WOODIE CANTRELL; WATHALENE CANTRELL; TAMMY CANTRELL; MURL WRIGHT; JAMES WRIGHT; HAROLD DEAN WRIGHT; ALETHA ANN WRIGHT BUTLER, ADMINISTRATRIX OF THE ESTATE OF LUTHER WRIGHT, DECEASED; KENNETH WRIGHT; LINDA WRIGHT; KATHLEEN PHILLIPS; THE ESTATE OF SHIRLEY WRIGHT; AND THE ESTATE OF ERMA JEAN WRIGHT v. OIL, INC.); AND ASHLAND EXPLORATION HOLDINGS, INC.
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RENDERED:
SEPTEMBER 15, 2006; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2003-CA-001784-MR
AND
NO. 2003-CA-001865-MR
WOODIE CANTRELL; WATHALENE CANTRELL;
TAMMY CANTRELL; MURL WRIGHT; JAMES WRIGHT;
HAROLD DEAN WRIGHT; ALETHA ANN WRIGHT BUTLER,
ADMINISTRATRIX OF THE ESTATE OF
LUTHER WRIGHT, DECEASED;
KENNETH WRIGHT; LINDA WRIGHT;
KATHLEEN PHILLIPS; THE ESTATE OF
SHIRLEY WRIGHT; AND THE ESTATE OF
ERMA JEAN WRIGHT
APPELLANTS/CROSS-APPELLEES
v.
APPEALS FROM JOHNSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE CARL U. HURST, SPECIAL JUDGE
ACTION NO. 97-CI-00442
ASHLAND INC. (F/K/A ASHLAND
OIL, INC.); AND ASHLAND
EXPLORATION HOLDINGS, INC.
(A/K/A ASHLAND EXPLORATION, INC.)
APPELLEES/CROSS-APPELLANTS
OPINION AND ORDER:
AFFIRMING DIRECT APPEAL;
DISMISSING CROSS-APPEAL;
3. DENYING MOTION TO
TAKE JUDICIAL NOTICE; AND
4. GRANTING MOTION TO STRIKE
1.
2.
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
COMBS, CHIEF JUDGE; TAYLOR, JUDGE; KNOPF,1 SENIOR JUDGE.
KNOPF, SENIOR JUDGE:
The parties to this appeal paint
dramatically different pictures of the claims in this case and
the proceedings in the Johnson Circuit Court.
The appellants,
Woodie Cantrell, Wathalene Cantrell, Tammy Cantrell, Murl
Wright, James Wright, Harold Dean Wright, Kenneth Wright, Linda
Wright, Kathleen Phillips, and the estates of Luther Wright,
Shirley Wright and Erma Jean Wright, brought this action against
Ashland Inc. and Ashland Exploration Holdings, Inc.
They allege
that Ashland’s oil-production activities on their properties
have brought above-normal concentrations of radioactive material
to the surface and, in the process, have contaminated the
surface and ground water of their properties.
The appellants
assert that this contamination has permanently diminished the
value of their properties.
In contrast, Ashland concedes that
there is some contamination, but asserts that the appellants
have magnified the danger out of all proportion to the actual
harm caused.
Likewise, the appellants claim that the trial court
was actively biased against them and that the court’s
evidentiary and discretionary rulings unfairly prevented them
1
Senior Judge William L. Knopf sitting as Special Judge by
assignment of the Chief Justice pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of
the Kentucky Constitution and KRS 21.580.
- 2 -
from proving their claims against Ashland at trial.
For its
part, Ashland counters that the trial court bent over backwards
to accommodate the appellants’ claims.
Ashland further asserts
that the trial court should not have even allowed the
appellants’ claims to proceed to trial.
As is often the case, the truth lies somewhere between
these poles.
Nevertheless, we conclude that Ashland’s position
has greater support in both fact and law.
We agree with the
trial court that the appellants knew for more than five years
before they brought this action that Ashland’s activities had
contaminated their ground water.
Therefore, those claims were
properly dismissed as untimely.
As to their claims for surface contamination by
radioactive materials, the appellants were required to prove not
only that their properties were contaminated by Ashland’s
conduct, but also that the contamination has caused an actual
and present injury to the properties.
Based on this standard,
the trial court’s evidentiary rulings and jury instructions were
proper.
Finally, we conclude that the trial court afforded the
appellants a fundamentally fair trial and the jury’s verdict in
favor of Ashland was supported by substantial evidence.
Hence,
we affirm the judgment in favor of Ashland, and we dismiss
Ashland’s cross-appeal as moot.
We further deny the appellants’
motion to take judicial notice of the scientific study included
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in their reply brief, and we grant Ashland’s motion to strike
those materials.
Facts
The underlying facts of this action are not in
dispute.
The appellants allege that Ashland’s oil production
methods contaminated their properties with naturally occurring
radioactive material (NORM).
As the name implies, NORM consists
of natural radioactive material, principally radon.
NORM can be
found almost anywhere, but it is most often found below the
earth’s surface in minute concentrations.
However, NORM can be
concentrated above ground by human activities; it is referred to
as technologically enhanced naturally occurring radioactive
material (TENORM).
In all its forms, NORM cannot be detected by
human senses as it is invisible, silent, tasteless and odorless.
The appellants are owners of real property in Johnson
County, Kentucky.
Their respective properties are located in an
area known as the Martha Oil Field.
The field was established
in the early 1920’s by Swiss Oil Company and was later acquired
by Ashland.
Ashland conducted this activity in the Martha Field
pursuant to leases with the landowners, including the
appellants.
All of the leases expired in 1987.
Beginning in the late 1950s through the early 1960s,
Ashland injected pressurized water into the oil-bearing stratum
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of the Martha Field.
In addition to increasing oil production,
this process carried other materials, including NORM, to the
surface.
The appellants also allege that this process polluted
their ground water with NORM and with non-radioactive
contaminants.
In 1987, Ashland and the federal Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) entered into a consent decree which
required Ashland to take action to remedy the ground-water
contamination.
Ashland did not admit causation or liability in
the consent decree.
But Ashland did provide funds to cap wells,
restore surface production pits and tank battery facilities,
evaluate and monitor ground water quality, and provided
alternative water supplies to residents of the affected
properties.
The 1987 consent decree only addressed the non-NORM
contamination.
In 1988, pipe from the Martha Field tested
positive for above-background levels of NORM.
Thereafter,
Ashland and the EPA entered into a second consent decree under
which Ashland agreed to perform remediation.
Pursuant to this
decree, Ashland removed contaminated pipe and soil from the
affected properties.
Thereafter, a number of affected
landowners brought actions against Ashland due to the
contamination of their properties.
action against Ashland in 1997.
- 5 -
The appellants brought their
Prior to trial, Ashland moved to dismiss the claims
for ground-water contamination and surface contamination by nonradioactive materials.
The trial court granted the motion,
concluding that these claims were untimely.
But in a separate
order, the trial court denied Ashland’s motion to dismiss the
claims relating to NORM contamination.
The remaining claims proceeded to a jury trial in July
2003.
The appellants conceded that the NORM contamination had
not caused any injury to any persons, animals or crops on their
properties.
Rather, they asserted that the contamination
constituted a continuing trespass and a permanent nuisance which
materially impaired the value and future use of the properties.
At the conclusion of proof, the jury found that Ashland had
failed to exercise ordinary care in its oil production, and that
its conduct was a substantial factor in causing NORM to be
deposited on the appellants’ properties.
However, the jury
further found no “basis in reason and experience for a fear of
the NORM above-background readings found” on the properties.
Since the jury concluded that the appellants had suffered no
injury from the NORM contamination, the court entered a judgment
in favor of Ashland.
This appeal followed.
Ashland has cross-
appealed from the denial of its summary judgment and subsequent
directed-verdict motions.
- 6 -
The appellants raise numerous issues which can be
grouped into four general categories: (1) dismissal of their
claims relating to ground-water contamination; (2) evidentiary
rulings; (3) jury instructions; and (4) trial-related issues.
The first and last issues are discrete and may be considered
separately.
However, the second and third issues are
essentially related as they both concern the sufficiency of the
appellants’ evidence.
Therefore, we shall address these issues
together.
Dismissal of claims relating to ground water contamination
The parties agree that actions for damages to real
property caused by another's negligence are subject to the fiveyear statute of limitation set out in KRS 413.120(4).
The trial
court excluded evidence of the appellants’ claims for groundwater contamination and non-radioactive surface contamination,
concluding that the appellants failed to file these claims
within five years from the time they knew of the contamination.
The Appellants contend that there are fact issues regarding when
they knew or should have known of the injury.
They also assert
that Ashland should be estopped from relying on the statute of
limitations because it attempted to conceal both the NORM
contamination in the ground water and the extent of the harm.
Finally, the appellants assert that Ashland’s conduct
- 7 -
constitutes a continuing tort for which they are entitled to
recover damages for the five years preceding filing of their
complaint.
We find none of these arguments convincing.
A cause of action accrues when a party knows that he
has been wronged, not when he knows that the wrong is
actionable.2
In cases involving latent injuries arising from
exposure to harmful substances, Kentucky courts have held that
the cause of action accrues when the plaintiff discovers or in
the exercise of reasonable diligence should have discovered not
only that he has been injured but also that his injury may have
been caused by the defendant's conduct.3
In this case, all of
the appellants were aware of problems with their ground water at
least before 1989.
Ashland presented evidence that the Cantrells and the
Wrights had complained about the bad smell and taste of their
well water for several decades prior to the entry of the 1987
consent decree.
Likewise, there was substantial evidence that
the appellants knew that these problems were caused by Ashland’s
oil production activities.4
2
The appellants concede these facts,
Conway v. Huff, 644 S.W.2d 333, 334 (Ky. 1982).
3
Louisville Trust Co. v. Johns-Manville Products Corp., 580
S.W.2d 497, 501 (Ky. 1979).
4
Similarly, the appellants admitted that they had been aware for
many years of incidents of oil spilling onto their land.
- 8 -
but contend that they were unaware of the presence of NORM in
their water until they had it tested during the mid-1990s.
Nevertheless, a plaintiff’s lack of knowledge of the
extent of his injuries does not toll a statute of limitations to
which the discovery rule is applied.5
Thus, even if the
appellants were not specifically aware of the NORM contamination
in their water, they were aware that the Ashland’s activities
had caused a significant degradation in the quality of their
ground water for more than five years before filing this action.
Therefore, the trial court correctly found that their claims for
ground-water contamination were untimely.
Furthermore, the burden of proving all the facts which
constitute the essential ingredients of an equitable estoppel
rests upon the party who asserts it, and the decision of that
question rests largely on the facts and circumstances of the
particular case.6
In this case, the appellants assert that
Ashland employees downplayed the danger from NORM contamination
in the water after 1989.
Nevertheless, the appellants failed to
present evidence showing that Ashland prevented them from
discovering the damage to the ground water supply.
The
appellants had been long aware that Ashland’s oil production
5
Id. at 500.
6
Byerly Motors, Inc. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 346 S.W.2d 762,
765 (Ky. 1961).
- 9 -
activities had degraded their ground water.
And while Ashland
did not admit liability in the 1987 consent decree, Ashland
provided all of the appellants with alternative water supplies
by 1990 at the latest.7
Consequently, Ashland is not estopped
from relying on the five-year statute of limitations.
Finally, the appellants argue that the ground water
contamination constitutes a continuing tort for which they are
entitled to claim damages for at least the five-year period
before they filed their actions.
But where the injury to the
land is permanent and cannot be remedied at an expense
reasonable in relation to the damage, only a one-time recovery
brought within five years is allowed.8
Furthermore, such a cause
of action accrues, at the latest, on the date that the
operations causing the trespass were completed.9
As previously
noted, Ashland’s oil leases expired in 1987, and there is no
allegation that any additional contamination to the ground water
occurred after that time.
Thus, the appellants’ actions filed
in 1997 were untimely.
7
In 1989, Ashland provided Woodie and Wathalene Cantrell with
bottled water for six months, and thereafter provided the
Cantrells with a city-water line. Ashland installed a cistern
on the Wrights’ property during the 1960s and also provided them
with a city-water line in 1990.
8
Wimmer v. City of Ft. Thomas, 733 S.W.2d 759, 761 (Ky.App.
1987).
9
Lynn Mining Co. v. Kelly, 394 S.W.2d 755 (Ky. 1965).
- 10 -
Evidentiary issues/Jury Instructions/Sufficiency of Evidence
The appellants next argue that the trial court
improperly excluded key evidence, thus preventing them from
establishing the essential elements of their case.
They further
assert that the trial court failed to properly instruct the jury
on their claims.
However, the more fundamental issue concerns
the proof necessary for the appellants to prevail on their
claims against Ashland.
The key to this inquiry is the Rockwell line of cases,
Wilhite v. Rockwell International Corp. (Rockwell I),10 and
Rockwell International Corp. v. Wilhite (Rockwell II).11
The
plaintiffs in these cases alleged that Rockwell International
had discharged waste products containing polychlorinated
biphenyls (PCBs) into the waterways adjacent to its
manufacturing plant in Russellville, Kentucky.
The landowners
further alleged that the PCBs were deposited on their downstream
properties.
Like the appellants in this case, the Rockwell
landowners sought damages for trespass and creation of a
permanent nuisance.
However, they offered no competent evidence
to show that the level of PCB contamination posed any
10
83 S.W.3d 516 (Ky. 2002).
11
143 S.W.3d 604 (Ky.App. 2003).
- 11 -
significant danger to humans, animals or the use of their
properties.
Nevertheless, the jury awarded the landowners
compensatory damages in excess of $7,000,000.00 and punitive
damages of more than $200,000,000.00.
On appeal, this Court reversed, finding that the
plaintiffs had failed to show injury to their properties and
that their principal expert's testimony should not have been
admitted.
In the absence of such evidence, this Court concluded
that Rockwell was entitled to a directed verdict.
On
discretionary review, the Kentucky Supreme Court agreed that the
expert’s testimony was inadmissible, but disagreed that the
remedy was reversal for a directed verdict.
The Supreme Court
noted that there was other evidence of permanent injury to the
properties for which landowners may be entitled to compensation,
and remanded the matter back to the Court of Appeals to address
whether the admissible evidence was sufficient to justify a new
trial.12
On remand in Rockwell II, this Court found that the
landowners’ claims were not barred by the five-year statute of
limitations.
However, the Court also concluded that the
landowners had failed to demonstrate an actual, present injury
to their properties.
12
The Court first noted that a landowner may
Rockwell I, 83 S.W.3d at 518-19.
- 12 -
recover damages for intentional trespass even when it is
harmless.
But the Court further stated that liability is
imposed for negligent trespass only where there has been harm to
the property.13
Because the landowners were only seeking damages
for negligent trespass, this Court held that they were required
to prove actual harm to their properties.
Trespass is designed to protect against
interference with exclusive possession, and
not just mere entry. When an object can be
seen or sensed in some manner, one may even
assume that a landowner's right to
exclusively possess his property is
infringed.
Where the “thing” that has
entered onto the plaintiff’s property is
imperceptible to ordinary human senses, it
does not so obviously infringe upon a
landowner’s right to exclusive possession.
In such cases, only when the substance
actually damages the property does it
intrude upon the landowner’s right to
exclusive possession. Therefore, an
essential element of [the landowners’] claim
is that the PCBs interfere with their right
to exclusive possession by causing actual
harm to the property.14
While the landowners clearly proved that PCBs are
dangerous and carcinogenic in higher concentrations, they
presented no evidence that the levels of PCBs found on their
13
Rockwell II, 143 S.W.3d at 620, citing Restatement (Second) of
Torts § 165 (comment b).
14
Id., quoting Mercer v. Rockwell International Corp., 24 F.
Supp. 2d 735, 743 (W.D.Ky. 1998) (Mercer also involved a claim
against Rockwell for PCB contamination from the Russellville
plant).
- 13 -
properties presented any health hazard.
Consequently, the Court
held that the mere presence of a potentially hazardous substance
on the landowners’ properties would not support a claim for
damages in the absence of a showing of some present injury to
persons or property.15
Therefore, this Court concluded that the
landowners could not prevail on their claims against Rockwell.
The current case presents remarkably similar issues
even though it involves contamination by a different substance.
Like the Rockwell landowners, the appellants in this case claim
that Ashland’s activities caused a potentially hazardous
substance to be deposited on their properties.
Likewise, the
appellants claim damage to their properties under theories of
negligence, trespass and nuisance.
And as in Rockwell, Ashland
concedes that there is some contamination, but asserts that the
levels of NORM found on the appellants properties are so minute
as to cause no actual harm to the properties.
As this Court held in Rockwell II, the mere presence
of NORM on their properties in above-background levels does not,
by itself, constitute an injury to the appellants’ properties.16
15
Id. at 620-25 (citing Wood v. Wyeth-Ayest Laboratories, 82
S.W.3d 849 (Ky. 2002), holding that mere exposure to a
potentially toxic substance is insufficient to allow recovery
without evidence of an actual, physical injury caused by that
exposure).
16
Id. at 623.
- 14 -
Thus, the appellants, like the Rockwell landowners, must present
evidence that the levels of NORM present on their properties
interfere with their right to exclusive possession by causing
actual harm to the property.17
When viewed in this light, the
appellants’ issues related to the trial court’s evidentiary
rulings and jury instructions come into clearer focus.
The appellants primarily argue that the trial court
improperly excluded crucial testimony from the key expert
witness, Stanley J. Waligora, Jr.
Waligora, a principal health
physicist with Environmental Dimensions, Inc., testified that he
had extensive experience working under contract with the United
States Government on the remediation of radioactive waste sites.
Ashland moved to exclude or limit Waligora’s testimony, arguing
he was not qualified to express an opinion regarding any health
risk from the NORM contamination.
Ashland further argued that
there was an insufficient scientific foundation for the models
underlying his opinions about the risk of future uses of the
properties.
In particular, Ashland asserted that these aspects of
Waligora’s testimony failed to meet the standards for
admissibility set out in Daubert v. Merrill Dow Pharmaceuticals,
17
Id. at 621.
- 15 -
Inc..18
The trial court referred the Daubert issues to a special
master commissioner, Hon. Pierce W. Hamblin.
After conducting a
hearing and reviewing Waligora’s deposition testimony,
Commissioner Hamblin partially granted Ashland’s motion to
exclude Waligora’s testimony.
The commissioner allowed Waligora
to testify regarding the fact and extent of the NORM
contamination on the Cantrell’s and the Wrights properties.
However, the commissioner specifically prohibited Waligora from
testifying as to the effect of the radiation or whether the
contamination creates a danger to present or future users of the
properties.
The appellants contend that this order prevented them
from showing actual harm to the property.
They state that
“Waligora would have explained that the level of radiation on
Plaintiffs’ properties would present significant health risks to
humans assuming various future land-use scenarios”.19
But
Waligora repeatedly admitted that his role was not to determine
whether the levels of contamination pose a health hazard to the
current landowners or residents, or to calculate the radiation
dose actually received by any of the current landowners.
18
509 U.S. 579, 113, S. Ct. 2786 125 L. Ed. 2d 469 (1993).
19
Appellants’ Brief at 7.
- 16 -
Rather, Waligora testified that his role was to determine the
nature and extent of the NORM contamination in the Martha Field.
To calculate the risks to future owners and occupiers
of the land from the radiation levels present on the appellants’
properties, Waligora used the Residual Radioactivity (RESRAD)
computer program to extrapolate the extent of the risk based
upon future land use scenarios.
But notwithstanding the
admissibility of such evidence, such methodology runs afoul of
the Rockwell II requirement that the landowners must show an
actual and present harm to the property.
By comparison, we note that that Waligora also
testified in a Louisiana case involving NORM contamination
caused by oil production activities, Grefer v. Alpha Technical.20
But in Grefer, Waligora testified concerning the actual costs
that the plaintiffs in that case would incur to remediate the
NORM contamination to within Federal regulatory levels.21
Under
the rule set out in Rockwell II, the plaintiffs’ liability for
such remediation expenses would constitute an actual and present
injury.
In this case, there is no allegation that any of the
landowners would be required to make those expenditures to
20
901 So.2d 1117 (La.App. 2005).
21
Id. at 1139-40.
- 17 -
remediate the NORM contamination.
Indeed, the appellants did
not seek to recover remediation expenses, but only damages for
reduction in the value of their properties caused by the
presence of NORM.
To this end, Waligora stated that he was
retained to analyze the risk of future harm caused by exposure
to the low levels of radiation present on the appellants’
properties.
Based upon these anticipated future risks, Waligora
intended to offer his opinions concerning the limitations on
future land uses to which the properties would be subject
without any further remediation.
Ashland objected to this testimony on three grounds:
(1) the RESRAD calculations were based, at least in part, by
faulty data collected by Michael Jarrett; (2) Waligora’s
interpretations of the RESRAD calculations were based on the
linear, no-threshold (LNT) model for determining future risks
from exposure to low levels of radiation; and (3) the RESRAD
calculations of future risk were unduly speculative.
The trial
court previously excluded the Jarrett data as unreliable, and
the appellants do not appeal from this ruling.
They argue,
however, that Waligora testified that he was able to make the
RESRAD calculations by relying solely on data collected by
Ashland.
The more critical issue concerns the RESRAD program’s
reliance on the LNT model to assess the extent of the future
- 18 -
risk.
The LNT model postulates that there is no minimum “safe”
threshold for exposure to ionizing radiation.
Instead, any
exposure to radiation increases the risk of cancer.
Using this
model, low levels of radiation can increase the risk of cancer
given exposures over a long period of time.
On the other hand,
the period of time involved makes it difficult to exclude other
causes.
Thus, while the LNT model is used extensively for
regulatory purposes, there is considerable dispute whether it is
an acceptable scientific technique in determining causation in
an individual instance.22
But in addition to the causation problem, Waligora’s
opinions, based upon the RESRAD program and the LNT model, look
to the potential for future injury and fail to assess the
present injury to the appellants’ properties.
Commissioner
Hamblin’s Daubert analysis highlights the problems with this
aspect of Waligora’s testimony:
[Waligora’s] opinions are not based upon
present circumstance. His models predict
construction of homes on hot spots (where
there is presently no construction) on level
property and/or hillsides; he predicts there
will be animals and vegetable gardens on
each property in the future; and he assumes
certain pathways for this contamination in
the future that are not present now and do
not rise above the level of speculation.
This future model opinion testimony may well
22
See Cano v. Everest Minerals Corp., 362 F. Supp. 2d 814, 84950 (W.D.Tex. 2005).
- 19 -
be relevant to EPA standards for clean up
and remediation, but such testimony is
legally insufficient to present to the jury
under the guidelines set forth by Daubert.
There are simply too many flaws in Stanley
Waligora’s methodology and predictions to
allow his testimony and opinions concerning
the extent of contamination on Plaintiffs’
properties.
The appellants urge that the commissioner disregarded
substantial evidence showing that the LNT model is a generally
accepted method for determining the effect of exposure to low
levels of radiation.
To this end, they have filed a motion for
this Court to take judicial notice of a recent study supporting
the validity of the LNT model.
We conclude that it is
inappropriate and unnecessary to do so.
23
23
The appellants have moved this Court to take judicial notice
of the seventh in a series of reports issued by the National
Research Council of the National Academies, entitled “Biological
Effects of Ionizing Radiation”. (BEIR VII). According to the
appellants, the recent BEIR VII report confirms their position
that the LNT model is generally accepted in the scientific
community. We conclude, however, that it is both inappropriate
and unnecessary for this Court to take judicial notice of the
BEIR VII report. Consequently, we must deny the appellants’
motion and grant Ashland’s motion to strike these materials from
the appellants’ reply brief.
KRE 201 permits a court to take judicial notice of
adjudicative facts. A judicially noticed fact must be one not
subject to reasonable dispute in that it is either generally
known in the community or capable of accurate and ready
determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot
reasonably be questioned. The BEIR VII report clearly involves
matters that are outside of the range of knowledge generally
known in the community. And while the NRC could be regarded as
an authoritative source, the conclusions contained in the report
are well outside this Court’s competence to interpret without
- 20 -
We do not quarrel with the general proposition that
exposure to low levels of radiation may increase a future risk
for developing cancer.
For this reason, the RESRAD program and
the LNT model may be prudent regulatory approaches to assess the
long-term risks of exposure to low levels of radiation.
We need
not reach this question, however, because Waligora did not
establish that his application of these methods was reliable or
probative of the legal issues presented in this case.
A
plaintiff is not entitled to recover for increased risk of
future harm from exposure to a potentially-harmful substance
unless there is a present injury.24
Therefore, the trial court
expert testimony. See Polley v. Allen, 132 S.W.3d 223, 226
(Ky.App. 2004).
Furthermore, our review of the trial court’s findings is
confined to matters properly made part of the record below.
Rohleder v. French, 675 S.W.2d 8, 9 (Ky.App. 1984). Although an
appellate court may take judicial notice under KRE 201, that
authority should not be used as a device to correct on appeal a
failure to present adequate evidence to the trial court. R.
Lawson, The Kentucky Evidence Law Handbook, s 1.00[5][d] (4th ed.
2003). In this case, the BEIR VII report was not in existence
either at the time of the Daubert hearing or at the time of
trial – it was not released until 2005. Waligora did refer to
the earlier BEIR V report in support of his use of the LNT
model, and the BEIR VII report would be merely cumulative of
that evidence.
Finally, the BEIR VII report would not compel admittance of
Waligora’s opinions. As noted above, the LNT model was not
probative of or applicable to the present danger caused by the
levels of NORM occurring on the appellants’ properties.
Consequently, we must deny the appellants’ request to take
judicial notice of the BEIR VII report.
24
Capital Holding Corp. v. Bailey, 873 S.W.2d 187, 192-93 (Ky.
1994).
- 21 -
did not abuse its discretion by excluding those portions of
Waligora’s testimony.25
Along the same lines, the appellants also argue that
Ashland’s expert, Dr. John Frazier, should not have been allowed
to testify that there is a safe threshold for exposure to
radiation.
They assert that, since the LNT model is accepted in
the regulatory context, Dr. Frazier’s opinions rejecting the
model are implicitly without accepted scientific foundation.
Consequently, the appellants contend that Dr. Frazier’s opinions
should not have been admitted.
A court must determine the admissibility of an
expert’s opinion on its own merits.
The trial court’s exclusion
of Waligora’s opinions based on the LNT model does not
necessarily justify the conclusion that Dr. Frazier’s contrary
opinions are scientifically reliable.
But the appellants
concede in their brief that “there is a debate in the scientific
community regarding the validity of such a risk threshold”.26
And as previously noted, the use of the LNT model by regulatory
agencies does not compel a conclusion that the model is
applicable or reliable to determine the present injury to the
25
Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co. v. Thompson, 11 S.W.3d 575, 577
(Ky. 2000).
26
Appellant’s Brief at 9-10.
- 22 -
properties.
Consequently, we cannot find that the trial court
abused its discretion by allowing Dr. Frazier’s testimony.
And more to the point, the appellants bore the burden
of proving that Ashland’s activities caused injury to their
properties.
The jury found that Ashland’s conduct was negligent
and that it caused above-background levels of NORM to be
deposited on the appellants’ properties.
But in Rockwell II,
this Court held the mere presence of a potentially harmful
substance in quantities not detectable by unassisted human
senses is insufficient to show injury to the property.
The
landowner must also show that the substance has caused actual
harm to persons or property.27
In this case, the appellants
concede that they could not establish that the NORM
contamination presented a health risk without Waligora’s
excluded testimony.
Therefore, the appellants could not prevail
on their trespass or nuisance claims against Ashland.
Nevertheless, the appellants assert that they were
entitled to recover because the presence of NORM has
substantially depreciated the value of their properties.
They
argue, with some supporting evidence, that buyers would be
unwilling to purchase their properties without a discount for
the NORM contamination.
Thus, the appellants assert that they
and their properties have been damaged by Ashland’s conduct.
27
Rockwell II, 143 S.W.3d at 621.
- 23 -
The Court in Rockwell II drew a sharp distinction
between an injury to property and the damages arising from that
injury, holding that “[d]ecreased fair market value is not harm
to the property, it is only a means of measuring that harm”.28
Since the trial of this action preceded this Court’s decision in
Rockwell II, the trial court allowed the appellants to present
evidence of such depreciation or “stigma” damages.
Where a
trespass or a taking has created a potentially dangerous
condition, a landowner may recover damages for depreciation in
the value caused by potential buyer’s fear of that condition.29
However, there must also be evidence that the fear is
reasonable given the actual condition of the property.30
This
approach is entirely consistent with this Court’s reasoning in
Rockwell II rejecting the landowners’ nuisance claims.
A
landowner may recover damages for the creation of a permanent
condition that causes “unreasonable and substantial annoyance to
the occupants of the claimant’s property or unreasonably
interferes with the use and enjoyment of such property, and
thereby causes the fair market value of the claimant’s property
28
Id. at 621, quoting Mercer, 24 F. Supp. 2d at 743.
29
Gulledge v. Texas Gas Transmission Corp., 256 S.W.2d 349, 352
(Ky. 1952).
30
Id. at 352-53.
- 24 -
to be materially reduced”.31
But the interference with the use
of the property must be reasonable based on the actual harm
presented by the presence of the substance.
The Court in Rockwell II found “no rational basis for
a finding that the discharge of minute quantities of PCBs onto
the landowners’ properties resulted in any interference with
their use or enjoyment of the properties. … Any annoyance or
interference sustained by the landowners here is the result of
an irrational fear of PCBs.
The law does not allow relief on
the basis of an unsubstantiated phobia.”32
Similarly, the
appellants in this case have not shown that the mere presence of
low levels of radiation would unreasonably interfere with their
use and enjoyment of the properties.
Therefore, they cannot
recover damages arising from an unsupported fear of that
radiation.
The other excluded evidence would not alter this
result.
The appellants complain that the trial court excluded
evidence of Ashland’s activities on other properties.
In
particular, they argue that the trial court struck the testimony
of Bob Grace and Clay Kimbrell, who would have testified that
Ashland’s oil-production methods were negligent and caused the
31
Rockwell II, 143 S.W.3d at 626, citing KRS 411.530(2).
32
Id. at 627.
- 25 -
NORM contamination.
on these issues.
However, the jury found for the appellants
Therefore, we cannot find that the appellants
were prejudiced by the exclusion of this testimony.
Similarly, the appellants attempted to introduce the
deposition testimony of Earl Arp, a former Ashland employee who
had circulated a memorandum in 1982 about proposed regulations
relating to radionuclides.
The appellants argue that the
memorandum was relevant to show Ashland’s prior knowledge of the
dangers of NORM as a by-product of oil-production activities.
The trial court excluded Arp’s testimony and the memorandum as
hearsay not covered by any exception.
But like the testimony
from Bob Grace and Clay Kimbrell, this evidence was only
probative of Ashland’s negligence, which the appellants proved.
Arp’s testimony and the 1982 memorandum were not probative of
the dangers of the levels of NORM actually present on the
appellants’ properties.
For the same reason, the trial court also properly
excluded the testimony of Bobby Alexander, an Ashland employee
who was involved in remediation efforts on other properties.
The appellants argue that Alexander’s testimony was relevant to
show that Ashland recognized the dangers of NORM and took steps
to monitor levels of radiation to which its employees were
exposed.
But while Alexander’s testimony may be relevant to
show that the levels of NORM present on other properties could
- 26 -
present a health hazard, he offered no evidence regarding the
levels of NORM present on the appellants’ properties.
Likewise, the trial court properly excluded the
evidence regarding the cost of remediation on other properties.
As with Bobby Alexander’s testimony, this evidence was not
probative of the levels of NORM present on the appellants’
properties.
And as previously noted, the appellants did not
seek to recover remediation expenses.
Therefore, this evidence
was not relevant to the issues before the jury.
The appellants next argue that that trial court
improperly excluded a video tape filmed by Chris Dawson.
The
video depicts Ashland employees dressed in protective gear
pumping water from a pit into a creek that adjoins Murl Wright’s
property.
The trial court excluded the tape, holding that it
was inadmissible under KRE 407 as evidence of a remedial
activity.
We disagree.
Evidence of activity which caused or
contributed to the NORM contamination on the appellants’
property is admissible to show Ashland’s negligence,
notwithstanding the fact that Ashland engaged in the conduct to
remediate a condition that it created on another property.
Consequently, the trial court erred by excluding the videotape
as evidence of a remedial activity.
- 27 -
However, the trial court also relied on KRE 403,
holding that the prejudicial nature of the videotape outweighs
its probative value.
We agree.
There was other evidence which
would suggest that the water which Ashland was pumping into the
creek was contaminated with NORM.
But there was no evidence to
indicate the levels of NORM in the water.
At the evidentiary
hearing, the appellants’ counsel suggested that “a fraction” of
the NORM in this water could have been deposited on Murl
Wright’s property.
But there was no evidence offered that these
actions by Ashland actually deposited any significant amount of
NORM on the property.
Therefore, while the videotape may have
some limited relevance to prove negligence on the part of
Ashland, the unfair prejudicial effect of the video far
outweighs any probative value it may have.
Just as we conclude that the trial court’s evidentiary
rulings were within its reasonable discretion, we also find that
the trial court’s jury instructions generally complied with the
applicable law.
While the trial court did not separately
instruct the jury on the applicable elements of trespass and
nuisance, it specifically directed the jury to determine whether
Ashland “failed to exercise ordinary care in its oil production
operations … and that such conduct was a substantial factor in
causing NORM to be deposited in above-background levels” on the
appellants’ properties. (Emphasis in original).
- 28 -
The court
separately instructed the jury to determine from the evidence
whether “there is a basis in reason and experience for a fear of
the NORM above-background readings” found on the appellants’
properties.
This second instruction adequately covers the
injury element required to prove trespass and the “unreasonable
and substantial interference with the use and enjoyment of
property” element necessary to prove nuisance.
Furthermore,
since the appellants could not prove actual harm to their
properties, they were not prejudiced by the trial court’s
failure to include instructions for either nominal or punitive
damages.
Trial-Related Issues
The appellants also complain about a number of issues
related to the trial court’s conduct during trial.
They cite to
specific rulings and comments during trial which they allege
demonstrate that the trial court was biased against them and in
favor of Ashland.
A close review of the record, however,
supports all of these rulings and dispels any suggestion of
favoritism.
At several points during the course of the trial, the
court expressed frustration to appellants’ counsel for
revisiting issues upon which the court had already ruled.
But
the court made these comments to the appellants’ counsel outside
- 29 -
of the presence of the jury.
Moreover, when considered in
context, the comments are not of a character which would raise
serious concerns about the trial judge’s fairness or
impartiality.33
In fact, when the issue of bias was raised, the
court tried to assure all parties that its evidentiary rulings
were neither slanted in favor of one party nor would its rulings
be influenced by allegations of bias.34
We also disagree with the appellants that the trial
court showed favoritism toward Ashland by considering Daubert
challenges to witnesses after its previously-imposed deadline
had passed.
Rather, the court questioned several of the
appellants’ witnesses to determine the admissibility of the
witnesses’ testimony based upon its prior evidentiary rulings.
Furthermore, the court engaged in this process outside of the
presence of the jury.
Likewise, the trial court’s apparently
sua sponte evidentiary rulings actually involved continuing
issues related to the admissibility of witness testimony.
We
find no abuse of discretion.
The appellants next argue that the trial court
improperly struck a portion of their opening statement.
During
the opening statement, the Cantrells’ counsel informed the jury
33
Foster v. Commonwealth, 348 S.W.2d 759, 760 (Ky. 1961).
also Johnson v. Ducobu, 258 S.W.2d 509 (Ky. 1953).
34
Trial Transcript, V. 16, pp. 2132-34.
- 30 -
See
that the evidence would show that Ashland breached its internal
standards of conduct in its oil production methods.
The
Cantrells’ counsel then added,
Well, what I think you will hear that there
is a standard of conduct that this Defendant
incorporated internally. When you compare
what they did with what they said, they
didn’t live up to that standard of conduct.
You know, we can look for standards
anywhere. My faith teaches me that we’re
supposed to do unto others … [Interjection
by court omitted] … I think you will find
those standards where you commonly expect to
find them. You have to ask yourself if this
Defendant was being a good corporate
neighbor. Was it treating its neighbors as
Ashland would wish to be treated? I think
that at the end of the day, it did not.35
At this point, Ashland objected, arguing that this was
an improper “golden rule” argument.
A "golden rule" argument is
one in which the counsel asks the jurors to imagine themselves
or someone they care about in the position of the plaintiff.36
The trial court correctly noted that the appellant’s argument
was not precisely a golden-rule argument.
But the Cantrells’
counsel admitted that “the argument is not that this jury should
treat this Plaintiff as its neighbor.
The argument is that the
Defendant should treat Mr. Cantrell as its neighbor”.37
35
Trial Transcript V. 5, pp. 569-70.
36
Caudill v. Commonwealth, 120 S.W.3d 635, 675 (Ky. 2003),
citing Black's Law Dictionary 700 (7th ed. West 1999).
37
Trial Transcript V. 5, p. 572.
- 31 -
Since opening statements and closing arguments are not
evidence, courts have traditionally allowed counsel wide
latitude in both.38
But that latitude is not unlimited.
We
agree with the trial court that this argument tended to confuse
the jury regarding the standard under which Ashland’s conduct
was to be judged.
Under the circumstances, the trial court did
not abuse its discretion by directing the jury to disregard the
argument.
The appellants complain that the trial court
unreasonably dictated their order of proof, thus preventing them
from presenting a comprehensible narrative to the jury.
However, KRE 611(a) requires that the trial court “shall
exercise reasonable control over the mode and order of
interrogating witnesses and presenting evidence so as to:
(1)
Make the interrogation and presentation effective for the
ascertainment of the truth;
time;
(2) Avoid needless consumption of
and (3) Protect witnesses from harassment or undue
embarrassment.”
The trial court is vested with broad discretion
to deal with problems and situations associated with the
production of evidence, and the court’s discretion will not be
38
Slaughter v. Commonwealth, 744 S.W.2d 407 (Ky. 1987).
- 32 -
disturbed except for abuse.39
We find no abuse of discretion in
this case.
Conclusion
In conclusion, we find that the appellants are not
entitled to a new trial based on any of the issues raised in
this appeal.
The appellants were aware for more than five years
prior to bringing this action of the contamination of their
ground water and the surface contamination by non-radioactive
substances.
Therefore, these claims were untimely.
The appellants timely brought their claims alleging
that Ashland’s oil-production activities contaminated their
properties with above-background levels of NORM.
The appellants
proved that Ashland’s negligence caused the contamination, but
they failed to prove that the above-background levels of NORM
caused any actual and present injury to their properties.
Consequently, the trial court acted within its discretion by
excluding testimony which was not probative of this issue.
Furthermore, we find that the trial court afforded the
appellants with a fundamentally fair trial.
We find no evidence
supporting the appellants’ assertions that the trial court was
39
Disabled American Veterans, Dept. of Kentucky, Inc. v. Crabb,
182 S.W.3d 541, 550-51 (Ky.App. 2005), citing Robert G. Lawson,
The Kentucky Evidence Law Handbook, § 3.20[2], 238 (4th ed.
2003).
- 33 -
biased against them.
The trial court reasonably exercised its
discretion in the conduct of the trial and took no action that
was unfairly prejudicial to the appellants’ case.
We also
conclude that the instructions given to the jury were generally
consistent with the applicable law and that the jury’s verdict
was supported by substantial evidence.
Finally, because we are
upholding the jury verdict in Ashland’s favor, we need not
determine whether Ashland was entitled to a summary judgment or
a directed verdict on the appellants’ claims.
Accordingly, the judgment of the Johnson Circuit Court
dismissing the appellants’ claims is AFFIRMED.
Ashland’s cross-
appeal from the trial court’s denial of their motions for
summary judgment and for a directed verdict is DISMISSED AS
MOOT.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the appellants’ motion for
this Court to take judicial notice of the BEIR VII report is
DENIED, and Ashland’s motion to strike the BEIR VII report
included as an exhibit to the appellants’ reply brief is
GRANTED.
ALL CONCUR.
ENTERED: September 15, 2006___
/s/ Wm. L. Knopf________________
SENIOR JUDGE, COURT OF APPEALS
- 34 -
BRIEF FOR APPELLANTS/CROSSAPPELLEES:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEES/CROSSAPPELLANTS:
Joseph Lane
Ned Pillersdorf
Pillersdorf, Derossett & Lane
Prestonsburg, Kentucky
Phillip D. Scott
Anne A. Chesnut
Brian M. Johnson
Greenbaum, Doll & McDonald,
PLLC
Lexington, Kentucky
Broadus Spivey
Price Ainsworth
Austin, Texas
Charles Cunningham
Charles E. Fell, Jr.
Cunningham & Fell, PLLC
Louisville, Kentucky
Michael J. Schmitt
Porter, Schmitt, Jones &
Banks, LLP
Paintsville, Kentucky
George Chandler
Kirk Matthis
Chandler Law Office
Lufkin, Texas
Michael Endicott
Paintsville, Kentucky
Darrin Walker
Kingwood, Texas
- 35 -
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