MATTHEW L. DARPEL, EXECUTOR OF THE ESTATE OF PATTI BYRL STEFFEN v. JEFFREY C. ARNZEN, EXECUTOR OF THE ESTATE OF ANTHONY P. STEFFEN
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RENDERED:
JANUARY 6, 2006, 10:00
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
A.M.
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO. 2003-CA-001411-MR
MATTHEW L. DARPEL,
EXECUTOR OF THE ESTATE
OF PATTI BYRL STEFFEN
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM CAMPBELL CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE WILLIAM J. WEHR, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 00-CI-00359
v.
JEFFREY C. ARNZEN,
EXECUTOR OF THE ESTATE
OF ANTHONY P. STEFFEN
APPELLEE
OPINION AND ORDER
(1) AFFIRMING
(2) DENYING MOTION TO DISMISS
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
BARBER, HENRY, AND KNOPF, JUDGES.
KNOPF, JUDGE:
Matthew L. Darpel, executor of the estate of
Patti Byrl Steffen (Byrl) appeals from a judgment of the
Campbell Circuit Court ordering partition of real property owned
by Byrl and her husband Anthony Phillip Steffen.
Byrl’s estate
argues that the trial court’s entry of a dissolution decree nunc
pro tunc could not affect her right to the entire property which
accrued upon Anthony’s death, prior to entry of the decree.
While we agree with Byrl’s estate, we must conclude that the
procedural posture of this case precludes granting any effective
remedy.
Hence, we affirm the circuit court’s judgment.
Byrl and Anthony Steffen were married in 1941 and
separated on August 17, 1998.
During the marriage, Byrl and
Anthony acquired several tracts of real property.
This case
concerns a tract located on Murnan Road in Cold Spring,
Kentucky, and which was the site of the marital residence.
Byrl filed a petition for dissolution of the marriage
on April 28, 1999. 1
She also filed a separate petition for legal
separation on March 17, 2000. 2
On March 22, 2000, the circuit
court in the dissolution action entered an order reserving a
ruling on Anthony’s motion to enter a final decree, stating that
it would rule on the motion after the domestic relations
commissioner heard evidence and reported findings to the court.
The circuit court added that, if necessary, it would enter a
decree nunc pro tunc effective as of March 17, 2000.
1
Action No. 99-CI-00483.
2
Action No. 00-CI-00335.
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On March 21, 2000, Anthony filed a separate action 3
requesting partition of the marital realty pursuant to KRS
381.135 and KRS 389A.030.
However, Anthony died on April 2,
2000, before the partition complaint was served on Byrl.
Anthony’s estate was substituted as a party to the partition
action on June 6, 2000.
On November 14, 2000, Byrl filed a motion to dismiss
the partition action, arguing that title to the marital property
vested automatically to her upon Anthony’s death.
Susan
Pearman, the residual beneficiary under Anthony’s will,
intervened, asserting an interest in the real property.
The matters raised in the partition action and the
dissolution action were heard together by the trial court.
Following unsuccessful attempts at mediation, Byrl renewed her
motion to dismiss both actions.
On May 8, 2002, the circuit
court entered a consolidated order covering both the partition
and the dissolution actions.
The court determined that it was appropriate to enter
a dissolution decree nunc pro tunc as of March 17, 2000.
The
court separately entered the decree in the dissolution action.
In the partition action, the circuit court determined that the
survivorship aspect of the title was terminated retroactively to
3
Action No. 00-CI-00359.
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the date of the decree.
Accordingly, the circuit court ordered
the real property to be sold and the proceeds divided equally.
Byrl died on July 29, 2002.
Thereafter, her estate was
substituted as a party to this action.
On July 5, 2003, the
circuit court entered an order declaring its May 8, 2002, order
to be final and appealable with respect to the partition action.
Byrl’s estate now brings this appeal.
As an initial matter, we question the circuit court’s
entry of a nunc pro tunc decree in the dissolution action.
The
circuit court had the inherent authority to enter the
dissolution decree nunc pro tunc. 4
However, the purpose of the
nunc pro tunc rule is to record some act of the court done at a
former time which was not carried into the record.
The power of
the court to make such entries is restricted to placing into the
record evidence of judicial action which has been actually
taken.
It may be used to make the record speak the truth, but
not to make it speak what it did not speak but ought to have
spoken.
Hence, a court in entering a judgment nunc pro tunc has
no power to construe what the judgment means, but only to enter
of record such judgment as had been formerly rendered, but which
had not been entered of record as rendered. 5
4
Muncie v. Muncie, 303 S.W.2d 257, 258 (Ky. 1957).
5
Carroll v. Carroll, 338 S.W.2d 694 (Ky. 1960). See also Powell
v. Blevins, 365 S.W.2d 104, 106 (Ky. 1963); James v. Hillerich &
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Furthermore, the nunc pro tunc rule cannot be used to
make an order that it might or should have made. 6
In its March
22, 2000, order, the circuit court expressly declined to enter a
decree at that time because the necessary proof had not been
taken.
While the circuit court could have, and perhaps should
have entered a decree at that time, it failed to take any action
to enter a decree prior to Anthony’s death.
The nunc pro tunc
rule did not allow the court to correct that omission after his
death.
Nevertheless, the circuit court’s decision to enter
the decree nunc pro tunc is not before the Court in this appeal. 7
The issue before the Court concerns the collateral effect of
that decree in the partition action.
A nunc pro tunc judgment
entered after the death of a party relates back to a day during
Bradsby Co., 299 S.W.2d 92, 94 (Ky. 1956); Benton v. King, 199
Ky. 307, 250 S.W. 1002, 1003 (Ky. 1923).
6
Hankins v. Hankins' Adm'r, 173 Ky. 475, 191 S.W. 258 (1917).
7
Apparently, Anthony’s estate was never substituted as a party
in the dissolution action. Consequently, when Byrl’s estate
attempted to appeal from the dissolution decree, this Court
dismissed the appeal for failure to name a necessary party.
Matthew L. Darpel, Executor of the Estate of Patti Byrl Steffen
v. Anthony P. Steffen, No. 2002-CA-001853-MR (Order Dismissing
Appeal September 23, 2003). By the same reasoning, however, it
would seem that there was no adversarial party before the
circuit court when it actually entered the decree.
Nevertheless, a judgment granting dissolution of marriage is not
appealable or subject to appellate jurisdiction. KRS
22A.020(3); Clements v. Harris, 89 S.W.3d 403, 404 (Ky. 2002).
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the term when the party was alive. 8
Anthony’s estate argues, and
the circuit court agreed that the nunc pro tunc decree operated
to terminate the survivorship aspect of the parties’ deed prior
to Anthony’s death. 9
Furthermore, Anthony’s estate asserts that,
since the dissolution judgment is now final, Patti’s estate is
now precluded from challenging it in the appeal from the
partition action.
However, a nunc pro tunc decree cannot alter the
vested rights of innocent persons. 10
Anthony and Byrl owned the
Murnan Road property as tenants by the entirety, meaning they
each owned the property by the undivided whole.
A
distinguishing feature of a tenancy by the entirety is that the
survivor takes the entire estate at the death of the deceased
co-tenant not by virtue of that death, but because, in law, each
was viewed to own the entire estate from the time of its
creation. 11
Since Byrl took possession of the entire estate
immediately upon Anthony’s death, the nunc pro tunc decree could
8
46 Am. Jur. Judgments §§ 115, 120 (pp. 465, 466) (1994 & 2005
Supp.).
9
See Nelson v. Mahurin, 994 S.W.2d 10 (Ky.App. 1998), holding
that dissolution of marriage terminates the survivorship right
to the entire estate. Id. at 14-15.
10
Benton v. King, 199 Ky. 307, 250 S.W. 1002, 1004 (Ky. 1923).
11
Sanderson v. Saxon, 834 S.W.2d 676, 678 (Ky. 1992).
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not operate to divest an interest that had already passed to
her.
Furthermore, the partition action did not remain
viable following Anthony’s death.
KRS 389A.130(5) provides that
“[t]he death of any party pending the [partition] action and
prior to distribution of the proceeds of sale or setting apart a
divisible share shall not affect the action but the court may
direct distribution or apportionment to the successors in
interest of the decedent upon application therefore.”However,
this statute does not apply to “tenants by the entirety in
residential property actually occupied by them as a principal
residence.” 12
Although Byrl moved out of the Murnan Road
residence in 1999, the property retained its character as a
marital residence until Anthony’s death.
And since the entire
estate passed to Byrl automatically, there was no interest
remaining for the court to partition.
The difficulty in this case concerns the appropriate
remedy.
Even if this Court holds that the partition action
should have been dismissed, the dissolution judgment is now
final.
Consequently, our holding in this case cannot affect the
property division in that action or in the separation action.
The Murnan Road property has already been sold and the assets
12
KRS 389A.030(1).
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distributed.
Despite the circuit court’s error in construing
the legal effect of its nunc pro tunc dissolution decree, the
procedural posture of this case precludes granting any relief to
Byrl’s estate.
judgment.
Therefore, we must affirm the circuit court’s
As we are affirming the trial court’s judgment,
Anthony’s estate’s motion to dismiss this appeal is now moot.
Accordingly, the judgment of the Campbell Circuit
Court is affirmed.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the motion by Jeffrey C.
Arnzen, Executor of the estate of Anthony P. Steffen, to dismiss
this appeal is DENIED AS MOOT.
ALL CONCUR.
January 6, 2006____
ENTERED:
__/s/ Wm. L. Knopf_________
JUDGE, COURT OF APPEALS
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Matthew L. Darpel
Ft. Mitchell, Kentucky
Jeffrey C. Arnzen
Covington, Kentucky
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