MICHAEL A. KLEINHENZ, EXECUTOR OF THE ESTATE OF ALVIN J. KLEINHENZ; AND MARGARET M. KLEINHENZ v. QUIGLEY COMPANY, INC.
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RENDERED: NOVEMBER 7, 2003; 2:00 P.M.
ORDERED NOT PUBLISHED BY THE KENTUCKY SUPREME COURT:
AUGUST 18, 2004 (2004-SC-0175-D)
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2002-CA-001328-MR
MICHAEL A. KLEINHENZ,
EXECUTOR OF THE ESTATE
OF ALVIN J. KLEINHENZ;
AND MARGARET M. KLEINHENZ
v.
APPELLANTS
APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE LISABETH HUGHES ABRAMSON, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 01-CI-004776
QUIGLEY COMPANY, INC.
APPELLEE
OPINION
VACATING AND REMANDING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
BARBER, McANULTY, AND TACKETT, JUDGES.
BARBER, JUDGE: The Appellants, Michael Kleinhenz, Executor of
the Estate of Alvin J. Kleinhenz, and Margaret Kleinhenz
(“Kleinhenz”), seek review of a summary judgment of the
Jefferson Circuit Court in favor of the Appellee, Quigley
Company, Inc. (“Quigley”), in this asbestos claim.
Kleinhenz
contends that the trial court erred, by not affording the
opportunity to complete discovery, and by failing to adhere to
its own deadlines set forth in the asbestos litigation master
order.
We vacate and remand.
On July 12, 2001, Alvin J. and Margaret Kleinhenz filed
a complaint in the Jefferson Circuit Court against Quigley, and
others, alleging that Alvin Kleinhenz had contracted asbestosrelated diseases as a result of his occupational exposure to
asbestos products manufactured or sold by the defendants.
July 12, 2001, a Master Order was entered, stating that:
Pursuant to CR 42 and in the interests of justice
and judicial economy IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that
all asbestos personal injury lawsuits, as defined
herein, shall be governed by this Master Order.
I. SCOPE OF MASTER ORDER. Asbestos personal
injury litigation shall be defined to include all
personal injury lawsuits, filed in Jefferson
Circuit Court, alleging injury as a result of
exposure to asbestos or asbestos-containing
products. The purpose of this Master Order is to
consolidate discovery and other matters as stated
herein which are common to all asbestos personal
injury litigation and to facilitate and expedite
trials in these cases. This Master Order shall
be deemed to be entered in each asbestos personal
injury lawsuit and a copy shall be placed in each
individual case file by the Clerk.
II. ASBESTOS DOCKET MANAGEMENT.
A. Trials. Asbestos personal injury lawsuits
shall be scheduled for trial according to the
following guidelines.
1. Scheduling of Trial Groups. The Asbestos
Administrative Judge shall identify and schedule
individual cases for trial in trial groups
pursuant to scheduling orders entered no later
than eleven months prior to the trial date. . . .
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. . . .
IV. DISCOVERY. In addition to the discovery
requirements imposed by the Civil Rules of
Procedure, this Master Order imposes additional
deadlines for disclosure of information particular
to asbestos personal injury litigation. Failure
to meet these deadlines may result in exclusion at
trial of the untimely disclosed evidence. Relief
from these deadlines will only be granted for good
cause.
. . . .
B.
Disclosure of Witnesses
1. Product Identification Witnesses. Parties
shall designate in writing all product
identification witnesses. A product
identification witness is anyone who will identify
a particular asbestos-containing product or the
manufacturer, distributor, installer or remover of
asbestos or asbestos-containing products.
a. Disclosure Deadline. Plaintiff shall
disclose these witnesses 150 days before trial.
Defendants shall disclose their witnesses 105 days
before trial. No additional product
identification witnesses shall be added without
good cause shown.
In the case sub judice no trial date had been set when
summary judgment was entered for Quigley on May 21, 2002 –
approximately ten months after the Complaint was filed.
Alvin Kleinhenz died on November 5, 2001.
On January
9, 2002, Michael Kleinhenz was appointed Executor of the Estate.
On January 23, 2002, the trial court granted leave to file an
amended complaint, substituting the Estate as plaintiff.
February 2, 2002, Quigley filed an answer to the amended
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complaint.
On February 26, 2002, Kleinhenz filed answers to
Quigley’s discovery request.
On April 2, 2002, Quigley filed a motion for summary
judgment, on grounds that Kleinhenz could not prove exposure to
its products.
On April 26, 2002, Kleinhenz filed a response,
including documentation that Quigley had produced asbestoscontaining products and an affidavit from Harry M. Tretter.
Tretter was formerly a bricklayer superintendent and part-owner
of J. Gordon English, a company that had used “Quigley Company’s
Panelag Refractory Cement on a frequent basis during the 1950’s
until the 1970’s.”
Tretter’s affidavit lists numerous job sites
where he worked, including General Electric, Kleinhenz’s former
employer.
Tretter explained that Quigley’s Panelag cement was
used for many purposes, including covering pipe insulation and
smoothing joints and seams of block insulation, and that it
created a visible dust when mixed, used and applied.
Kleinhenz also submitted a consult report from Douglas
A. Pohl, M.D., who had performed an examination on July 17,
2001.
History related was that Kleinhenz had worked at
Louisville & Nashville Railroad from 1946-67; at International
Harvester from 1947-52; at Reynolds Metals from 1952-55; and at
General Electric from 1955-85 “with exposure to asbestos.”
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Dr.
Pohl opined that Mr. Kleinhenz’s tumor was a malignant pleural
mesothelioma, and explained that:
Prior to the twentieth century, mesothelioma was
an exceedingly rare cancer whose existence was
sometimes questioned. This reflects the protected
nature of the pleural space, a space that is
normally inaccessible to environmental
carcinogens. The use of asbestos would change all
that. Asbestos, a mineral fiber mined from the
earth, was used in increasing amounts in
industrial applications where thermal insulation
and thermally resistant binders were required.
Asbestos was inexpensive and readily manufactured
into a variety of different products.
Unfortunately, asbestos products released
particles of aerodynamic asbestos dust that could
be breathed by individuals in the vicinity of the
product. By 1924, it was recognized that the
inhalation of asbestos dust could produce a
progressive and often fatal fibrosis of the lungs
called asbestosis. In the 1930’s asbestos was
also found to cause lung cancer. In the 1940’s,
reports began to appear linking asbestos exposure
to mesothelioma. In 1953, Weiss published his
belief that mesothelioma was an asbestos related
cancer. Weiss’ assertion is widely accepted
today. In fact, asbestos is recognized as cause
of more than 95% of all cases of mesothelioma
worldwide.
Asbestos produces mesothelioma through its
transmigration from the lungs into the pleural
space. . . .
No other carcinogen has yet been identified that
is capable of naturally accessing the pleural
space as does asbestos. For this reason, asbestos
is in large part the only cause of mesothelioma.
Knowing that a patient suffers from a
mesothelioma, a careful examination of the
patient’s occupational history will inevitably
uncover the individual’s past exposure to asbestos
dust. In Mr. Kleinhenz’s case, he had worked in
occupational settings where he was exposed to
considerable asbestos dust. As a result, Mr.
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Kleinhenz breathed asbestos dust over a long
period of time.
As reflected in the published literature, this
type of exposure was more than sufficient to
produce Mr. Kleinhenz’s mesothelioma.
Based upon a reasonable medical probability, Dr. Pohl
opined that “Mr. Kleinhenz’s occupational exposure to asbestos
was the specific cause of his incurable pleural mesothelioma.”
On April 26, 2002, Kleinhenz also filed a “Request for
Admissions, Interrogatories and Request for Production of
Documents to Defendant, Quigley.”
On April 29, 2002, a hearing was held on the motion for
summary judgment.
Despite its apparent conviction that Quigley
would “get” its motion for summary judgment, the trial court
declined to grant the motion at the hearing.
“There’s just
enough there in the Tretter affidavit that I’m not going to sign
off on your motion for summary today.”
The trial court was not
prepared to throw the case out “in the initial stages in terms of
discovery.” Instead, the trial court gave Kleinhenz two weeks to
find out what Tretter would say and schedule his deposition.
On May 1, 2002, the court entered the following Order
that provides in relevant part:
Plaintiff’s counsel shall ascertain whether or not
witness Harry Tretter can offer testimony
sufficient to overcome Defendant Quigley’s Motion
for summary Judgment. If Plaintiff’s counsel
believes in good faith that Mr. Tretter can offer
such testimony, then Plaintiff’s counsel shall
schedule, with Counsel for Quigley Company, the
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deposition of Harry Tretter. This determination
shall be made, and either the deposition scheduled
or the Court advised that it will not be
scheduled, within two weeks of this Order. The
deposition of this witness, or any other product
identification witness named in the next two
weeks, and any supplementation of discovery
related to product identification, shall occur
within 90 days of this Order.
As the Court advised the parties on the record,
without testimony linking this Plaintiff in time
and location to an asbestos-containing product
manufactured by the Defendant, Quigley, summary
judgment will be entered in favor of Quigley
Company.
On May 21, 2002, the trial court entered an order
granting summary judgment in favor of Quigley.
On June 18, 2002, Kleinhenz filed a notice of appeal
to this Court.
On appeal, Kleinhenz contends that summary
judgment was entered before the opportunity to complete discovery
was afforded, and that the trial court failed to adhere to the
discovery practices and deadlines set forth in the master order
entered on May 1, 2002.
The standard of review on appeal of a summary judgment
is whether the trial court correctly found that there were no
genuine issues as to any material fact and that the moving party
was entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
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There is no
requirement that we defer to the trial court, because factual
findings are not at issue.1
Kleinhenz cites numerous decisions in support of the
argument that summary judgment was premature, because discovery
was not complete.
Quigley relies upon Welch v. American
Publishing,2 for the proposition that the focus should be on what
is in the record at the time of the motion, rather than what
could be presented at trial.
Welch involved the review of an
adverse judgment in a defamation lawsuit brought by a defeated
mayoral candidate against the publishers of a political
advertisement.
There, the record was devoid of “any hint” that
the defendants had any doubts about the truth of the published
statements.
Focusing our attention on what was in the record at the
time of Quigley’s motion, we see that the trial court would not
grant the motion, because there was “enough” in Tretter’s
affidavit to withstand summary judgment.
Nevertheless, the
trial court gave Kleinhenz only two weeks to name and schedule
the depositions of product identification witnesses.
1
2
Scifres v. Kraft, Ky. App., 916 S.W.2d 779, 781 (1996).
3 S.W.3d 724 (1999).
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We conclude that two weeks, under the facts of this
case, was not a reasonable amount of time.
On May 21, 2002,
when the trial court entered summary judgment, Quigley’s
response to Kleinhenz’s pending discovery request had not been
filed and was not yet due.
The time to identify a product
identification witness under the master order (150 days for the
plaintiff) had not started to run.
This was an abuse of
discretion.
Moreover, in determining that there was “enough” in
Tretter’s affidavit, the trial court implicitly concluded that
Quigley, as the moving party, had failed to negate Kleinhenz’s
claim.
At that point, the trial court should have simply denied
Quigley’s motion for summary judgment.
Instead, the trial court
delayed its ruling and directed Kleinhenz to come up with
additional proof.
In so doing, the trial court effectively
shifted the burden of proof to Kleinhenz, the opponent of the
motion.
This was error.
A summary judgment must be cautiously
granted. “The courts hold the movant to a strict
standard. To satisfy his burden the movant must
make a showing that is quite clear what the truth
is, and that excludes any real doubt as to the
existence of any genuine issue of material fact.
Since it is not the function of the trial court to
adjudicate genuine factual issues at the hearing
on the motion for summary judgment, in ruling on
the motion all inferences of fact from the proofs
proffered at the hearing must be drawn against the
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movant and in favor of the party opposing the
motion,” Moore's Federal Practice, Vol. 6, pages
2124, 2125, and again at page 2128: “On motion for
summary judgment by a defendant on the ground that
plaintiff has no valid claim, the defendant, as
the moving party, has the burden of producing
evidence of the necessary certitude, which
negatives the opposing party’s (plaintiff’s)
claim. This is true because the burden to show
that there is no genuine issue of material fact
rests on the party moving for summary judgment,
whether he or his opponent would at trial have the
burden of proof on the issue concerned * * *.”
(Emphasis added.)3
Accordingly, we vacate and remand for completion of
discovery and further proceedings in accordance with the master
order and the Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Kenneth L. Sales
Joseph D. Satterley
Louisville, Kentucky
Stephen M. Bowers
Atlanta, Georgia
3
Hoskins' Adm'r v. Kentucky Ridge Coal Co., Ky., 277 S.W.2d
57, 58-59 (1955).
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