DANIEL K. COYLE v. STEVEN C. SCHWARTZ and STEVEN CRAIG SCHWARTZ v. DANIEL K. COYLE; AND AMERICAN SCALE CORPORATION
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RENDERED:
March 26, 2004; 2:00 p.m.
ORDERED NOT PUBLISHED BY THE KENTUCKY SUPREME COURT:
February 9, 2005 (2004-SC-0333-D)
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2002-CA-001287-MR
DANIEL K. COYLE
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE THOMAS J. KNOPF, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 00-CI-007628
STEVEN C. SCHWARTZ
AND
APPELLEE
NO.
STEVEN CRAIG SCHWARTZ
v.
2002-CA-001574-MR
CROSS-APPELLANT
CROSS-APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE THOMAS J. KNOPF, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 00-CI-007628
DANIEL K. COYLE; AND
AMERICAN SCALE CORPORATION
CROSS-APPELLEES
OPINION
AFFIRMING IN PART AND
REVERSING IN PART
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: JOHNSON AND McANULTY, JUDGES; AND JOHN D. MILLER,
SENIOR JUDGE.1
JOHNSON, JUDGE:
Daniel K. Coyle has appealed from an opinion
and order of the Jefferson Circuit Court entered on May 15,
2002, which held that the trial court’s previous orders entered
on December 12, 2001, and March 4, 2002, were final and
appealable.
Steven C. Schwartz has cross-appealed from that
same order.
On December 12, 2001, the trial court entered an
order granting Coyle’s motion for summary judgment in part,
finding that the stock-transfer agreement and cross-purchase
agreement between Coyle and Schwartz were valid and enforceable.
In that same order, the trial court granted Schwartz’s motion
for partial summary judgment, finding that the stock-valuation
provision in the cross-purchase agreement was unenforceable as a
penalty.
On March 4, 2002, the trial court denied Coyle’s
motion to alter, amend, or vacate that portion of the trial
court’s December 12, 2001, order which held that the stockvaluation provision was unenforceable.
Having concluded that
the share-transfer agreement and cross-purchase agreement were
valid and enforceable, we affirm that portion of the trial
1
Senior Judge John D. Miller sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the
Chief Justice pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and
KRS 21.580.
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court’s order granting Coyle’s motion for summary judgment on
those issues.
Having concluded that the stock-valuation
provision was also valid and enforceable, we reverse that
portion of the trial court’s order granting Schwartz’s motion
for partial summary judgment on that issue.
American Scale Corporation, a closely-held Kentucky
corporation with its principal place of business in Louisville,
Kentucky, was incorporated in February 1985.2
Coyle (president
of American Scale) and Schwartz (vice-president of American
Scale) were and are American Scale’s sole shareholders.
At the
time of incorporation, Coyle and Schwartz each received 200
shares of stock in exchange for their capital contributions of
$10,000.00.
In early March 1986 Schwartz was involved in an
automobile accident in which his passenger was seriously
injured.
Schwartz’s passenger filed suit against American
Scale, since it was the party that had provided insurance
coverage on Schwartz’s vehicle.
Following the accident, Coyle
became concerned that Schwartz’s activities would expose
American Scale to further liability.3
As a result, Coyle
informed Schwartz that he no longer desired to be in a 50-50
2
American Scale is a business involved in the sale and repair of industrial
and commercial scales.
3
According to Coyle’s brief, he was particularly displeased with Schwartz’s
actions in transporting an underage female, who was purportedly Schwartz’s
girlfriend, in a vehicle insured by American Scale.
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shareholder relationship with him.
Coyle told Schwartz that
unless Schwartz agreed to transfer 1% of his shares to Coyle,
thereby permitting Coyle to assume majority control of American
Scale, Coyle would either seek a dissolution of American Scale,
or withdraw and begin operating a business in competition with
American Scale.
On March 21, 1986, Coyle and Schwartz executed a
share-transfer agreement wherein Schwartz transferred 1% of his
American Scale shares to Coyle.
The agreement specifically
stated that Coyle would thereafter own a 51% interest in
American Scale, leaving Schwartz as owner of the remaining 49%
of American Scale’s shares.
Approximately two years later, on August 25, 1988,
Coyle and Schwartz executed a written “Stockholders’ CrossPurchase Agreement.”
The cross-purchase agreement provided a
mechanism for the repurchase of a shareholders’ stock in the
event of death, disability, or voluntary withdrawal of that
shareholder.
Specifically, the agreement stated that if Coyle
or Schwartz died, or otherwise attempted to dispose of their
shares, the other shareholder would have the right to purchase
those shares (share-transfer restriction).
In addition, the
cross-purchase agreement gave the majority shareholder an option
to purchase all of the minority shareholder’s stock at any time
upon 60-days written notice (majority-purchase option).
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With respect to both the share-transfer restriction
and the majority-purchase option, the agreement provided a
stock-valuation method for determining a per share price in the
event either of the provisions were triggered.
The stock-
valuation provision of the cross-purchase agreement read in
pertinent part as follows:
Unless altered as herein provided, for
the purpose of determining the purchase
price to be paid for the stock of a
Stockholder, the fair market value of each
share of stock shall be, as of [August 25,
1988], $250.00.
The Stockholders shall redetermine the
value of the stock within 60 days following
the end of each fiscal year. . . . If the
Stockholders fail to make the required
annual redetermination of value for a
particular year, the last previously
recorded value shall control.
Over the course of the next 12 years, neither Coyle
nor Schwartz ever initiated proceedings to revaluate the price
of American Scale’s shares as provided in the cross-purchase
agreement.
Hence, the initial price of $250.00 per share was
never revalued pursuant to the cross-purchase agreement.
In a letter dated November 20, 2000, Coyle informed
Schwartz that he was exercising the majority-purchase option.
The letter stated, inter alia, that “the purchase price to be
paid for [Schwartz’s] stock [was] $250.00 per share.”
On
November 27, 2000, after refusing to tender his shares to Coyle
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for the price specified in Coyle’s letter, Schwartz filed a
complaint in the Jefferson Circuit Court, naming Coyle and
American Scale as defendants.
Schwartz sought an order
compelling Coyle and American Scale to allow Schwartz to inspect
various books and records of the corporation.
On November 29,
2000, Schwartz filed an amended complaint seeking, among other
things, a declaration of rights4 regarding the validity of the
cross-purchase agreement as a whole or any part thereof.
On January 24, 2001, Coyle filed an answer to
Schwartz’s amended complaint, and added a counterclaim for a
declaration of rights and specific performance.
In his
counterclaim, Coyle asked for an order compelling Schwartz to
transfer all of his shares to Coyle at a price of $250.00 per
share.5
Over the course of the next several months, Coyle filed
a motion for summary judgment and Schwartz filed a motion for
partial summary judgment.
4
In Coyle’s motion for summary
See Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) 418.040.
5
On February 5, 2001, the trial court entered an order permitting Schwartz to
file a second amended complaint, which added a shareholder’s derivative
claim. Schwartz alleged that Coyle had engaged in a variety of improper
activities that harmed American Scale, such as paying himself excessive
compensation and borrowing money from the corporation without repaying it.
On June 21, 2001, the trial court entered an order permitting Schwartz to
file a third amended complaint, wherein he added a breach of fiduciary duty
claim and an intentional infliction of emotional distress claim against
Coyle, and a retaliatory discharge claim against Coyle and American Scale.
In an order entered on December 12, 2001, the trial court ruled that
Schwartz’s claims of wrongdoing on the part of Coyle which occurred prior to
November 27, 1995, were time-barred pursuant to KRS 413.120(2). Schwartz has
not appealed from that ruling. While some of Schwartz’s remaining claims are
still pending before the trial court, they are not relevant to the issues in
this appeal.
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judgment, he sought, inter alia, a determination that the
parties’ March 21, 1986, share-transfer agreement and August 25,
1988, cross-purchase agreement were valid and enforceable.
Coyle also sought an order compelling Schwartz to transfer his
shares to Coyle at a price of $250.00 per share pursuant to the
cross-purchase agreement.
In Schwartz’s motion for partial
summary judgment, he sought a determination that the stockvaluation provision, which listed a stock price of $250.00 per
share, was unenforceable as a penalty.
On December 12, 2001, after a significant amount of
discovery had taken place, the trial court entered an order
addressing the pending cross-motions for summary judgment.
The
trial court ruled that the parties’ March 21, 1986, sharetransfer agreement was supported by valuable consideration, and
was therefore enforceable.
Hence, the trial court found that
Coyle was the majority shareholder of American Scale (owner of
51% of the stock) and that Schwartz was the minority shareholder
(owner of 49% of the stock).
Further, the trial court ruled that the parties’
August 25, 1988, cross-purchase agreement was valid, and that
Coyle, as majority shareholder, had the right under the
majority-purchase option to buy all of Schwartz’s stock upon
proper written notice.
However, the trial court found that
forcing Schwartz to sell all of his stock at the price of
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$250.00 per share would constitute a penalty.
Thus, the trial
court ruled that the stock-valuation provision listing a price
of $250.00 per share was unenforceable, and ordered that a
current valuation of the stock must be undertaken before
Schwartz could be compelled to transfer his shares.
Therefore,
Coyle’s motion for summary judgment was granted in part and
denied in part, and Schwartz’s motion for partial summary
judgment as to the validity of the stock-valuation provision was
granted.
On December 21, 2001, Coyle filed a motion to alter,
amend, or vacate that portion of the trial court’s order which
held that Coyle could not compel Schwartz to transfer his stock
at the price of $250.00 per share.
On March 4, 2002, the trial
court entered an order denying Coyle’s motion to alter, amend,
or vacate.
On March 7, 2002, Coyle filed a motion to certify
the trial court’s December 12, 2001, and March 4, 2002, orders
as final and appealable under CR6 54.02.
A hearing on this
motion was held on April 25, 2002, after which the trial court
entered an order granting Coyle’s motion to certify on May 15,
2002.
Coyle’s appeal and Schwartz’s cross-appeal followed.
Summary judgment is only proper “where the movant
shows that the adverse party could not prevail under any
6
Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure.
-8-
circumstances.”7
The trial court is required to view the record
“in a light most favorable to the party opposing the motion for
summary judgment and all doubts are to be resolved in his
favor.”8
As this Court has previously stated, “[t]he standard of
review on appeal of a summary judgment is whether the trial
court correctly found that there were no genuine issues as to
any material fact and that the moving party was entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.
There is no requirement that the
appellate court defer to the trial court since factual findings
are not at issue” [citations omitted].9
We first address Schwartz’s claim on his cross-appeal
that the trial court erred by finding that the parties’ March
21, 1986, share-transfer agreement was supported by valuable
consideration and enforceable, whereby Coyle became a majority
shareholder in American Scale.
Specifically, Schwartz argues:
In his [b]rief, Coyle claims that “in
consideration of Coyle’s agreement to both
forebear from seeking a dissolution of
American Scale and thereafter continue his
involvement in the operation of the
corporation,” Schwartz and Coyle entered
into the [share-transfer agreement].
According to the express terms of the
[share-transfer agreement], however, Coyle
made no such promise and did not agree to
7
Steelvest, Inc. v. Scansteel Service Center, Inc., Ky., 807 S.W.2d 476, 480
(1991) (citing Paintsville Hospital Co. v. Rose, Ky., 683 S.W.2d 255 (1985)).
8
Steelvest, supra, (citing Dossett v. New York Mining & Manufacturing Co.,
Ky., 451 S.W.2d 843 (1970)).
9
Scifres v. Kraft, Ky.App., 916 S.W.2d 779, 781 (1996).
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forebear from anything. Without such a
promise . . . there was no consideration for
the [share-transfer agreement] and therefore
it was invalid [citations to record
omitted].
According to Schwartz, since the share-transfer
agreement did not expressly recite Coyle’s promise to forebear
from seeking a dissolution of the corporation, Coyle was at
liberty to initiate a dissolution at anytime.
Thus, Schwartz
argues that Coyle suffered no detriment under the share-transfer
agreement, and that Schwartz is therefore not bound by the terms
of the agreement.
In a related argument, Schwartz also argues
that the parol evidence rule prohibited the trial court from
considering extrinsic evidence apart from the written agreement
in determining whether the share-transfer agreement was
supported by valuable consideration.
We disagree and reject
both of Schwartz’s arguments.
Section 218 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts,10
provides in pertinent part as follows:
(2) Evidence is admissible to prove whether
or not there is consideration for a promise,
even though the parties have reduced their
agreement to a writing which appears to be a
completely integrated agreement.
Comment d to Section 218 states:
Omission of consideration. Where a written
agreement requires consideration and none is
stated in the writing, a finding that the
10
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 218 (1981).
-10-
writing is a completely integrated agreement
would mean that it is not binding for want
of consideration. Since only a binding
integrated agreement brings the parol
evidence rule into operation, evidence is
admissible to show that there was
consideration and what it was.
Further, in Apple v. McCullough,11 the former Court of Appeals
stated that “‘it is always competent to inquire into the
consideration and show by parol or other extrinsic evidence what
the real consideration was.’”
Hence, even though the parties’ March 21, 1986, sharetransfer agreement did not specifically recite Coyle’s promise
to forebear from seeking a dissolution of American Scale, this
omission does not preclude the parties from being bound by the
agreement if, via extrinsic evidence, it is shown that valuable
consideration supports the agreement.
In the case sub judice, the trial court specifically
found that Coyle agreed not to sell his stock and/or seek a
dissolution of the corporation in exchange for Schwartz’s
agreement to transfer 1% of his stock to Coyle.
not challenged this factual finding on appeal.
Schwartz has
It is well-
established that a promise to refrain from doing that which an
individual has a right to do can constitute valuable
11
239 Ky. 74, 38 S.W.2d 955, 956 (1931)(quoting 22 C.J. 1157, § 1555).
-11-
consideration.12
Schwartz has conceded that Coyle had the right
to seek a dissolution of the corporation absent an agreement to
the contrary.
Therefore, the parties’ March 21, 1986, share-
transfer agreement was supported by valuable consideration.
Accordingly, the trial court did not err by finding that the
parties’ share-transfer agreement was supported by valuable
consideration and enforceable, and that subsequent to the
execution of the share-transfer agreement, Coyle became the
majority shareholder in American Scale.
As a final basis for his argument that the sharetransfer agreement was not supported by consideration, Schwartz
claims that Coyle’s promise to forebear from seeking a
dissolution of the corporation in exchange for Schwartz’s
agreement to transfer 1% of his shares, was nothing but a mere
“threat,” and should not be deemed valuable consideration on
public policy grounds.
We disagree.
The ownership of a controlling interest in a
corporation is a valuable asset.
“The stockholders holding a
majority of the capital stock of a corporation have the right to
determine the policy to be pursued and to manage and direct the
corporation’s affairs, and the minority must submit to their
judgment so long as the majority act in good faith and within
12
See Luigart v. Federal Parquatry Mfg. Co., 194 Ky. 213, 238 S.W. 758, 76061 (1922).
-12-
the limitation of the law” [footnotes omitted].13
Hence, a
shareholder who does not own a controlling interest in the
corporation, and who may be concerned over the corporation’s
recent affairs, has a legitimate reason to acquire a controlling
interest in the business.
In the instant case, the trial court found that Coyle
had a legitimate, good-faith reason for seeking a controlling
interest in American Scale, i.e., Coyle had lost confidence in
Schwartz’s judgment.14
Schwartz has not challenged this finding
by the trial court on appeal.
Accordingly, we conclude that
Coyle’s promise to forebear from seeking a dissolution of
American Scale in exchange for Schwartz’s agreement to transfer
1% of his shares to Coyle, constituted valuable consideration
and does not violate public policy.
Accordingly, we affirm the
trial court’s granting of summary judgment in favor of Coyle on
the issue of the validity of the share-transfer agreement.
Having concluded that the share-transfer agreement was
valid and enforceable, we now turn to Schwartz’s claim in his
cross-appeal that the August 25, 1988, cross-purchase agreement
is invalid.
The cross-purchase agreement executed by Coyle and
Schwartz contained a majority-purchase option, entitling the
majority shareholder to purchase all of the minority
13
18A Am.Jur.2d Corporations § 762 (Supp. 2003).
14
A finding of a good-faith reason may not have been necessary.
Am.Jur.2d Corporations § 763 (1985).
-13-
See 18A
shareholder’s stock upon 60-days written notice.
As we stated
above, after the execution of the share-transfer agreement,
Coyle became the majority shareholder in American Scale.
Hence,
Coyle had the option to purchase all of Schwartz’s shares upon
60-days written notice.
Schwartz claims that there was no consideration
supporting the majority-purchase option provision and that the
trial court erred by finding that particular provision to be
enforceable.
We disagree.
There is no requirement that each
provision of a contract be supported by separate, independent
consideration.15
“It is sufficient if the overall agreement has
a consideration.”16
In the case at bar, the cross-purchase
agreement as a whole was supported by valuable consideration.
Prior to the execution of the cross-purchase
agreement, Coyle and Schwartz were free to dispose of their
shares in any manner they desired.
However, the cross-purchase
agreement placed a significant limitation on each party’s
ability to dispose of their respective shares.
The share-
transfer restriction provided that if either Coyle or Schwartz
died or otherwise attempted to dispose of their shares, the
other would have the right to purchase those shares.
15
Stiles v. Reda, 312 Ky. 562, 564, 228 S.W.2d 455, 456 (1950).
16
Hamrick v. City of Ashland, Ky., 321 S.W.2d 401, 403 (1959).
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Thus, in addition to receiving a benefit under the
share-transfer restriction, i.e., Coyle and Schwartz were
virtually assured that an outsider to the corporation would be
unable to seize control, both Coyle and Schwartz also suffered a
detriment in the sense that they could not freely dispose of
their respective shares.
The presence of benefits and
concomitant detriments in the parties’ agreement constituted the
essence of the consideration.17
Thus, since the cross-purchase
agreement was supported by valuable consideration, the trial
court did not err by finding that the majority-purchase option
provision was enforceable.
Accordingly, we affirm the trial
court’s granting of summary judgment in favor of Coyle on the
issue of the validity of the majority-purchase option.
The cross-purchase agreement also contained a stockvaluation provision.
In his appeal, Coyle argues that the trial
court erred by finding that the stock-valuation provision was
unenforceable as a penalty.
Specifically, Coyle claims that Man
O’ War Restaurants, Inc. v. Martin,18 the case relied upon by the
trial court in ruling that the stock-valuation provision was
17
See Phillips v. Phillips, 294 Ky. 323, 335, 171 S.W.2d 458, 464
(1943)(defining consideration as “‘[a] benefit to the party promising, or a
loss or detriment to the party to whom the promise is made. “Benefit,” as
thus employed, means that the promisor has, in return for his promise,
acquired some legal right to which he would not otherwise have been entitled.
And “detriment” means that the promisee has, in return for the promise,
forborne some legal right which he otherwise would have been entitled to
exercise’”)(quoting Luigart, 238 S.W. at 760).
18
Ky., 932 S.W.2d 366 (1996).
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unenforceable, is distinguishable from the facts of the case at
bar and does not compel a finding that the stock-valuation
provision was unenforceable as a penalty.
We agree.
In Man O’ War, the provision at issue required a
shareholder/employee to return his stock to the corporation if
his employment with the corporation was terminated.
In the
event of termination, the provision stated that the
shareholder/employee would receive the price he originally paid
for his shares in exchange for the return of his stock.
Our
Supreme Court held that this provision was unenforceable,
stating that a provision which called for the return of stock at
the price paid without regard to the stock’s actual value was an
unenforceable penalty.19
However, the facts of the case sub
judice are distinguishable and Man O’ War is not controlling.
Unlike the provision in question in Man O’ War, Coyle
and Schwartz were not bound by a fixed price under the terms of
their cross-purchase agreement.
Rather, the agreement that
Coyle and Schwartz entered into provided that the “mutual
agreement” method would control the valuation of American
Scale’s stock if the majority shareholder exercised the
majority-purchase option.
stock each year.
The parties agreed to revaluate the
If no revaluation took place in a given year,
the parties agreed that the last recorded value would control.
19
Id. at 368.
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This “mutual agreement” method was expressly recognized as a
permissible valuation method by our Supreme Court in Man O’
War.20
While Coyle and Schwartz never revaluated the stock, this
fact alone does not render the provision unenforceable.
In Concord Auto Auction, Inc. v. Rustin,21 the United
States District Court for the District of Massachusetts was
presented with an analogous situation.
In Rustin, the
administrator of a deceased shareholder’s estate refused to
transfer the decedent’s shares back to the corporation as called
for in the repurchase agreement following the shareholder’s
death.
Although the repurchase agreement had called for an
annual revaluation of the stock, no revaluation had taken place
prior to the decedent shareholder’s death.
The administrator
argued, inter alia, that the “mutual agreement” valuation
provision should not be enforced since the actual value of the
stock was much higher than the value that had originally been
listed in the repurchase agreement.
In rejecting the
administrator’s argument, the Court stated:
[T]he Court rules that the purchase prices
were carefully set, fair when established,
evidenced by an Agreement binding all
parties equally to the same terms without
20
Id. at 368-69 (stating that “[p]arties are allowed to agree
financial valuation under the ‘mutual agreement’ method which
parties to agree to an initial fixed value for the stock, but
the parties at defined intervals (after six months, one year)
prior agreement to adjust the valuation to reflect changes in
market value”).
21
627 F.Supp. 1526 (D.Mass. 1986).
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upon a
allows the
requires that
revisit their
the actual
any indication that any one sibling would
reap a windfall. The courts may not rewrite
a shareholder’s agreement under the guise of
relieving one of the parties from the
hardship of an improvident bargain. The
Court cannot protect the parties from a bad
bargain and it will not protect them from
bad luck. Cox, the party whose estate is
aggrieved, had while alive every opportunity
to call the annual meeting and persuade his
sisters to revalue their stock. Sad though
the situation be, sadness is not the
touchstone of contract interpretation
[citations omitted].22
We find this reasoning of the federal district court
to be persuasive.
Schwartz, as owner of 49% of American Scale’s
outstanding shares, had the right under the corporation’s bylaws
to call for a special meeting to revaluate the listed price of
American Scale’s shares.
Schwartz has admitted in his
deposition testimony that he never made such a request.
Hence,
by sitting on his rights for over 12 years, Schwartz took the
risk that Coyle would exercise the majority-purchase option at a
time when the actual value of American Scale’s shares was in
excess of the $250.00 price originally listed in the stockvaluation provision.
Schwartz is not entitled to have the
courts rewrite the parties’ agreement simply because he believes
he is receiving the short end of the bargain.23
22
Accordingly, we
Id. at 1531-32.
23
See also 18A Am.Jur.2d Corporations § 703 (discussing contract provisions
requiring periodic revaluations and stating that “[t]he original price would
control where the agreement clearly provides that the last figure agreed upon
would be conclusive or that, failing a redetermination of the stock's value,
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reverse the trial court’s finding that the stock-valuation
provision listing a price of $250.00 per share was
unenforceable.24
The terms of the stock-valuation provision listed an
original price of $250.00 per share.
The provision further
stated that the fair market value shall be $250.00 “[u]nless
altered as herein provided” via the “mutual agreement”
revaluation method.
Since the parties failed to revaluate the
price of American Scale’s shares, $250.00 is the “last recorded
value” with respect to the price of the corporation’s shares.
the earlier figures shall govern”); Matter of Dillon’s Estate, 575 P.2d 127
(Okla.App. 1977)(enforcing a mutual agreement provision and the original
price of $1.00 per share where the stock valuation provision stated that the
last price agreed upon would be “conclusive as to the value” of the stock,
and no revaluation had taken place); and In re Borchard’s Estate, 74 Misc.2d
376, 346 N.Y.S.2d 620 (N.Y.Sur.Ct. 1973)(enforcing a periodic revaluation
provision and the original price of $450.00 per share where the last price
agreed upon was to govern if no revaluation had taken place).
24
It is important to note that on July 15, 2002, two months after the trial
court entered the order from which this appeal and cross-appeal were taken,
KRS 271B.6-270 was amended. Under the statute as amended, an agreement
requiring a shareholder to sell his shares to the corporation or another
person for an agreed upon price or a price based on a valuation formula,
including a requirement to transfer the shares for an amount equal to the
price paid for the shares, is enforceable. KRS 271B.6-270(4) states in
pertinent part:
A restriction on the transfer or registration of
transfer of shares may without limitation:
. . .
(c) Obligate a shareholder to transfer
the restricted shares to the corporation
or other persons for an agreed price or a
price based on a valuation formula,
including an obligation to transfer the
shares for an amount equal to the
original consideration paid for the
shares[.]
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Therefore, the majority-purchase option and the stock-valuation
provision entitle Coyle to purchase all of Schwartz’s stock at a
price of $250.00 per share.
Finally, we address Schwartz’s claim in his crossappeal that the trial court erred by finding that Schwartz and
Coyle did not abandon the stock-valuation provision of the
cross-purchase agreement.
Specifically, Schwartz argues:
[I]t is clear that both Schwartz and Coyle
abandoned their rights under the [c]ross[p]urchase [a]greement by virtue of their
failure to take any action to re-value their
shares for more [than] a decade. By
completely ignoring the [c]ross-[p]urchase
[a]greement’s requirement that both
shareholders “shall redetermine the value of
the stock within 60 days following the end
of each fiscal year” and record the same, as
well as their intention to re-value their
shares in American Scale, Schwartz and Coyle
unequivocally acted in a manner inconsistent
with the existence of the [c]ross-[p]urchase
[a]greement.
We disagree and hold that the trial court did not err by finding
that Coyle and Schwartz did not abandon their rights under the
stock-valuation provision.
In Texaco, Inc. v. Debusk,25 the former Court of
Appeals discussed what must be shown to constitute abandonment:
“A contract may be rescinded or
discharged by acts or conduct of the parties
inconsistent with the continued existence of
the contract, and mutual assent to abandon a
contract may be inferred from the attendant
25
Ky., 444 S.W.2d 261, 263 (1969)(quoting 17 Am.Jur.2d Contracts § 494).
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circumstances and conduct of the parties.
There is authority to the effect that even a
contract under seal may be released,
surrendered, or discharged by matters in
pais.”
“While as a general rule a contract
will be treated as abandoned or rescinded
where the acts and conduct of one party
inconsistent with its existence are
acquiesced in by the other party, to be
sufficient the acts and conduct must be
positive and unequivocal” [emphasis added].
In the instant case, while Coyle and Schwartz never
revaluated American Scale’s stock in the years following the
execution of the cross-purchase agreement, this fact, standing
alone, does not constitute “positive and unequivocal” acts which
could lead to a finding of abandonment.
The stock-valuation
provision itself provided a default price for the stock in the
event the parties failed to revaluate the shares.
Therefore,
Coyle and Schwartz contemplated that they might not always
conduct a revaluation.
Accordingly, the failure of Coyle and
Schwartz to conduct an annual revaluation of American Scale’s
shares did not constitute an abandonment of the stock-valuation
provision.
Based on the foregoing, the orders of the Jefferson
Circuit Court are affirmed in part and reversed in part.
McANULTY, JUDGE, CONCURS.
MILLER, SENIOR JUDGE, DISSENTS AND FILES SEPARATE
OPINION.
-21-
MILLER, SENIOR JUDGE, DISSENTING:
I dissent from so
much of the majority opinion as reverses the circuit court on
the valuation of the interest to be purchased.
I am of the
opinion that the stock-valuation provision in this case is a
forfeiture of the type disapproved in Man O’ War Restaurants,
Inc. v. Martin, Ky., 932 S.W.2d 366 (1996).
Equity detests
forfeiture provisions and frequently will find them
unenforceable.
Man O’ War Restaurants, Inc., at 368 (citing
Sebastian v. Floyd, Ky., 585 S.W.2d 381 (1979); C.I.T. Corp. v.
Thompson, 293 Ky. 637, 169 S.W.2d 820 (1943)).
I believe
fundamental principles of equity and fair-dealing compel that
the stock-valuation provision be invalidated in this case.
I would affirm the circuit court on all issues.
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT/CROSSAPPELLEES:
BRIEFS FOR APPELLEE/CROSSAPPELLANT:
Alan N. Linker
J. Gregory Troutman
Louisville, Kentucky
David B. Mour
R. Kenneth Kinderman
Jeffrey A. Cross
Louisville, Kentucky
ORAL ARGUMENT FOR
APPELLANT/CROSS-APPELLEES:
J. Gregory Troutman
Louisville, Kentucky
ORAL ARGUMENT FOR
APPELLEE/CROSS-APPELLANT:
David B. Mour
Louisville, Kentucky
-22-
Id.
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