DARIUS BURDELL v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED:
SEPTEMBER 8, 2006; 2:00 P.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2003-CA-001947-MR
DARIUS BURDELL
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM FAYETTE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE GARY D. PAYNE, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 98-CR-00661
v.
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
TAYLOR, JUDGE; BUCKINGHAM AND EMBERTON, SENIOR JUDGES.1
TAYLOR, JUDGE:
Darius Burdell brings this pro se appeal from an
August 15, 2003, order of the Fayette Circuit Court denying his
motion pursuant to Ky. R. Crim. P. (RCr) 11.42 to vacate his
sentence.
We affirm.
On June 29, 1998, appellant was indicted by the
Fayette County Grand Jury for the murder of his cousin, Fred
Dunson, on the evening of March 4, 1998.
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Following a jury
Senior Judges David C. Buckingham and Thomas D. Emberton sitting as Special
Judges by assignment of the Chief Justice pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of
the Kentucky Constitution and Kentucky Revised Statutes 21.580.
trial, appellant was convicted of first-degree manslaughter and
sentenced to twenty years’ imprisonment by judgment entered
March 22, 1999.
Appellant’s conviction was affirmed by the
Supreme Court of Kentucky in Appeal No. 1999-SC-000304-MR.
Appellant subsequently filed a pro se RCr 11.42 motion
to vacate his sentence on February 14, 2003.
The circuit court
subsequently appointed counsel for appellant.
Counsel did not
supplement appellant’s pro se motion.
On August 15, 2003, the
circuit court entered an order denying appellant’s RCr 11.42
motion without an evidentiary hearing.
This appeal follows.
An RCr 11.42 motion is properly denied without an
evidentiary hearing if the allegations raised therein are
conclusively refuted upon the face of the record.
Commonwealth, 23 S.W.3d 619 (Ky. 2000).
Baze v.
If the allegations
cannot be conclusively proved or disproved by examination of the
record, the circuit court must grant appellant a hearing on the
motion.
Fraser v. Commonwealth, 59 S.W.3d 448 (Ky. 2001).
The proper standard for reviewing a claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel is set forth in Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
See Gall v. Commonwealth, 702
S.W.2d 37 (1985); Sanborn v. Commonwealth, 975 S.W.2d 905
(1998).
The Strickland standard requires a showing that (1)
counsel’s performance was deficient as it fell outside the range
of professionally competent assistance, and (2) such deficiency
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was prejudicial as there exists a reasonable probability the
outcome would have been different if not for counsel’s
performance.
Id.
Appellant raises several allegations of error.
Initially, appellant contends his trial counsel was ineffective
for failing to move for dismissal of the indictment when the
jury was dismissed resulting in violation of the constitutional
proscription against double jeopardy.
The record reveals that prospective jurors were called
and voir dire was conducted.
Thirteen jurors were ultimately
selected from the pool of prospective jurors.
However, the
court dismissed the selected jurors upon request by the
Commonwealth for a continuance.
The jurors were dismissed
before being sworn by the court.
It is well-established that “jeopardy attaches in a
jury trial when the jury is ‘empanelled and sworn.’”
Johnson v.
Commonwealth, 12 S.W.3d 258, 265 (Ky. 1999)(quoting Crist v.
Bretz, 437 U.S. 28, 38 (1978)).
In the case sub judice, the
record reflects that the jury selected and dismissed by the
court was never sworn.
As the jury was not sworn, the law is
clear that jeopardy had not attached.
Thus, we reject
appellant’s contention that counsel was ineffective for failing
to move for dismissal of the indictment.
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Appellant next contends trial counsel was ineffective
for failing to conduct certain pretrial discovery.
Specifically, appellant argues counsel was ineffective for
failing to discover the identification procedures utilized by
police officers when a witness, Rachel Birdsong, identified
appellant as the perpetrator.
However, as pointed out by the
Commonwealth, the Fayette County Commonwealth Attorney’s Office
has an “open file policy” which renders filing a formal pretrial
motion unnecessary.
Moreover, as evidenced by testimony at
trial, Birdsong knew appellant before the shooting and even
identified appellant by his nickname.
Because Birdsong was
familiar with appellant, the identification procedures utilized
by officers were not crucial to Birdsong’s identification.
As
such, we believe trial counsel’s alleged failure to discover the
identification procedure was not outside the range of
professionally competent assistance.
See Strickland, 466 U.S.
668.
Appellant also asserts trial counsel was ineffective
for admitting appellant’s guilt during closing argument.
Specifically, appellant complains of the following statement by
counsel:
“I am not standing here today telling you that you are
necessarily gonna find that Darius Burdell did not shoot Fred
Dunson.”
Appellant’s Brief at 24.
Appellant asserts that this
“admission” of guilt by counsel constitutes ineffective
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assistance because it was contrary to appellant’s previous plea
of “not guilty.”
The Commonwealth responds that this statement by trial
counsel was taken out of context.
A review of the record
reveals that counsel began closing argument by informing the
jury it would be faced with two issues: (1) whether the
Commonwealth had proven beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant
shot Dunson, and (2) if so, whether appellant was guilty of
murder.
Counsel initially emphasized the weaknesses in the
Commonwealth’s case and argued the Commonwealth had not proved
beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant shot Dunson.
Counsel
then argued that even if the jury believed appellant had shot
Dunson, it should conclude appellant was not guilty of murder.
In light of the overwhelming evidence of appellant’s
guilt, including the victim’s dying declaration and Birdsong’s
testimony that she saw appellant shoot Dunson, counsel’s
argument was appropriate and clearly constituted trial strategy.
See Simmons v. Commonwealth, 191 S.W.3d 557 (Ky. 2006).
As
such, we reject appellant’s contention that counsel was
ineffective for the “admission” made during closing argument.
Appellant also contends his trial counsel was
ineffective for presenting “false evidence” regarding a witness
during closing argument.
Appellant asserts counsel erroneously
stated that a witness, Linda Hayes, testified that she “saw the
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shooting” when, in fact, her testimony revealed she only heard
the shooting.
A review of the record reveals trial counsel did
mistakenly state that Hayes “saw the shooting.”
However,
immediately preceding that statement, counsel correctly indicted
Hayes heard the shooting.
Appellant has failed to demonstrate
how this misstatement was prejudicial.
Considering the
overwhelming evidence of guilt presented at trial, there does
not exist a reasonable probability the outcome of the trial
would have been different but for the misstatement.
Strickland, 466 U.S. 668.
See
Accordingly, we reject appellant’s
contention that counsel was ineffective for making the
misstatement during closing argument.
Appellant next argues the circuit court “abused its
discretion by erroneously finding that a proper foundation had
been established for the admission of the dying declaration of
the victim.”
Admissibility of testimony is an issue that should
have been raised on direct appeal.
S.W.3d 405 (Ky. 2002).
Bowling v. Commonwealth, 80
As admissibility of testimony is
properly an issue for direct appeal, it cannot be raised in an
RCr 11.42 motion.
Id. (citing Haight v. Commonwealth, 41 S.W.3d
436 (Ky. 2001))(holding that an RCr 11.42 motion is limited to
issues that were not and could not be raised on direct appeal).
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Thus, we reject appellant’s contention that the circuit court
erroneously admitted the dying declaration of the victim.
Appellant finally contends he was “denied his 6th
Amendment right to effectively confront and cross-examine his
accuser, Dominico Morbley, as to a prior inconsistent statement
made to police . . . .”
In appellant’s direct appeal, the
Kentucky Supreme Court addressed the cross-examination and
confrontation of Morbley and concluded no error had occurred.
An opinion of this state’s highest court “is the law of the
case” and, thus, binding on this Court.
argument is without merit.
446 (Ky. 1996).
Therefore, appellant’s
Thomas v. Commonwealth, 931 S.W.2d
Furthermore, a motion made pursuant to RCr
11.42 “is limited to issues that were not and could not be
raised on direct appeal.”
Sanborn, 975 S.W.2d at 909.
As such,
we believe appellant is precluded from raising the issues of
cross-examination and confrontation of Moberly in the RCr 11.42
motion.
See id.
We view all of appellant’s remaining contentions to be
without merit.
For the foregoing reasons, the order of the Fayette
Circuit Court is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
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BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Darius Burdell, Pro Se
Beattyville, Kentucky
Gregory D. Stumbo
Attorney General of Kentucky
Samuel J. Floyd, Jr.
Assistant Attorney General of
Kentucky
Frankfort, Kentucky
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