ROBERT M. CLARK and DEENA CLARK v. LEXINGTON-FAYETTE URBAN COUNTY GOVERNMENT and SAM DUNN
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RENDERED: June 11, 1999; 2:00 p.m.
ORDERED PUBLISHED: July 16, 1999; 10:00 a.m.
ORDERED NOT PUBLISHED BY THE KENTUCKY SUPREME COURT:
JANUARY 12, 2000 (1999-SC-0656-D)
C o m m o n w e a l t h O f K e n t uc k y
C o urt O f A ppe a l s
NO.
1998-CA-000892-MR
ROBERT M. CLARK and
DEENA CLARK
APPELLANTS
APPEAL FROM FAYETTE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE GARY PAYNE, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 96-CI-01037
v.
LEXINGTON-FAYETTE URBAN
COUNTY GOVERNMENT and
SAM DUNN
APPELLEES
OPINION
AFFIRMING
* * * * * * * * * *
BEFORE:
BUCKINGHAM, COMBS, and MCANULTY, Judges.
BUCKINGHAM, JUDGE.
Robert and Deena Clark appeal from an order
of the Fayette Circuit Court granting summary judgment to the
Lexington-Fayette Urban County Government (LFUCG) and Sam Dunn.
We affirm.
Robert began his employment with the LFUCG in 1982 and
was promoted to the position of director of the division of
building maintenance and construction (the division) in 1988.
In
1994, Dunn became commissioner of general services for the LFUCG,
which meant that he became Robert’s immediate supervisor.
In
September 1994, a report was issued to Dunn by Julius Berry, an
administrative aide to the LFUCG mayor, which detailed various
allegations against Robert, including favoritism and racism.
This report prompted a further study concerning alleged problems
in the division.
Despite the serious allegations contained in the Berry
report, Robert was evaluated by Dunn in January 1995 and was
found to be an Aabove average employee who was Adedicated@ and
@
Aworks hard to provide the LFUCG with effective building
maintenance and construction services. In June 1995, Robert
@
fell while working on a roof and suffered a work-related injury
for which he filed a claim for workers’ compensation benefits.
Robert alleges that Dunn screamed at him following the injury and
told him that his injury would Acost the city a lot of money.
@
In the fall of 1995, the LFUCG engaged Robert Roark to
investigate the allegations contained in the Berry report and the
subsequent further study.
In September 1995, around the same
time that the LFUCG retained Roark, Robert filed a second
workers’ compensation claim and took a medical leave of absence
due to work-related stress.
When Robert returned to work in
October 1995, he was questioned under oath by Roark, an attorney,
concerning the allegations contained in the Berry report.
Later
in October 1995, LFUCG Mayor Pam Miller sent Robert a letter
outlining Amany serious matters which had come to her attention
@
as a result of Roark’s investigation.
Among the matters
mentioned by Mayor Miller were Robert’s alleged failure to
complete work requests by the LFUCG Police Department, his
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alleged racism, and his extensive renovation of the division’s
offices.
On November 7, 1995, Robert was involved in a work-
related auto accident for which he filed a third workers’
compensation claim.
He was then placed on leave under the Family
and Medical Leave Act.
In December 1995, Dunn filed charges with the
Lexington-Fayette Urban County Civil Service Commission (the
commission) seeking Robert’s dismissal as an employee of the
LFUCG.
Robert resigned his position in January 1996, before the
commission had acted on the charges against him.
He was awarded
disability retirement benefits by the Commonwealth of Kentucky,
although the exact nature of his disability (or disabilities) is
unclear from the record.
In March 1996, Robert filed a complaint in the Fayette
Circuit Court against the LFUCG and Dunn, alleging causes of
action which included age discrimination, retaliation for filing
workers’ compensation claims, and disability discrimination.
The
complaint also contained a claim by Deena for loss of consortium.
Following a period of discovery, the trial court granted the
summary judgment motions of the LFUCG and Dunn on all of Robert’s
and Deena’s claims.
Robert and Deena then filed the appeal sub
judice.
Robert argues that the trial court erred in granting
summary judgment to the LFUCG and Dunn because they failed to
satisfy Kentucky’s stringent standard for summary judgment.
The
standard for ruling on a summary judgment motion is familiar and
clear:
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A movant should not succeed in a motion for
summary judgment unless the right to judgment
is shown with such clarity that there is no
room left for controversy and it appears
impossible for a nonmoving party to produce
evidence at trial warranting judgment in his
favor. . . . The motion for summary
judgment must convince the circuit court from
evidence in the record of the nonexistence of
a genuine issue of material fact.
Hubble v. Johnson Ky., 841 S.W.2d 169, 171 (1992).
,
Furthermore,
A[t]he record must be viewed in a light most favorable to the
party opposing the motion for summary judgment and all doubts are
to be resolved in his favor.
@
Steelvest, Inc. v. Scansteel
Service Center, Inc. Ky., 807 S.W.2d 476, 480 (1991).
,
When
summary judgment has been granted by the trial court, the
question before an appellate courtAis whether the trial court
correctly found that there were no genuine issues as to any
material fact and that the moving party was entitled to judgment
as a matter of law.
@
781 (1996).
Scifres v. Kraft Ky. App., 916 S.W.2d 779,
,
The trial court is entitled to no deference in this
area since factual findings are not at issue. Id.
We will
examine each claim for relief made by the Clarks separately to
determine the appropriateness of summary judgment on each claim.
One of the claims made by Robert against the LFUCG and
Dunn was that they retaliated against him for filing workers’
compensation claims.
Kentucky Revised Statute (KRS) 342.197(1)
provides that A[n]o employee shall be harassed, coerced,
discharged, or discriminated against in any manner whatsoever for
filing and pursuing a lawful claim under this chapter. Robert
@
elaborates at length about the circumstances leading to the
filing of his first workers’ compensation claim.
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He states that
Dunn ordered him to check a meter on a defective roof, that the
roof caved in and that he was injured, and that Dunn screamed at
him upon learning of his injuries and told Robert that he would
Acost the city a lot of money.
@
As these actions occurred prior
to the filing of the first claim, we fail to perceive how they
can constitute retaliation for Robert’s filing a workers’
compensation claim.
Even if Dunn did scream at Robert after the
claim was filed, such an action would not constitute harassment,
coercion, or discrimination, as there is no allegation that Dunn
threatened Robert’s employment or physical well-being, nor is
there any allegation that Dunn used abusive language.
Robert also refers to the letter sent by Mayor Miller
to him in October 1995.
As the trial court noted, the letter
contains no reference, either direct or implied, to Robert’s
workers’ compensation claims.
Furthermore, the letter was a
direct result of the investigation performed by Roark, which had
been necessitated by the Berry report.
The Berry report was
written long before Robert filed any workers’ compensation
claims, and Robert makes no allegation in his brief that the
Roark investigation focused on those claims.
Robert also contends that Mayor Miller’s deposition
contains proof of workers’ compensation-related retaliation.
Mayor Miller testified that if a LFUCG employee had four workrelated auto accidents in one year, then that employee
Ais
usually disciplined.
@
Considering the question asked in the
deposition, the response given by Miller, and the apparent
failure by counsel to follow with a question to clarify the
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response and determine its meaning, we conclude that the
testimony is insufficient to create a fact issue concerning
retaliation.
In short, as Robert points to no specific incidents
which could logically be construed as retaliation for his
pursuing his workers’ compensation claims, he has not shown that
Aretaliation for filing or pursuing a workers’ compensation claim
was a substantial motivating factor in any adverse employment
@
action which the LFUCG took against him. First Property Mgmt.
Corp. v. Zarebidaki Ky., 867 S.W.2d 185, 189 (1993).
,
Furthermore, regardless of the disposition of this claim against
the LFUCG, Robert’s retaliation claim against Dunn was properly
dismissed by summary judgment, as KRS 342.197(1) is directed
toward employers and Dunn is not an employer under KRS 342.630.
Robert also alleges a cause of action based upon age
discrimination.
As Robert is fifty-two years old, he is
protected by KRS 344.040, which forbids employment discrimination
against persons over forty years of age. ADiscrimination is
@
defined in KRS 344.010(5) as meaningAany direct or indirect act
or practice of exclusion, distinction, restriction, segregation,
limitation, refusal, denial, or any other act or practice of
differentiation or preference in the treatment of a person or
persons, or the aiding, abetting, inciting, coercing, or
compelling thereof made unlawful under this chapter. To defeat
@
a defendant’s summary judgment motion, a plaintiff alleging age
discrimination by his or her employer mustAproduce specific
evidence that age was a determining factor in the adverse
@
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employment action, since A[i]n the absence of specific evidence
of age discrimination, a summary judgment is proper. Harker v.
@
Federal Land Bank of Louisville Ky., 679 S.W.2d 226, 230 (1984).
,
Robert contends that he offered direct evidence of age
discrimination in the form of an affidavit of John Wayne Turner,
who is apparently a LFUCG employee, which provided that Dunn told
Turner in October 1995 that ABob Clark had been brought up
through the old school and that Bob was too old to change. This
@
case is similar to Carpenter v. Western Credit Union 62 F.3d 143
,
(6th Cir. 1995), in which an employee of a credit union was
terminated and subsequently filed suit alleging age
discrimination.
As part of her proof, Carpenter offered an
affidavit which provided that the person who had terminated her
and another employee had stated to the affiant that the decision
was Apurely economical, they were the oldest employees here.
@
Id. at 144.
The Carpenter court opined that summary judgment in
favor of the credit union was proper asAisolated and ambiguous
statements are too abstract, in addition to being irrelevant and
prejudicial, to support a finding of age discrimination. Id. at
@
145 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
As the
alleged statement at issue in the case sub judice is far more
innocuous than that in Carpenter, we conclude that there is a
lack of specific evidence that age was a determining factor in an
adverse employment action.
In fact, the alleged statement by
Dunn was not accompanied by any adverse employment action against
Robert.
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In the absence of direct evidence of age
discrimination, Robert could nevertheless sustain his age
discrimination action by proof through indirect evidence.
In
such circumstances, he would be required to show that: A(1) he
was a member of a protected class; (2) he was qualified for the
position; (3) he was discharged; and (4) he was replaced by a
younger person.
@
Id. at 144.
While Robert was a member of a
protected class due to his age, his forty-five-year-old
replacement was also within the same protected class.
It is no
longer necessary, however, for a plaintiff to show that he was
replaced by someone outside the protected class in order to
prevail on an age discrimination claim. O’Connor v. Consolidated
Coin Caterers Corp. 517 U.S. 308, 116 S. Ct. 1307, 134 L. Ed. 2d
,
433 (1996).
Instead, when a plaintiff’s replacement is also
within the protected class, the plaintiff must show that the
replacement is Asubstantially younger.
@
S. Ct. 1310.
Id. at 517 U.S. 313, 116
As Robert was fifty-two years old and his
replacement was forty-five years old, we conclude that Robert was
not replaced by an individual who wasAsubstantially younger.
@
Furthermore, it is apparent that Robert could not prove
the second and third elements necessary to prove age
discrimination by indirect proof.
The second element requires
that Robert be qualified for the position.
Robert points to
nothing in the record to contradict the trial court’s finding
that he was unable to perform his job duties, and we conclude
that he has thus failed to demonstrate he was qualified for his
position when he terminated his employment with the LFUCG.
-8-
The
third element Robert must prove is that he was discharged due to
his age.
As Robert elected to take disability retirement, he was
not discharged by the LFUCG.
In short, summary judgment was
proper as to Robert’s age discrimination claim under any of the
1
aforementioned theories.
Robert also states a cause of action for disability
discrimination.
KRS 344.040 provides that an employer may not
discriminate against Aa qualified individual with a disability
. . . .@
A Aqualified individual with a disability is defined
@
in KRS 344.030(1) as
an individual with a disability as defined in
KRS 344.010 who, with or without reasonable
accommodation, can perform the essential
functions of the employment position that the
individual holds or desires unless an
employer demonstrates that he is unable to
reasonably accommodate an employee’s or
prospective employee’s disability without
undue hardship on the conduct of the employers’ (sic) business. Consideration shall be
given to the employer’s judgment as to what
functions of a job are essential . . . .
Robert does not specify in what manner he was
discriminated against based upon his disability, other than to
argue that the LFUCG failed to provide him with a reasonable
accommodation.
Therefore, as the trial court noted, neither the
LFUCG nor Dunn can be found to have discriminated against Robert
based upon his disability until such time as they learned that he
was disabled. See Taylor v. Principal Financial Group, Inc. 93
,
th
F.3d 155, 163 (5 Cir. 1996), cert. denied 117 S. Ct. 586, 136
1
Summary judgment as to Robert’s claim against Dunn for age
discrimination is also proper.
-9-
L. Ed. 2d 515 (1996); Kocsis v. Multi-Care Management, Inc. 97
,
th
F.3d 876, 884 (6 Cir. 1996).2
The record does not reflect the exact nature of
Robert’s disability; therefore, it is difficult to determine when
the LFUCG knew of Robert’s disability.
Deena wrote a letter to
Mayor Miller in September 1995, stating her concerns about
Robert’s Ahealth and general well-being.
@
However, as the trial
court noted, such a letter is not Asufficient to place LFUCG on
notice of any [specific] disability Mr. Clark may have had.
@
The first document received by LFUCG which would
arguably be sufficient to place it on notice of Robert’s
disability is a letter from Robert to Dunn dated November 8,
The letter provides that AI am requesting leave from
1995.
November 9, 1995, until further notice for medical reasons.
@
Accompanying this letter was a statement from a licensed
psychologist which stated that Robert would not be able to return
to work Auntil further notice.
@
Therefore, since LFUCG did not
know of Robert’s disability until it received those letters, it
would have been impossible for Robert to have been discriminated
against due to his disability prior to November 1995. Taylor,
supra; Kocsis, supra.
2
Neither party has cited, nor have we independently
located, a Kentucky case explicitly setting forth the
requirements that a plaintiff must meet in order to prevail on a
disability discrimination claim under KRS Chapter 344. However,
as KRS 344.020(1)(a) provides that one of the general purposes of
KRS Chapter 344 is to Aprovide for execution within the state of
the policies embodied in the . . . Americans with Disabilities
Act of 1990,@ then federal cases construing that act are
instructive.
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Robert wrote another letter to Dunn in December 1995
informing him that he had applied for disability retirement but
that it was his Apreference that Lexington Fayette Urban County
Government make reasonable accommodations for me to continue my
employment . . . .
@
However, Robert did not specify what
reasonable accommodations he was requesting and did not outline
the specific nature of his disability.
As Robert did not
specifically identify his disability and resulting limitations
and did not suggest specific reasonable accommodations, the LFUCG
cannot be found to have violated KRS Chapter 344 for failing to
provide Robert with a reasonable accommodation. See Taylor,
supra at 165; Monette v. Electronic Data Systems Corp. 90 F.3d
,
th
1173, 1183 (6 Cir. 1996).3
Robert’s next claim against the LFUCG and Dunn is that
he was subjected to a hostile work environment based upon his age
and his disability.
Assuming that such claims are viable under
Kentucky law, the trial court’s granting of summary judgment on
the claims was proper.
As we have noted previously, the LFUCG
had no notice of Robert’s disability until November 1995.
Thus,
it cannot have created a hostile work environment for him based
on that disability prior to that date.
3
Also, Robert has not
In addition, as noted by the trial court, Robert is also
precluded from prevailing on this claim because he cannot
demonstrate that he suffered an adverse employment decision due
to his disability. First, since Robert elected to take
disability retirement, any adverse employment decision was of his
own choosing. Second, the charges filed with the commission
stemmed from an investigation which predated the LFUCG’s
knowledge of Robert’s disability. Therefore, it cannot be said
that the LFUCG attempted to discharge Robert because of his
disability.
-11-
offered any evidence that the LFUCG or Dunn took any action
against him, verbal or otherwise, which could be construed as
discriminating against him based upon his disability.
Furthermore, Robert has presented insufficient evidence
to demonstrate that he was subjected to conduct which created an
objectively hostile working environment for him due to his age.
The fact that Dunn allegedly stated that Robert was
Atoo old to
change@ is an isolated utterance which is insufficient to create
an objectively reasonable hostile working environment.
The trial
court properly granted summary judgment to both the LFUCG and
Dunn on this claim.
Robert has also alleged a cause of action for the tort
of outrage, also known as intentional infliction of emotional
distress.
This tort occurs when someoneAby extreme and
outrageous conduct intentionally or recklessly causes severe
emotional distress to another . . . @ Craft v. Rice Ky., 671
.
,
S.W.2d 247, 251 (1984)(quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46
(1965)).
It is unclear which alleged actions by the LFUCG and
Dunn Robert relies upon for this claim.
Presumably, he relies
upon actions such as the filing of the charges against him with
the commission, Mayor Miller’s letter to him accusing him of
misconduct, and Dunn’s screaming at him after his work-related
roof accident.
However, none of those actions, either separately
or combined with any of the other facts of this case, is
sufficient to sustain a claim for intentional infliction of
emotional distress.
Those allegations are notAbeyond all
possible bounds of decency such as Ato be regarded as atrocious,
@
-12-
and utterly intolerable in a civilized community. Humana of
@
Kentucky, Inc. v. Seitz Ky., 796 S.W.2d 1, 3 (1990).
,
Summary
judgment was properly granted to the LFUCG and Dunn on this
claim.4
Deena’s claim is for loss of consortium.
KRS 411.145
allows a spouse to recover damages from a wrongdoer for loss of
consortium.
That statute contains no indication, express or
implied, that it was intended to be a waiver of sovereign
immunity.
Thus, Deena’s loss of consortium claim against the
LFUCG is barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity. Withers
v. University of Kentucky Ky., 939 S.W.2d 340 (1997).
,
Likewise,
her claim against Dunn is barred by official immunity. Malone,
supra.
We conclude that the trial court properly granted the
LFUCG and Dunn summary judgment on this issue.
4
The trial court based its summary judgment in this area on
the doctrine of sovereign immunity. It is unquestioned that the
LFUCG is entitled to claim the protection of sovereign immunity
from court liability. Hempel v. Lexington-Fayette Urban County
Government, Ky. App., 641 S.W.2d 51, 53 (1982). Robert’s
argument that sovereign immunity applies only to unintentional
torts is to no avail, as the law is clear thatAthe sovereign
state cannot be held liable in a court of law for either
intentional or unintentional torts . . . @ Calvert Investments,
.
Inc. v. Louisville & Jefferson County Metropolitan Sewer
District, Ky., 805 S.W.2d 133, 139 (1991). Similarly, any
intentional infliction of emotional distress claim against Dunn
is barred by immunity, as a public officialAis immune from
liability when exercising a discretionary function as long as the
official acts within the general scope of the authority of
office.@ Franklin County, Kentucky v. Malone Ky., 957 S.W.2d
,
195, 202 (1997). Dunn’s election to file charges against Robert
with the commission was a discretionary function of his powers as
Robert’s supervisor. The alleged screaming incident is
insufficient to rise to the level of reprehensible conduct
required to constitute intentional infliction of emotional
distress. Seitz, supra.
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Finally, the Clarks allege that the trial court erred
by failing to compel the LFUCG and Dunn to respond to
interrogatories related to the Roark investigation.
The trial
court denied the Clarks’ motion to compel based upon the work
product doctrine of CR 26.02(3)(a).
Robert seeks discovery of
documents obtained by the Roark investigationAto show that the
charges [filed against him with the commission] were without
merit and merely a pretext for discrimination. As we have
@
determined that summary judgment was proper as to all of the
aforementioned claims, this issue is rendered moot.
Nevertheless, the trial court properly resolved this issue, as
the Clarks were apparently provided with a list of the witnesses
who were interviewed by Roark and the Clarks have apparently
taken Roark’s deposition.
Therefore, the Clarks had a means of
ascertaining the Asubstantial equivalent of the fruits of
@
Roark’s investigation. See CR 26.02(3)(a).
We further conclude
that the cases relied upon by the Clarks on this issue are
distinguishable.
The judgment of the Fayette Circuit Court is affirmed.
McANULTY, JUDGE, CONCURS.
COMBS, JUDGE, CONCURS IN PART AND DISSENTS IN PART BY
SEPARATE OPINION.
COMBS, JUDGE, CONCURRING IN PART AND DISSENTING IN PART.
I
cannot agree that Kentucky’s stringent standard for summary
judgment has been met by the defendants-appellees in this case.
Appellant has raised serious issues of material fact that merit
-14-
examination by a trial on the merits.
For example, the
coincidences in timing surrounding his first injury and the
subsequent investigation allegedly premised on the Berry report
clearly raise the innuendo or specter of possible retaliation for
having filed a workers’ compensation claim.
He has, in my
opinion, withstood the test to prevent entry of summary judgment
dismissing his claim as to the retaliation charge.
However, I
agree that summary judgment was properly entered as to all of his
other claims.
BRIEFS AND ORAL ARGUMENT
FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
J. Robert Cowan
Lexington, KY
Robert L. Roark
Jeffrey S. Walther
Lexington, KY
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