RICHARD J. SCOTT v. COGNEX, INC.; HONORABLE J. LANDON OVERFIELD, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE; AND WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD
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RENDERED:
NOVEMBER 10, 2005; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2005-CA-001345-WC
RICHARD J. SCOTT
APPELLANT
PETITION FOR REVIEW OF A DECISION
OF THE WORKERS’ COMPENSATION BOARD
CLAIM NO. WC-04-00347
v.
COGNEX, INC.;
HONORABLE J. LANDON OVERFIELD,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE; AND
WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD
APPELLEES
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
BARBER, MINTON, AND TAYLOR, JUDGES.
MINTON, JUDGE:
Richard J. Scott seeks review of an opinion of
the Workers’ Compensation Board affirming a decision of an
administrative law judge (“ALJ”) denying Scott’s
claim for benefits.
affirm.
Finding no error in the Board’s opinion, we
In August 2002, during the course of his employment as
a field service technician for Cognex, Inc., Scott purportedly
injured his shoulder while installing parts on a piece of
equipment in Russellville, Kentucky.
Following that incident,
Scott returned to his home in California and began receiving
medical treatment, including shoulder surgery performed by
Dr. Scott Forster in October 2002.
Following the surgery, Scott
continued to receive treatment from physicians, including
Dr. Mannie Joel, a pain management specialist.
In February
2004, Scott filed a claim for benefits stemming from the
incident in Russellville two years earlier.
Scott has not
returned to work.
As is typical in workers’ compensation cases, each
side marshaled medical and lay testimony and opinions.
Dr. Joel, who provided the main source of testimony on behalf of
Scott, opined that Scott was 100 percent disabled due to the
August 2002 incident.
On the other hand, Cognex relied
principally upon the opinion of Dr. Phillip Corbett, a Kentucky
physician who examined Scott at Cognex’s request.
Based on an
MRI report, his personal examination of Scott, and Scott’s
medical history, Dr. Corbett opined that Scott suffered from
degenerative disc disease that pre-existed the August 2002
incident.
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From the array of opinions and testimony, the ALJ
chose to rely mainly upon the conclusions of Dr. Corbett.
Based
on Dr. Corbett’s conclusions, the ALJ found that Scott had not
met his burden to show that the August 2002 incident caused
Scott’s current condition.
Rather, the ALJ found that Scott’s
condition stemmed from another work-related incident that
occurred in Pennsylvania in April 2002.
Scott’s claim.
Thus, the ALJ dismissed
After the Board affirmed the ALJ, Scott filed
this appeal.
Before Scott’s specific argument is addressed, it is
necessary to recall the permissible scope of this Court’s review
of a decision of the Board.
It is well-established that our
function in workers’ compensation cases “is to correct the Board
only where the . . . Court perceives the Board has overlooked or
misconstrued controlling statutes or precedent, or committed an
error in assessing the evidence so flagrant as to cause gross
injustice.” 1
Furthermore, Scott, as the claimant, has the burden
of proof and must prove every element of his claim. 2
Because the
ALJ’s decision was not in Scott’s favor, the issue on appeal is
“whether the evidence was so overwhelming, upon consideration of
the entire record, as to have compelled a finding in [Scott’s]
1
Western Baptist Hospital v. Kelly, 827 S.W.2d 685, 687-688 (Ky.
1992).
2
Magic Coal Co. v. Fox, 19 S.W.3d 88, 96 (Ky. 2000).
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favor.” 3
In order to be compelling, evidence must be “so
overwhelming that no reasonable person would fail to be
persuaded by it . . . .” 4
The ALJ is the finder of fact in workers’ compensation
cases, meaning that the ALJ alone “has the authority to
determine the quality, character . . . substance” 5 and weight of
the evidence presented, as well as the inferences to be drawn
therefrom. 6
Thus, the ALJ “may reject any testimony and believe
or disbelieve various parts of the evidence, regardless of
whether it comes from the same witness or the same adversary
party’s total proof.” 7
Accordingly, given our limited scope of
review, this Court may not “substitute its judgment” for that of
the ALJ, nor may we render our own findings or direct the
findings or conclusions the ALJ shall make. 8
Bearing those principles in mind, we now turn to
Scott’s argument.
Scott contends that the medical evidence
compels a finding that his current condition was caused by the
3
Wolf Creek Collieries v. Crum, 673 S.W.2d 735, 736 (Ky.App. 1984).
4
Magic Coal Co., 19 S.W.3d at 96.
5
Paramount Foods, Inc. v. Burkhardt, 695 S.W.2d 418, 419 (Ky. 1985).
6
Miller v. East Kentucky Beverage/PepsiCo., Inc., 951 S.W.2d 329, 331
(Ky. 1997).
7
Magic Coal Co., 19 S.W.3d at 96.
8
Wolf Creek Collieries, 673 S.W.2d at 736.
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August 2002 incident and that consequently, the ALJ erred by
finding otherwise.
Scott’s argument is unavailing.
First, as the ALJ and
the Board both noted, many of Dr. Joel’s records list April 2002
(the date when Scott suffered a work-related injury in
Pennsylvania), as Scott’s date of injury.
In fact, Dr. Joel’s
records do not show August 2002 as being Scott’s date of injury
until May 2004, after the date Scott filed this claim for
benefits.
In addition, Dr. Forster’s written notes regarding
the shoulder surgery he performed on Scott say that Scott
suffered from chronic rotator cuff impingement, which would be
indicative of a condition pre-dating the August 2002 incident.
Furthermore, although he was unable to state definitively
whether the April 2002 or August 2002 incident was the precise
date of the onset of Scott’s current condition, Dr. Corbett did
definitively state that Scott developed work-related shoulder
problems in April 2002, probably as a result of an aggravation
or arousal of a pre-existing condition.
In addition to relying upon Dr. Corbett’s medical
opinions, the ALJ based his conclusions upon his belief that
Scott had been less than candid regarding the severity of the
April 2002 incident.
According to the ALJ, though Scott
testified that the April 2002 incident was relatively minor,
Dr. Joel listed the April incident as the injury onset date
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until after Scott filed this application for benefits.
In
addition, Dr. Joel’s March 7, 2003, office notes record that in
April 2002, Scott “slipped and grabbed onto something to stop a
fall and pulled hard on his left arm.”
Finally, as the Board
observed, Scott did not report the April 2002 incident until
“right before” the August 2002 incident, “bringing into question
his motivations for claiming the August 6, 2002[,] incident as
the sole cause of his current complaints.” 9
So the record
supports the ALJ’s decision to discredit Scott’s account of the
severity of the April 2002 incident.
Dr. Corbett’s conclusions are clearly at odds with
those of other physicians.
But the ALJ was entitled to rely
upon Dr. Corbett’s conclusions and to draw all reasonable
inferences from them in arriving at his ultimate findings.
Furthermore, the mere fact that the record contains evidence
that would support a different conclusion is insufficient to
trigger reversal.
Thus, as the ALJ has the unfettered right to
choose which evidence to believe, 10 and as the ALJ’s decision is
supported by the conclusions of Dr. Corbett, the inconsistencies
in Dr. Joel’s notes, and the ALJ’s permissible decision to
discount Scott’s testimony regarding the April 2002 incident, we
9
Board’s opinion, p. 18, n.1.
10
Magic Coal Co., 19 S.W.3d at 96.
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must affirm because the evidence simply is not so overwhelming
as to compel a finding in Scott’s behalf. 11
For the foregoing reasons, the decision of the
Workers’ Compensation Board is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
W. Kenneth Nevitt
Louisville, Kentucky
Ronald J. Pohl
Crystal L. Moore
Lexington, Kentucky
11
Wolf Creek Collieries, 673 S.W.2d at 736.
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