DEWANNA SMALLWOOD, ADMINISTRATRIX OF THE ESTATE OF TAWNE MARIE HYDEN, DECEASED v. SHELL OIL COMPANY AND ROGERS OIL COMPANY
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RENDERED:
April 2, 1999; 2:00 p.m.
ORDERED NOT PUBLISHED BY THE KENTUCKY SUPREME COURT:
DECEMBER 9, 1999 (1999-SC-0399-D)
C o m m o n w e a l t h O f K e n t uc k y
C o urt O f A ppe a l s
NO.
1997-CA-001591-MR
DEWANNA SMALLWOOD, ADMINISTRATRIX
OF THE ESTATE OF TAWNE MARIE
HYDEN, DECEASED
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM SCOTT CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE DAVID L. KNOX, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 95-CI-000287
v.
SHELL OIL COMPANY AND
ROGERS OIL COMPANY
APPELLEES
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
BUCKINGHAM, GUIDUGLI AND JOHNSON, JUDGES.
JOHNSON, JUDGE: Dewanna Smallwood (Smallwood) has appealed from
two orders of the Scott Circuit Court entered on April 15, 1997,
and June 16, 1997, which summarily dismissed her complaint
against the appellees, Shell Oil Company (Shell) and Rogers Oil
Company (Rogers).
We affirm.
Smallwood’s decedent, Tawne Marie Hyden (Hyden), died
as a result of a gunshot wound to her head shortly after 3:00
a.m. on September 19, 1994.
This senseless death occurred during
the course of a robbery committed by two young men, one a
juvenile, at Hyden’s place of employment, the Shell One Stop,
located on Delaplain Road in Georgetown, Kentucky.
Hyden was
twenty-two years old at the time of her death, and the mother of
two children.
She had worked as a cashier at the Shell One Stop
for over a year and had been promoted to the position of
assistant manager.
She was working alone on the morning she was
murdered.
The Shell One Stop is owned and operated by Hamilton
Enterprises, Inc. (Hamilton Enterprises).
It is undisputed that
Smallwood, Hyden’s mother and the administratrix of her
daughter’s estate, sought and obtained workers’ compensation
benefits from Hamilton Enterprises’ insurer, including burial
expenses and benefits for Hyden’s dependent children.
On
September 18, 1995, Smallwood filed a complaint in the Scott
Circuit Court seeking damages for Hyden’s wrongful death.
In her
complaint, and in amended complaints, Smallwood claimed that
Hamilton Enterprises was negligent in failing to provide Hyden
with a safe place to work.
She also alleged that Shell and
Rogers, the entities from which Hamilton Enterprises obtains the
petroleum products it sells, had an agency relationship with
Hyden’s employer and were vicariously liable for the damages
resulting from Hamilton Enterprises’ negligence.
Further,
Smallwood alleged that Shell and Rogers had an independent duty
to require Hamilton enterprises to maintain a safe place of
employment and were thus directly liable for the damages
resulting from Hyden’s death.
Finally, Smallwood’s complaint
included a claim against James Brian Bennett (Bennett) and Joshua
-2-
1
Young Cheng (Cheng), Hyden’s killers. Shell and Rogers filed
cross-claims against Bennett and Cheng.
Before addressing the issues upon which the trial court
predicated the dismissal of the two oil companies from this
lawsuit, it is necessary to discuss the relationship between
Shell, Rogers and Hamilton Enterprises.
Shell, a major producer
of petroleum products, had a contract with Rogers, known in the
industry as a Ajobber@ contract.
Under the terms of this
agreement, Rogers agreed to purchase certain amounts of gasoline
and other oil products from Shell and Shell granted Rogers the
right to use Shell’s name and logo and to assign the use of
Shell’s identifications to other entities.
Pursuant to the
jobber contract, Rogers entered into a marketing agreement with
Hamilton Enterprises in 1992, in which Rogers granted Hamilton
Enterprises the right to appropriate Shell’s name and
identification at the Shell One Stop in exchange for the purchase
1
The record reflects that Cheng pled guilty in the Scott
Circuit Court to the charge of murder and, as a result of that
plea, was sentenced to serve twenty-five (25) years in prison
without the possibility of parole. In his answer, he stated he
had no affirmative defenses to the allegations in the complaint.
Bennett, whose criminal charges were pending at the time he was
served in this case, denied the allegations in the complaint.
The resolution of the criminal charges against Bennett is not
contained in the record on appeal.
-3-
2
of gasoline and petroleum products from Rogers for resale. The
marketing agreement specifically provided as follows:
MARKETER'S INDEPENDENCE. Marketer [Hamilton
Enterprises] is an independent businessman,
and nothing in this agreement shall be
construed as reserving to Rogers any right to
exercise any control over, or to direct in
any respect the conduct or management of
Marketer's business or operations conducted
pursuant to this agreement; but the entire
control and discretion of such business and
operation shall be and remain in Marketer,
subject only to Marketer's performance of the
obligations of this agreement. Neither
Marketer nor any person performing any duties
or engaged in any work at Marketer's station
for or on behalf of Marketer shall be deemed
an employee or agent of Rogers or Shell, and
none of them is authorized to impose on
Rogers or Shell any obligations or liability
whatsoever.
Shell and Rogers have consistently maintained that they
owed no duty to Hyden to provide her with a safe place to work,
and that they never voluntarily undertook a duty to provide her
with a safe place to work.
On January 31, 1997, they moved for
summary judgment arguing that there was nothing in the
contractual relationship with Hamilton Enterprises that placed a
duty on them to protect Hamilton Enterprises’ employees from the
criminal attacks of third parties.
The oil companies contended
that any control they asserted over Hamilton Enterprises was
designed to maintain minimum standards of operation and
2
Hamilton enterprises is known as aAjobber-dealer or a
@
Asubjobber.@ Shell Oil utilizes other types of arrangements in
marketing its products. For example, it hasAdealer stores,
@
also known as Afranchise stores where it contracts directly with
@
an independent business to operate a Shell branded store. We
discern little difference between the relationship of Shell to
its jobber-dealers and franchisees. Shell also owns and operates
Shell convenience stores which are known asAsalary or corporate
stores.@
-4-
appearance to preserve the public’s confidence in Shell’s
products and that they had neither the right, nor the duty, to
control the security at the Shell One Stop.
They also insisted
that since Hamilton Enterprises was an independent contractor and
not their agent, they could not be held vicariously liable for
any negligence by Hamilton Enterprises in not providing a safe
work place.
In the alternative, they argued that even if a
principal/agent relationship were established, they would not be
liable to Smallwood as they were protected by the
Aup-the-ladder
@
defense under Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) 342.610(2).
In her response, Smallwood argued that the contractual
arrangement between Shell, Rogers and Hamilton Enterprises was
designed to Amanipulate and directly or indirectly control these
so-called ’independent’ marketers, jobbers and dealers, and
others involved in the chain of petroleum product distribution.
@3
To make her point, Smallwood outlined nearly fifty terms in the
contracts giving Shell and/or Rogers control over the manner in
4
which Hamilton Enterprises operated the Shell One Stop. She
3
In his affidavit filed in response to the motion for
summary judgment, Smallwood’s expert witness, James M. Patterson,
explained that until the 1940s and 1950s, most gasoline stations
were company owned and operated. According to Patterson, the
switch to independent jobbers was accomplished in part
Ato
attempt to insulate the major oil companies as much as possible
from the risks and liabilities associated with gasoline retail
sales, including unionization, harm to life and limb and
environmental liability.
@
4
Examples recited by Smallwood included:AHamilton had to
comply with Shell’s standards of operation and appearance
@;
AHamilton was required to have hours of operation from 6:00 a.m.
to 12:00 p.m. (Interestingly, Hamilton Enterprises was not
@
required to have the store open 24 hours a day or at the time of
day that Hyden was murdered.); AHamilton was required to perform
(continued...)
-5-
maintained that it was necessary for Shell and other major oil
companies to control their jobber stationsAif they are to
effectively implement their strategy of product differentiation.
@
This control, she argued, was sufficient evidence for the trial
court to determine that Hamilton Enterprises was the agent of
Shell and Rogers and to hold the oil companies vicariously liable
for Hamilton Enterprises’ negligence in failing to provide Hyden
with a safe place to work.
Smallwood also argued that there was evidence from
which a jury could determine that Shell voluntarily assumed a
duty to provide Hyden with a safe place to work.
This evidence
consisted of Shell having provided materials for Hamilton
Enterprises to use in training store employees regarding safety
concerns.
The packet of materials supplied by Shell to jobbers,
including Hamilton Enterprises, was accompanied by a letter which
read in part as follows:
In today's society, security is critical to
the success and safe operation of a service
station facility. Good security practices
help reduce the threat of robbery and
burglary, enhancing the safety of both
employees and customers. As part of Shell's
ongoing effort to provide more information on
service station security, the enclosed
information packet was created. The packet
contains important suggestions for deterring
robberies at your station, as well as
providing valuable sources of security
4
(...continued)
automotive repairs in a workmanlike manner AHamilton’s
@;
employees were required to wear clean uniforms of a type and
style approved by Rogers and Shell AHamilton had to obtain
@;
Rogers’ prior written approval before installing or replacing any
vending machines or display equipment for merchandising sundry
convenience items and AHamilton was required to keep the
@;
station free from loitering.
@
-6-
related equipment and training aids. Also
included is information on the enhanced
Service Station Reward Program now offering
up to $20,000 for the arrest and conviction
of criminals committing violent crimes
against Shell Dealers, Jobbers, Jobber
Dealers or employees in Shell branded service
stations.
Using this material as part of your training
program will help prepare your employees if
they are faced with a life threatening
situation. While this packet was originally
distributed in 1990, the magnitude of service
station security problems warrants its
reissue. We urge you to use this material to
make your business a safer place to work.
Smallwood also argued that a jury could conclude
Athat
Shell and Rogers should have recognized the need for adequate
training of marketers/buyer outlets so as to protect employees
from criminal attack.
@
Smallwood further argued that there were
public policy considerations making summary judgment
inappropriate.
Specifically, she argued:
To allow Shell to exert such control over
Hamilton as will enable Shell to provide
consumers nationwide with a uniform level of
service, while at the same time allowing
Shell to escape liability by claiming that it
does not control Hamilton's operations,
confers upon Shell the benefits of a
franchise system or a jobber distributions
system without requiring Shell to bear any of
the burdens or risks.
Finally, Smallwood argued that Shell and Rogers were not entitled
to assert the up-the-ladder defense as they were not
Acontractors@ as contemplated by KRS 342.610(2).
In its order of April 15, 1997, the trial court
analyzed the various cases cited by both Smallwood and the oil
companies and held as follows:
-7-
[T]here does not appear to be any evidence
that Shell or Rogers sought to control the
manner in which Hamilton was to operate its
business. The Jobber Contract gave Shell the
right to conduct inspections, and the
Marketing Agreement gave Rogers the right to
conduct inspections. However, there appears
to be no evidence that Shell actually
conducted inspections, and the evidence is
disputed as to whether Rogers conducted
inspections. Even if Rogers did conduct
inspections, it does not appear that it
ordered conditions corrected, issued threats
to cancel the contract, or advised Hamilton
how to conduct its business.
Shell distributed a security packet to
jobbers and dealers containing security
suggestions which the packet stated that
recipients should consider as part of their
overall security program. The packet
expressly disclaimed any claim that its
suggestions would prevent crimes and
injuries. Unlike J.M. v. Shell [922 S.W.2d
754 (Mo. 1996)], however, the security packet
did not set forth details or the manner in
which safety was to be achieved, and it does
not appear that Shell required the recipients
to implement those suggestions.
In this Court's opinion, considering all
of the foregoing, this Court does not believe
that the evidence demonstrates that Shell and
Rogers maintained sufficient control over
Hamilton's operation of the station such as
to create an actual agency relationship, and
thus render them liable for Ms. Hyden's
death.
The trial court also dismissed Smallwood’s claim with
respect to a breach of an independent duty to provide a safe work
environment as follows:
It does not appear to this Court that
[Smallwood] articulates upon what basis she
believes that that duty exists, nor does she
appear to address the argument presented by
Shell and Rogers. In any event, this Court
does not believe that it has been shown law
which would support a conclusion that Shell
and Rogers owed Ms. Hyden an independent duty
to provide her with a safe work environment.
-8-
As to the issue of Shell’s and Rogers’ voluntary undertaking to
provide security to Hyden, the trial court held that there must
be Agreater involvement for liability to attach than the degree
undertaken by Shell and Rogers in this case. It reasoned: AThe
@
security packet expressly provides that it contains information
which recipients should consider as part of the security program,
and it disclaimed any representation that its implementation
would prevent crimes or injuries.
@
The trial court’s order did not address the effect, if
any, of the Workers’ Compensation Act.
Smallwood asked the trial
court to reconsider its order and address the issue of whether
Shell and Rogers were entities protected by the workers’
compensation scheme.
The trial court granted Smallwood’s request
and in its order entered June 16, 1997, addressed the appellees’
up-the-ladder defense as follows:
This Court believes that, pursuant toKRS
342.610(2) and Firem[a]n's Fund [Insurance
Co. v. Sherman and Fletcher Ky., 705 S.W.2d
,
459 (1986)], in order for Shell and Rogers to
be considered contractors, they must have
been contracting with another to perform the
kind of work which is a regular part of their
business. There does not appear to be any
requirement that they subcontract work
because of a contractual obligation owed to a
third party. It appears to this Court that
marketing and selling oil products and
operating convenient stores is a regular part
of the business of Shell and Rogers. It
seems to this Court that the business
arrangement among Shell, Rogers, and Hamilton
appears to place Shell and Rogers in the
status of contractors, since they have
contracted with each other and with Hamilton
to sell oil products and to operate a
convenient store. This Court believes that
their status as contractors render them
potentially liable for Workers[’]
Compensation coverage for Ms. Hyden, and
-9-
pursuant to KRS 342.690(1) they are entitled
,
to protection from liability for that reason.
After the trial court granted the motion of Shell and
Rogers for summary judgment, it also granted a similar motion
made by Hamilton Enterprises on September 2, 1997.
The trial
court held that Smallwood’s claims against Hyden’s employer were
barred as a matter of law by the terms of KRS 342.690(1) and KRS
342.610(4).
Smallwood has not appealed from the judgment
dismissing Hamilton Enterprises.
The claims against Bennett and
Cheng are still pending in the trial court.
In this appeal, Smallwood continues to argue that Shell
and Rogers are vicariously liable for the alleged negligence of
Hamilton Enterprises in failing to provide Hyden with a safe
place to work.
She states that A[a] critical question before
this Court is whether Shell and/or Rogers had the right to
exercise control over the business operation of Hamilton
[Enterprises] at the Delaplain Shell One Stop. She argues in
@
the alternative that summary judgment was inappropriate because
there is a genuine issue of material fact regarding the control
Shell and Rogers exerted over Hamilton Enterprises.
Additionally, Smallwood argues that the trial court erred in
summarily dismissing her claim that Shell and Rogers had an
independent duty to require Hamilton Enterprises to maintain a
safe place for Hyden to work.
Shell and Rogers argue that
Hamilton Enterprises was an independent contractor and that
neither Acontrolled how Hamilton [Enterprises] operated its
service station and Adid not participate in the decisions or
@
details of the day-to-day operations to the degree necessary to
@
-10-
create an agency relationship and to be vulnerable to claims
predicated on vicarious liability.
In addressing Smallwood’s
theory of independent liability, the appellees contend that there
is Ano general duty owed by a franchisor to provide a secure
workplace to employees of its franchisee, thereby justifying the
@
summary judgment with respect to that portion of Smallwood’s
complaint.
As our recitation of the facts indicated, the trial
court determined that Shell and Rogers did not maintain
sufficient control over Hamilton Enterprises to create an agency
relationship, or in the alternative, were protected by the upthe-ladder defense.
It is our opinion that the trial court
reached the right result on the issue of whether Shell and Rogers
are vicariously liable for the negligence, if any, of Hamilton
Enterprises, although our reasoning is different.
Many of the
cases Smallwood has cited convince us that there is a significant
issue of fact concerning the existence of an agency relationship
between Shell and Hamilton Enterprises. See note 6, infra.
Also, we are not convinced that KRS 342.610(2)(b) is applicable
5
in the context of a franchisor/franchisee relationship.
5
The purpose of KRS 342.610(2)(b) is to protect employees of
subcontractors and Ato prevent subcontracting to irresponsible
people.@ Fireman’s Fund 705 S.W.2d at 461. We question its
,
applicability, however, where the relationship of the alleged
contractor (Shell and/or Rogers) and the alleged subcontractor
(Hamilton Enterprises) is that of franchisor/franchisee or
parent/subsidiary. We have no doubt that if Hamilton Enterprises
had not secured workers’ compensation insurance coverage, the
appellees would be quick to deny responsibility for those
benefits, relying upon the explicit language in the marketing
agreement providing that no employee of Hamilton Enterprises
Ashall be deemed an employee or agent of Rogers or Shell. The
@
(continued...)
-11-
However, even if, as Smallwood urges, the control retained by
Shell and Rogers over Hamilton Enterprises’ operation of the
Shell One Stop were sufficient to create a principal/agent
relationship, and further assuming the appellees were not
entitled to the up-the-ladder defense, Smallwood would not be
entitled to recover damages from Shell or Rogers under a theory
predicated on respondeat superior or imputed liability.
It is a settled principle in this jurisdiction that a
release of the agent or servant acts as a release of the
principal/master whose liability isAvicarious in nature and
derived solely from its legal relation to the wrongdoer. . . @ .
Copeland v. Humana of Kentucky, Inc. Ky.App., 769 S.W.2d 67, 70
,
(1989).
In Copeland, this Court held that a covenant not to sue
the primary tortfeasors, two anesthesiologists,Aaffected a
5
(...continued)
irony of the argument advanced by Shell and Rogers
Ci.e., that
they were potentially liable for Hyden’s workers’ compensation
benefits despite the clear terms of the marketing agreement
Cwas
not lost on Professor Larson who made the following observation:
Ordinarily it is the corporation that is
trying to insist on its separateness from its
subsidiary, and it is the plaintiff that is
trying to Apierce the corporate veil. But
@
here the positions are reversed. The parent
strives to disavow its separateness so as to
assume identity with its subsidiary and thus
share its immunity as employer. But this
makes it vulnerable to the argument that the
parent, having deliberately set up the
corporate separateness for its own purposes,
should not be heard to disavow that
separateness when it happens to be to its
advantage to do so.
Larson, Workers’ Compensation Law § 72.40 (1998).
,
-12-
complete discharge of the hospital (the master/employer) who is
only secondarily liable, id. at 70, and reasoned as follows:
@
Having agreed not to sue the
servant/agent, and made recovery by
settlement therefrom, the appellant may not
now seek additional recovery from the
master/principal based upon the same acts of
alleged negligence, whether the document is
called a "release" or "covenant not to sue."
It matters little how the servant was
released from liability; as long as he is
free from harm, it appears to us that his
master should also be blameless. Max v.
Spaeth, 349 S.W.2d 1 (Mo.1961).
This result is required for either or both
of two reasons: "That such a result will
avoid circuity of action or that since the
liability of the master or principal is
merely derivative and secondary, exoneration
of the servant removes the foundation upon
which to impute negligence to the master or
principal." Holcomb v. Flavin 34 Ill.2d
,
558, 216 N.E.2d 811, 814 (1966).
Id. at 69.
This principle is no less applicable where, as in the
instant case, the agent/servant is released or immune from
liability by virtue of a statute. A[A] statute that bars a claim
against an agent equally protects those in whose behalf he acted
as agent, where there are no circumstances of equity to prevent
the operation of the statute in their favor[.] 3 Am.Jur.2d
@
Agency § 348 (1986).
Clearly, our Kentucky Workers’ Compensation
Act grants immunity from tort liability to all employers covered
by the act.
KRS 342.690.
In Boggs v. Blue Diamond Coal Company
,
th
590 F.2d 655 (6 Cir.1979), the Court, relying on the
Restatement (Second) of Agency §§ 185 and 217, stated:
The parent is not liable under the doctrine
of respondeat superior for the negligence of
-13-
the subsidiary. For purposes of the doctrine
of respondeat superior, a subsidiary which
provides workmen's compensation should be
treated as having terminated the derivative
liability of its parent or principal by
satisfaction of the claim.
Id. at 663 (citations omitted). See also Clem v. Steveco, Inc.
,
450 N.E.2d 550, 554 (Ind.Ct.App. 1983) (satisfaction of claim
against employer under workers’ compensation act
Aalso satisfies
the liability of all parties whose liability is predicated solely
upon their relationship to the immediate employer
@).
We have reviewed the numerous cases cited by Smallwood
for the proposition that a franchisor who retains control over
its franchisee can be vicariously liable for the torts of the
franchisee.
However, these cases involve claims by patrons of
6
the franchisee, not employees.
The importance of this
6
See Brenner v. Socony Vacuum Oil Co. 158 S.W.2d 171
,
(Mo.Ct.App.1942) (agency relationship found between oil company
and lessee of service station so as to impute liability for
injuries suffered by customer as a result of negligence of
lessee's employee); Aweida v. Kientz 536 P.2d 1138
,
(Co.Ct.App.1975) (summary judgment in favor of oil company in
suit brought by customer injured by ruptured tire against service
station operator and oil company determined to be inappropriate
where evidence showed oil company had "the right to control all
of the activities" of service station operator);
Edwards v. Gulf
Oil Corporation 24 S.E.2d 843 (Ga.Ct.App.1943) (plaintiff, whose
,
son died from burns sustained at service station where he was a
patron, was allowed to recover against oil company under agency
theory); Balderas v. Howe 891 S.W.2d 871 (Mo.Ct.App.1995)
,
(summary judgment in favor of franchisor reversed in suit by
automobile accident victim whose injuries were allegedly caused
by franchisee’s employee where evidence indicated franchisor had
right to control physical conduct of franchisee);
J.M. v. Shell
Oil Company, 922 S.W.2d 759, 764 (Mo.banc 1996) (customer, who
was sexually assaulted and shot at Shell convenience store and
gasoline station leased to franchisee, was entitled to proceed
against oil company as the agreements between oil company and
franchisee (similar to those in the instant case) "g[a]ve rise to
a factual question as to whether Shell had a right of control
over [franchisee] in providing security for customers of the
(continued...)
-14-
distinction is obvious.
There is no statutory or common law
immunity implicated when the person injured is a customer of the
franchisee.
Smallwood has not cited a single case where an
injured employee of a franchisee has recovered damages from the
franchisor under the agency theory ofrespondeat superior and our
research does not reveal any such cases.
Rather, the only cases
relied upon by Smallwood where employees prevailed against a
franchisor involved allegations of independent negligence by the
franchisor.
It is settled that summary judgment is inappropriate
unless Ait appears impossible for the nonmoving party to produce
evidence at trial warranting a judgment in his favor. . . @.
Steelvest, Inc. v. Scansteel Service Center, Inc. Ky., 807
,
S.W.2d 476, 482 (1991).
Regardless of the evidence Smallwood
could produce on what she perceives to be theAcritical@ issue of
control, it must be concluded as a matter of law that Smallwood’s
claim based on respondeat superior fails.
Accordingly, the
summary judgment for Shell and Rogers on this claim was
appropriate.
We will now turn to Smallwood’s claim that there is
evidence precluding summary judgment dismissing her claim that
Shell and Rogers are liable for their independent acts of
6
(...continued)
station"); Chevron Oil Company v. Sutton 515 P.2d 1283
,
(N.M.1973) (estate of woman who died from injuries sustained in
an automobile accident attributable to repairs made by service
station allowed to proceed against oil company under theory of
imputed negligence); Juarbe v. City of Philadelphia 431 A.2d
,
1073 (Pa.Super.Ct.1981) (plaintiff who slipped and fell on
petroleum products on sidewalk next to service station allowed to
proceed against oil company under theory ofrespondeat superior).
-15-
negligence resulting in Hyden’s death.
The gist of Smallwood’s
argument in this regard is that AShell controls and directly
influences nearly every aspect of an ’independent’ dealer’s
operation, including security measures and is Auniquely in a
@,
position to know about the risks and dangers associated with
operation of service station/convenience stores and the ways in
which the risks of crime and other hazards might be reduced.
@
Further, she contends that because dealers, such as Hamilton
Enterprises, Atypically lack sophistication about technical and
retail security and safety matters Shell, at a minimum, should
@,
have insisted that Hamilton Enterprises demonstrate that it was
Afollowing accepted practice in the protection of [its] customers
and employees from common health and safety hazards before
@,
doing business with Hamilton Enterprises.
Essentially, Smallwood
would place a duty on Shell, because of its greater expertise and
financial wherewithal, to voluntarily undertake to control the
security for all their jobbers.
The cases relied upon by Smallwood fall into two basic
categories:
Either the franchisor required the franchisee to
utilize the instrumentality that caused the employee’s injury, or
the franchisor voluntarily undertook to provide security for the
franchisee. Wise v. Kentucky Fried Chicken Corp. 555 F.Supp.
,
991 (D.N.H.1983), involves the claim of an injured employee
against a franchisor, Kentucky Fried Chicken (KFC).
The
plaintiff, injured by a defective pressure cooker, claimed that
KFC was Aprimarily liable for its own negligent conduct. Id. at
@
994.
Summary judgment in favor of KFC was reversed as the facts,
-16-
Aif proven, would support a finding that KFC, at a minimum, had a
duty to warn.
@
Id. at 996.7
See also Whitten v. Kentucky Fried
Chicken Corp. 570 N.E.2d 1353 (Ind.Ct.App.1991) (extent of
,
franchisor’s control over the injury-causing instrument, the
chicken fryer, gave rise to a genuine issue of material fact as
to whether it owed a duty to its franchisees’ employees vis-a-vis
the fryers).
In Martin v. McDonald’s Corporation 213 Ill.App.3d
,
487, 572 N.E.2d 1073 (1991), the verdict for the plaintiffs,
whose daughter was killed while working at a McDonald’s
franchise, was affirmed based on a claim that the franchisor
Avoluntarily assumed a duty to provide security at the
@
franchisee’s store. Id. at 492.
The appellate court held that
the evidence was sufficient to support the jury’s finding that
McDonald’s breached that assumed duty and that the breach was the
proximate cause of plaintiffs’ injury. Id. at 493-494.
In Clem
v. Steveco, supra, an employee of a convenience store was
murdered while working the late-night shift alone.
As noted
earlier herein, that Court rejected a claim of derivative
liability against Southland, the franchisor.
However, the Court
reversed the dismissal for failure to state a claim with respect
7
The facts at issue included that the agreement between KFC
and its franchisee, plaintiff’s employer, required the franchisee
to purchase Aapproved equipment, that the pressure cooker which
@
malfunctioned and caused plaintiff’s injuries was purchased from
Athe approved supplier list, that KFC was aware of 40 accidents
@
involving the specific pressure cooker in its various franchises
and had been informed by the cooker’s manufacturer of
Acorrective
measures which could be utilized to avoid such accidents,and
@
that, though knowing of the defect, KFC did not warn its
franchisee of the Adangers associated with the use of the
equipment.@ Id. at 993.
-17-
to that portion of the complaint which alleged an independent
duty on the part of Southland to provide the deceased with a safe
place to work, and reasoned as follows:
We agree . . . that franchise agreements
commonly involve questions of material fact
which cannot be disposed of by summary
judgment. Therefore, preliminary disposition
of the question of the amount of control a
franchisor retains is generally inappropriate
on a motion to dismiss for failure to state a
claim upon which relief could be granted
because the question commonly presents a
question which is not addressable by a T.R.
12(B)(6) motion.
Id., 450 N.E.2d at 555-556.
In Helmchen v. White Hen Pantry, Inc. 685 N.E.2d 180
,
(Ind.Ct.App.1997), a recent case cited by both Smallwood and the
appellees, the parents of an employee abducted and murdered while
working at a convenience store early in the morning brought a
suit against the franchisor, White Hen Pantry (WHP), for failing
to provide adequate security at its franchisee’s store.
That
case recognized, as the appellees argue, thatA[t]here is no
general direct duty to provide a secure workplace owed by a
franchisor to employees of its franchisees. Id. at 181.
@
Thus,
Helmchen is contrary to Smallwood’s argument that Shell’s
superior expertise and/or financial position created a legal duty
to voluntarily provide security, or to insure that its franchisee
provided adequate security, for the protection of the
franchisee’s employees.
Nevertheless, Smallwood finds support inHelmchen’s
holding that Aa duty may arise depending on the extent of control
a franchisor has over the operations of the franchise. Id.
@
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A[T]he relevant inquiry is whether there is a genuine issue of
material fact as to the extent WHP controlled security measures
at its convenience stores.
@
Id. at 182.
Thus, Smallwood argues,
A[a]t a minimum, the case should be remanded to allow for further
factual development of the adequacy of the Asafety procedures in
@
place which caused [Hyden] to be killed.
@
Normally, the question of the existence of a duty is
one of law. Mullins v. Commonwealth Life Insurance Company Ky.,
,
839 S.W.2d 245, 248 (1992). AThe statement of whether a duty
exists is but a conclusion of whether a plaintiff’s interests are
entitled to legal protection against the defendant’s conduct.
@
Alderman v. Bradley Ky.App., 957 S.W.2d 264, 267 (1997).
,
However, as the Helmchen, Clem, Wise, and Martin cases suggest,
the issue may involve a mixed question of law and fact.
It is our opinion, however, that the trial court
correctly determined that Shell and Rogers did not have a legal
duty to provide Hyden with a safe work environment.
The
authorities upon which Smallwood relies, and others which we have
found in our research, provide that in order for the franchisor
to have a duty to the employees of its franchisee, it must be
demonstrated that the franchisor retained the ability to make
decisions concerning the daily operation of the franchisee and
specifically retained the ability to control the security of the
franchise.
For example, in Clem, the Court, quoting from Coty v.
U.S. Slicing Machine Company 58 Ill.App.3d 237, 15 Ill.Dec. 687,
,
373 N.E.2d 1371 (1978), stated as follows:
A[A] [franchisor] who possesses a right to
supervise the internal operations of
-19-
another’s enterprise, which includes a right
to veto an unsafe procedure, may be liable
for the negligent failure to do so. . . .
However, this right to interdict unsafe
practices must consist of something more than
a general right to make suggestions or
recommendations or to order the work stopped
or resumed.@
Id., 450 N.E.2d at 555. See also Folsom v. Burger King 135
,
Wash.2d 658, 958 P.2d 301, 308-310 (1998).
In the instant case,
Smallwood has failed to present any evidence bearing on the issue
of Shell’s or Rogers’ control of the security in place at the
Shell One Stop.
Thus, regardless of the adequacy of the safety
procedures in place on the night Hyden was murdered, the record
does not reveal, nor does Smallwood allege, that Shell or Rogers
exerted any control over the security at the Shell One Stop.
This lack of control was consistent with the contracts between
the parties which did not provide the appellees with the right to
control the security at the Shell One Stop.
The only evidence that Smallwood points to in this
regard is the security packet provided by Shell to Hamilton
Enterprises that contained information and suggestions for
security at the Shell One Stop.
As the appellees point out,
Helmchen dispels the notion that giving adviceAcalculated to
heighten awareness regarding security issues and to offer
suggestions for addressing criminal activity is sufficient to
@
create a legal duty on the part of a franchisor. Id. at 182-183.
There being no duty owed to Hyden in the first instance by Shell
or Rogers, summary judgment was appropriately granted. Sheehan
v. United Services Automobile Association Ky.App., 913 S.W.2d 4,
,
6 (1996).
-20-
Accordingly, the judgment of Scott Circuit Court is
affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF AND ORAL ARGUMENT FOR
APPELLEE:
Hon. Shirley A. Cunningham,
Jr.
Hon. Rosanna L. Peace
Lexington, KY
Hon. Ashley W. Ward
Lexington, KY
ORAL ARGUMENT FOR APPELLANT:
Hon. Shirley A. Cunningham,
Jr.
Lexington, KY
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