANY
CROSS-APPELLEE
AND:
NO. 2004-CA-001434-MR
MID STATES STEEL PRODUCTS CO.
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM FRANKLIN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE WILLIAM L. GRAHAM, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 00-CI-00430
HNTB CORPORATION
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING IN PART,
REVERSING IN PART,
AND
REMANDING IN PART
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
BUCKINGHAM,1 JOHNSON, AND TACKETT, JUDGES.
BUCKINGHAM, JUDGE:
Mid States Steel Products Co. appeals and
the University of Kentucky (UK) cross appeals from a judgment of
the Franklin Circuit Court on claims brought by each party
arising out of a contract between them in connection with an
expansion project for UK’s Commonwealth Stadium.
The court
conducted a three-week bench trial and entered a judgment
resolving the numerous issues before it.
Some issues were
resolved favorably to Mid States, and some were resolved
favorably to UK.
The court’s rulings on practically all issues
1
This opinion was completed and concurred in prior to Judge David C.
Buckingham’s retirement effective May 1, 2006. Release of the opinion was
delayed by administrative handling.
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have now been appealed to this court for our review.
Mid States
also appeals from a summary judgment dismissing its complaints
against HNTB Corporation.
Having reviewed the voluminous
record, the numerous arguments raised by the parties, and the
judgment of the trial court, we affirm in part, reverse in part,
and remand in part.
In the late 1990s, UK undertook an expansion project
for its football stadium (Commonwealth Stadium).
The project
entailed enclosing both end zones of the stadium and adding
approximately 7,000 seats and 40 luxury suites.
Construction of
the project could not begin until after the last home football
game of the 1998 season and had to be completed before the first
home game of the 1999 season.
Mid States, a fabricator of structural steel products,
was the successful bidder for the structural steel fabrication
and erection for the project.
Mid States subcontracted the
erection portion of the work to Powell Construction Co., which
was not a party to this litigation.
The design of the project,
including the architectural and structural steel design
drawings, was provided by HNTB Corporation pursuant to its
contract with UK.
Following the trial of this case, the court made
numerous findings of fact.
These are set forth hereinafter.
On August 5, 1998, Mid States and UK signed a contract following
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Mid States’ successful bid.
On August 11, 1998, Mid States
received a Notice to Proceed, which was effective on August 12,
1998.
However, Mid States had not received final complete
design drawings from HNTB upon which it was to fabricate the
structural steel.
In mid-October 1998, UK and its consultants decided to
modify the design of the steel frame to accommodate DantClayton, the seating supplier.
Mid States received the first of
these modifications on October 27, 1998.
comprised major changes to the work.
The modifications
Such changes delayed Mid
States in the performance of its work and significantly
increased its costs.
The changes delayed the start of
fabrication from late September until early November.
In an effort to have the work completed in a timely
manner, the contract provided for milestone dates for the
completion of the work.
The contract also required Mid States
to pay liquidated damages to UK if it did not complete its work
by the milestone dates.
Early in the project, Mid States began
documenting the problems and adverse conditions it faced in a
series of letters to UK.
Those letters documented Mid States’
right to relief from the milestone dates and requested
additional payments to compensate Mid States for some of its
additional costs and expenses.
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A December 3, 1998 letter from Mid States to UK
established Mid States’ right to an extension of the date for
substantial completion of the structural steel until at least
May 2, 1999.
UK never responded to any of Mid States’ several
requests for adjustments to the milestone dates.
Rather than
requesting Mid States to quantify its claim, UK directed Mid
States to stop writing claim letters and to proceed without the
paperwork normally required under the contract.
Despite the fact that Mid States did not meet any of
the original milestone dates set forth in the contract, UK never
gave Mid States notice that its failure to do so constituted a
breach of the contract.
Rather, UK encouraged and accepted Mid
States’ continued performance of the contract.
Further, UK did
not provide Mid States with any notice of new or adjusted
milestone dates that it considered subject to liquidated
damages.
Mid States planned to erect the steel in the east end
of the stadium beginning on the south side of Quadrant D and
proceeding around to the north side of Quadrant C.
In late
November or early December, after fabrication had commenced,
Turner Construction Co., UK’s construction manager, notified Mid
States that it must erect the steel across the entire front of
the east end and only back to column line D to accommodate the
precast supplier.
This constituted a change in the work which
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required Mid States to change and re-sequence fabrication
efforts that were underway in its shop, resulting in the
disruption of fabrication and erection work.
In order to overcome the early delays, UK requested Mid
States to start erection on December 7, 1998, to accommodate
UK’s precast supplier.
Mid States had no obligation under the
contract to begin erection on that date, and its early erection
efforts were not fully productive due to several factors.
Full-
scale erection did not commence until January 8, 1999.
In a letter dated January 12, 1999, UK agreed to
reimburse Mid States for certain requested costs.
The parties
also agreed that certain categories of additional costs would be
waived by Mid States.
To induce Mid States’ continued
performance, the letter expressly recognized that Mid States did
not waive potential claims for other categories of costs. In the
letter, UK also accepted Mid States’ January 8, 1999 proposal to
accelerate the fabrication.
Later, UK agreed to pay erection
overtime and extra equipment rental at the rates quoted by Mid
States in its January 18, 1999 quotation letter.
From January 1999 until the erection of the structural
steel was completed, Mid States and its erection subcontractor
were confronted with additional events and conditions which
further changed the scope of the work and delayed it.
Among the
changes that increased the scope of Mid States’ work beyond
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original contract requirements were the addition of window
washing platforms, the addition of window mullion tubes, and the
addition of channel handrails.
In addition, UK’s consultants
continued to design and redesign significant components of the
steel frame during the first four months of 1999.
The changes
ranged from the redesign of the wing areas and truck entrance to
changes in suite expansion joints, vomitory entrances, roof
details, and the relocation of bracing and beams.
These changes
delayed and interfered with the performance of the work that was
subject to milestone dates under the contract.
Finally, Mid
States also experienced several days of unusually inclement
weather, from which it was entitled to milestone date relief.
In short, the field erection effort was hampered and
delayed by various factors beyond the control of Mid States and
its subcontractor.
Mid States would have been entitled to
extensions to the milestone dates as well as relief from all
liquidated damages.
Mid States was able to achieve the
milestone for the completion of the structural steel on May 14,
1999.2
That date was several weeks in advance of the date that
would have been allowed had the contract been properly
administered by UK and its consultants.
In cases tried upon the facts without a jury, the court
is required to find the facts specifically and to separately
2
Detail work was not completed until June 17, 1999.
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state its conclusions of law thereon.
CR3 52.01.
“Findings of
fact shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due
regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court to
judge the credibility of the witnesses.”
Id.
In its 26-page
ruling, the trial court made extensive findings of fact and
conclusions of law before rendering its judgment.
Having
reviewed the arguments of the parties in these appeals, it is
apparent that most of the challenges are to the fact findings of
the court.
As will be explained hereinafter, we fail to find
that any of the challenged fact findings were clearly erroneous.
MID STATES’ APPEAL AGAINST UK
Mid States argues on appeal that the trial court erred
in dismissing several of its damage claims against UK and erred
in awarding UK a judgment on its counterclaim.
In essence, Mid
States appeals from practically every portion of the court’s
judgment that was adverse to it.
We will begin by examining Mid
States’ argument that the court erred in awarding UK a judgment
on UK’s counterclaim.
The fabrication and erection of channel handrails for
the stadium were part of Mid States’ scope of work pursuant to a
change order.
After the channel handrails were fabricated and
erected by Mid States, a problem arose with the appearance of
rust stains.
3
The court determined that Mid States was liable
Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure.
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for the problem based on its failure to meet requirements under
the contract.
UK obtained an estimate in the amount of $148,630 from
Wilhite, Ltd., to remedy the defective handrails.
UK offered
the estimate at trial as evidence of its damages.
However, UK
offered no witness to establish the foundation requirements for
the document or to give testimony in connection with the figures
therein.
Mid States objected to the estimate as being hearsay
and thus inadmissible.
In response, UK stated that the estimate
was not being offered as evidence of damage.
Noting that mere
uncertainty as to the amount of damages does not preclude
recovery, the court held that the estimate of $148,630 offered
by UK was the best evidence that could be offered and afforded a
reasonable basis for estimating UK’s loss.
The court found that
the amount was the maximum amount of recovery on the claim, and
it ordered UK to pay a credit to Mid States if the lowest
responsible competitive bid to remedy the defective handrails
came in below that amount.
After advertising bid documents, UK received three
bids.
Two of the bids were in excess of the Wilhite estimate of
$148,630.
The other bid was for $58,801.22, and it came from
Mid States.
UK rejected Mid States’ bid as not a responsible
bid offering the best value to UK.
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Thereafter, in an order
entered subsequent to the initial judgment, the court awarded a
judgment to UK on its counterclaim for $148,630.
Mid States argues on appeal that the Wilhite bid was
inadmissible evidence to support the claim because it was
hearsay.
Mid States also points to UK’s acknowledgment at trial
that the estimate was not being offered as evidence of damages.
Mid States further notes that UK never requested the court to
reopen the record to accept additional evidence and never
advised the court that it had any additional evidence to offer.
As Mid States asserts, the court never conducted any post-trial
or post-judgment evidentiary hearing.
In short, Mid States
argues that UK failed to offer any competent evidence of the
amount of its damages.
In response, UK relies on the trial court’s reasoning
that mere uncertainty as to the amount of damages does not
preclude its recovery.
See Hanson v. American National Bank &
Trust Co., 865 S.W.2d 302 (Ky. 1993), overruled in part on
grounds by Sand Hill Energy, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 83 S.W.3d
483, 495 (Ky. 2002), wherein the court held that “mere
uncertainty as to the amount will not preclude the right of
recovery.”
Id. at 309.
UK also notes that Mid States offered
no proof challenging the amount of the estimate or the method
used in the estimate to correct the problem.
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UK argues that Mid
States failed to provide any factual or legal authority to
establish that the court’s ruling was clearly erroneous.
“[A]buse of discretion is the proper standard of review
of a trial court’s evidentiary rulings.”
Goodyear Tire & Rubber
Co. v. Thompson, 11 S.W.3d 575, 577 (Ky. 2000).
We conclude
that the trial court abused its discretion in allowing the
Wilhite estimate to be introduced into evidence as proof of
damages because the estimate constituted inadmissible hearsay.
“’Hearsay’ is a statement, other than one made by the
declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in
evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted.”
801(c).
KRE4
The Wilhite estimate was a document prepared at UK’s
direction in anticipation of litigation.
It was offered to
prove the truth of the matter asserted (damages).
The person
who prepared the estimate did not testify and, therefore, was
not subject to cross-examination by Mid States.
document was inadmissible hearsay.
We conclude the
See Wright v. Premier
Elkhorn Coal Co., 16 S.W.3d 570, 572 (Ky.App. 1999).
The trial court determined that Mid States was liable
on UK’s claim in connection with the channel handrails.
However, UK was required to prove all elements of its claim,
including damages.
See CR 43.01.
Because the Wilhite estimate
was the only evidence of damages submitted by UK, UK failed to
4
Kentucky Rules of Evidence.
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prove all elements of its claim.
Therefore, the judgment in
favor of UK in the amount of $148,630 is reversed.5
The remainder of Mid States’ arguments relates to the
court’s dismissal of various damage claims.
claims made by Mid States were:
Among the damage
under utilization of shop due
to initial delay ($221,245), excess shop personnel hours
($824,940), excess trucking costs ($52,554), and excess erection
labor ($414,840).
The court rejected some of these claims as
being barred by the no damages for delay clause in the contract
and some as being barred by the notice clause in the contract.
Further, the court determined that even if the claims were not
barred by those clauses, Mid States’ damages were too
speculative to be recoverable.
Finally, the court also stated
that Mid States failed to prove the essential elements required
to assert a total cost or modified total cost damage claim.6
5
Mid States goes to some length in its reply brief to address the issue of
whether the estimate was admissible under the business record exception to
the hearsay rule. UK did not raise this argument in its brief; therefore, we
will address it simply by noting that the estimate was not admissible as a
business record under KRE 803(6) since it was not a record kept in the course
of a regularly conducted business activity. See Galbraith v. Starks, 117 Ky.
915, 79 S.W. 1191, 1193 (1904).
6
Mid States’ claim for excess erection labor was apparently summarily
rejected by the court prior to the trial. The parties refer in their briefs
to this claim as a “pass-through” claim asserted by Mid States on behalf of
Powell, its subcontractor. The parties suggest the court rejected this claim
on the grounds that Mid States was not the real party in interest. See CR
17.01. However, no written summary judgment was ever entered disposing of
this claim. Nevertheless, we conclude that the court finally disposed of the
claim on the last page of its judgment when it stated that “[a]ll other
claims for damages by Mid States are hereby DENIED.” We will not resolve the
specific issue as to whether Mid States had standing to assert this claim
since it is unnecessary to the resolution of the case.
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We conclude that the trial court did not err in
dismissing Mid States’ aforementioned claims for two reasons.
First, the claims were barred by the no damages for delay clause
in the contract.
Article 21 of the General Conditions portion
of the contract stated in relevant part as follows:
Extensions of time shall be the Contractor’s
sole remedy for any and all delays. No
payment or compensation of any kind shall be
made to the Contractor for damages because
of impacts, hindrance in the orderly
progress of the Work or delay from any cause
in the progress of the Work, whether such
hindrances or delays be avoidable or
unavoidable. The Contractor expressly
agrees not to make, and hereby waives, any
claim from damages on account of any delay,
obstruction, or hindrance for any cause
whatsoever, including but not limited to the
aforesaid causes. The Contractor agrees
that the sole right and remedy in the case
of any delay shall be an extension of the
time fixed for completion of the Contract.
Without limitation, the Owner’s exercise of
its rights under the changes clause,
regardless of the extent or number of such
changes, shall not under any circumstances
be construed as compensable delays. The
Contractor acknowledges that the Contract
Amount includes and anticipates any and all
delays whatsoever from any cause, whether
such delays be avoidable or unavoidable.
In Humphreys v. J.B. Michael & Co., 341 S.W.2d 229 (Ky. 1960),
overruled in part on other grounds by Foley Constr. Co. v. Ward,
375 S.W.2d 392 (Ky. 1963), the court upheld the enforceability
of a no damages for delay clause in a road construction contract
between a contractor and the state.
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Id. at 234.
See also John
E. Green Plumbing & Heating Co., Inc. v. Turner Constr. Co., 742
F.2d 965, 966 (6th Cir. 1984).
Because each of Mid States’
claims that were denied by the trial court were based on delay,
the trial court properly denied the claims pursuant to the
contract provision.7
We also conclude that the trial court properly
dismissed Mid States’ remaining damage claims due to Mid States’
failure to prove the essential elements required to assert a
total cost or modified total cost damage claim as required in
W.R.B. Corp. v. U.S., 183 Ct. Cl. 409, 426 (1968).
The total
cost method determines the amount of change or damages to be
recovered by subtracting the contract amount from the total cost
of performance.
See Bagwell Coatings, Inc. v. Middle South
Energy, Inc., 797 F.2d 1298, 1307 (5th Cir. 1986).
The modified
total cost approach adjusts the contract amount to allow for
mistakes the contractor may have made in his or her estimate and
adjusts the total costs for problems attributable to the
contractor.
See Seattle W. Indus. v. David A. Mowat, 750 P.2d
245, 249 (Wash. 1988).
Mid States apparently used the modified
7
Mid States argues that the claims were based on change of work and that the
no damages for delay clause was thus not applicable. If Mid States intended
to recover damages based upon changes in work, it should have asserted its
rights under Article 18 of the Contract at the time such changes were being
made. We note that throughout the contract, such as with the additional
crane and with the channel handrails, change orders were processed to reflect
the change in scope of work. Thus, Mid States’ failure to do so precludes it
from being awarded damages based on changes of work.
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total cost approach, as evidenced by its concession that
approximately $54,000 of its costs were attributable to itself.
Assuming, without deciding, Kentucky courts accept
this method of establishing damages, we note that under this
method, the contractor must prove not only that he or she was
not liable for the extra cost, but that the defendant was
responsible.
See Glasgow, Inc. v. Dept. of Transp., 529 A.2d
576, 579 (Pa. 1987).
Mid States failed to do this.
The trial
court made a determination that part of the delay and additional
expense incurred by Mid States was attributable to a change in
the scheduling and sequencing of the field erection effort
dictated by UK’s construction manager, Turner Construction Co.
Another delay was caused in UK’s decision to modify the design
of the steel frame to accommodate the seating supplier, DantClayton.
Yet another, and more significant, reason for delay
was the failure of HNTB to provide final complete design
drawings.
These three facts alone support the court’s ruling
that Mid States did not prove that UK was entirely responsible
for its damages.
See W.R.B. Corp., supra.
In short, we agree
with the trial court that Mid States failed to prove all
elements of its claim and that its damages were too speculative
to be recoverable.
UK’S CROSS-APPEAL AGAINST MID STATES
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As was the case with Mid States, UK has appealed from
practically every portion of the court’s judgment that was
decided adversely to it.
The first of the four issues raised by
UK in its cross-appeal is that the trial court erred in awarding
Mid States’ claims for erection overtime premium ($134,849) and
for an additional erection crane ($83,809).
The first part of
UK’s argument is that Mid States should not have been allowed to
assert these claims because it was not the real party in
interest.
UK argues that these were claims on behalf of Mid
States’ subcontractor, Powell, and that only Powell had standing
to assert them.
The trial court determined that Mid States and UK had
agreed that UK would pay Mid States for overtime premium and
extra equipment rental in accordance with the rates quoted in
Mid States’ January 18, 1999 quotation.8
In fact, change orders
were issued by UK reflecting this agreement.
Thus, Mid States
was not asserting this claim on behalf of Powell, but it was
asserting it on its own behalf.
This establishes Mid States’
right to recover these amounts from UK, as Mid States is the
real party in interest.
See CR 17.01.
Rather than contest the existence of the agreement, UK
contends that its agreement to pay for overtime premium and
extra equipment rental was expressly conditioned upon Mid States
8
UK did not contest this finding.
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completing all work subject to the milestone dates in advance of
March 31, 1999.
The court found otherwise, and the evidence was
sufficient to support the court’s ruling on this matter.
Mid
States’ January 18, 1999 quotations letter expressly stated that
Mid States was proceeding with the understanding that it would
be paid.
No reference was made to any condition to payment.
The letter also requested UK’s representative to contact Mid
States immediately if it misunderstood the direction “in any
way.”
The court determined that no probative evidence was
offered to establish that UK actually communicated the alleged
condition to Mid States at any time before August 1999.
On
August 8, 1999, UK sent a letter informing Mid States that it
was reversing the three prior change orders paying for overtime
premium and extra equipment rental.
The court determined that
reasonable inferences “strongly suggest that the alleged
condition was merely asserted by the University as a pretext for
withholding payment.”
In short, we conclude that the court did
not err in awarding Mid States judgment on this portion of its
claim.
The court’s fact findings in this regard were not
clearly erroneous.9
9
UK
that
that
give
argues that Jack Miller’s testimony was sufficient probative evidence
the condition was communicated in January 1999. This ignores the fact
the court had the authority to determine the weight and credibility to
the evidence presented. See CR 52.01; Sherfey v. Sherfey, 74 S.W.3d
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UK’s second argument is that the trial court erred
when it awarded Mid States $199,304 that UK withheld from
payment in connection with the responsibility for the final
field coat of urethane paint on the steel structure.
The court
ruled before trial that Addendum No. 6, which UK contends places
responsibility for the field finish coat on Mid States, was
issued in violation of UK’s Instructions to Bidders in that it
was issued later than five working days prior to the date of
receipt of bids.
Following this initial ruling by the court,
the only issue at trial in connection with this matter was
whether Mid States had waived the late issuance of Addendum No.
6.
The court found that it had not done so, and the court
awarded Mid States judgment on its claim of $199,304.
UK now argues on appeal that the five-day notice
requirement in the Instructions to Bidders was waived by Mid
States as a matter of law when it signed the contract.
UK bases
its argument on Article 7 of the contract which listed contract
documents as including “all Addenda.”
Thus, UK now argues that
whether Mid States otherwise waived any objection to the
issuance of Addendum No. 6 is irrelevant because Addendum No. 6
became a part of the contract as a matter of law.
777, 782 (Ky.App. 2002). Thus, we find no error in the fact that the court
rejected UK’s evidence on this matter.
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This issue was not raised to the trial court.
As we
have noted, the issue at trial was whether Mid States had waived
its objection to the enforceability of the addendum.
The
Kentucky Supreme Court has held that appellants “will not be
permitted to feed one can of worms to the trial judge and
another to the appellate court.”
S.W.2d 219, 222 (Ky. 1976).
Kennedy v. Commonwealth, 544
Therefore, this argument is not
subject to our appellate review.
At any rate, because the
addendum was issued in violation of the bid instructions, it
never became a part of the contract and was not enforceable.
Alternatively, the court determined that Addendum No.
6 did not require Mid States to furnish and apply the final
field coat.
The court determined that the addendum was
reasonably susceptible to more than one interpretation, and it
thus considered parol evidence pursuant to the doctrine of
contemporaneous construction.
See Billips v. Hughes, 259 S.W.2d
6, 7 (Ky. 1953); A.L. Pickens Co., Inc. v. Youngstown Sheet &
Tube Co., 650 F.2d 118 (6th Cir. 1981).
UK now argues that the
court’s consideration of this evidence was erroneous because
Addendum No. 6 was not ambiguous or susceptible to more than one
interpretation.
We reject UK’s argument in this regard for more than
one reason.
trial.
First, UK did not object to this evidence in the
Second, Addendum No. 6 did not clearly place
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responsibility for the final field coat on Mid States.
In fact,
there was much evidence to support the court’s finding that the
addendum did not require Mid States to furnish and apply the
final field coat.
Furthermore, UK’s own interpretation of the
addendum has not been consistent throughout the proceedings,
leaving us to conclude that the addendum was not as clear as UK
would have us believe.
In short, the court did not err in this regard for
several reasons.
contract.
First, Addendum No. 6 was never a part of the
Second, Mid States did not waive any challenge to its
enforceability.
Third, Addendum No. 6 did not require Mid
States to apply the final field coat.
UK’s third argument is that the trial court erred in
refusing to assess liquidated damages against Mid States because
Mid States failed to meet the milestone dates and failed to
prove entitlement to extensions of time as required by the
contract.
The contract between the parties provided for
milestone dates for Mid States’ performance of the erection of
the steel.
The contract also provided for liquidated damages to
be paid by Mid States in the amount of $2,000 per day for each
day the work was not completed beyond the milestone dates.
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UK
asserted a claim against Mid States for liquidated damages in
the amount of $156,000.10
There is no question that Mid States did not meet any
of the original milestone dates set forth in the contract.
However, the court entered fact findings that there were delays
in performance that were not caused by Mid States.
These delays
included, among other things, the fact that Mid States never
received final complete design drawings from HNTB, that design
modifications were approved by UK to accommodate Dant-Clayton,
and that changes in the sequence of erection was directed by
Turner, UK’s construction manager.
In addition, the court found
UK further delayed and interfered with Mid States’ work by
adding to the scope of work required under the contract and by
designing and redesigning components as construction was
ongoing.
Furthermore, UK has acknowledged that Mid States’
failure to meet the original milestone dates did not constitute
a breach of the contract.
Article 21 of the contract allowed for the adjustment
of milestone dates.
Article 18.1 required that modifications
must be in writing.
UK argues that Mid States never complied
with the requirements of Article 21 for proving time extensions.
10
Since UK asserted its claim, it has acknowledged that Mid States was
entitled to an extension of milestone dates under the contract. Based on the
testimony of UK’s own expert, it concluded Mid States is entitled to a credit
of $18,000. Thus, UK’s claim is now for $138,000.
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Thus, it maintains that the court erred by not awarding UK
liquidated damages.
This argument ignores findings of fact made
by the court.
The trial court found that beginning in August 1998,
Mid States wrote a series of letters to UK pursuant to Article
21 in which it requested relief from the milestone dates due to
various circumstances.
1998.
The letters continued through December
The court also found that UK did not respond to those
letters, either by advising Mid States that it was bound by the
original milestone dates or by fixing new milestone dates.11
Based on these circumstances, the court found that Mid States
was entitled to relief from the original dates.
We agree with the trial court’s analysis of this
issue.
The court concluded that once the original milestone
dates had passed, Mid States had a contractual right to know, in
advance, the specific new deadlines, if any, by which UK
expected Mid States to commence and complete its work or else be
subject to liquidated damages.
We see no error in the court’s
reliance on SIPCO Services & Marine, Inc. v. U.S., 41 Fed. Cl.
196, 218-19 (1998).
Furthermore, we agree with the trial court
11
During oral argument, UK cited to a memo dated January 12, 1999, from Jack
Miller to Mid States. UK argued this was evidence that Mid States was
informed it was bound by the original milestone dates. Once again we note UK
has ignored the fact that the trial court had the authority to accept, weigh,
and draw reasonable inferences from the evidence. See CR 52.01; Sherfey, 74
S.W.3d at 782. As the findings are supported by substantial evidence, we
find no error in this regard.
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that any other construction of the contract would be contrary to
its express and implied provisions, including the parties’
obligations of good faith and fair dealing.
See Ranier v. Mount
Sterling Nat’l Bank, 812 S.W.2d 154, 156 (Ky. 1991).
(“In every
contract, there is an implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing.”)
As the trial court determined, UK’s failure to
provide Mid States with timely advance notice of new milestone
dates results in UK’s surrender of its right to later impose
liquidated damages for any failure by Mid States to begin or
complete its work.
In addition to rejecting UK’s liquidated damages claim
on that basis, the court determined an alternative ground upon
which to reject the claim.
In a January 1999 telephone
conversation, Jack Miller, UK’s representative,12 told Kenneth
Galbraith of Mid States that Mid States should stop writing
letters documenting its right to relief from the milestone dates
and liquidated damages.
The court found that Mid States
reasonably relied on Miller’s instructions and was induced to
stop taking action to protect itself against the imposition of
liquidated damages.
Thus, the court concluded that UK was
precluded by principles of equity and its contractual
obligations of good faith and fair dealing from thereafter
12
Jack Miller was UK’s representative responsible for capital project
management.
-23-
assessing liquidated damages against Mid States.
The court
cited Wehr Constructors, Inc. v. Steel Fabricators, Inc., 769
S.W.2d 51, 53-4 (Ky.App. 1988).
UK argues that Miller’s statement was not sufficient
evidence that UK had waived the contractual requirements.
This
was a factual determination by the court, and we may not set it
aside unless it was clearly erroneous.
supra.
See CR 52.01; Sherfey,
Further, the holding of this court in Wehr Constructors,
Inc., makes it clear that clauses requiring written notice or
approval may be excused where there has been modification,
waiver, or abrogation, by either written or oral agreement.
769 S.W.2d at 53.
Thus, we conclude that the finding was not
clearly erroneous, and we thus reject UK’s argument for this
additional reason.
UK’s fourth and final argument is that the trial court
erred in denying UK’s motion for attorney fees, costs, and
expenses.
UK cites Article 39.2 of the contract which states in
part that:
The Owner shall recovery from the Contractor
all attorney’s fees, costs and expenses
incurred if the Owner prevails in the
litigation of disputes under the Contract.
The Contractor shall be liable to the Owner
for all attorney’s fees, costs and expenses
incurred by the Owner to enforce the
provisions of the Contract.
-24-
UK argues that it prevailed in the litigation because “Mid
States recovered only 16.67% of its claimed damages against UK
and UK recovered 100% of its counterclaim against Mid States.”
Alternatively, citing cases from other jurisdictions as
authority, UK contends that it is entitled to recover at least
83.33% of its attorney fees, costs, and expenses based on the
percentage for which it prevailed in defending against Mid
States’ claims and enforcing the contract provisions.
The court determined that Mid States prevailed on the
whole of the case.
It noted that Mid States was successful on
some, although not all, of its claims and that it recovered a
substantial net judgment against UK.
Thus, the court denied
UK’s motion.
We see no error or abuse of discretion in this regard.
Although several of Mid States’ claims were denied, judgment on
several of its claims was awarded resulting in a substantial
judgment against UK.
Furthermore, with our reversal of the
judgment in favor of UK on its counterclaim, the result is that
UK did not prevail in any manner on its claim.
In short, there
was no abuse of discretion in the court’s ruling.
MID STATES’ APPEAL AGAINST HNTB
When Mid States filed its initial complaint with the
circuit court, it included HNTB Corporation as a defendant as
well as UK.
As we have noted, HNTB was hired by UK to provide
-25-
the architectural and structural steel design drawings for the
project.
In its complaint and amended complaint, Mid States
alleged causes of action against HNTB based on breach of
contract and negligence.
Before the bench trial of this case began, the court
granted summary judgment to HNTB and dismissed Mid States’
claims against it.
Although the written summary judgment order
does not state specific grounds in support thereof, the parties
apparently agree that the court reasoned there was no legal
basis for Mid States’ claims against HNTB in the absence of
privity of contract.13
After the court entered summary judgment
in favor of HNTB, Kentucky law in this regard developed further.
In Presnell Constr. Managers, Inc. v. EH Constr., 134
S.W.3d 575 (Ky. 2004), the Kentucky Supreme Court joined the
majority of jurisdictions and adopted § 552 of the RESTATEMENT
(SECOND)
OF
TORTS. Id. at 582.
(1)
Section 552 states as follows:
One who, in the course of his business,
profession or employment, or in any
other transaction in which he has a
pecuniary interest, supplies false
information for the guidance of others
in their business transactions, is
subject to liability for pecuniary loss
caused to them by their justifiable
reliance upon the information, if he
fails to exercise reasonable care or
competence in obtaining or
communicating the information.
13
The court had earlier advised the parties in a telephonic conference that
HNTB’s summary judgment motion would be granted.
-26-
(2)
Except as stated in Subsection (3), the
liability stated in Subsection (1) is
limited to loss suffered
(a)
(b)
(3)
by the person or one of a limited
group of persons for whose benefit
and guidance he intends to supply
the information or knows that the
recipient intends to supply it;
and
through reliance upon it in a
transaction that he intends the
information to influence or knows
that the recipient so intends or
in a substantially similar
transaction.
The liability of one who is under a
public duty to give the information
extends to loss suffered by any of the
class of persons for whose benefit the
duty is created, in any of the
transactions in which it is intended to
protect them.
In adopting § 552, the court held that “[w]e agree that privity
is not necessary to maintain a tort action, and, by adopting §
552, we agree that the tort of negligent representation defines
an independent duty for which recovery in tort for economic loss
is available.”
Id.
Based on § 552, Mid States argues that this
court should reverse the circuit court’s summary judgment order
in favor of HNTB and remand for further proceedings.
We agree
and remand for further proceedings.
As we have noted, Mid States’ two-part claim against
HNTB alleged causes of action for breach of contract and
-27-
negligence.
We will address the negligence claim first.
The
basis of the negligence claim was stated by Mid States in Count
IV of its First Amended Complaint as follows:
The conduct complained of herein,
specifically including failure to disclose
the condition of its drawings, and delays in
providing timely and accurate design
information, constitutes negligence on the
part of HNTB the proximate cause of which
was damage to Mid States.
Although it is not entirely clear from its brief, it appears
that Mid States claims that HNTB was negligent in its design
drawings and negligent in its delays in timely providing the
drawings.
To the extent Mid States may be alleging negligent or
faulty design drawings, summary judgment to HNTB was
appropriate.
Liability under § 552 is limited to loss suffered
when the false or faulty information provided is relied upon by
the injured party.
Because Mid States acknowledges that it was
aware of the problems in the design drawings at all times, its
claim that it relied upon those drawings is without support.
Therefore, the court properly awarded summary judgment to HNTB
on this portion of Mid States’ negligence claim.
However, to the extent Mid States’ negligence claim
consists of an allegation of negligent misrepresentation as to
assurances made by HNTB concerning when complete drawings would
-28-
be provided, a valid claim has been stated.14
Because final
complete design information had not been supplied when Mid
States submitted its bid for the steel fabrication and erection
portion of the project, Mid States was concerned and inserted in
its written proposal a provision stating that incomplete,
inaccurate, or inconsistent drawing information would result in
delay.
Mid States alleges that it submitted its bid after being
assured by HNTB that final complete drawing information would be
forthcoming.
In fact, it appears that Mid States never received
final complete design drawings from HNTB.
Having concluded that Mid States may state a claim
alleging negligent representation in light of the Presnell case,
we now turn to the other grounds raised by HNTB in support of
its summary judgment motion.
Our review of the portion of the
tape where the court granted HNTB summary judgment, apparently
based on lack of privity, reveals that the court rejected HNTB’s
other arguments.
HNTB claims that any cause of action against it by Mid
States is barred by KRS15 413.245.
KRS 413.245 provides a one-
year statute of limitations for professional negligence.
HNTB
asserts that the statute is applicable because it rendered
14
See Donnelly Constr. Co. v. Oberg/Hunt/Gilleland, 677 P.2d 1292 (Ariz.
1984), for a factually similar case.
15
Kentucky Revised Statutes.
-29-
“professional services” as defined in KRS 413.243.
Further,
HNTB relies on Old Masons’ Home of Kentucky, Inc. v. Mitchell,
892 S.W.2d 304 (Ky.App. 1995), wherein a person providing
architectural services pursuant to a contract fell within the
purview of KRS 413.245.
Id. at 306.
HNTB thus argues that the
circuit court could have granted summary judgment to it because
Mid States’ professional malpractice claim was barred by the
one-year statute of limitations.
The question becomes whether Mid States’ claim was one
for professional malpractice or was one for ordinary negligence.
The answer depends on the nature of the claim.
noted, the claim apparently had two parts.
As we have
The first part was
based on faulty design drawings, and we have determined that
that claim was properly dismissed.
That portion of the claim
was a professional malpractice claim.
However, the second
portion of Mid States’ negligence claim was that it relied on
assurances from HNTB concerning when the final complete design
drawings would be forthcoming and that it suffered damages when
the information proved to be inaccurate.
Although there is no Kentucky case on point, we
believe the analysis by the Texas Court of Appeals in Safeway
Managing Gen. Agency, Inc. v. Clark & Gamble, 985 S.W.2d 166
(Tex.Ct.App. 1998), is persuasive.
In that case the court held
that “[a] negligent misrepresentation claim is not equivalent to
-30-
a professional malpractice claim. . . .
Under a negligent
misrepresentation theory, liability is not based on professional
duty; instead, liability is based on an independent duty to
avoid misstatements intended to induce reliance.”
Id. at 169.
In short, we conclude that the one-year statute of limitations
for professional malpractice is not applicable to this portion
of Mid States’ claim.
We then face the issue of what statute of limitations
is applicable.
this regard.
statute.
Mid States has not made any suggestion to us in
We conclude that KRS 413.120(7) is the applicable
That statute provides a five-year limitations period
for “[a]n action for an injury to the rights of the plaintiff,
not arising on contract and not otherwise enumerated.”
Under
this statute, Mid States’ claim would not be barred.
HNTB also argues that it was properly awarded summary
judgment because Mid States’ negligence claim was not supported
by expert witness testimony.
We reject this argument.
While
professional negligence claims usually must be supported by
expert witness testimony, Mid States’ claim is not a
professional negligence claim.
Rather, it is an ordinary
negligence claim that does not require expert testimony.
HNTB next argues that Mid States’ complaints did not
plead a claim based on § 552.
It asserts that the first time
Mid States mentioned a negligent misrepresentation claim was in
-31-
its memorandum in opposition to HNTB’s summary judgment motion.
It further notes that the memorandum was filed shortly after
this court rendered its decision in the Presnell case, which
decision was later affirmed by the Kentucky Supreme Court.
In the Presnell case the complaint alleged that
“Presnell . . . supplied faulty information and guidance” to the
project’s contractors.
The court held that the allegation was
sufficient to avoid dismissal.
Id. at 582.
Because Mid States’
negligence claim in its First Amended Complaint alleged failure
to disclose and delays in providing timely and accurate
information, we conclude that the allegation was sufficient to
state a valid cause of action for negligent misrepresentation
and to avoid summary judgment dismissing it.
See CR 8.01(1).
HNTB further argues that the no damages for delay
provision in the Mid States/UK contract precludes Mid States
from recovering any damages for delay aside from an extension of
time for completion of the project.
While it is true that Mid
States could not recover damages for delay from UK, HNTB’s
argument overlooks Section 42.2 of the contract wherein Mid
States reserves the right to recover damages caused by other
contractors.16
In short, the Mid States/UK contract does not
16
We believe that Mid States would not have been precluded from seeking
damages from HNTB even in the absence of a clause such as Section 42.2.
-32-
preclude Mid States from asserting a cause of action against
HNTB.
Finally, we turn to the portion of Mid States’
complaints alleging a cause of action against HNTB for breach of
contract.
In its First Amended Complaint, Mid States alleged
that “[t]he conduct complained of herein constitutes a breach of
the statutory and contractual obligations of HNTB under the HNTB
Contract to Mid States as an intended third-party beneficiary.”
On page 22 of its brief, Mid States urges us to likewise reverse
the circuit court’s summary judgment dismissing this portion of
its claim.
However, Mid States cites no authority to support
its position and makes no reference to any portion of the
record.
Further, Mid States does not reply to the authority
cited by HNTB in its brief on this issue.
Therefore, we are not
persuaded that the circuit court erred in dismissing Mid States’
breach of contract claim against HNTB.
This portion of the
summary judgment in favor of HNTB is affirmed.
The judgment of the Franklin Circuit Court is affirmed
in part, reversed in part, and remanded in part.
ALL CONCUR.
-33-
BRIEFS AND ORAL ARGUMENT FOR
APPELLANT, MID STATES STEEL:
William W. Allen
Lexington, Kentucky
BRIEFS AND ORAL ARGUMENT FOR
APPELLEE, UNIVERSITY OF
KENTUCKY:
Lynn C. Stidham
Lexington, Kentucky
BRIEFS FOR APPELLEE, HNTB
CORPORATION:
Leonard A. Weakley, Jr.
Cincinnati, Ohio
Julie A. Neuroth
Union, Kentucky
ORAL ARGUMENT FOR APPELLEE,
HNTB CORPORATION:
Leonard A. Weakley, Jr.
Cincinnati, Ohio
-34-
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