R.W. v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY, CABINET FOR FAMILIES AND CHILDREN, AND N.F.W., A CHILD
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RENDERED:
DECEMBER 22, 2005; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2003-CA-002089-ME
R.W.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM JESSAMINE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE C. HUNTER DAUGHERTY, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 03-AD-00007
v.
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY,
CABINET FOR FAMILIES AND CHILDREN,
AND N.F.W., A CHILD
APPELLEES
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
BARBER, MINTON, AND TACKETT, JUDGES.
MINTON, JUDGE:
In this expedited appeal, R.W. asks us to
reverse the circuit court’s order terminating his parental
rights to his daughter following his conviction in a separate
criminal prosecution for having sexually abused this child. 1
1
This appeal was filed in 2003 and is being heard on an expedited
basis because the parental rights to a child are at issue. On the
surface, the issuance of an opinion some two years after the appeal
was filed does not appear expedited. But the delay in the issuance
of this opinion is entirely attributable to the fact that R.W. did
The evidence supporting the court’s termination order is
overwhelming.
So we affirm.
Following an Alford 2 plea, R.W. was sentenced to a
maximum of five years’ imprisonment for committing first-degree
sexual abuse against N.F.W.
There is no indication that R.W.
has attempted an appeal or a collateral attack on the judgment
of conviction and sentence.
After R.W.’s final sentencing, the
Cabinet for Families and Children filed a petition in circuit
court for involuntary termination of R.W.’s parental rights as
to N.F.W.
Even though R.W. had originally signed a petition for
the voluntary termination of his parental rights as to N.F.W.,
the termination proceedings were conducted as if the termination
were involuntary. 3
Counsel was appointed for R.W.
An
evidentiary hearing was conducted on the petition at which R.W.
was personally present.
Following the hearing, the circuit
court entered findings of fact, conclusions of law, and a
separate order, all of them entered September 10, 2003,
not, for various reasons, submit his appellant’s brief until
July 31, 2005. Thus, the regrettable delay is not of our making.
2
So named because of North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970), an
Alford plea is “[a] guilty plea that a defendant enters as part of a
plea bargain, without actually admitting guilt.” BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2004).
3
For example, the trial court’s findings of fact and conclusions of
law make several explicit references to the termination action being
conducted on an involuntary basis.
-2-
terminating R.W.’s parental rights as to N.F.W.
R.W. then filed
this appeal.
It is difficult to discern precisely the issues R.W.
wants us to resolve due to the confusing nature of his pro se
briefs.
Many of the contentions in R.W.’s briefs appear to be
attacks on his criminal conviction.
But the criminal case is
not before us as the only orders R.W. mentions in his notice of
appeal are those entered in the termination case on
September 10, 2003.
So this opinion will address only the
termination of R.W.’s parental rights as to N.F.W.
If R.W.
believes that irregularities exist in his criminal conviction,
he must raise them in post-conviction proceedings in the
criminal case.
We construe R.W.’s issues as a generalized attack on
the propriety of terminating his parental rights.
Our review of
termination orders is limited to determining whether the lower
court’s decision is clearly erroneous. 4
The trial court’s
findings will not be overturned on appeal unless they are not
supported by substantial evidence. 5
4
M.P.S. v. Cabinet for Human Resources, 979 S.W.2d 114, 116 (Ky.App.
1998).
5
Id.
-3-
Kentucky Revised Statute (KRS) 625.090 governs
terminations of parental rights cases.
Under subsection one of
that statute, a parent’s rights may be terminated if the trial
court finds by clear and convincing evidence that the child in
question is abused or neglected and the termination is in the
child’s best interest.
And a court must find by clear and
convincing evidence at least one additional enumerated ground,
including “[t]hat the parent has caused or allowed the child to
be sexually abused or exploited[.]” 6
In the record of the termination hearing, a physician
who specializes in child sex abuse cases testified that she had
examined N.F.W. and that N.F.W. had credibly described, in
detail, R.W.’s sexual abuse of her.
In addition, N.F.W.’s
therapist testified that N.F.W. had detailed to her the sexual
abuse perpetrated by R.W.
Furthermore, the therapist testified
that N.F.W. did not want to have further contact with R.W. but,
instead, wanted to be adopted by her foster parents.
Finally,
R.W.’s wife, who is N.F.W.’s mother, testified that N.F.W. had
told her of R.W.’s sexual abuse in a believable manner. 7
Based on this testimony, we find that the trial
court’s findings that N.F.W. was an abused child, that R.W. had
6
KRS 625.090(2)(f).
7
R.W.’s wife was convicted of complicity to commit sexual abuse
toward N.F.W. R.W.’s wife’s parental rights toward N.F.W. were also
terminated.
-4-
sexually abused her, and that termination of R.W.’s parental
rights was in N.F.W.’s best interests, to be amply supported by
substantial evidence.
Thus, we affirm.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
R.W., Pro se
LaGrange, Kentucky
Jerry M. Lovitt, Esq.
Georgetown, Kentucky
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