SAMUEL DEAN WADE v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED:
AUGUST 25, 2006; 2:00 P.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2003-CA-002499-MR
SAMUEL DEAN WADE
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM BREATHITT CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE LARRY MILLER, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 97-CR-00021
v.
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
GUIDUGLI AND JOHNSON, JUDGES; HUDDLESTON,1 SENIOR JUDGE.
JOHNSON, JUDGE:
Samuel Dean Wade, pro se, has appealed from an
order entered by the Breathitt Circuit Court on November 7,
2003, denying his CR2 60.02 motion to vacate his sentence
pursuant to a judgment entered on November 10, 1997.3
Having
1
Senior Judge Joseph R. Huddleston sitting as Special Judge by assignment of
the Chief Justice pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution
and Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) 21.580.
2
3
Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure.
We note that several important orders in this case were handwritten and very
difficult to read.
concluded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by
denying Wade relief, we affirm.
Because this Court affirmed Wade’s appeal4 from the
denial of his RCr5 11.42 motion, we quote the pertinent facts
from that Opinion as follows:
On May 23, 1997, [a] Breathitt County
grand jury indicted Wade on thirty-five (35)
counts of first-degree rape, eighteen (18)
counts of second-degree rape, thirty-five
(35) counts of first-degree sodomy and
twelve (12) counts of second-degree sodomy.
According to information contained in the
Commonwealth’s bill of particulars, these
acts were committed between June 1995 and
April 1997. Ninety-four (94) offenses were
committed against Wade’s step-daughter and
six (6) offenses were committed against two
other females.
Wade pled guilty to all counts of the
indictment and on November 10, 1997, was
sentenced to a total of twenty (20) years in
prison pursuant to a plea bargain agreement.
On September 11, 2000, Wade filed a [pro se]
motion to vacate, set aside or correct the
judgment pursuant to RCr 11.42. . . .
. . . .
Without an evidentiary hearing, the
trial court dismissed Wade’s motion based
upon its finding that the record clearly
refuted every allegation stated therein.
4
Case No. 2000-CA-002761-MR, rendered July 5, 2002, not-to-be-published.
This case was made final on September 10, 2002.
5
Kentucky Rules of Criminal Procedure.
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Wade did not file a motion for discretionary review of this
Court’s affirmation of the trial court’s denial of the RCr 11.42
motion with the Supreme Court of Kentucky.
On October 24, 2003, Wade filed his pro se motion to
vacate judgment pursuant to CR 60.02(e) and (f)6 along with an
accompanying memorandum of law.
He alleged that his trial
counsel was ineffective and that the indictment was void because
it did not contain the statement “A TRUE BILL”.
The trial court
denied Wade’s motion without holding an evidentiary hearing
noting that the motion was “not [filed] within a reasonable
time.”7
This appeal followed.
In Gross v. Commonwealth,8 our Supreme Court set forth
a detailed, sequential procedure governing post-conviction
6
CR 60.02(e) and (f) provides:
On motion a court may, upon such terms as are
just, relieve a party or his legal representative
from its final judgment, order, or proceeding upon
the following grounds: . . . (e) the judgment is
void, or has been satisfied, released, or discharged,
or a prior judgment upon which it is based has been
reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer
equitable that the judgment should have prospective
application; or (f) any other reason of an
extraordinary nature justifying relief. The motion
shall be made within a reasonable time[.]
7
The trial court entered an order appointing counsel to represent Wade on
appeal. However, the Department of Public Advocacy filed a motion with this
Court requesting that it be allowed to withdraw as counsel because it had
determined that Wade’s case was “not a proceeding that a reasonable person
with adequate means would be willing to bring at his own expense.” This
Court granted the Department’s motion on September 7, 2004, and allowed Wade
to proceed pro se on appeal.
8
648 S.W.2d 853 (Ky. 1983).
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proceedings.
“The structure provided in Kentucky for attacking
the final judgment of a trial court in a criminal case is not
haphazard and overlapping, but is organized and complete.”9
The
Supreme Court then held in McQueen v. Commonwealth,10 that a
criminal defendant must first bring a direct appeal when
available, and only then should he utilize the provisions of RCr
11.42 by addressing every error of which he was, or should have
been, aware.11
The Court emphasized that CR 60.0212 relief is
“special, extraordinary relief” and “is not a separate avenue of
appeal to be pursued in addition to other remedies, but is
available only to raise issues which cannot be raised in other
proceedings.”13
Wade claims that the trial court erred in denying his
CR 60.02 motion to his prejudice for several reasons.
First, he
claims that the indictment was invalid because it failed to name
the particular person he criminally assaulted, since it only
9
Gross, 648 S.W.2d at 856.
10
948 S.W.2d 415 (Ky. 1997).
11
Id. at 416.
12
The Court in Gross, 648 S.W.2d at 856 stated:
Rule 60.02 is part of the Rules of Civil Procedure.
It applies in criminal cases only because Rule 13.4
of the Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that “the
Rules of Civil Procedure shall be applicable in
criminal proceedings to the extent not superseded by
or inconsistent with these Rules of Criminal
Procedure.
13
McQueen, 948 S.W.2d at 416.
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stated that he committed the charged offenses with “A” minor.
Also in relation to this argument is Wade’s claim that the
indictment was wholly invalid because it did not contain the
phrase “A TRUE BILL”.
However, Wade has failed to preserve the
issue for appellate review because he did not object to the
indictment by filing a pretrial motion pursuant to RCr 8.18.14
Furthermore, “any error in the omission of the phrase ‘A TRUE
BILL’ is harmless and must be disregarded.”15
Wade’s second claim of error is that counsel failed to
investigate certain aspects of his case, including whether or
not he was in Kentucky when the crimes occurred.
This claim was
raised in Wade’s RCr 11.42 motion and decided adversely to him
in his appeal to this Court.
Therefore, the law-of-the-case
doctrine precludes any further review of this issue.16
Third, Wade claims that the trial court erred in
failing to appoint counsel to represent him in bringing his CR
60.02 motion.
The constitutional right to representation exists
at the trial and direct appeal stages, but our Supreme Court has
previously held there is no constitutional right to counsel in
14
See Thomas v. Commonwealth, 931 S.W.2d 446 (Ky. 1996).
15
Topass v. Commonwealth, 80 S.W.3d 795 (Ky.App. 2002).
16
See Thomas, 931 S.W.2d at 450 (quoting Martin v. Frasure, 352 S.W.2d 817,
818 (Ky. 1961) (stating that “‘[a] final decision of [an appellate court],
whether right or wrong, is the law of the case and is conclusive of the
questions therein resolved’”).
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post-conviction proceedings.17
KRS 31.110 limits an indigent
person’s right to appointed counsel in post-conviction
proceedings to “a proceeding that a reasonable person with
adequate means would be willing to bring at his own expense. . .
.”
RCr 11.42(5) provides that if the movant is without counsel
of record and is financially unable to employ counsel, the trial
court shall appoint counsel to represent him in the proceedings,
including appeal; however, there is no corresponding provision
in CR 60.02, and our Supreme Court has declined to extend KRS
31.110 to apply to CR 60.02 motions.18
Consequently, the trial
court did not abuse its discretion in denying Wade’s request for
counsel.
Regardless of the foregoing, perhaps the most
compelling reason for denying Wade’s CR 60.02 motion is the fact
that Wade failed to exercise due diligence in pursuing his
claims.
CR 60.02 requires that the motion shall be made within
a “reasonable time.”19
More than six years have passed between
the time Wade pled guilty and the time he filed his CR 60.02
motion; and under the circumstances of this case, this period of
delay is not reasonable.
In Wade’s RCr 11.42 motion attacking
the judgment, he could have raised, or in some respects did
17
Fraser v. Commonwealth, 59 S.W.3d 448 (Ky. 2001).
18
See Gross, 648 S.W.2d at 857.
19
Ray v. Commonwealth, 633 S.W.2d 71, 73 (Ky.App. 1982).
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raise, the present issues.
Absent evidence of extraordinary
circumstances, we cannot conclude that six years qualifies as a
reasonable time.
The decision on whether to grant relief under CR 60.02
“is one that is generally left to the sound discretion of the
trial court[.]”20
As such, we have examined whether the trial
court abused its discretion in denying Wade’s CR 60.02 motion.
Given the circumstances, particularly the issues raised and the
lengthy delay before this motion was filed, we conclude that it
was not an abuse of discretion for the trial court to deny
Wade’s motion as he is not entitled to relief under the
provisions of CR 60.02.
Accordingly, the order of the Breathitt Circuit Court
is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Samuel Dean Wade, Pro Se
Fredonia, Kentucky
Gregory D. Stumbo
Attorney General
Rickie L. Pearson
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
20
Schott v. Citizens Fidelity Bank & Trust Co., 692 S.W.2d 810, 814 (Ky.App.
1985).
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