STANLEY M. BILLINGSLEY AND GARY TILLEY v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED:
MODIFIED:
June 4, 2004; 2:00 p.m.
OCTOBER 15, 2004; 10:00 a.m.
ORDERED NOT PUBLISHED BY THE KENTUCKY SUPREME COURT:
AUGUST 17, 2005 (2004-SC-829-D & 2004-SC-978-D)
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2002-CA-001879-MR
AND
NO. 2002-CA-001957-MR
STANLEY M. BILLINGSLEY
APPELLANT
AND
GARY TILLEY
REAL PARTY IN INTEREST
APPEALS FROM CARROLL CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE STEPHEN L. BATES, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 02-CI-00063
v.
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
BARBER, SCHRODER, AND VANMETER, JUDGES.
VANMETER, JUDGE:
This is an appeal by a judge of the Carroll
District Court from a writ of prohibition entered by the Carroll
Circuit Court.
The writ prohibited the district judge,
appellant, Stanley M. Billingsley, from enforcing an order
suppressing the introduction of the Breathalyzer (“BA”) test
performed on the real party in interest, Gary Tilley.
For the
reasons stated hereafter, we affirm.
On August 11, 2001, Tilley was arrested for driving
under the influence (DUI) in Carroll County, Kentucky.
Tilley
was transported to the Carroll County Jail where he received a
BA test on the Intoxilyzer 5000 with the simulator attachment,
which tested 0.181.
On February 8, 2002, Tilley moved to
suppress the BA test results because the arresting officer
failed to follow the directions for the simulator, specifically,
whether the simulator’s hoses were warm and whether the
simulator’s paddle properly turned.
Upon the conclusion of the
suppression hearing, appellant held that the arresting officer
did not abide by the standard operating procedures for the
Intoxilyzer 5000 and therefore, the machine was not in proper
working order on the testing day as required by Owens v.
Commonwealth, Ky., 487 S.W.2d 897 (1972).1
As a result, appellee, the Commonwealth of Kentucky,
filed for a writ prohibiting appellant from enforcing the
suppression order.
On August 21, 2002, the Carroll Circuit
Court entered a writ of prohibition holding: (1) according to
Commonwealth v. Williams, Ky. App., 995 S.W.2d 400 (1999) and
Tipton v. Commonwealth, Ky. App., 770 S.W.2d 239 (1989), it had
1
Overruled by Commonwealth v. Roberts, Ky., 122 S.W.3d 524, 528 (2003).
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jurisdiction; and (2) based on Commonwealth v. Davis, Ky., 25
S.W.3d 106 (2000), the arresting officer’s failure to check the
simulator’s hoses for warmth and to determine whether its paddle
properly turned go to the weight of the evidence, rather than to
its admissibility.
This appeal followed.
Appellant contends the circuit court erred in granting
a writ of prohibition under Williams, 995 S.W.2d 400 and Tipton
770 S.W.2d 239, arguing that those decisions contradict the
court’s holding in Eaton v. Commonwealth, Ky., 562 S.W.2d 637
(1978), and in allowing the BA test results into evidence
arguing that the circuit court ignored the foundation
requirements in Owens, 487 S.W.2d 897.
In addition, appellant
argues the Court of Justice denied him due process of law by
failing to provide him funding for legal counsel to proceed on
this appeal.
Similarly, the Real Party in Interest, Gary Tilley
(“Tilley”), argues that the circuit court erred in granting the
writ of prohibition since the Commonwealth would encounter
neither great injustice nor irreparable harm by suppressing the
evidence; and in failing to follow the standards in Owens.
As to the circuit court’s jurisdiction to issue a writ
of prohibition, in Tipton, we found that a party seeking relief
from interlocutory district court rulings, procedurally, may
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obtain circuit court review through CR 81 and KRS 23A.080(2).2
770 S.W.2d at 241.
Specifically, in Tipton we held:
While we are persuaded that the Commonwealth
cannot properly get the review it sought and
obtained [through KRS 22A.020(2)3 or KRS
23A.080(1)4], we equally believe some vehicle for
review of such interlocutory district court
rulings should be available. Otherwise, the
Commonwealth may be forced to trial without vital
evidence or with some other significant prejudice
to its case, as shown herein.
In our opinion, review of district court rulings
is available through an original proceeding for
relief in the nature of mandamus or prohibition
in the appellate court, herein the circuit court.
See SCR 1.040(6). CR 81 allows the old remedy by
writs of mandamus and prohibition to be obtained
by an original action in the appropriate court.
This is not an immediate and direct interlocutory
appeal to the appellate court but an original
action. Procedurally, review is granted, thereby
comporting with KRS 23A.080(2) which says, “The
circuit court may issue all writs necessary in
aid of its appellate jurisdiction . . . .”
Id. (emphasis original).
Here, upon suppression of Tilley’s BA
test result, the Commonwealth was unable to seek relief from
either KRS 22A.020(2), which gives the court of appeals
jurisdiction over interlocutory orders from the circuit court,
or from KRS 23A.080(1), in which a “final” action of the
2
CR 81 states: “Relief heretofore available by the remedies of mandamus,
prohibition . . . may be obtained by original action in the appropriate
court.” KRS 23A.080(2) states: “The Circuit Court may issue all writs
necessary in aid of its appellate jurisdiction . . . .”
3
KRS 22A.020(2) states: “The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to review
interlocutory orders of the Circuit Court in civil cases . . . .”
4
KRS 23A.080(1) states: “A direct appeal may be taken from District Court to
Circuit Court from any final action of the District Court.”
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district court is required before it can directly appeal to the
circuit court.5
Therefore, “the circuit court is without
jurisdiction to take an interlocutory ‘appeal’ from district
court as the proper method of procedure is through an original
action seeking a writ of mandamus or prohibition” by CR 81 and
KRS 23A.080(2).
jurisdiction.
Thus, the circuit court herein acted within its
Williams, 995 S.W.2d at 403.
See also Tipton,
770 S.W.2d at 242.
Even so, appellant argues that the circuit court’s
decision contradicts Eaton, which found that the exclusion of
evidence “does not permit an appellate court to disturb the
discretionary ruling of a trial court” and a writ of prohibition
“is an extraordinary remedy available only in certain narrowly
defined circumstances.
It is not available to control the
discretionary acts of a trial court within its jurisdiction.”
562 S.W.2d at 638-639.
Moreover, appellant contends that we
exceeded our appellate authority by creating “a new rule of law”
in Williams and Tipton.
Thus, appellant is essentially
requesting that this court overturn our previous holdings.
However, the facts of the instant case and those in
Williams and Tipton are readily distinguishable from those in
5
In Lexington Herald-Leader Co. v. Beard, Ky., 690 S.W.2d 374, 376 (1984),
the court held: “The test for determining the appealable character of an
order of the trial court is whether ‘. . . the order grants or denies the
ultimate relief sought in the action or requires further steps to be taken in
order that parties' rights may be finally determined.’" (quoting Evans
Elkhorn Coal Co. v. Ousley, Ky., 388 S.W.2d 130, 130-31 (1965)).
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Eaton.
In Eaton, the Commonwealth appealed a discretionary
ruling of the circuit court, as the trial court, pursuant to KRS
22A.020(4), which allows an appeal from the circuit court to the
court of appeals.
However, in the instant case, the
Commonwealth sought a writ of prohibition by an original action
from the district court to the circuit court since “an appeal is
available only in the instance of a final ruling from district
court” through KRS 23A.080(1).
Williams, 995 S.W.2d at 403.6
Given the procedural differences between the matter herein and
Eaton, we are not willing to disturb our previous holdings.
Next, appellant argues the circuit court erroneously
relied on dicta from Tipton, 770 S.W.2d at 241, which is cited
in Williams, 995 S.W.2d at 403, stating “we equally believe some
vehicle for review of such interlocutory district court rulings
should be available” and “[i]n our opinion, review of district
court rulings is available through an original proceeding for
relief in the nature of mandamus or prohibition in the appellate
court, herein the circuit court.”
However, we find that “should
be” and “in our opinion” are not dicta since the statements
addressed a subject which was “‘necessary to the determination
of the issues raised by the record and considered by the
6
Without holding specifically that writs of prohibition are not permitted for
evidentiary rulings, in Williams, 995 S.W.2d 400, we remanded the circuit
court’s dismissal of the Commonwealth’s writ prohibiting the district court
from suppressing the defendant’s BA test since the circuit court’s holding
was not consistent with the principles in Tipton, 770 S.W.2d 239.
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court.’”
Brown v. Diversified Decorative Plastics, LLC, Ky.
App., 103 S.W.3d 108, 111 (2003) (quoting Utterback’s Adm’r v.
Quick, 230 Ky. 333, 19 S.W.2d 980, 983 (1929)).
Clearly, as set
forth above, the distinctions between KRS 22A.020 and KRS
23A.080 were matters necessary for review by the court in
Tipton, 770 S.W.2d at 241.
Next, appellant and Tilley argue the circuit court
erred by ignoring the foundation requirements for admitting the
BA test result as set forth in Owens, 487 S.W.2d at 900.7
Marcum v. Commonwealth, Ky., 483 S.W.2d 122 (1972).
See
However,
the Kentucky Supreme Court recently modified the foundation
requirements for admitting a BA test and overruled Owens and
Marcum in Commonwealth v. Roberts, Ky., 122 S.W.3d 524, 528
(2003).
The Court’s holding, according to relevant cases,8
statutes9 and administrative regulations,10 was that the
foundation requirements for admission of a breath test are as
follows:
7
Specifically, Owens held: “It is generally held that the prosecution has the
burden of proving tests such as the breathalyzer were correctly administered.
As a minimum this proof must show that the operator was properly trained and
certified to operate the machine and that the machine was in proper working
order and that the test was administered according to standard operating
procedures.” 487 S.W.2d at 900.
8
See Commonwealth v. Wirth, Ky., 936 S.W.2d 78 (1996); Marcum, 483 S.W.2d
122; Owens, 487 S.W.2d 897.
9
See KRS 189A.103(3)(a); KRS 189A.103(4).
10
See 500 KAR 8:020(2); 500 KAR 8:030(2).
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1)
That the machine was properly checked and in
proper working order at the time of conducting
the test.
2)
That the test consist of the steps and the
sequence set forth in 500 KAR 8:030(2).
3)
That the certified operator have continuous
control of the person by present sense impression
for at least twenty minutes prior to the test and
that during the twenty minute period the subject
did not have oral or nasal intake of substances
which will affect the test.
4)
That the test be given by an operator who is
properly trained and certified to operate the
machine.
5)
That the test was performed in accordance
with standard operating procedures.
Roberts, 122 S.W.2d at 528.
Here, appellant specifically argues
that the circuit court failed to find that the BA test was
performed in accordance with standard operating procedures since
the arresting officer failed to follow the directions for using
the simulator attachment issued by the Justice Cabinet.11
Appellant contends that because the manufacturer of the
Intoxilyzer 5000 has not issued instructions for the simulator
attachment, the Justice Cabinet’s direction list should be
considered the “standard operating instructions” requirement as
found in Roberts, 122 S.W.3d at 528.12
See KRS 189A.103(3)(a);
KRS 189A.103(4); and 500 KAR 8:030(2).
11
The directions for use of the simulator component of the Intoxilyzer 5000
state: “Step 1: Push start test button (green) if display not on; verify date
and time. Step 2: Record screen time on test ticket for start of observation
period. Step 3: Check alcohol simulator to ensure lights are on, and paddle
is moving. Step 4: Check tubing and assure warm hoses . . . .”
12
Appellant cites Owens, 487 S.W.2d 897, as authority; however, this
requirement is stated the same in Roberts, 122 S.W.3d at 528.
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It is important that we clarify that the simulator
component is an optional attachment in which Kentucky uses as a
connection to the Intoxilyzer 5000.13
Despite appellant’s
argument that the Justice Cabinet’s list of directions should be
considered the “standard operating procedures,” our legislature
has yet to promulgate universal instructions for the simulator
attachment nor has the Justice Cabinet issued the direction list
outside of its training manual; thus, we are not willing to do
so ourselves.
Therefore, based on Commonwealth v. Davis, Ky.,
25 S.W.3d 106 (2000), we find that any failures in following the
Justice Cabinet’s directions for using the simulator attachment
go to the weight of the evidence, rather than its admissibility.
In Davis, the district court suppressed a BA test
after the machine had registered out of the tolerance reading on
the calibration component therefore not satisfying the standards
in Owens.
Finding that the trial court erred by suppressing the
evidence, the Kentucky Supreme Court held:
The Intoxilyzer test results should be admitted
into evidence, and any problems with the
simulator component of the device should go to
the weight of such evidence, rather than its
admissibility, when the calibration unit and
13
Phillip Lively, employed by the Intoxilyzer manufacturer, testifying at the
suppression hearing stated: “The simulator is a totally separate piece of
equipment from the intoxilyzer itself. The intoxilyzer basically, in its
purest form, is to take an air sample which contains alcohol, calculate the
concentration of alcohol which is in that air sample and render a result
. . . We manufacture and provide the hoses at the request of the State of
Kentucky. The hoses are not a standard piece of equipment that we provide
with all intoxilyzers . . . we do not therefore have any specific operational
requirements nor mandates that even a heated hose be used.”
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testing unit are in proper working order on the
testing date.
Davis, 25 S.W.3d at 108-09 (emphasis added).
Likewise, relying
on Davis, the circuit court held in the present case:
It is this Court’s conclusion that the failures
[of the arresting officer] in the present case go
to the weight of the evidence rather than the
admissibility of the BA evidence. This
conclusion is based on a careful reading of the
transcript of the testimony of Mr. Phillip
Lively, the expert called by the District Court
in this case. His testimony clearly was that the
failure to check these items in the present case
were issues of form over substance and would not
significantly affect the reading or functioning
of the BA. His testimony was that, only under
the most extreme case facts, which do not exist
in this case, would there be any possibility of
an adverse effect on the proper functioning of
the BA.
Finding no evidence in the record to the contrary, we conclude
that the Intoxilyzer 5000 was in proper working order on the
date of testing Tilley and the foundation requirements set forth
in Roberts, 122 S.W.3d at 528, were satisfied.
Problems with
the simulator attachment run to the weight of the evidence,
rather than its admissibility.
Nonetheless, Tilley argues that by suppressing the BA
test the Commonwealth would not be subjected to great injustice
and irreparable harm since it may continue to prosecute the case
as an under the influence case rather than a per se case.
disagree.
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We
Given that the issue presented is one of law, our
review of the appropriateness of the writ of prohibition is not
confined to an abuse of discretion inquiry standard.
Kentucky
Labor Cabinet v. Graham, Ky., 43 S.W.3d 247, 251 (2001).
In
Tipton, we stated that a writ of prohibition should be granted
only upon a showing that:
(1) the lower court is proceeding or is about to
proceed outside of its jurisdiction and there is
no adequate remedy by appeal, or (2) the lower
court is about to act incorrectly, although
within its jurisdiction, and there exists no
adequate remedy by appeal or otherwise and great
injustice and irreparable injury would result.
The issuance of the writ is only under
exceptional circumstances in order to prevent a
miscarriage of justice.
Reasoning laterally, we are also of the opinion
that “in aid of its appellate jurisdiction,” as
found in KRS 23A.080(2), the circuit court
inherently has the power to issue such writs, as
the same was determined in Francis v. Taylor,
Ky., 593 S.W.2d 514 (1980), for the Court of
Appeals when it issues a writ of mandamus.
770 S.W.2d at 241-42 (citations omitted).
See also Southeastern
United Medigroup, Inc. v. Hughes, Ky., 952 S.W.2d 195, 199
(1997).
It follows that the Commonwealth would experience great
injustice and irreparable injury if the BA test were suppressed
given that any problems with the simulator attachment do not
affect the reliability of the Intoxilyzer 5000 machine itself14
14
Phillip Lively, testifying at the suppression hearing, stated: “There are a
number of committees that look at some of the operational aspects of the
instrumentation. One being the National Safety Council Committee on Alcohol
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and even if it did, those problems would adhere to the weight of
the evidence; thus, the circuit court did not err.
Lastly, appellant contends that the Court of Justice
denied him due process of law by failing to provide him funding
for legal counsel and requests an award of $1.00, which should
be drawn on the state treasury.
However, given that neither the
appellant nor this court could find authority supporting this
argument, we are not willing to create a new rule holding
otherwise.
Therefore, the circuit court’s writ of prohibition is
affirmed and the case is remanded to the district court for
further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
BARBER, JUDGE, CONCURS.
SCHRODER, JUDGE, DISSENTS AND FILES SEPARATE OPINION.
SCHRODER, JUDGE, DISSENTING.
“The proper procedure
for appeals from district court is governed by KRS 23A.080, and
therein we see no corollary to KRS 22A.020(4) authorizing an
interlocutory appeal by the Commonwealth.”
Tipton v.
Commonwealth, Ky. App., 770 S.W.2d 239, 241 (1989).
Tipton,
like our case, involved a motion to suppress results from a
Breathalyzer.
Tipton couldn’t be clearer.
There is no
statutory authority for interlocutory appeals of district court
and Drugs. Their recommendation is that an external simulator be used, but
they do not recommend either heating nor non-heated tubing.”
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rulings, only appeals of final orders or judgments.
The Tipton
Court recognized that “the legislature did not authorize
interlocutory orders to be reviewable by direct appeal.”
241.
Id. at
Nevertheless, the Court went on to opine that “some
vehicle for review of such interlocutory district court rulings
should be available.” (Emphasis added.)
Id.
The Court went on
to authorize original actions in circuit court.
This decision
is a direct contradiction of our Supreme Court in Eaton v.
Commonwealth, Ky., 562 S.W.2d 637 (1978), also involving a
pretrial motion to suppress and the Commonwealth’s desire for an
interlocutory appeal.15
Finding no statutory authority, the
Commonwealth sought a writ of prohibition.
Our Supreme Court,
our highest court, stated:
The order of prohibition is an extraordinary
remedy available only in certain narrowly
defined circumstances. It is not available
to control the discretionary acts of a trial
court within its jurisdiction. In this case
the trial court was ruling upon the
admissibility of evidence. That was a
matter clearly within his jurisdiction. The
fact that his ruling may have been erroneous
does not remove the jurisdictional basis for
his action. The court many years ago
stated:
“No question is better settled in this
jurisdiction than that the writ of
prohibition will not lie to restrain an
inferior court from acting within its
jurisdiction, however erroneous its action
may be; and this is true although the party
15
This was from a circuit court decision, before interlocutory appeals from
circuit court were authorized.
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seeking the writ is without right of
appeal.”
Id. at 638.
(Citations omitted.)
See also, Commonwealth v.
Williams, Ky. App., 995 S.W.2d 400 (1999), which flies in the
face of Eaton.
Eaton, 562 S.W.2d at 639, also discussed the
significance of the fact that no remedy was available to the
Commonwealth and the alleged improper exclusion of evidence
could result in a dismissal of the Commonwealth’s case.
The
Supreme Court responded:
this possibility does not permit an
appellate court to disturb the discretionary
ruling of a trial court acting within its
jurisdiction. The United States Supreme
Court has said:
“Nor are the considerations against
appealability made less compelling as to
orders granting motions to suppress, by the
fact that the Government has no later right
to appeal when and if the loss of evidence
forces dismissal of its case.” Dibella v.
U.S., 369 U.S. 121, 82 S. Ct. 654, 7 L. Ed.
2d 614 (1962).
Eaton at 639.
Our Supreme Court, and the United States Supreme
Court, recognized some cases will be dismissed.
Court of Appeals?
Why can’t the
The General Assembly can correct the
situation if it is of the opinion that there should be a
district court/circuit court corollary to KRS 22A.020(4), which
was enacted in 1976 (H.B. 432).
For these reasons, I would
dismiss the appeal, realizing the other issues become moot.
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BRIEF FOR APPELLANT JUDGE
STANLEY M. BILLINGSLEY:
Judge Stanley M. Billingsley
Carroll District Court
Carrollton, Kentucky
BRIEF FOR REAL PARTY IN
INTEREST GARY TILLEY:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
James C. Monk
Carroll County Attorney
Carrollton, Kentucky
A. B. Chandler III
Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
Edward M. Bourne
Owenton, Kentucky
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