BRADFORD SCOTT WRIGHT v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED:
March 5, 2004; 10:00 a.m.
ORDERED NOT PUBLISHED BY THE KENTUCKY SUPREME COURT:
DECEMBER 8, 2004 (2004-SC-0266-D)
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
2003-CA-000157-MR
BRADFORD SCOTT WRIGHT
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE DENISE CLAYTON, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 01-CR-001327
v.
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
JOHNSON, KNOPF, AND McANULTY, JUDGES.
KNOPF, JUDGE:
Bradford Wright appeals from a judgment of the
Jefferson Circuit Court, entered January 9, 2003, convicting him
following a jury trial of second-degree manslaughter1 and
sentencing him to ten years’ imprisonment.
Wright contends that
the trial court’s exclusion of evidence pertaining to the
1
KRS 507.040.
victim’s likely alcohol consumption rendered the trial unfair.
He also contends that he was entitled to a directed verdict of
acquittal.
We reject both of these contentions and affirm.
The Commonwealth accused Wright of murder for having
fatally stabbed David Stayton during the early morning hours of
May 24, 2001, in the parking area outside Red Eye’s Bar on
Minors Lane in Jefferson County.
Although many of the details
of the incident are disputed, the evidence established that on
the evening of May 23, 2001, Wright’s wife, Jo Ann, without
informing Wright of her plans, took the family car to go to Red
Eye’s Bar and seriously damaged the car en route.
A passing
motorist gave her a ride to the bar, where she remained until
approximately 1:00 or 1:30 the following morning.
At that point
Wright arrived at the bar and angrily and forcibly insisted that
Jo Ann accompany him home.
Wright had borrowed a friend’s car
and apparently was just then learning of the damage to his.
A
bartender and possibly others intervened and separated Wright
from Jo Ann.
A short time later, when Wright appeared to have
calmed down, the bar’s manager permitted the couple to leave.
A moment later, however, a patron announced to others
in the bar that Wright was beating Jo Ann in the car.
Several
patrons rushed to the car where Wright was indeed slapping Jo
Ann (Wright’s version) or beating her more violently (the
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version of several witnesses).
An unidentified person opened
the passenger door and pulled Jo Ann from the car.
At about the same time, Stayton and (possibly) one or
two others, with several other persons not far behind them,
opened the driver’s door.
According to those nearest the event,
Wright almost immediately struck out at Stayton, who thereupon
collapsed with a massive fatal stab wound to his throat.
Others
(meanwhile pushed past Stayton) and beat Wright briefly until
they realized how seriously Stayton had been injured.
The
beating then stopped, and Wright drove away.
According to Wright, Stayton, who was about six-feet
four-inches tall and weighed more than 250 pounds, pulled him
from the car, and proceeded, along with three or four others to
beat him.
Fearing serious injury, he managed to unsheathe a
knife he carried on the back of his belt and struck Stayton in
the throat in an attempt to defend himself.
Wright estimated
that the beating lasted as long as thirty seconds.
subsided, he hastened to his car and fled.
When it
The police found him
at the emergency room of the University of Louisville Hospital
where he was treated for an injured jaw and scalp lacerations.
The jury found Wright guilty of second-degree
manslaughter under an instruction that provided in pertinent
part as follows:
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Even though the defendant might otherwise be
guilty . . . if at the time the defendant
killed David Stayton . . . he believed that
David Stayton was then and there about to
use physical force upon him, he was
privileged to use such physical force
against David Stayton as he believed to be
necessary in order to protect himself
against it, but including the right to use
deadly physical force in so doing only if he
believed it to be necessary in order to
protect himself from death or serious
physical injury at the hands of David
Stayton. . . .
Provided,. . . however, if you believe from
the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that
the Defendant was mistaken in his belief
that it was necessary to use physical force
against David Stayton in self-protection, or
in his belief in the degree of force
necessary to protect himself, and . . .
[t]hat when he killed David Stayton, he was
aware of an[d] consciously disregarded a
substantial and unjustifiable risk that he
was mistaken in that belief, and that his
disregard of that risk constituted a gross
deviation from the standard of care that a
reasonable person would have observed in the
same situation, then if you would otherwise
find the Defendant guilty of Murder under
Instruction No. 3, or First-Degree
Manslaughter under Instruction No. 4, you
shall not find him guilty of that offense,
but shall instead find him guilty of SecondDegree Manslaughter under this Instruction.
Wright contends that he was entitled to a directed
verdict of acquittal.
As he correctly notes, in ruling on a
motion for directed verdict,
the trial court must draw all reasonable
inferences from the evidence in favor of the
Commonwealth and assume that the
Commonwealth’s evidence is true, leaving
questions of weight and credibility to the
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jury. If the evidence would induce a
reasonable juror to believe that the
defendant is guilty, the directed verdict
motion should be denied. Commonwealth v.
Benham, Ky., 816 S.W.2d 186, 187 (1991).
“On appellate review, the test of a directed
verdict is, if under the evidence as a
whole, it would be clearly unreasonable for
a jury to find guilt, only then the
defendant is entitled to a directed verdict
of acquittal.” Id.2
The question then is whether it was clearly
unreasonable for the jury to conclude, as it apparently did,
that Wright’s belief in the need to defend himself with deadly
force was wantonly held; that is, that Wright formed the belief
in conscious disregard of circumstances that made it
substantially likely that the belief was false and that the
belief constituted a gross deviation from what a reasonable
person would have believed in the circumstances.
Although other evidence could be cited, the testimony
by Christopher Hale, April Broughton, and Jonathan King, as well
as the testimony by the medical examiner concerning the location
of blood spatters inside the vehicle, permitted a finding that
Stayton, who was about fifty years old and unarmed, was the
person who opened Wright’s car door and first contacted Wright
either as he was still seated in the vehicle or as he first
stood up in the door way.
2
The jury could reasonably have found
Slaughter v. Commonwealth, Ky. App., 45 S.W.3d 873, 875 (2000).
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that the two grappled briefly, when Wright inflicted two incise
wounds to Stayton’s back, but that within a matter of moments
and before any blows had been thrown, he delivered the fatal
stab.
Although Wright’s situation was fearful, any belief at
that point that he was being threatened with serious physical
injury as opposed to being restrained, however roughly, even
violently, from assaulting his wife, the jury could reasonably
determine to have been wanton.3
The trial court did not err,
therefore, by denying Wright’s motions for a directed verdict.
Wright’s primary contention is that the trial court
erred by not permitting him to seek clarification of testimony
by the medical examiner.
The examiner testified that Stayton’s
blood-alcohol concentration at the time of death was 0.213.
She
also testified that his blood contained a low level of cocaine.
Following her direct and cross-examination, a juror asked her
how much alcohol Stayton would have had to drink to produce that
blood-alcohol concentration.
She qualified her answer by saying
that a precise estimate would depend on many factors such as the
person’s height and weight and when in the metabolic process the
blood sample had been taken, but then testified that for a 150pound man there is a rule-of-thumb that each beer per hour
3
Cf. Thomas v. Commonwealth, Ky., 412 S.W.2d 578 (1967)
(Defendant’s resort to a knife against an unarmed attacker was
not justified.).
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raises the blood-alcohol level by a factor of 0.015.
“So, if
you multiply that to get to two,” she said, “around eight beers
within an hour’s time frame would get you to a level of about
two.”
Wright sought to follow-up this answer by asking the
examiner whether a 250-pound man, such as Stayton, would need to
drink substantially more than eight beers in an hour to achieve
that same blood-alcohol level.
The trial court disallowed the
question, however, apparently because its policy was not to
permit follow-up questions to testimony elicited by juror
questions.
The court did permit Wright to question the examiner
by avowal.
She agreed that a 250-pound man would need to drink
more than eight beers, but she declined to say “substantially”
more.
Wright contends that the trial court’s exclusion of
this follow-up questioning of the medical examiner denied him
his constitutional right to confront the witness.
Because
Wright did not seek to impeach the examiner so much as to elicit
testimony tending to establish his defense, it may be that the
constitutional right at stake was his right to due process
rather than his right to confront adverse witnesses.4
4
Be that as
United States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303, 140 L. Ed. 2d 413, 118
S. Ct. 1261 (1998); Rogers v. Commonwealth, Ky., 86 S.W.3d 29
(2002).
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it may, we agree that the interest at stake for Wright is a
fundamental one.5
On the other hand, it is also well established
that trial courts enjoy broad discretion to limit crossexamination to relevant testimony that is neither confusing nor
unduly redundant.6
The exercise of this discretion is
particularly important in conjunction with KRE 614(c), which
provides for juror questioning of witnesses.
Juror questioning is permitted because of the
opportunity it affords to eliminate juror confusion, not because
jurors should be routinely invited to serve as interrogators.7
As numerous other courts have noted, the practice of juror
questioning is perilous to the delicate balances at play in our
adversarial system of justice.8
Among the risks involved is the
possibility that a juror question could alter the burden of
proof by eliciting evidence of a fact it was the Commonwealth’s
burden to prove.
5
Id.; Barrett v. Commonwealth, Ky., 608 S.W.2d 374 (1980).
6
Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 89 L. Ed. 2d 674, 106 S.
Ct. 1431 (1986); Commonwealth v. Maddox, Ky., 955 S.W.2d 718
(1997).
7
Slaughter v. Commonwealth, Ky., 744 S.W.2d 407 (1987).
8
See, for example, State v. Costello, 646 N.W.2d 204 (Minn.
2002); United States v. Collins, 226 F.3d 457 (6th Cir. 2000).
See also, Jonathan M. Purver, Annotation, Propriety of Jurors
Asking Questions in Open Court During Course of Trial, 31 ALR 3d
872 (1970).
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It appears that the trial court in this case sought to
guard against this possibility.
The court required juror
questions to be submitted in writing, and permitted the parties
to object to them outside the hearing of the jury.
Apparently
the court also disallowed questions that pursued lines of
inquiry not raised by the parties, allowing instead only
questions that sought clarification of or elaboration upon the
testimony already elicited.
This seems to have been the basis
for the court’s policy of disallowing the parties to follow-up
the juror questions with more questions of their own.
Because
the juror question would have elicited only clarification of
prior testimony rather than new testimony, there would be no
need to follow-up.
We think the court’s practice (if indeed
that is what it was) of limiting juror questions to those
seeking clarification of prior testimony was proper and
calculated to accomplish the purpose of juror questioning—the
elimination of confusion—while avoiding its potential to divert
jurors from their role as neutral fact finders.
A blanket policy disallowing follow-up questions,
however, does not serve those goals and runs the risk, as Wright
contends, of encroaching upon the parties’ rights to impeach
adverse witnesses and to elicit testimony tending to establish
the claim or defense.
Those jurisdictions allowing juror
questioning typically allow follow-up questions limited to the
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subject matter of the juror’s question and witness’s answer.9
Such limited follow-up is not likely to add unduly to the
proceedings and would permit clarification of a confusing
response to a juror’s question.10
We agree with Wright, therefore, that the trial court’s
blanket policy of disallowing follow-up questions to juror
questions was erroneous and that he should have been permitted
to ask the examiner whether Stayton, a heavier man, would likely
have had to drink more than the hypothetical 150-pound man to
achieve the same blood-alcohol concentration.
We are convinced,
however, that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt
and thus does not provide grounds for relief.
The test here,
where constitutional rights are implicated, is whether, had the
disputed testimony been entered and its damaging potential fully
realized, it is clear beyond a reasonable doubt that the outcome
would not have been affected.11
9
See Nicole L. Mott, Symposium: The Jury at a Crossroad, 78
Chicago-Kent Law Review 1099, 1104 (2003) (“Under most jury
questioning guidelines, courts allow counsel to pose follow-up
questions to the witness after a juror question is asked in
court.”)
10
Here, for example, the medical examiner apparently made an
arithmetical mistake when she attempted to apply her rule-ofthumb formula. Had Wright noticed the apparent mistake at the
time, a follow-up question to clarify the calculation would have
been appropriate.
11
Delaware v. Van Arsdall, supra; Crane v. Commonwealth, Ky.,
726 S.W.2d 302 (1987).
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There is virtually no doubt that the outcome would not
have been affected even had Wright elicited from the medical
examiner the testimony that Stayton would likely have had to
consume more, even substantially more, than eight beers in an
hour to achieve a blood-alcohol level of 0.213.
This fact, as
Wright made clear to the jury during closing argument, was
evident already from the medical examiner’s testimony.
Wright
was able to call the jury’s attention to the examiner’s likely
mathematical mistake, and he emphasized that she had testified
that Stayton weighed in excess of 250 pounds and that a heavier
person would need to consume more beers than the 150-pound man
upon whom the rule-of-thumb was based.
The jury was duly
apprised of the role of intoxicants in this tragic incident.
Wright’s follow-up question was essentially cumulative and would
not have altered the result.
For this reason and because there was sufficient
evidence of Wright’s guilt to submit the case to the jury, we
affirm the January 9, 2003, judgment of the Jefferson Circuit
Court.
JOHNSON, JUDGE, CONCURS.
McANULTY, JUDGE, CONCURS AND FILES SEPARATE OPINION.
McANULTY, JUDGE, CONCURRING:
I agree with the
majority that the trial court has the power to control or limit
cross-examination.
It is quite another thing to say that it is
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appropriate to preclude it.
Such practice should not be
countenanced as compatible with either the right to confront or
the right to due process.
However, upon review of the evidence
as a whole and the degree of punishment fixed by the verdict, I
believe the presumption of prejudice is overcome by a
determination that it was harmless error beyond a reasonable
doubt.
See Blake v. Commonwealth, Ky., 646 S.W.2d 718, 719
(1983).
Therefore, I concur.
BRIEF AND ORAL ARGUMENT FOR
APPELLANT:
Bart Adams
Louisville, Kentucky
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Albert B. Chandler III
Attorney General of Kentucky
Samuel J. Floyd, Jr.
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
ORAL ARGUMENT FOR APPELLEE:
Samuel J. Floyd, Jr.
Frankfort, Kentucky
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