MICHELLE THOMAS, ADMINISTRATRIX OF THE ESTATE OF MARK J. THOMAS, JR. v. GRANGE MUTUAL CASUALTY COMPANY
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RENDERED: JUNE 4, 2004; 2:00 p.m.
MODIFIED: JULY 30, 2004; 2:00 p.m.
ORDERED NOT PUBLISHED BY THE KENTUCKY SUPREME COURT:
MAY 11, 2005 (2004-SC-0611-D)
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2003-CA-000449-MR
AND
CROSS-APPEAL NO. 2003-CA-000505-MR
MICHELLE THOMAS, ADMINISTRATRIX
OF THE ESTATE OF
MARK J. THOMAS, JR.
v.
APPELLANT/CROSS-APPELLEE
APPEAL AND CROSS-APPEAL
FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE DENISE CLAYTON, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 01-CI-008589
GRANGE MUTUAL CASUALTY COMPANY
APPELLEE/CROSS-APPELLANT
OPINION
REVERSING AND REMANDING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
EMBERTON, CHIEF JUDGE;1 BUCKINGHAM AND VANMETER, JUDGES.
BUCKINGHAM, JUDGE: Michelle Thomas, administratrix of the estate
of Mark J. Thomas, Jr., appeals and Grange Mutual Casualty
1
Chief Judge Emberton concurred in this opinion prior to his retirement
effective June 2, 2004.
Company cross-appeals from a judgment of the Jefferson Circuit
Court in favor of Grange.
We reverse and remand.
On January 8, 2000, Daniella Dolson was operating an
automobile owned by her mother, Martha Dolson, in Louisville,
Kentucky, when she collided with a parked automobile owned by
Mark J. Thomas, Jr.
Because the Thomas automobile was not
occupied at the time of the accident, Daniella left a note
apologizing for the accident and requesting the owner to call
her.
Upon finding the note, Thomas’s daughter, Michelle Thomas,
the exclusive driver of the Thomas automobile, contacted the
Dolson residence and spoke with Daniella’s mother, Martha.
During their conversation, Martha told Michelle that the Dolsons
did not want a damage claim submitted to their insurance
company, Grange, and that her husband, James, would be
contacting Michelle in the near future in regard to obtaining an
estimate for the necessary repairs to her automobile.
On January 21, 2000, Michelle took her damaged
automobile to Hall’s Collision Center and obtained a repair
estimate in the amount of $1,502.14.
On January 24, 2000, at
the request of James Dolson, Michelle took her automobile to
Senn’s Body & Paint Shop and obtained a repair estimate in the
amount of $1,015.14.
After receiving these two repair
estimates, James informed Michelle that, in his opinion,
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Daniella had not caused all the damage listed on the repair
estimates.
Claiming that there was pre-existing damage to the
rear of the Thomas automobile, the Dolsons offered Michelle only
$300 to settle the matter.
She rejected the settlement offer
and, on April 10, 2000, she received a letter from the Dolsons’
attorney advising her that the $300 settlement offer had been
withdrawn.
Further, the letter requested information concerning
the nature and extent of any pre-existing damage to the
automobile.
Even though the Dolsons did not want the claim
submitted to their insurance company, on May 11, 2000, Michelle
filed a written claim with Grange and attached the Hall’s
Collision Center repair estimate of $1,502.14.
The matter was
referred to a claim supervisor, Millie Snyder.
According to the
records of Grange, Snyder received a call from James Dolson on
June 1, 2000, reaffirming to her that he did not want Grange
involved in the matter.
On the same day, Snyder wrote a letter
to Martha Dolson advising the Dolsons that Grange would close
its file at their request but that Martha Dolson would first
have to sign a “waiver of coverage” letter.
Martha signed the
letter and returned it to Grange on July 17, 2000.
Pursuant to
the “waiver of coverage” letter and the Dolsons’ request that
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Grange not be involved in the matter, Grange apparently
considered the matter closed.
On December 18, 2000, Michelle wrote Snyder a letter
and advised her that her attempts to resolve the matter with the
Dolsons had been unsuccessful.
She further demanded that Grange
immediately pay the amount of $1,502.14.
Further, Michelle
stated that a copy of her letter was being sent to the Kentucky
Department of Insurance.
Snyder replied to Michelle in a letter dated December
21, 2000.
She advised Michelle that Martha Dolson was
responsible for the outcome of the claim and that “we will not
be making payment to you on behalf of our insured Ms. Martha
Dolson.”
On January 5, 2001, the Kentucky Department of
Insurance sent Michelle a letter advising her that the matter
was “out of Grange’s hands” and that she would have to proceed
directly against Martha Dolson to get her money “because Grange
is no longer involved.”
The letter also stated that the
Kentucky Department of Insurance “cannot be involved.”
Thereafter, Michelle retained an attorney.
On January
9, 2001, the attorney sent a letter to Grange demanding payment
to Thomas in the amount of $1,502.14.
Snyder responded to the
attorney with a letter on January 22, 2001, advising him that
Grange would not be issuing payment to his client because “Ms.
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Dolson is considered to be self-insured for the alleged
accident.”
On October 11, 2001, Michelle’s attorney again wrote a
letter to Snyder advising her of numerous court decisions and
treatises which have held that agreements between an insurer and
an insured not to pay a claim, entered into after a property
damage loss has occurred, are not effective against innocent
third-party claimants.
On October 19, 2001, Snyder responded
with a letter to Michelle’s attorney advising him that Grange
was denying the claim based on the fact that Martha Dolson had
requested that Grange make no payments.
On December 14, 2001, Mark Thomas, Jr., Michelle’s
father and the owner of the automobile, filed a civil complaint
in the Jefferson Circuit Court against Daniella Dolson and
Grange.
The complaint asserted a property damage claim against
Dolson as well as a bad faith claim against Grange under the
Unfair Claims Settlement Practices Act.
See KRS2 304.12-230.3
On February 14, 2002, Grange’s attorney sent a letter
to Michelle’s attorney offering to settle the property claim
against Dolson for $1,258.64.
The offer was refused.
On March
6, 2002, Grange paid Mark Thomas, Jr., $1,502.14, the full
2
Kentucky Revised Statutes.
3
Thomas’s complaint alleged other causes of action against Dolson and Grange.
However, those claims by Thomas were apparently abandoned.
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amount of the highest repair estimate, to settle the claim
against Dolson.
An agreed order was entered dismissing that
claim and dismissing Dolson as a defendant.
Thomas’s claims
against Grange remained pending.
On June 11, 2002, Mark Thomas, Jr., died, and Michelle
was subsequently appointed as the administratrix of his estate.
The action against Grange was revived by Michelle by the filing
of an amended complaint pursuant to an order entered by the
circuit court on September 3, 2002.
The amended complaint set
forth the same claims alleged in the original complaint.
The trial of the case began on February 11, 2003.
At
the close of Michelle’s case, Grange moved the court for a
directed verdict.
The court granted the motion and entered a
judgment in Grange’s favor dismissing Michelle’s complaint.
This appeal followed.
Michelle raises several arguments on appeal.
Her main
argument is that the trial court erred in granting Grange a
directed verdict at the close of her proof at trial.
When a
trial court is confronted with a motion for a directed verdict,
it must consider the evidence in the strongest possible light in
favor of the party opposing the motion.
Ky. App., 700 S.W.2d 415, 416 (1985).
See Taylor v. Kennedy,
Further, the court must
give the party opposing the motion the advantage of every fair
and reasonable inference that can be drawn from the evidence.
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Id.
The court must not grant a directed verdict unless there is
a complete absence of proof on a material issue in the action or
unless there is no disputed fact issue upon which reasonable
minds could differ.
Id.
In granting Grange’s motion for a directed verdict,
the trial court stated that Michelle had not met her burden of
proof.
In support of this ruling, the court apparently found
that Grange had a reasonable basis for denying the Thomas claim
and also that Michelle could not recover any damages, including
punitive damages, for Grange’s alleged bad faith due to her
failure to prove compensatory damages.
We believe the court
erred in granting the directed verdict.
Michelle’s bad faith claim was brought pursuant to the
Unfair Claims Settlement Practices Act set forth in KRS 304.12230.
That statute states that it is an unfair claims settlement
practice for any person to commit or perform any of fifteen
enumerated acts or omissions.
including an insurer.
Id.
“Person” is defined as
See KRS 304.1-020.
A third-party
claimant, such as Thomas, has a private right of action for
damages against an insurer under the Unfair Claims Settlement
Practices Act if the claimant was injured by the insurer’s bad
faith adjusting of a property claim.
See State Farm Mut. Auto.
Ins. Co. v. Reeder, Ky., 763 S.W.2d 116, 117-18 (1988).
also KRS 446.070.
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See
First, Michelle argues that she presented sufficient
evidence to establish a valid cause of action against Grange for
bad faith in the settlement of her claim and that the court
thereby erred in granting Grange’s directed verdict motion.
The
three elements of a bad faith claim against an insurance company
were set forth by the Kentucky Supreme Court in Wittmer v.
Jones, Ky., 864 S.W.2d 885, 890 (1993).
They are: “(1) the
insurer must be obligated to pay the claim under the terms of
the policy; (2) the insurer must lack a reasonable basis in law
or fact for denying the claim; and (3) it must be shown that the
insurer either knew there was no reasonable basis for denying
the claim or acted with reckless disregard for whether such a
basis existed.”
Id., quoting Federal Kemper Ins. Co. v.
Hornback, Ky., 711 S.W.2d 844, 846-47 (1986)(Leibson, J.,
dissenting).
Michelle clearly proved the first element of the claim
because Grange was obligated to pay the claim under the terms of
its policy with Dolson.
was Dolson’s insurer.
In fact, Grange acknowledged that it
The points of contention are whether
Grange lacked a reasonable basis in law or fact for denying the
claim and, if so, whether it either knew there was no reasonable
basis for denying the claim or acted with reckless disregard for
whether such a basis existed.
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Throughout its dealings with Michelle prior to the
filing of her lawsuit, Grange refused to process the claim or
otherwise deal with her because Dolson had “waived coverage.”
Grange continued to take this position even after Michelle’s
attorney advised Snyder in his letter of October 11, 2001, of
his opinion that it had no legal right to do so.
Michelle’s
attorney clearly stated in his letter his opinion that an
insurer and insured have no right to agree to destroy the rights
of innocent third parties by mutual consent or agreement once
those rights have vested.
KRS 304.20-030 provides as follows:
No insurance contract insuring against loss
or damage through legal liability for the
bodily injury or death by accident of any
individual, or for damage to the property of
any person, shall be retroactively annulled
by any agreement between the insurer and
insured after the occurrence of any such
injury, death, or damage for which the
insured may be liable, and any such
annulment attempted shall be void.
In our view, this statute prohibited the waiver of coverage
agreement between Dolson and Grange and did not constitute a
reasonable basis for Grange’s denial of Michelle’s claim.
In
fact, Grange does not rely on this waiver of coverage agreement
to support its argument that it had a reasonable basis for
denying the claim.
Rather, Grange asserts that the disagreement
over the amount of damages to the Thomas automobile was a valid
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reason for denying the claim.
However, this overlooks the fact
that Grange denied the claim based on the waiver of coverage
agreement and not based on the dispute over damages.
It also
overlooks the fact that Grange had a statutory duty to attempt
in good faith to negotiate a settlement of the claim since the
liability of its insured was clear.
See KRS 304.12-230(6).
Michelle’s bad faith claim under the Unfair Claims
Settlement Practices Act was based on Grange refusing to pay her
claim without conducting a reasonable investigation based upon
all available information and Grange not attempting in good
faith to effectuate a prompt, fair, and equitable settlement of
a claim in which liability had become reasonably clear.
304.12-230(4) and (6).
See KRS
Michelle’s proof at trial was sufficient
to establish that Grange had violated these statutes as well as
KRS 304.20-030.
Furthermore, the reliance upon the waiver of
coverage agreement was not a reasonable basis in law or fact for
denying the claim.
Thus, Michelle presented evidence to support
the second element of her bad faith claim against Grange.
The third element of a bad faith claim is that it must
be shown that the insurer either knew there was no reasonable
basis for denying the claim or acted with reckless disregard for
whether such a basis existed.
Wittmer, 864 S.W.2d at 890.
The
claims adjuster, Snyder, testified that she proceeded with the
waiver of coverage agreement after seeking legal advice from
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Grange’s in-house counsel, Lyle Sailer.
Sailer worked in
Grange’s home office in Columbus, Ohio.
According to Snyder, Sailer advised her that if the
Dolsons did not want Grange to handle the claim, then Grange
would not be responsible for the outcome of any litigation
between Thomas and the Dolsons.
According to Grange’s answers
to interrogatories propounded by Michelle, Sailer had no notes
of his conversation with Snyder and did not remember any of its
details.
Regardless of whether Snyder acted on her own or
pursuant to legal advice from Grange’s in-house counsel, there
was sufficient evidence that Grange either knew there was no
reasonable basis for denying the claim or acted with reckless
disregard for whether such a basis existed.
In short, the
evidence presented on behalf of Michelle at trial was sufficient
to support her bad faith claim and to overcome Grange’s motion
for a directed verdict.
The second reason the circuit court gave for granting
Grange’s motion for a directed verdict was that Michelle failed
to prove compensatory damages and therefore was not entitled to
the recovery of punitive damages.
The court relied on Estep v.
Werner, Ky., 780 S.W.2d 604 (1989).
Therein, the court stated
that the rule of law recognized in Kentucky was that “if the
plaintiff has suffered an injury for which compensatory damages
might be awarded, . . . he may in a proper case recover punitive
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damages.”
Id. at 607, quoting Lawrence v. Risen, Ky. App., 598
S.W.2d 474, 476 (1980).
While Grange agrees with the court that
punitive damages may not be awarded when there are no
compensatory damages, Michelle counters that Kentucky law now
recognizes that punitive damages may be awarded even in the
absence of an award of compensatory damages.
In Louisville & N.R. Co. v. Ritchel, 148 Ky. 701, 147
S.W. 411 (1912), the court held that the correct rule “is that
if a right of action exists - - that is, if the plaintiff has
suffered an injury for which compensatory damages might be
awarded, although nominal in amount - - he may in a proper case
recover punitive damages.”
147 S.W. at 414.
Years later, this
court reaffirmed that principle in the Lawrence case.
Lawrence, 598 S.W.2d at 476.
See
Further, this court stated in
Lawrence that, because the appellant therein did not assert any
claim on which actual or compensatory damages could be awarded,
it was precluded from seeking punitive damages.
Id.
The same
principle was again reiterated, this time by the Kentucky
Supreme Court, in 1989 in the Estep case.
Id. at 607.
Michelle essentially concedes that she did not present
proof of compensatory damages during the trial.
She argues that
she could have been awarded compensatory damages for mental
anguish and for prejudgment interest, but she acknowledges that
she did not make claims for such damages.
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Her reliance that she
was entitled to recover punitive damages even in the absence of
an award of compensatory damages is based on the recent case of
Commonwealth, Dept. of Agriculture v. Vinson, Ky., 30 S.W.3d 162
(2000).
On the other hand, Grange argues that the Vinson case
is distinguishable because punitive damages were allowed therein
based on a statute.
In the Vinson case, two individuals brought a lawsuit
against the Kentucky Department of Agriculture for violations of
the Kentucky Whistleblower Act set forth in KRS 61.101 et seq.
The jury in that case awarded a total of $1,000,000 in punitive
damages against the Department of Agriculture, and one of the
issues on appeal was whether the plaintiffs were entitled to
recover punitive damages in the absence of actual or
compensatory damages.
The applicable statute, KRS 61.103(2),
provided that employees alleging a violation of the act could
bring a civil action for appropriate injunctive relief or
punitive damages or both.
The Kentucky Supreme Court
unanimously upheld the punitive damages award and reexamined the
applicable principles of law in doing so.
Id. at 166-67.
The court noted the trend throughout this nation that
allows the recovery of punitive damages even in the absence of a
showing of actual or compensatory damages.
Id. at 166.
Further, the court noted that it was “persuaded by the reasoning
of Nappe v. Anschelewitz, 97 N.J. 37, 477 A.2d 1224 (1984), that
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compensatory damages are not an essential element of an
intentional tort committed willfully and without justification.”
Id.
The court also held that “[t]he punitive damages provision
of the Whistleblower Act is in harmony with the Kentucky common
law as to punitive damages.”
Id. at 167.
In the Nappe case, the New Jersey Supreme Court was
faced with the issues of whether a cause of action for legal
fraud exists in the absence of compensatory damages and whether
punitive damages may be awarded in the absence of a compensatory
damage award in an action for legal fraud.
Id. at 1226.
The
court stated that “the requirement of actual damage to sustain a
cause of action for intentional torts no longer serves a useful
purpose, at least where a victim of an intentional wrong has
suffered some loss, detriment, or injury but is unable to prove
that he is entitled to compensatory damages.
His rights have
been invaded and he should be entitled to vindication in an
award of nominal damages.”
Id. at 1229.
Therefore, the court
held that “compensatory damages are not an essential element of
an intentional tort committed wilfully and without justification
when there is some loss, detriment or injury, and that nominal
damages may be awarded in such cases in the absence of
compensatory damages.”
Id.
Grange urges us to reject the principles concerning
compensatory and punitive damages as set forth in the Vinson
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case because that case involved a specific statute allowing the
recovery of punitive damages, whereas the Unfair Claims
Settlement Practices Act contains no similar provision.
While
we understand the distinction between the facts in Vinson and
the facts herein, we cannot overlook our supreme court’s
statement that it was persuaded by the reasoning of the New
Jersey Supreme Court in the Nappe case and by our supreme
court’s apparent adoption of the national trend allowing
punitive damages even in the absence of a showing of actual
damages.
See Vinson, 30 S.W.3d at 166.
The circuit court should not have granted Grange’s
motion for a directed verdict even though Michelle failed to
present proof of compensatory damages.
She presented sufficient
proof to support the three elements of a bad faith claim action,
and if that claim had been accepted by the jury, Michelle was
entitled to seek punitive damages even though she failed to
prove compensatory damages.
If her bad faith claim is accepted
by a jury, then it will have been determined that a wrong has
been committed against her.
She will therefore be entitled to
seek punitive damages, and Grange may not be freed of its
responsibility for the wrong it committed even though
compensatory damages were not shown.
In short, we conclude that
the circuit court erred in granting a directed verdict in favor
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of Grange based on Michelle’s failure to show compensatory
damages.
Next, it appears that the circuit court may have
granted Grange’s motion for a directed verdict based on a
conclusion that Michelle had not proven oppression or fraud.
KRS 411.184 provides a statutory right to recover punitive
damages.
It states in relevant part that “[a] plaintiff shall
recover punitive damages only upon proving, by clear and
convincing evidence, that the defendant from whom such damages
are sought acted toward the plaintiff with oppression, fraud or
malice.”
KRS 411.184(2).4
Even though KRS 411.184(5) states
that the statute “is applicable to all cases in which punitive
damages are sought,” Michelle asserts that the statute is not
applicable to bad faith claims.
She relies on the Wittmer case
in this regard.
We agree with Michelle.
In the Wittmer case the
Kentucky Supreme Court stated as follows:
Throughout this litigation State Farm
has presented various arguments against
submitting the issue of punitive damages to
the jury based on its interpretation of
statutory language found in the new punitive
damages statute enacted in 1988, now
codified as KRS 411.184. It suffices to say
that this Court could not interpret KRS
4
To the extent this statute requires a plaintiff to show malice on the part
of the defendant in order to recover punitive damages, it has been held
unconstitutional. See Williams v. Wilson, Ky., 972 S.W.2d 260, 265-69
(1998).
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411.184 to destroy a cause of action for
punitive damages otherwise appropriate
without fatally impaling upon jural rights
guaranteed by the Kentucky Constitution,
Sections 14, 54, and 241.
Wittmer, 864 S.W.2d at 890.
bad faith claim.
The Wittmer case also involved a
In short, Michelle was not required to prove
oppression or fraud pursuant to KRS 411.184(2) in order to
establish her bad faith claim.
Grange’s first argument in its brief is that
Michelle’s claim should have been dismissed due to her failure
to comply with CR5 8.01(2).
That rule provides in pertinent part
that “[w]hen a claim is made against a party for unliquidated
damages, that party may obtain information as to the amount
claimed by interrogatories; if this is done, the amount claimed
shall not exceed the last amount stated in answers to
interrogatories.”
Id.
Grange asserts that Michelle never filed
interrogatory answers which complied with the mandatory
requirements of CR 33.01 and, therefore, that she did not comply
with CR 8.01(2).
CR 33.01(2) states in pertinent part that
“[e]ach interrogatory shall be answered separately and fully in
writing under oath, unless it is objected to, in which event the
reasons for objections shall be stated in lieu of an answer.
The answers are to be signed by the person making them, and the
objections signed by the attorney making them.”
5
Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure.
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During the discovery phase of this litigation, Grange
served Michelle with interrogatories.
Michelle failed to comply
with the requirements of CR 33.01(2) in that she failed to sign
her answers to them.
Rather, they were signed by her attorney.
Based on this defect and the cases of Fratzke v. Murphy, Ky., 12
S.W.3d 269 (1999), and LaFleur v. Shoney’s, Inc., Ky., 83 S.W.3d
474 (2002), Grange argues that Michelle was prohibited from
being awarded any damages during the trial and that the trial
court erred in not granting its motion to dismiss the case for
this reason alone.
The trial court offered to grant a mistrial
due to the defect, but Grange declined the offer.
In the Fratzke case, Murphy served Fratzke with a set
of interrogatories requesting that she identify and quantify
each of her claims for damages.
Fratzke filed timely answers to
the interrogatories, but her answers omitted an amount for any
damage claim other than medical expenses.
The case proceeded to
trial, and defense counsel objected to Fratzke recovering any
unliquidated damages as she had failed to include the amount of
any unliquidated claims in her answers to the defendant’s
interrogatories.
The trial court in Fratzke allowed her to seek
damages for her unliquidated claims, but this court ultimately
reversed the award of unliquidated damages and the Kentucky
Supreme Court subsequently affirmed the reversal.
The supreme
court reasoned that “[b]y omitting an amount for any damage
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claim other than her medical expenses incurred to date, Fratzke
effectively stated that her claim for her unliquidated damages
was nothing.
Thus, under the rule, Fratzke’s claim for
unliquidated damages at trial could not exceed $0.00.”
Id. at
271.
In the LaFleur case Shoney’s served written
interrogatories on LaFleur.
In her answers to the
interrogatories, LaFleur claimed specific amounts for medical
expenses and lost wages but not specific amounts for either
special damages or unliquidated damages.
She stated that any
special damages were undetermined and that she would supplement
her information as to unliquidated damages prior to trial.
On the morning of the trial, Shoney’s made a motion in
limine to preclude any evidence on LaFleur’s claims for damages
which exceeded the damages claimed in her interrogatory answers.
The jury awarded LaFleur damages for past and future pain and
suffering and past medical expenses.
Shoney’s appealed to this
court, which reversed and remanded the case.
This court
instructed the trial court on remand to enter a judgment limited
to medical expenses and lost wages in the same amounts as
claimed by LaFleur in her answers to interrogatories.
The
Kentucky Supreme Court affirmed this court and stated that the
Fratzke case held that the plain language of CR 8.01(2) “places
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a duty on the plaintiff to seasonably supplement her answers to
interrogatories.”
LaFleur, 83 S.W.3d at 480.
In the case sub judice, Interrogatory No. 5 stated,
“Please state, pursuant to CR 8.01(2), the exact amount of
damages which you are seeking from the Defendant.”
Michelle’s
answer stated, “Subject to completion of discovery relevant to
how many other legitimate claims Grange has wrongfully denied in
the recent past in order to maximize its profits, as of now,
$150,000.00.”
Further, Michelle answered in her interrogatories
that she would comply with the Rules of Civil Procedure
regarding the supplementing of her answers.
The facts in this case are distinguishable from the
facts in the Fratzke and LaFleur cases.
In the Fratzke case,
the plaintiff did not identify each item of damage sought to be
recovered other than providing an itemized list of medical
expenses incurred to that time.
In the LaFleur case, the
plaintiff stated that the amounts of her specific damages were
“undetermined” and that she would supplement information
concerning her claim for unliquidated damages.
In this case,
Michelle stated that she would seek to recover $150,000 in
damages, although the answers to the interrogatories were not
signed by her but by her attorney.
In the Fratzke case, the court stated that “the
purpose of the rule is to allow a party to discover the amount
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an opposing party is seeking for unliquidated damage claims.”
Id. at 273.
case.
The court reaffirmed this principle in the LaFleur
Id. at 477.
The court in the LaFleur case further
engaged in an analysis of the role of CR 8.01(2) in the
discovery process.
The court stated that “[t]he role of CR
8.01(2) in this process is to provide notice of the damages at
stake.”
Id. at 478.
The court further explained that “[t]he
purpose of the rule is to put a party on notice as to the amount
of unliquidated damages at stake to allow that party to make
economically rational decisions concerning trial preparation and
trial strategy.”
Id. at 481.
We conclude that Michelle’s failure to sign her
answers to interrogatories did not constitute a Fratzke
violation so as to preclude her from seeking damages at trial.
Her answers accomplished the purpose of giving Grange notice of
the amount of damages at stake so as to allow it to make
appropriate decisions concerning possible settlement and/or
trial preparation and strategy.
Furthermore, as stated by the
Kentucky Supreme Court in Thompson v. Sherwin Williams Co.,
Inc., Ky., 113 S.W.3d 140 (2003), “[t]he remedy for a violation
of CR 33.01 is found in CR 37.01 and CR 37.02, not in CR
8.01(2).”
Id. at 144.
The trial court did not err in denying
Grange’s motion to dismiss for Michelle’s failure to comply with
civil discovery rules.
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Grange’s next argument is that the trial court
properly granted its motion for a directed verdict because no
punitive damages could have been properly awarded to Michelle
due to Grange not being liable for the acts of its agent or
employee, Snyder.
In support of this argument, Grange cites KRS
411.184(3) which states that “[i]n no case shall punitive
damages be assessed against a principal or employer for the act
of an agent or employee unless such principal or employer
authorized or ratified or should have anticipated the conduct in
question.”
See also Berrier v. Bizer, Ky., 57 S.W.3d 271, 283-
84 (2001).6
Grange argues that its board of directors or
principal officers did not have any knowledge of Snyder’s
actions and had no reason to anticipate them.
In response to this argument, Michelle refers to
Snyder’s testimony at trial.
Snyder testified that, prior to
drafting the waiver of coverage letter, she sought legal advice
from Grange’s in-house counsel, Lyle Sailer, who worked in
Grange’s home office in Columbus, Ohio.
Snyder testified that
Sailer advised her that if the Dolsons did not want Grange to
handle the claim, then Grange would not be responsible for the
outcome of any litigation between Thomas and the Dolsons.
Snyder also testified that she again sought legal advice from
6
Therein, the Kentucky Supreme Court stated that “Kentucky is the only state
with a statute that so broadly limits vicarious liability for punitive
damages.” Id. at 283.
-22-
Grange’s in-house counsel in October 2001 after she received the
letter from Michelle’s attorney.
Snyder testified that she
forwarded the letter to in-house counsel, Lavonne Coleman, who
directed her to respond to the letter as she sought fit.
We
conclude that this testimony was sufficient to prove that Grange
authorized or ratified Snyder’s conduct in connection with the
waiver of coverage agreement.
Thus, Grange’s argument that the
court properly granted it a directed verdict for this reason is
without merit.
Grange next argues that Michelle was not entitled to
punitive damages in light of KRS 411.184(2), which states that
“[a] plaintiff shall recover punitive damages only upon proving,
by clear and convincing evidence, that the defendant from whom
such damages are sought acted toward the plaintiff with
oppression, fraud or malice.”
Grange reasons that since any
actions on its part were against Mark Thomas, Jr., who is now
deceased, and not against the plaintiff, then the statute
precludes a recovery of punitive damages.
In support of its
argument, Grange cites Stewart v. Estate of Cooper, Ky., 102
S.W.3d 913 (2003).
In the Cooper case our supreme court held that the
statute precludes a recovery of punitive damages against a
defendant tortfeasor’s estate since the estate itself did not
commit the acts against the plaintiff.
-23-
Id. at 916.
In other
words, the Stewart case involves facts that are directly
opposite from those in this case.
In the case sub judice
punitive damages are sought by the estate of the party suffering
damages against the tortfeasor not the tortfeasor’s estate.
We
believe there should be a distinction between the way the two
situations are treated.
In the Stewart case the court noted that the injured
party was not entitled to an award of punitive damages because
such damages were recoverable only after proof that “‘the
defendant from whom such damages are sought’—i.e., the Estate
itself -‘acted toward the plaintiff with oppression, fraud or
malice.’”
Id. at 916.
Obviously, the tortfeasor’s estate had
not committed a wrong against the injured party and could not
have any liability for punitive damages under the statute.
However, in this case the party committing the wrong was still a
party to the case.
Only the party suffering damages had been
replaced as a party by his estate following his death.
The public policy considerations for the two
situations are different.
Punitive damages are damages “awarded
against a person to punish and to discourage him and others from
similar conduct in the future.”
KRS 411.184(1)(f).
The purpose
of a punitive damages award is defeated where the tortfeasor
dies as was the case in Stewart, but it remains where only the
injured party dies.
-24-
The parties have not cited any authority concerning
the issue of whether a claim for punitive damages survives the
death of the injured party.
However, most states addressing the
issue have concluded that the claim does survive in a tort
action.
See Jay M. Zitter, Annotation, Claim for Punitive
Damages in Tort Action as Surviving Death of Tortfeasor or
Person Wronged, 30 A.L.R. 4th 707 (1984).
More importantly, the Kentucky statutes address what
actions shall survive.
The pertinent statute states:
No right of action for personal injury or
for injury to real or personal property
shall cease or die with the person injuring
or injured, except actions for slander,
libel, criminal conversation, and so much of
the action for malicious prosecution as is
intended to recover for the personal injury.
For any other injury an action may be
brought or revived by the personal
representative, or against the personal
representative, heir or devisee, in the same
manner as causes of action founded on
contract.
KRS 411.140.
Pursuant to this statute, the weight of authority
from other states, and public policy considerations, we conclude
the claim for punitive damages survived following Thomas’s
death.
We turn now to Michelle’s final two arguments, each of
which involve the admissibility of evidence.
First, Michelle
argues that the trial court erred in denying portions of her
motion to exclude Grange’s expert witness testimony.
-25-
Grange
retained retired Judge Michael McDonald to testify as an expert
witness concerning the issue of bad faith.
In addition to
having been a judge for a number of years in this state, Judge
McDonald had practiced law in the field of insurance issues and
had been employed as an insurance adjuster handling property
damage claims.
Judge McDonald did not have the opportunity to testify
on behalf of Grange during the trial because the trial court
directed a verdict at the close of Michelle’s proof.
However,
Judge McDonald gave a deposition prior to trial, and Michelle
moved the court to restrict his testimony on a number of
subjects that she felt required no specialized knowledge to
assist the jury in understanding.
The trial judge entered an
order restricting Judge McDonald from testifying as to some
matters but not others.
Grange urges us not to address this issue since
neither the deposition of Judge McDonald nor his live testimony
was offered at trial.
On the other hand, Michelle urges us to
address the issue in the event we reverse the judgment and
remand for a new trial since the matter is likely to arise at
that time.
For that reason, we will do so.
KRE7 702 provides that “[i]f scientific, technical, or
other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to
7
Kentucky Rules of Evidence.
-26-
understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a
witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience,
training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an
opinion or otherwise.”
In reviewing whether the trial court
erred in its rulings concerning Judge McDonald’s testimony, we
must determine whether the court abused its discretion.
See
Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co. v. Thompson, Ky., 11 S.W.3d 575,
577-78 (2000).
Michelle maintains that Judge McDonald’s opinion
testimony should be excluded because it is not based on any
specialized knowledge and that it would not be helpful to the
jury in resolving the bad faith issue.
She asserts that his
testimony is nothing more than his lay opinion of what result
the jury should reach based upon the evidence it will hear at
trial.
We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in the manner in which it ruled on the admissibility
of Judge McDonald’s testimony.
Finally, Michelle argues that the trial court erred by
denying her motion to admit the Hall’s Collision Center repair
estimate into evidence.
The court denied the motion to admit
the estimate into evidence on the ground that it was hearsay and
not subject to any other exception to the hearsay rule.
no error in this ruling.
We find
At any rate, since this case is being
remanded for a new trial, Michelle will have the opportunity to
introduce property damage evidence in an appropriate manner.
-27-
The judgment of the Jefferson Circuit Court is
reversed, and this case is remanded for a new trial.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEFS AND ORAL ARGUMENT FOR
APPELLANT/CROSS-APPELLEE:
BRIEFS AND ORAL ARGUMENT FOR
APPELLEE/CROSS-APPELLANT:
John R. Shelton
Louisville, Kentucky
Kim F. Quick
Elizabethtown, Kentucky
-28-
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