COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY; COMMONWEALTH ATTORNEY'S OFFICE, FOR THE SIXTEENTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT; AND KENTON COUNTY POLICE DEPARTMENT v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY, DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC ADVOCACY; COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY, FINANCE AND ADMINISTRATION CABINET; AND EARNIE VIRES
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RENDERED:
MAY 28, 2004; 10:00 a.m.
ORDERED NOT PUBLISHED BY THE KENTUCKY SUPREME COURT:
AUGUST 17, 2005 (2004-SC-0500-D)
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2003-CA-000392-MR
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY;
COMMONWEALTH ATTORNEY'S
OFFICE, FOR THE SIXTEENTH
JUDICIAL CIRCUIT; AND
KENTON COUNTY POLICE DEPARTMENT
v.
APPELLANTS
APPEAL FROM KENTON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE DOUGLAS M. STEPHENS, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 02-CR-00505
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY,
DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC ADVOCACY;
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY,
FINANCE AND ADMINISTRATION
CABINET; AND EARNIE VIRES
APPELLEES
OPINION
REVERSING AND REMANDING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
GUIDUGLI, JOHNSON AND MINTON, JUDGES.
GUIDUGLI, JUDGE.
Following the conviction of Earnie L. Vires
(hereinafter “Vires”) for trafficking in a controlled substance,
first degree (KRS 218A.1412), the Kenton Circuit Court ordered
money seized at the time of Vires’s arrest to be forfeited.
The
trial court ordered the money (approximately $17,937) forfeited
and further ordered Vires “to contribute the sum of $2,500.00 as
partial compensation for defendant’s legal representation by the
Office of Public Advocacy” and to pay statutory court costs from
the forfeited funds.
The Commonwealth of Kentucky (hereinafter
“the Commonwealth”) has appealed that order arguing that the
circuit court had no statutory authority to pay such expenses
and costs from the forfeited money.
We agree, thus we reverse
and remand.1
Vires was indicted by the Kenton County Grand Jury on
August 2, 2002, on the charges of trafficking in a controlled
substance in the first degree (KRS 218A.1412) and possession of
a firearm by a convicted felon (KRS 527.040).
The indictment
was a result of a consensual search of Vires’s home on February
18, 2002.
Following a jury trial, Vires was convicted of the
trafficking charge and entered a guilty plea to the handgun
offense.
He was sentenced to eight (8) years and five (5) years
respectfully, with the time running concurrently for a total of
eight years’ imprisonment.
On November 19, 2002, the Commonwealth filed a motion
for forfeiture of the $17,937 in United States currency seized
in conjunction with the controlled substance trafficking
1
Vires also appealed his conviction for trafficking in a controlled
substance. That appeal numbered 2003-CA-000116-MR was affirmed in a separate
opinion rendered by this Court on the same day as this appeal.
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offense, for which Vires had been convicted.
Following briefing
by the parties and a hearing before the circuit court, the trial
judge entered the following order which forms the basis of this
appeal:
This matter is before the court
pursuant to the Commonwealth’s motion for
forfeiture of $17,937.00 in U.S. currency
seized from defendant’s home. The
Commonwealth argues that the jury’s verdict
of guilty compels a conclusion that the jury
believed the money was the defendant’s and
was obtained from the unlawful sale of
drugs. The court accepts the Commonwealth’s
argument, and finds that the $17,937.00 in
U.S. currency was defendant’s property and
the product of illegal activity.
In view of the defendant’s resources
($17,937.00) and ability to contribute to
his own defense, defendant shall be ordered
to contribute the sum of $2,500.00 as
partial compensation for defendant’s legal
representation by the Office of Public
Advocacy. Also, defendant shall pay the
statutorily imposed court costs. The
remainder of defendant’s funds, seized at
the time of his arrest, shall be forfeited
pursuant to KRS 218A.410.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED AND ADJUDGED as
follows:
1. The statutory court costs shall be
paid from defendant’s seized funds;
2. Thereafter, there shall be paid as
reimbursement to the Office of Public
Advocate the sum of $2,500.00; and,
3. The remainder of the funds seized
from the defendant shall be forfeited
pursuant to KRS 218A.410.
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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED AND ADJUDED that
the Kenton County Police Department, the
custodian of defendant’s seized funds, shall
retain said funds until further orders of
the court and subject to the terms set about
above.
SO ORDERED this the 23rd day of January,
2003.
On appeal, the Commonwealth contends that KRS 218A.405
et. seq., relating to forfeited property sets forth the
statutory scheme which the circuit court must follow once
property is determined to be subject to forfeiture.
The
Department of Public Advocacy, (hereinafter “the Department”),
on the other side, argues that KRS 31.211 relating to a
defendant’s ability to pay the costs of the proceedings
controls.
Having reviewed the statutes in question and the
applicable law, we believe the Commonwealth’s position is
correct in that KRS 218A.405 et. seq. is determinative in
resolving this controversy.
KRS 31.211(1) and (5) relied upon by the Department
states:
(1)
At arraignment, the court shall conduct
a nonadversarial hearing to determine
whether a person who has requested a
public defender is able to pay a
partial fee for legal representation,
the other necessary services and
facilities of representation, and court
costs. The court shall order payment
in an amount determined by the court
and may order that the payment be made
in a lump sum or by installment
-4-
payments to recover money for
representation provided under this
chapter. This partial fee
determination shall be made at each
stage of the proceedings.
. . . .
(5)
If a person receives legal assistance
or other benefit under this chapter to
which he or she is not entitled or if a
person receives legal assistance under
this chapter and is financially able to
pay for representation on the date the
suit is brought, the public advocate,
on behalf of the Commonwealth, shall
recover, where practical, payment or
reimbursement, as the case may be, from
the person who received the legal
assistance or his or her estate. Suit
shall be brought within five (5) years
after the date on which the aid was
received.
In contrast, the Commonwealth relies upon KRS 218A.410(2) and
KRS 218A.435(12).
KRS 218A.410(2), in relevant part, states:
Title to all property, including all
interests in the property, forfeit under
this section vests in the Commonwealth on
the commission of the act or omission giving
rise to forfeiture under this section
together with the proceeds of the property
after the time.
KRS 218A.435(12), states:
Other provisions of law notwithstanding, the
first fifty thousand dollars ($50,000) of
forfeited coin or currency or of the
proceeds from sale of any property forfeited
pursuant to this chapter which was seized or
forfeited by a single order of forfeiture,
shall not be paid into the fund but ninety
percent (90%) shall be paid to the law
enforcement agency or agencies which seized
-5-
the property to be used for direct law
enforcement purposes and ten percent (10%)
to the office of the Commonwealth’s attorney
or county attorney who has participated in
the forfeiture proceeding. The moneys are
intended to supplement any funds
appropriated to the recipient and shall not
supplant other funding of any recipient. In
addition, forty-five percent (45%) of all
proceeds above fifty thousand dollars
($50,000) shall not be paid into the fund
but shall be retained by the law enforcement
agency or agencies which seized the property
to be used for direct law enforcement
purposes.
Having reviewed the two statutes in issue, the
Department argues that the trial court exercised proper judicial
discretion in harmonizing two conflicting statutes.
Since KRS
31.211 was enacted more recently, the Department contends it
should be given greater weight.
The Department cites Newport
Benevolent Burial Ass’n v. Clay, 170 Ky. 633, 186 S.W. 658
(1916), for the proposition that “where the provisions of two
(2) statutes are not repugnant to each other, although dealing
to some extent with the same subject matter, and can be enforced
consistently with the provisions of each, the court may enforce
the provisions of each.”
Thus, the Department contends the
trial court properly acted within its discretion and gave
statutory and equitable meaning to both statutes.
The
Department argues that the court followed KRS 31.211 and ordered
that because Vires had received legal assistance under this
chapter [KRS 31] that he must pay a sum to the public advocate
-6-
for those services received.
The trial court then enforced the
forfeiture statute (KRS 218A.435) and gave the Commonwealth the
balance of the funds confiscated.
As such, the Department
argues both entities benefited from the ruling and each
governmental agency should be satisfied with the result.
The
Department insists the trial court wisely harmonized the two
statutes to the good of all involved.
However, as wise and
equitable as the trial court’s decision appears, we cannot agree
that it fully complied with sound statutory construction.
Under KRS 218A.410(2) it states, in relevant part,
“that title to all property . . . forfeit[ed] under this section
vests in the Commonwealth on the commission of the act or
omission giving rise to [the] forfeiture . . . .”
added).
(Emphasis
The statute is clear and unambiguous that all property
vests in the Commonwealth as of the date of the offense.
Vires
had no interest in any of the property at the time of the
hearing on the forfeiture.
The indictment alleged he trafficked
in a controlled substance on February 18, 2002.
Once the jury
convicted him of said offense all property forfeited became
property of the Commonwealth as of that date (February 18,
2002).
While the Department argues that the trial court first
ordered Vires to contribute to his defense based upon his
resources (the $17,937) pursuant to KRS 31.311 and then invoked
the forfeiture statute dispensing the remaining funds pursuant
-7-
to KRS 218A.410, that is not factually accurate.
Nowhere in the
record do we find a statement from the Commonwealth that the
$17,937 was Vires’s property at the time the forfeiture motion
was filed.2
In fact, whether the money was Vires’s, his wife’s,
or both of theirs is not relevant.
The trial court properly
found that the money was the result of illegal activity thus
invoking KRS 218A.410(2) which mandates that all property
subject to forfeiture vests in the Commonwealth on the
commission of the act (February 18, 2002).
In that the funds in
question belonged to the Commonwealth and not Vires, he did not
have resources and/or ability to contribute to his defense and
KRS 218A.435(12) sets forth the mandatory statutory process as
to what agencies are to receive the seized property (90% to law
enforcement agency, 10% to the Office of the Commonwealth’s
Attorney).
For the foregoing reasons, the order of the Kenton
Circuit Court providing that the forfeited funds shall be paid
to the Department of Public Advocacy and towards costs is
reversed and the matter is remanded for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion.
ALL CONCUR.
2
Apparently Mrs. Vires was also charged with some criminal offense as a
result of the search of the Vires’s residence. It appears Mrs. Vires was
seriously ill and reached a plea agreement in which the charges were
dismissed and she signed a waiver relinquishing any interest to the seized
funds. According to the Commonwealth, Mrs. Vires has since passed away.
-8-
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
A. B. Chandler
Attorney General
Larry D. Beale
Department of Public Advocacy
Frankfort, KY
Kent T. Young
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, KY
David A. Smith
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, KY
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