JIM HURST, d/b/a JIM HURST INSURANCE v. JOHNNY CURTSINGER AND MARGARET C. BRITTON, ADMINISTRATRIX FOR ESTATE OF DELCIA CURTSINGER, DECEASED and AGWAY INSURANCE COMPANY v. JIM HURST, d/b/a JIM HURST INSURANCE
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RENDERED:
January 23, 2004; 10:00 a.m.
ORDERED NOT PUBLISHED BY THE KENTUCKY SUPREME COURT:
JUNE 8, 2005 (2004-SC-0699-D)
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2001-CA-001031-MR
JIM HURST, d/b/a JIM HURST INSURANCE
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM WASHINGTON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE ALLAN RAY BERTRAM, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 97-CI-00031
JOHNNY CURTSINGER AND
MARGARET C. BRITTON,
ADMINISTRATRIX FOR ESTATE OF
DELCIA CURTSINGER, DECEASED
APPELLEES
NO. 2002-CA-000054-MR
AGWAY INSURANCE COMPANY
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM WASHINGTON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE ALLAN RAY BERTRAM, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 97-CI-00031
JIM HURST, d/b/a JIM HURST INSURANCE
APPELLEE
NO. 2002-CA-001918-MR
JOHNNY CURTSINGER AND
MARGARET C. BRITTON, ADMINISTRATRIX
FOR ESTATE OF DELCIA CURTSINGER, DECEASED
v.
APPELLANTS
APPEAL FROM WASHINGTON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE ALLAN RAY BERTRAM, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 97-CI-00031
JIM HURST, d/b/a JIM HURST INSURANCE
AND CELESTE HURST (NOW RAPIER)
APPELLEES
OPINION
AFFIRMING IN PART,
REVERSING IN PART, AND REMANDING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
BARBER, SCHRODER, AND VANMETER, JUDGES.
SCHRODER, JUDGE.
These consolidated appeals arise out of a fire
loss for which the insurer refused to pay a claim because of the
failure of the agent to timely forward premiums to the insurer
to reinstate the plaintiffs’ homeowners policy.
The insurer,
agent, and homeowners all appeal from various judgments in the
action.
We reject plaintiffs’ argument that they were entitled
to attach the wife’s interest in an account jointly owned by the
agent husband and wife, who was employed by the insurance agency
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at issue, to satisfy its judgment against the agent and, thus,
affirm the order denying the non-wage garnishment.
However, we
agree with the insurer that they were entitled to indemnity from
the agent and therefore reverse the order denying same.
We also
agree with the agent that plaintiffs were not entitled to
punitive damages because plaintiffs failed to specify the amount
sought pursuant to CR 8.01(2).
Accordingly, we must reverse the
judgment awarding punitive damages.
In 1995, Agway Insurance (“Agway”) entered into an
agency agreement with Jim Hurst d/b/a Jim Hurst Insurance
Company (“Hurst Insurance”) whereby Hurst could sell insurance
on behalf of Agway.
In June 1995, Johnny and Delcia Curtsinger
applied for a farm/homeowners policy with Agway through Hurst.
The Curtsingers’ policy became effective in June of 1995.
Agway
issued a bill to the Curtsingers for a one-year renewal of their
policy on May 21, 1996, and thereafter on June 18, 1996, Agway
mailed the Curtsingers a reminder notice advising them that the
renewal premium was due on or before June 30, 1996.
On June 28,
1996, the Curtsingers hand-delivered a check for their renewal
premium to Celeste Hurst, Jim Hurst’s wife who was employed by
Hurst Insurance.
However, that check was not forwarded to Agway
by the June 30, 1996, deadline.
Consequently, Agway issued a
notice to the Curtsingers on July 9, 1996, that their policy had
been terminated.
Hurst Insurance also received a copy of this
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notice.
Approximately a week later, Agway received the
Curtsingers’ renewal check and a copy of the renewal bill
payment stub.
Although the check was dated June 28, 1996, the
payment, which was mailed by Jim Hurst, was postmarked July 12,
1996, three days after the July 9 notice of termination.
On
July 17, 1996, Agway returned the Curtsingers’ uncashed check
and again advised them that the policy had been cancelled.
Agway also sent Hurst Insurance another notice that the
Curtsingers’ policy had been terminated.
After receiving notice
that their policy had been terminated, the Curtsingers made a
cash payment to Celeste Hurst on July 23, 1996, in an effort to
reinstate the policy.
Celeste Hurst represented that the policy
was reinstated and the Curtsingers were given a receipt for said
payment, but Hurst Insurance failed to ever forward this payment
to Agway.
Jim Hurst did, however, contact Agway on July 23,
1996, requesting that Agway provide coverage to the Curtsingers.
In that telephone conversation, Agway’s underwriter, Sue Burns,
instructed Jim Hurst that to reinstate coverage for the
Curtsingers, Hurst Insurance must provide Agway with a statement
affirming that the Curtsingers suffered no loss during the
period of the policy lapse.
On or about November 7, 1996, the Curtsingers made a
second cash payment to Hurst Insurance.
Again the Curtsingers
were given a receipt with “Agway” on it.
As with the July 23
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payment, Hurst Insurance never forwarded it to Agway and never
returned the funds to the Curtsingers.
Further, Hurst Insurance
never sent the requested no loss statement to Agway.
On December 19, 1996, the Curtsingers suffered a fire
loss and thereafter contacted Jim Hurst regarding coverage.
Jim
Hurst informed the Curtsingers that their policy had long been
terminated.
The Curtsingers directly contacted Agway in January
1997, requesting payment of the claim for the fire.
Agway
denied the claim on grounds that their policy had been
terminated as of July 1996 and never reinstated.
On March 4, 1997, the Curtsingers filed an action
against Jim Hurst d/b/a Jim Hurst Insurance Company and Agway
seeking compensatory and punitive damages as a result of the
denial of their fire claim.
In that complaint, the Curtsingers
alleged breach of the insurance contract, fraud, and violation
of the Kentucky Consumer Protection Act (“KCPA”).
Agway filed a
cross-claim for indemnification against Hurst Insurance.
The
contract claim determining whether the Curtsingers had coverage
was bifurcated from the other claims and tried before a jury on
February 25-26, 1999.
The jury found that the Curtsingers had
coverage for the loss through Agway based on the representations
of Hurst Insurance.
Based on the jury’s findings, the court
entered a judgment against Agway and Jim Hurst d/b/a Hurst
Insurance Company in the amount of $96,560.
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Agway thereafter filed a motion for summary judgment
on their indemnity claim against Hurst Insurance relative to the
above judgment.
The court denied the motion, adjudging that
Agway was not entitled to indemnification because the
Curtsingers made their renewal payment to Hurst Insurance, which
was explicitly allowed by Agway, in a timely manner on June 28,
1996.
From the order denying Agway’s claim for indemnity
against Hurst Insurance, Agway now appeals.
The Curtsingers’ claims against Jim Hurst d/b/a Jim
Hurst Insurance Company for fraud and violation of the KCPA were
tried on March 13-14, 2001.
The jury returned a verdict
awarding the Curtsingers $50,000 in compensatory damages and
$80,000 in punitive damages.
Jim Hurst/Hurst Insurance now
appeals from that portion of the judgment awarding punitive
damages.
At some point during the litigation of the
Curtsingers’ claims, Celeste Hurst filed for divorce from Jim
Hurst and obtained a decree of dissolution without a division of
property.
Pursuant to the dissolution proceeding, the Hursts
sold their marital residence, and the proceeds from the sale
were placed in a joint bank account pending the circuit court’s
property division.
It is undisputed that other than the
proceeds in this bank account, Jim Hurst is insolvent as is
Hurst Insurance.
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Subsequent to the judgments against Jim Hurst d/b/a
Hurst Insurance, the Curtsingers delivered a non-wage
garnishment order to the court for attachment of the bank
account holding the proceeds from the sale of the Hurst
residence.
The court declined to enter the garnishment order,
instead directing the Curtsingers to join Celeste Hurst (who was
never named a party in the insurance complaint), individually,
as a party to defend any interest she claimed in the account
that was not subject to the garnishment.
The Curtsingers
thereafter filed a motion to join Celeste Hurst as a necessary
party to determine her interest in the bank account sought to be
garnished.
As a result of a hearing on the garnishment motion
on February 18, 2002, the court entered an order granting the
garnishment of the account in question subject only to a
determination of child support arrearages accrued as a prior
lien against the account.
Subsequently, Celeste Hurst and Jim
Hurst filed motions to alter, amend or vacate the garnishment
order.
After a hearing on this motion, the court reversed in
part its earlier order and determined that Celeste’s interest in
the account could not be garnished because she was never named a
party to the action filed by the Curtsingers and was not an
owner or operator of Hurst Insurance.
Curtsingers now appeal.
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From this order, the
We shall first address the Curtsingers’ appeal from
the order denying garnishment of Celeste’s interest in the bank
account.
The trial court based its decision on the holding in
Strong v. First Nationwide Mortgage Corporation, Ky. App., 959
S.W.2d 785 (1998).
In Strong, the husband and wife owned a body
shop together, out of which the husband was operating a chop
shop.
After the husband filed for dissolution, he was indicted
for his illegal activities related to the chop shop.
Thereafter, two customers who had purchased vehicles containing
stolen parts sued the husband and obtained judgments against
him.
The marital residence was subsequently sold and the issue
on appeal was whether the claims of the husband’s two judgment
creditors had priority over the wife’s interest in the proceeds
of the sale of the residence pursuant to the dissolution
proceedings.
This Court found that the wife’s interest in the
proceeds had priority and could not be attached by the
plaintiffs in the suit against her husband.
Likewise, in the
instant case, since Celeste was not a party to the action, the
Curtsingers could not attach her interest in the proceeds
resulting from the sale of the parties’ real property.
The Curtsingers urge us to distinguish Strong by the
fact that the husband only, and not the business, was sued in
Strong and there was no evidence that the wife had any
involvement in the chop shop activities.
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They point out that
the business (Hurst Insurance Company) was made a party and that
it was a family business operated by both Celeste and Jim Hurst.
Most significant, they argue, was Celeste’s actual participation
in the fraudulent scheme, which was not the case in Strong.
As
noted by the trial court in the case herein, although Celeste
was employed by Hurst Insurance, the only licensed auto and
property insurance agent for the business was Jim Hurst.
Other
than the fact that she was married to Jim Hurst, there was no
evidence that she was anything other than an employee of the
business.
While it is true that there was certainly evidence of
Celeste’s participation in the wrongdoing, the Curtsingers did
not get a judgment against her and cannot now attach her
interest in the property in question via the judgment against
Jim Hurst and Hurst Insurance.
The Curtsingers also argue the presumption enunciated
in Brown v. Commonwealth of Kentucky, Natural Resources and
Environmental Protection Cabinet, Ky. App., 40 S.W.3d 873
(1999), that a joint account holder owns the entire account such
that the entire account can be attached by a judgment creditor
of that joint account holder.
However, that presumption can be
rebutted by proof that the other joint account holder made
separate contributions to the account and that the joint account
holder was sufficiently removed from the indebtedness or that
each joint account holder understood that their respective
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contributions would not be subject to the indebtedness of the
other.
Id. at 882.
Although the Curtsingers properly cite this
general rule, the distinguishing factor in the instant case is
that the proceeds in the bank account were the result of the
sale of real property pursuant to a dissolution action.
Celeste’s interest in the funds is thus governed by domestic
law, in particular, KRS 403.190 (the disposition of marital
property statute), not by property law.
Accordingly, the trial
court properly ruled that Celeste’s interest in the funds at
issue was not subject to attachment by the Curtsingers.
We now turn to Hurst’s appeal of the punitive damage
award.
Hurst maintains that the Curtsingers were not entitled
to punitive damages because they failed to specify the amount
they were seeking in response to Hurst’s interrogatory.
On April 11, 2000, Hurst served an interrogatory upon
the Curtsingers, asking, “What is the amount of damages
Plaintiffs claim entitlement to under each count of the Second
Amended Complaint?”
The Curtsingers listed the specific amount
of compensatory damages sought, but as to punitive damages, the
Curtsingers replied, “In such amounts as determined appropriate
by the jury.”
Subsequently, on February 1, 2001, the
Curtsingers filed a pre-trial memorandum which stated that they
were seeking $50,000 in punitive damages for the fraudulent
misrepresentations and $25,000 in punitive damages for the
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violations of the Consumer Protection Act.
However, in another
pre-trial memorandum filed just 18 days later, the Curtsingers
gave no specific amount of punitive damages sought.
They again
stated they were seeking “[p]unitive damages as determined
appropriate by the jury.”
After all the proof was closed and
before the jury was instructed, Hurst objected to any punitive
damages instruction based on the fact that the Curtsingers had
not stated any amount of punitive damages in answer to
interrogatories as required by CR 8.01(2) and Fratzke v. Murphy,
Ky., 12 S.W.3d 269 (1999).
The trial court overruled the
objection, adjudging that punitive damages are not unliquidated
damages and thus the above law would not apply.
Consequently,
the jury was instructed on and awarded the Curtsingers $80,000
in punitive damages.
CR 8.01(2) provides:
In any action for unliquidated damages the
prayer for damages in any pleading shall not
recite any sum as alleged damages other than
an allegation that damages are in excess of
any minimum dollar amount necessary to
establish the jurisdiction of the court;
provided, however, that all parties shall
have the right to advise the trier of fact
as to what amounts are fair and reasonable
as shown by the evidence. When a claim is
made against a party for unliquidated
damages, that party may obtain information
as to the amount claimed by interrogatories;
if this is done, the amount claimed shall
not exceed the last amount stated in answer
to interrogatories.
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The above rule has been interpreted such that a
plaintiff must specify the amount of unliquidated damages sought
in response to an interrogatory in order to recover those
damages at trial.
Fratzke v. Murphy, Ky., 12 S.W.3d 269 (1999);
LaFleur v. Shoney’s, Inc., Ky., 83 S.W.3d 474 (2002).
“The
language of the rule is mandatory and gives a trial court no
discretion as to its application.”
Fratzke, 12 S.W.3d at 273.
The Court in Nucor Corp. v. General Elec. Co., Ky., 812 S.W.2d
136, 141 (1991), explained the difference between liquidated and
unliquidated damages:
[I]n general “liquidated” means “[m]ade
certain or fixed by agreement of parties or
by operation of law.” Black’s Law
Dictionary 930 (6th ed.1990). . . .
“[U]nliquidated[]” [damages are] defined in
Black’s as “[d]amages which have not been
determined or calculated, . . . not yet
reduced to a certainty in respect to amount.
Black’s supra at 1537.
“Punitive damages are damages other than compensatory
or nominal damages, awarded against a person to punish him for
his outrageous conduct.”
Ashland Dry Goods Co. v. Wages, 302
Ky. 577, 195 S.W.2d 312, 315 (1946); KRS 411.184(1)(f).
As
conceded by the Curtsingers, the determination of whether
punitive damages are to be awarded and, if so, the amount, is up
to the jury.
KRS 411.186.
Hence, “[p]unitive damages ‘by their
very nature are unliquidated.’”
Bailey v. Container Corp. of
America, 660 F.Supp. 1048, 1056 (S.D. Ohio 1986) (quoting Gray
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v. Allison Division, General Motors Corp., 52 Ohio App.2d 348,
358, 370 N.E.2d 747 (1977)).
The Curtsingers argue that the term “unliquidated
damages” in the beginning of CR 8.01(2) speaks only to the
amount of compensatory damages necessary to establish
jurisdiction.
Hence, it follows that the term “unliquidated
damages” in the second sentence of the rule must likewise be
referring to only compensatory damages and not punitive damages.
We disagree.
As pointed out by Hurst, punitive damages alone
can establish jurisdiction.
See Commonwealth Dept. of
Agriculture v. Vinson, Ky., 30 S.W.3d 162 (2000).
Further, the
purpose of the latter part of the rule is “to allow a party to
discover the amount an opposing party is seeking for
unliquidated damage claims.”
Fratzke, 12 S.W.3d at 273.
Thus,
the party would be entitled to discover the claimed amounts for
all unliquidated damage claims.
There is no logical reason why
punitive damage claims would be excluded from this discovery.
The Curtsingers also cite Louisville & Nashville
Railroad Co. v. Taylor, Ky., 237 S.W.2d 842 (1951), for the
proposition that they were not required to give the specific
amount of punitive damages sought.
The Curtsingers’ reliance on
that case is misplaced as it merely held that a party need not
expressly plead the fact that it is seeking punitive damages if
the wording of the pleading (allegations constituting gross
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negligence) is such that the opposing party would be put on
notice that punitive damages are being sought.
Id. at 843-844.
Taylor did not address CR 8.01(2) and whether the amount of
punitive damages must be given in response to an interrogatory
regarding unliquidated damages.
Accordingly, since the Curtsingers did not give a
specific amount of punitive damages they were seeking in
response to the interrogatories, they were barred from
recovering any punitive damages.
Hence, we must reverse the
award of punitive damages.
We now turn to the third appeal, Agway’s appeal of the
denial of their indemnity claim.
Agway maintains that indemnity
from Hurst was warranted pursuant to its agency agreement with
Hurst as well as under common law.
In adjudging that Agway was
not entitled to indemnity from Hurst, the court stated at the
hearing on the matter:
The loss did not stem from [Hurst’s] failure
to send the [no loss] information [to
Agway]. The loss came from a fire and a
failure to recognize the policy that [Agway]
knew that they would have to stand good for
because payment had been timely made to
their agent. So, I don’t think that the
things stand separate and apart by
themselves in the actions of either party.
For that reason, the Court’s going to deny
both motions for indemnity.
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In essence, the trial court found that Agway contributed to the
loss by wrongfully failing to reinstate the Curtsingers’ policy
when the renewal payment was paid to Hurst in a timely manner.
The right to indemnity can be based on common law and
principles of equity or by reason of a contractual relation.
Ashland Oil & Refining Co. v. Bertram & Thacker, Ky., 453 S.W.2d
591, 595 (1970).
If it is based on contractual relation, “[t]he
nature of an indemnitor’s liability under an indemnity contract
shall be determined by the provisions of the indemnity agreement
itself.”
U.S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Napier Electric &
Construction Co., Inc., Ky. App., 571 S.W.2d 644, 646 (1978).
The agency agreement between Hurst and Agway specifically
provided that Agway was entitled to indemnity from Hurst 1) if
Agway was held liable for Hurst’s actions or omissions and Agway
did not contribute to the error or omission; or 2) Agway
suffered losses as a result of Hurst’s violations of the agency
agreement or Agway’s instructions.
The agreement further
provided that the agent was required to forward to Agway all
premiums collected within three business days of receipt
thereof.
Agway contends that its liability to the Curtsingers
arose from both Hurst’s errors and his violation of the above
provision of the agency agreement.
We agree.
Pursuant to the jury instructions in this case, the
jury specifically found that Hurst represented to the
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Curtsingers that they had coverage, that the Curtsingers relied
on said representation, and that Hurst was acting within his
apparent authority as agent of Agway when he made this
representation.
Thus, Agway’s liability was solely based on the
(mis)representation by Hurst and it was Hurst’s failure to
timely forward the Curtsingers’ renewal payment(s) to Agway
which caused Agway to not renew the policy in the first place.
In essence, had Hurst not misrepresented that the policy had
been renewed (an error on his part), when in fact it had not due
to Hurst’s failure to timely forward the premiums (an undisputed
violation of the agency agreement), Agway would not have been
liable to the Curtsingers.
It was Hurst’s position below and now on appeal that
because the Curtsingers actually did pay their premium on time
to Hurst as was specifically allowed by language in Agway’s
billing notices, Agway had a duty to renew the policy and, thus,
contributed to the loss by not renewing their policy.
In
support of this argument, Hurst cites to KRS 304.20-320(3)(c)
which allows payment to the agent or the insurer.
This argument
ignores the fact that because Hurst did not timely forward the
first premium payment and failed to ever forward the subsequent
payments or the no loss statement, Agway had no knowledge that
the premium had been paid at the time the policy lapsed.
Agway
cannot be required to renew a policy when, to the extent of its
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knowledge, no renewal payment has been made.
Regardless of
whether payment to Hurst was timely, the fact is that Agway
would have reinstated the policy and not allowed it to lapse had
Hurst forwarded the renewal payment in a timely manner.
Interestingly, Hurst as much as admits indemnification
from him to Agway is warranted in the following language in his
appellee’s brief:
Agway might punish Hurst, its agent, under
these circumstances. However, Agway chose
instead to punish the Curtsingers and
thereby launch the entire unfortunate set of
circumstances surrounding this case.
This was exactly what Agway sought through indemnification from
Hurst.
Agway does not deny that it was bound by the
misrepresentations of coverage by its agent; it simply seeks
indemnification from the agent for its liability resulting from
those misrepresentations.
We also agree that under common law, Agway was
entitled to indemnification from Hurst.
The right to indemnity
“is available to one exposed to liability because of the
wrongful act of another with whom he/she is not in pari
delicto.”
Degener v. Hall Contracting Corp., Ky., 27 S.W.3d
775, 780 (2000).
The two situations where indemnity is
permitted are:
(1) Where the party claiming indemnity has
not been guilty of any fault, except
technically, or constructively, as where an
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innocent master was held to respond for the
tort of his servant acting within the scope
of his employment; or (2) where both parties
have been in fault, but not the same fault,
towards the party injured, and the fault of
the party from whom indemnity is claimed was
the primary and efficient cause of the
injury.
Id. (quoting Louisville Ry. Co. v. Louisville Taxicab & Transfer
Co., 256 Ky. 827, 77 S.W.2d 36, 39 (1934)).
The issue of whether indemnity is warranted is a
question of law to be decided once the fact finder has
determined any factual issues surrounding the indemnity claim.
Robinson v. Murlin Phillips & MFA Ins. Co., Ky., 557 S.W.2d 202,
204 (1977).
We see the case at hand as a classic case where
indemnity is warranted.
As discussed above in the analysis of
indemnity claimed under the agency agreement, Hurst committed
two wrongful acts which caused the loss to Agway - failing to
forward the collected premiums or the no loss statement and the
subsequent misrepresentation of coverage.
Agway’s liability was
solely based upon the jury’s factual finding that Hurst, acting
as an agent of Agway, misrepresented that the Curtsingers had
coverage.
Contrary to the trial court’s finding, we adjudge
that Agway in no way contributed to the loss by failing to renew
the policy when no renewal payment, as far as it knew, had been
paid therefor.
Thus, Agway did not act in pari delicto with
Hurst to cause the loss.
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Hurst’s final argument in defending the indemnity
claim is that because Agway would have continued to insure the
Curtsingers had they received the renewal premium, Agway cannot
show that Hurst’s actions were the proximate cause of their
loss.
The cases cited in support of this argument are from
other jurisdictions and thus are not binding on us.
Further,
accepting this argument would, in essence, allow Hurst to
benefit from his fraudulent conduct.
He could simply pocket the
premiums collected, misrepresent coverage, and not have any
responsibility to Agway therefor in the event of a loss.
will not be permitted to profit from his own wrong.
County v. Nance, Ky., 362 S.W.2d 723 (1962).
One
Webster
We decline to
absolve Hurst from responsibility to Agway for his fraudulent
conduct.
Accordingly, Agway is entitled to full indemnity from
Hurst for its liability to the Curtsingers.
For the reasons stated above, the judgment in favor of
the Curtsingers for punitive damages is reversed, as is the
judgment denying Agway’s indemnity claim, while the judgment in
favor of Celeste Hurst denying attachment of her interest in the
joint bank account is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
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BRIEF FOR APPELLANT, AGWAY
INSURANCE COMPANY:
BRIEF FOR JIM HURST, d/b/a JIM
HURST INSURANCE:
David K. Barnes
Deanna M. Tucker
Louisville, Kentucky
Ridley M. Sandidge, Jr.
Lynn K. Fieldhouse
Louisville, Kentucky
BRIEF FOR JOHNNY CURTSINGER
AND MARGARET C. BRITTON,
ADMINISTRATRIX FOR THE ESTATE
OF DELCIA CURTSINGER,
DECEASED:
Bradley S. Guthrie
Harrodsburg, Kentucky
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE, CELESTE
HURST RAPIER:
Lola P. Lewis
Lexington, Kentucky
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