JOHN DOUGLAS HUBBARD AND JEFFREY BRETT DAVIDSON, EXECUTORS OF THE ESTATE OF JERE BARTON DAVIDSON, SR.; AND LYSTRA REVISITED, LLC v. TALBOTT TAVERN, INC. and JOHN DOUGLAS HUBBARD AND JEFFREY BRETT DAVIDSON, EXECUTORS OF THE ESTATE OF JERE BARTON DAVIDSON, SR. v. TALBOTT TAVERN, INC.
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RENDERED: July 28, 2006; 2:00 P.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2003-CA-001468-MR
AND
NO. 2003-CA-001543-MR
JOHN DOUGLAS HUBBARD AND
JEFFREY BRETT DAVIDSON,
EXECUTORS OF THE ESTATE
OF JERE BARTON DAVIDSON, SR.;
AND LYSTRA REVISITED, LLC
v.
APPELLANTS/CROSS-APPELLEES
APPEALS FROM NELSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE LARRY D. RAIKES, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 01-CI-00527
TALBOTT TAVERN, INC.
AND:
APPELLEE/CROSS-APPELLANT
NO. 2004-CA-002184-MR
JOHN DOUGLAS HUBBARD AND
JEFFREY BRETT DAVIDSON,
EXECUTORS OF THE ESTATE
OF JERE BARTON DAVIDSON, SR.
v.
APPELLANTS
APPEAL FROM NELSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE LARRY D. RAIKES, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 01-CI-00527
TALBOTT TAVERN, INC.
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING APPEAL NO. 2003-CA-001468-MR;
AFFIRMING CROSS-APPEAL NO. 2003-CA-001543-MR;
AND AFFIRMING APPEAL NO. 2004-CA-002184-MR
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
JOHNSON AND TAYLOR, JUDGES; HUDDLESTON,1 SENIOR JUDGE.
TAYLOR, JUDGE:
John Douglas Hubbard, Executor of the Estate of
Jere Barton Davidson, Sr. and Lystra Revisited, LLC (Lystra)
bring Appeal No. 2003-CA-001468-MR from a June 13, 2003,
judgment of the Nelson Circuit Court; Talbott Tavern, Inc.
(Talbott Tavern) brings Cross-Appeal No. 2003-CA-001543-MR from
the same June 13, 2003, judgment of the Nelson Circuit Court;
and John Douglas Hubbard, Executor of the Estate of Jere Barton
Davidson, Sr. brings Appeal No. 2004-CA-002184-MR from a October
4, 2004, order of the Nelson Circuit Court.
These appeals stem
from a contract between the parties for the purchase of Talbott
Tavern.
We affirm Appeal No. 2003-CA-001468-MR, affirm Cross-
Appeal No. 2003-CA-001543-MR, and affirm Appeal No. 2004-CA002184-MR.
In June 2001, Lystra entered into a contract with
Talbott Tavern to purchase business and real property located in
Nelson County known as the Talbott Tavern and the McClean House
1
Senior Judge Joseph R. Huddleston sitting as Special Judge by assignment of
the Chief Justice pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution
and Kentucky Revised Statutes 21.580.
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for $2,100,000.00.
Jere Barton Davidson, Sr. (Davidson)
executed the agreement as a guarantor for the partial payment on
the purchase price due at closing in the amount of $900,000.00.2
A closing date was scheduled for September 19, 2001.
Apparently, neither Davidson nor any representative of Lystra
appeared at the closing; thus, a closing never took place.
Talbott Tavern subsequently filed a complaint in the
Nelson Circuit Court on October 12, 2001, alleging breach of
contract against Lystra and Davidson.
Talbott Tavern filed a
motion for summary judgment upon the issue of liability.
On
August 14, 2002, the circuit court entered an interlocutory
summary judgment.
Therein, the court concluded that Lystra and
Davidson were liable for breaching the contract to purchase
Talbott Tavern and the McLean House.
The court reserved the
issue of damages for later adjudication.
After a hearing upon the issue of damages, the circuit
court entered final judgment on June 13, 2003 (June 13, 2003,
final judgment).
The circuit court determined that specific
performance of the contract was not warranted and, instead,
ordered damages to be paid to Talbott Tavern in the amount of
$405,000.00, representing the difference between the value of
the properties on the date of the breach (September 19, 2001)
and the contract price of $2,100,000.00.
2
The court rejected
Jere Barton Davidson, Sr. (Davidson) also executed the contract on behalf of
Lystra Revisited, LLC (Lystra) as its organizer.
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Talbott Tavern’s damage claim for operating losses in the amount
of $194,858.19.
The record indicates that neither Lystra, Davidson,
nor Talbott Tavern filed a Ky. R. Civ. P. (CR) 59 motion to
alter, amend, or vacate the final judgment.
Rather, on July 11,
2003, Davidson and Lystra filed a notice of appeal from the June
13, 2003, final judgment (Appeal No. 2003-CA-001468-MR), and on
July 23, 2003, Talbott Tavern filed a notice of cross-appeal
from the June 13, 2003, final judgment (Cross-Appeal No. 2003CA-001543-MR).
While the appeal and cross-appeal were pending in the
Court of Appeals, Talbott Tavern proceeded to satisfy the
judgment.
Neither Davidson nor Lystra superseded the judgment.
By order entered April 5, 2004 (April 5, 2004, order), the
circuit court assigned to Talbott Tavern “Davidson’s membership
interests in Parnassus Farms, LLC, Atheneaum Productions, LLC,
and Parnassus Air, LLC.”
The order also stated that Davidson
“shall disassociate from Parnassus Farms, LLC, Atheneaum
Productions, LLC, and Parnassus Air, LLC, and he shall cease
being a member of all three companies.”
This order included CR
54.02 language.
On April 14, 2004, Davidson filed a CR 59 motion to
alter, amend, or vacate the April 5, 2004, order.
While the CR
59 motion was pending, Davidson also filed a CR 60.02 motion to
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amend the June 13, 2003, final judgment.
By order entered
October 4, 2004, the circuit court denied the CR 60.02 motion to
vacate the June 13, 2003, final judgment and also denied the CR
59 motion to amend the April 5, 2004, order.3
John Douglas Hubbard and Jeffrey Brett Davidson, as
the executors of the estate of Jere Barton Davidson, Sr.
(collectively referred to as the Estate), filed a notice of
appeal from the October 4, 2004, order (Appeal No. 2004-CA002184-MR), on October 20, 2004.
Appeal Nos. 2003-CA-001468-MR
and 2004-CA-002184-MR
Davidson and Lystra originally filed Appeal No.
2003-CA-001468-MR from the June 13, 2003, final judgment.4
final judgment adjudicated liability and damages.
The
The Estate
then filed Appeal No. 2004-CA-002184-MR from the October 4,
2004, order.
This order denied a CR 60.02 motion to amend the
June 13, 2003, final judgment and denied a CR 59 motion to alter
the April 5, 2004, order.
The April 5, 2004, order “assigned”
certain assets to Talbott Tavern.
3
On May 29, 2004, Davidson passed away during the pendency of the action. By
order entered September 24, 2004, the circuit court revived the action in the
name of the executors of his estate, John Douglas Hubbard and Jeffrey Brett
Davidson.
4
Upon the death of Davidson, this Court granted a motion to substitute John
Douglas Hubbard and Jeffrey Brett Davidson, as executors of the estate of
Davidson as appellants in Appeal No. 2003-CA-001468-MR.
-5-
By order entered February 11, 2005, this Court
consolidated Appeal Nos. 2003-CA-001468-MR and 2004-CA-002184MR.
The Estate and Lystra (hereinafter collectively referred to
as appellants) then filed a consolidated brief for these
appeals.
In the brief, appellants framed the issues for our
review as follows:
A. Impossibility and CR 60.02
1.
Whether impossibility is a defense to a
contract when there is a failure of
financing and if so, whether Davidson
was personally responsible as a
guarantor of Lystra Revisited, LLC
(Lystra), the second party in the
purchase of Talbott Tavern.
2.
Whether Davidson was responsible for
the entire damage amount of
$414,040.00. If he were liable, how
much would he owe?
B. Motion to Amend, Alter, and Vacate
1.
Whether the plaintiff is a successor in
interest to Davidson’s interest in
Parnassus Farms, LLC, Atheneaum
Productions, LLC, and Parnassus Air,
LLC.
2.
Whether KRS 275.280 is relevant to the
case at bar and operates to
disassociate Davidson from and cause
him to cease being a member of the
LLCs.
Appellants’ Brief at 2.
We shall initially address appellants’ arguments
relating to the denial of the CR 60.02 motion to vacate the June
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13, 2003, final judgment and, then, address appellants’
arguments relating to denial of the CR 59 motion to vacate the
April 5, 2004, order.
It is well-established that a movant must make a
substantial showing to be entitled to extraordinary relief under
CR 60.02.
Ringo v. Commonwealth, 455 S.W.2d 49 (Ky. 1970);
Wilson v. Commonwealth, 403 S.W.2d 710 (Ky. 1966).
not a substitute for a direct appeal.
CR 60.02 is
Rather, a CR 60.02 motion
is only available to raise allegations of error that could not
have been raised by direct appeal.
Gross v. Commonwealth, 648
S.W.2d 853 (Ky. 1983); Wimsatt v. Haydon Oil Co., 414 S.W.2d 908
(Ky. 1967).
The issues advanced by appellants are substantive and
attack the finding of liability made in the June 13, 2003, final
judgment.
Appellants argue the circuit court erred by finding
that Davidson breached the contract and specifically argues the
defense of impossibility of performance.
Appellants also
maintain that Davidson was not personally liable for the “entire
Judgment amount” of $414,040.00.
However, appellants fail to
explain why these issues were not or could not have been raised
on direct appeal of the June 13, 2003, final judgment.
These
issues do not involve the discovery of new facts, falsified
evidence, or fraud, as required under CR 60.02.
Simply put, the
legal issues presented by appellants could have easily been
-7-
advanced on direct appeal.
As the above two issues should have
been raised on direct appeal of the June 13, 2003, final
judgment, we must treat that appeal as having been abandoned
and, thus, decline to reach the merits of these issues in the
appeal of the CR 60.02 proceeding.
Accordingly, there being
insufficient grounds presented to warrant relief, the trial
court did not abuse its discretion in denying the CR 60.02
motion to modify the June 13, 2003, judgment.
Notwithstanding appellants’ failure to properly
preserve the issue of impossibility of performance for review on
direct appeal of the June 13, 2003, final judgment, we note that
appellants raised the issue of impossibility of performance in
their answer to the complaint, in their trial brief filed prior
to the entry of the June 13, 2003, final judgment, and in their
prehearing statement filed in Appeal No. 2003-CA-001468-MR.
Accordingly, while appellants failed to properly present this
argument on direct appeal, we will nonetheless address the issue
as if it were properly before the Court at this time.5
Appellants argue that they could not perform under the
contract as a result of the tragic events of September 11, 2001,
5
The issue of whether Davidson is personally responsible as a guarantor of
Lystra for the entire judgment indebtedness was not raised by appellants
prior to entry of the June 13, 2003, final judgment and thus will not be
addressed by this Court in Appeal No. 2003-CA-001468-MR. Additionally, as
noted, the issue likewise will not be addressed in Appeal No. 2003-CA-002184MR as concern appellants’ Ky. R. Civ. P. 60.02 motion for the reasons
previously stated in this opinion.
-8-
which resulted in appellants’ investors being “scared to take
any chances with their money, and they backed out of the deal.”
Appellants’ Brief at 4.
Essentially, appellants could not close
on the date agreed due to their lack of financing to go forward
with the deal.
Appellants characterize these events as a
“supervening impossibility” which was unforeseen and otherwise
not the fault of appellants.
Appellants further argue they can
rely on this doctrine of impossibility by showing that they were
initially able to perform the contract but that the
circumstances of September 11, 2001, were beyond their control
and changed the parameters of the agreement such that it was
commercially impractical to perform thereunder.
As a general rule, the impossibility necessary to
excuse the performance of a contract must look to the nature of
the thing to be done and not the inability or incapacity of the
promisor or obligor to do it.
(1999).
17B C.J.S. Contracts § 522
Impossibilities that arise from the inability of a
promisor to perform an act do not discharge any duties created
by the contract.
Raisor v. Jackson, 225 S.W.2d 657 (Ky. 1950).
In this case, the subject matter of the contract was
not directly affected by the unfortunate events of September 11,
2001.
The impossibility of performance alleged as a defense by
appellants looks to the performance of third parties, that being
the investors who apparently were financing the transaction for
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appellants.
In Raisor, our highest Court has specifically
addressed circumstances surrounding the actions of third parties
regarding the impossibility of performance of a contract as
follows:
[T]he inability to control the actions of a
third person, whose co-operation is needed
for the performance of an undertaking, is
ordinarily not to be regarded as an
impossibility avoiding the obligation. One
who engages for the act of a stranger must
procure the act to be done, and the refusal
of the stranger without the interference of
the other party to the contract is no
excuse. The performance of an absolute
promise is not excused by the fact that a
third person refuses or fails to take action
essential to performance.
Id. at 659 (citation omitted).
The refusal of the investors to go forward with the
transaction on behalf of appellants did not render appellants’
performance of the contract impossible to achieve.
Two obvious
factors that defeat appellants’ argument stand out.
First, we
note that the performance of the contract was not expressly
conditioned upon appellants obtaining financing from a specific
investor.
The contract makes no mention of any third party
financing requirement or condition.
Second, there is absolutely
no evidence in the record that the investors were disabled or
otherwise unable to perform as a result of the events of
September 11, 2001, other than the investors being “scared” as
alleged by appellants.
Of course, had the Talbott Tavern
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facility been destroyed during the events of September 11, 2001,
then appellants could have validly raised the defense of
impossibility since Talbott Tavern could not have performed at
the time of closing due to the subject matter of the contract
having been destroyed.
Unfortunately for appellants, we are not
presented with that scenario.
Finally, in review of the contract between the
parties, we note that there is no force majeure clause.
This
type of clause is traditionally used in contracts to allocate
the risks between the parties if performance becomes impossible
or impractical as a result of some event that the parties did
not anticipate or otherwise could not have controlled.
For
example, force majeure clauses often excuse performance for
certain acts of nature, such as floods and acts of individuals,
such as strikes or wars.
Under the facts of this case, without
such a clause being set forth in the agreement, there exists no
legal basis to excuse the performance of appellants under the
contract.6
For these reasons, appellants’ arguments that
performance should have been excused under the doctrine of
impossibility are simply without merit.
6
Upon close examination of the contract, appellants were only obligated to
pay $900,000.00 at the closing, while the remaining purchase price of
$1,400,000.00 was being financed by Talbott Tavern over a five year period.
This alone diminishes the impossibility argument since the entire purchase
price was not due at closing.
-11-
We shall next address appellants’ arguments under the
title “Motion to Amend, Alter, and Vacate.”
Davidson filed a CR
59 motion to amend the April 5, 2004, order.
In this order, the
court held, in relevant part:
1.
That pursuant to KRS 275.260,
Davidson’s membership interest in Parnassus
Farms, LLC shall be and it is hereby
judicially assigned to the plaintiff,
subject to any interest of Beverly Brady,
until this Court’s judgment of June 13,
2003, has been satisfied.
2.
That pursuant to KRS 275.260,
Davidson’s membership interest in Atheneaum
Productions, LLC shall be and it is hereby
judicially assigned to the plaintiff,
subject to any interest of Elaine Zinser and
Sasha, LLC, until this Court’s judgment of
June 13, 2003, has been satisfied.
3.
That pursuant to KRS 275.260,
Davidson’s membership interest in Parnassus
Air, LLC shall be and it is hereby
judicially assigned to the plaintiff, until
this Court’s judgment of June 13, 2003, has
been satisfied.
4.
The plaintiff shall be entitled to
sell the above assignments so long as the
sales are conducted in a commercially
reasonable manner.
5.
That pursuant to KRS
275.280(1)(d), Davidson shall disassociate
from Parnassus Farms, LLC, Atheneaum
Productions, LLC, and Parnassus Air, LLC,
and he shall cease being a member of all
three companies.
Appellants initially argue that Talbott Tavern “is not
a successor in interest to Davidson’s interest in Parnassus
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Farms, LLC, Atheneaum Productions, LLC, and Parnassus Air, LLC.”
Specifically, appellants maintains the circuit court erred by
ordering Davidson to disassociate himself and to cease being a
member of the limited liability corporations.
Appellants also
question the applicability of KRS 275.280(1)(d).
The record discloses that Davidson filed a petition in
bankruptcy on September 12, 2003.
Under KRS 275.280(1)(d), a
person becomes legally disassociated with a limited liability
company and ceases to be a member upon the filing of a petition
in bankruptcy.
Moreover, under KRS 275.280(1)(f), a person is
also disassociated upon death.
Thus, under either KRS
275.280(1)(d) or (1)(f), Davidson is no longer a member of the
limited liability corporations.
As such, we do not reach the
issue of whether Davidson was properly disassociated from
membership under KRS 275.280(1)(d) because of an assignment to
creditors.7
7
We also do not reach any issues concerning the nature of Davidson’s interest
in the limited liability corporations upon his death. The issues revolving
around the interests Davidson held at his death were not raised before the
circuit court and are not properly before this Court.
-13-
Cross-Appeal No. 2003-CA-001543-MR
Talbott Tavern claims the circuit court erred by
failing to award damages for operating losses in the amount of
$194,858.19.8
Specifically, Talbott Tavern argues:
Had the defendants performed their
obligations under the contract, the
plaintiff would not have lost an additional
dollar after the closing. As a direct
result of the defendant’s failure to close,
the plaintiff lost an additional $194,858.19
that it would not have lost but for the
defendant’s failure to close. Accordingly,
to place the plaintiff in the position it
would have been in had the defendants
performed, the Court must award the
additional operating losses incurred after
the breach.
Talbott Tavern’s Brief at 14.
The circuit court rejected
Talbott Tavern’s claim for operating losses and stated:
As to the balance of the $194,858.19
claim of Talbott Tavern, it must be rejected
for the simple reason that Plaintiff was
losing business prior to September 19, 2001,
and although its co-owner, John S. Kelley
Jr. testified that the losses were greater
subsequent to September 19, 2001 than they
were prior to that date, the Court has no
pre-September 19, 2001 loss figures to
compare those presented for the postSeptember 19, 2001 time frame. In other
words, the Court would have to indulge in
rank speculation to assign a operations
damage loss figure attributable to
Davidson’s breach of the subject contract.
It is well-established that damages for lost profits must be
proved with reasonable certainty.
8
Caney Creek Co. v. Ellis, 437
The circuit court did award Talbott Tavern, Inc. $9,040.00, which
represented expenses associated with efforts to sell the property.
-14-
S.W.2d 745, (Ky. 1969).
Upon a review of the record, we are
compelled to agree with the circuit court that evidence
supporting lost profits was too speculative.
Thus, we do not
believe the circuit court erred by failing to award damages for
lost profits.
For the foregoing reasons, Appeal No. 2003-CA-001468MR is affirmed, Cross-Appeal No. 2003-CA-001543-MR is affirmed,
and Appeal No. 2004-CA-002184-MR is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANTS/
CROSS-APPELLEES:
BRIEF AND ORAL ARGUMENT FOR
APPELLEE/CROSS-APPELLANT:
Donald M. Heavrin
Chris C. Hodge
Louisville, Kentucky
Matthew Hite
Bardstown, Kentucky
ORAL ARGUMENT FOR APPELLANTS/
CROSS-APPELLEES:
Donald M. Heavrin
Louisville, Kentucky
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