BROOKLAWN YOUTH SERVICES v. MELISSA HANEBERG; HON. MARCEL SMITH, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE; AND WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD
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RENDERED:
NOVEMBER 18, 2005; 2:00 P.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2005-CA-001025-WC
BROOKLAWN YOUTH SERVICES
APPELLANT
PETITION FOR REVIEW OF A DECISION
OF THE WORKERS’ COMPENSATION BOARD
ACTION NO. WC-00-94857
v.
MELISSA HANEBERG;
HON. MARCEL SMITH,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE;
AND WORKERS’ COMPENSATION BOARD
APPELLEES
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
BARBER, MINTON, AND TAYLOR, JUDGES.
BARBER, JUDGE:
Appellee, Melissa Haneberg (Haneberg), began
working for Appellant, Brooklawn Youth Services (Brooklawn), in
July 1999 as a residential counselor for boys, ages eight to
fourteen.
The boys were placed in the facility as a result of
emotional, physical, or sexual abuse.
Haneberg has a bachelor’s
degree in psychology and is working on a master’s degree in
social work.
Haneberg’s first injury occurred October 5, 1999, when
she was restraining a twelve-year-old boy who refused to go to
his room.
The boy, who weighed between 100 to 110 pounds, was
placed in a “kneeling cradle” position by Haneberg.
Haneberg
stood behind the boy and locked her arms around his waist.
the same time, a co-worker restrained the boy’s legs.
At
During
this incident, Haneberg suffered an onset of severe low back
pain.
Haneberg was able to complete her shift but went to the
immediate care center the following day.
The physician at the
immediate care center diagnosed Haneberg with a lumbar strain
and released her to return to work with restrictions of no
lifting over 100 pounds.
Haneberg continued to work until February 8, 2000,
when she sustained a second low back injury while restraining a
resident in a chair.
Following this incident, she remained off
work from February 14, 2000 until June 19, 2000.
received temporary total disability benefits.
Haneberg
While off work,
Haneberg was seen by Dr. Joseph Werner, an orthopedic surgeon,
on May 30, 2001.
Haneberg then worked from June 20, 2000 to December
13, 2000.
While working, her condition continued to worsen.
As
a result, Dr. Werner performed fusion surgery on Haneberg
December 14, 2000.
He performed an anterior discectomy at L5-S1
and fusion of L5-S1 with insertion of titanium cages and bone
grafts.
Haneberg received temporary total disability benefits
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from December 13, 2000 until October 23, 2001.
Haneberg then
filed her workers’ compensation claim December 21, 2001.
Dr. Werner performed a repeat fusion surgery on
October 8, 2002 because Haneberg was still experiencing pain.
The L5-S1 fusion consisted of instrumentalities and a left iliac
crest bone graft.
Haneberg received temporary total disability
benefits from October 8, 2002 through December 16, 2003.
Haneberg did not return to work following her second surgery.
During the discovery portion of Haneberg’s claim,
independent medical examinations (IME) were performed by Dr.
Bart J. Goldman, Dr. Robert F. Baker, 1 and Dr. Tinsley Stewart.
A deposition of Dr. Baker was also taken on April 22, 2002.
In
addition to the above, medical records from Haneberg’s treating
physician, Dr. Werner, as well as his August 8, 2002 deposition
were submitted into the record.
Following discovery, a final
hearing on her claim was held on May 4, 2004 before Hon. Marcel
Smith, Administrative Law Judge (ALJ).
In her June 28, 2004 Opinion and Award, the ALJ
assigned an impairment rating of 30% to Haneberg based upon KRS
342.730(1)(b) and the medical evidence provided by Dr. Baker. 2
The ALJ also found that Haneberg retained the physical capacity
to return to the type of work she performed at the time of her
1
Dr. Baker performed two IMEs, the first IME was performed after Haneberg’s
first surgery and the other IME was performed after her second surgery.
2
Dr. Baker’s IMEs were performed at the request of Brooklawn.
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injury based upon Dr. Baker’s findings and thus was not entitled
to the 1.5 multiplier contained in KRS 342.730(1)(c)(1).
In
support of her decision regarding the multiplier, the ALJ cited
Kentucky River Enterprises, Inc. v. Elkins, 107 S.W.3d 206 (Ky.
2003), and Fawbush v. Gwinn, 103 S.W.3d 5 (Ky. 2003).
The ALJ
ruled that Haneberg was entitled to temporary total disability
benefits for October 23, 2001 through October 8, 2002 based on
the statements of Dr. Werner.
The ALJ also held that Haneberg
was not entitled to vocational rehabilitation and was liable for
various medical bills.
Haneberg filed an appeal July 19, 2004.
She alleged
error by the ALJ in refusing to apply the 1.5 multiplier of KRS
342.730(1)(c)(1) to her case as well as denying her vocational
rehabilitation benefits.
However, Haneberg failed to make any
substantive argument in her brief related to the denial of
vocational rehabilitation benefits.
The Workers’ Compensation
Board (WCB) issued its opinion October 22, 2004.
The sole issue
the WCB examined was the ALJ’s alleged error in failing to award
the 1.5 multiplier of KRS 342.730 (1)(c)(1) for Haneberg’s work
injury.
The WCB found that any analysis pursuant to Fawbush
was inappropriate because that case dealt with an analysis of
the 2000 version of the Workers’ Compensation Act (Act), rather
than the 1996 Act applicable to Haneberg’s case.
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The WCB stated
the correct case for the ALJ to utilize was Ford Motor Co. v.
Forman, 142 S.W.3d 141 (Ky. 2004).
As such, the WCB remanded
the matter to the ALJ for further findings concerning the
application of the 1.5 multiplier pursuant to KRS
342.730(1)(c)(1) of the 1996 Act in accordance with the law set
forth in Forman.
Specifically, the WCB stated the ALJ must make
a determination whether Haneberg was capable of returning to her
actual pre-injury job which required restraining children.
Neither party appealed the WCB’s Order remanding the matter to
the ALJ.
The ALJ issued her Order on Remand December 7, 2004. 3
The ALJ found that under the reasoning of Forman, Haneberg would
not, under Dr. Baker’s restrictions, be able to restrain unruly
children and would not be able to return to her actual preinjury job.
As such, the ALJ found that the 1.5 multiplier of
KRS 342.730(1)(c)(1) as it existed at the time of Haneberg’s
injury 4 was applicable and amended the original ALJ opinion to
reflect the same.
Brooklawn appealed the ALJ’s Order on Remand January
7, 2005.
Brooklawn requested the WCB to reverse the ALJ’s
December 7, 2004 order and remand with directions to enter an
order stating the conclusion of law that Haneberg has not lost
3
The original Order on Remand had an incorrect date of September 10, 2004
that was corrected per order entered January 11, 2005.
4
The 1996 version of the Act.
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the physical capacity to return to the type of work she
performed at the time of the injury.
Brooklawn further
requested that the WCB reinstate the ALJ’s original Opinion and
Award.
The WCB issued an opinion April 15, 2005 affirming the
ALJ’s Order on Remand.
Brooklawn appealed the WCB opinion May
17, 2005.
Brooklawn makes three arguments in its brief: (1) the
WCB erred in reversing the original opinion of the ALJ that
Haneberg had not lost the physical capacity to return to the
type of work she performed prior to the injury; (2)
the issue
on appeal is a question of law, not a question of fact; and (3)
the WCB erred in its second opinion on remand by affirming the
ALJ’s order on remand making a conclusion of law that the
medical opinion of Dr. Baker supports entitlement to the 1.5
enhancement multiplier based upon loss of physical capacity to
return to the type of work Haneberg performed prior to the
injury.
Haneberg argues that the first issue should be whether
Brooklawn was entitled to appeal the second WCB order which
affirmed the ALJ’s award after remand.
Haneberg states that
Brooklawn’s current appeal is precluded because the first WCB
order was the “law of the case.”
We now turn our attention to
the original WCB opinion.
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Brooklawn first argues that the WCB’s interpretation
of “type of work” of KRS 342.730(1)(c)(1) 5 to mean Haneberg’s
actual pre-injury job relying upon Forman was in error.
Specifically, Brooklawn argues that “type of work” refers to the
employee’s line of work rather than the employee’s actual preinjury job.
Where a decision of the WCB sets aside an ALJ’s
decision and either directs or authorizes the ALJ to enter a
different award upon remand, it divests the party who prevailed
before the ALJ of a vested right and, therefore, the decision is
final and appealable to the Court of Appeals.
Morgan, 52 S.W.3d 567, 569 (Ky. 2001). 6
Whittaker v.
In contrast, a WCB
5
In its brief, Brooklawn mistakenly cites the 2000 Act of KRS 342.730 rather
than the applicable 1996 Act in effect at the time of Haneberg’s injuries.
6
In Whittaker, the WCB issued an opinion that the Special Fund was entitled
to credit against the income benefits that were awarded at reopening for
benefits that were awarded under the settlement, but that the credit must be
calculated as set forth in KRS 342.125(2)(b), rejecting the Special Fund’s
argument that a different calculation be used. The WCB remanded the claim to
the ALJ to calculate the credit for the Special Fund.
The WCB’s decision divested the claimant of his victory before
the ALJ on the question of credit and did not divest the Special Fund of
anything that the ALJ had previously decided in its favor. The Special Fund,
not the claimant, appealed to the Court of Appeals. It was determined that
if the Special Fund had failed to appeal the WCB’s decision with regard to
the legal question concerning the manner in which the credit should be
calculated, it would have been precluded by the “law of the case” doctrine
from raising the issue again after the ALJ’s decision on remand. The Supreme
Court stated that a party who is aggrieved by an adverse appellate
determination must appeal at the time the decision is rendered because an
objection on remand is futile, and an appeal from the implementation of the
appellate decision on remand amounts to an attempt to relitigate a
previously-decided issue. It was determined that in view of the fact that
the WCB decided the legal question that was raised by the Special Fund and
rejected its argument, the question subject to appeal following the remand
would have been whether the ALJ properly construed and applied the order of
remand.
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opinion is interlocutory if it remands the case to the ALJ with
directions to comply with statutory requirements without
authorizing the taking of additional proof or the entry of a
different award.
Davis v. Island Creek Coal Co., 969 S.W.2d
712, 714 (Ky. 1998).
In its original opinion, the WCB stated “the ALJ,
while determining Haneberg could return to her former job
classification of social work/counselor, does not state with
specificity whether she could return to her actual job which
required restraining children.” (Emphasis added.)
The WCB
continued by stating the “matter must be remanded to the ALJ for
a factual finding addressing Haneberg’s capability of returning
to her actual pre-injury job.” (Emphasis added.)
The WCB then
remanded to the ALJ for further findings concerning the
application of the 1.5 multiplier pursuant to KRS
342.730(1)(c)(1), as it existed at the time of the injury in
accordance with the law set forth in Forman.
This opinion set
aside the ALJ’s decision 7 and authorized the ALJ to enter a
different award upon remand and, therefore, the WCB opinion
decision was final and appealable.
7
The ALJ had relied, in part, upon Fawbush v. Gwinn, 103 S.W.3d 5 (Ky. 2003)
in making her decision not to apply the multiplier of KRS 342.730(1)(c)(1).
The WCB found that such an analysis was inappropriate because Fawbush
concerned an analysis of the 2000 Act, rather than the 1996 Act applicable at
the time of Haneberg’s injuries.
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Brooklawn’s failure to appeal the WCB’s original
opinion caused the WCB’s interpretation of the law related to
KRS 342.730(1)(c)(1), specifically that the term “type of work”
means a claimant’s actual pre-injury job, to become the law of
the case.
Whittaker, supra 52 S.W.3d at 569.
As such, the
opinion of the WCB that “type of work” meant a claimant’s actual
pre-injury job became controlling at all subsequent stages of
the litigation, and the questions to be considered following the
remand were limited to whether the ALJ properly construed and
applied the Board’s mandate.
Inman v. Inman, 648 S.W.2d 847,
849 (Ky. 1982).
Brooklawn argues that Haneberg had not lost the
physical capacity to return to the “type of work” she performed
prior to the injury, therefore the WCB erred in reversing the
original opinion of the ALJ.
In its brief, Brooklawn argues
about the appropriate definition for “type of work” in KRS
342.730(1)(c)(1).
We believe Brooklawn’s first argument was not
properly preserved, because they failed to appeal the original
WCB opinion.
this opinion.
As such, the argument will not be addressed in
The “law of the case” doctrine mandates that the
WCB’s interpretation of the law related to KRS 342.730(1)(c)(1),
specifically that the term “type of work” means a claimant’s
actual pre-injury job, to become the law of the case at all
subsequent stages of litigation.
Additionally, we would like to
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note that the failure of legislature to amend a judicially
interpreted statute, such as was done in Forman, strongly
implies legislative agreement with the interpretation.
Rye v.
Weasel, 934 S.W.2d 257, 262 (Ky. 1996).
Brooklawn’s second argument is that the issue on
appeal is a question of law, not a question of fact.
disagree.
We
In essence, Brooklawn is appealing the application of
the KRS 342.730(1)(c)(1) multiplier to Haneberg’s case.
The
issue of a claimant’s retained capacity and the application of
the 1.5 multiplier in KRS 342.730(1)(c)(1) is one of fact based
on the evidence, both lay and medical.
Carte v. Loretto
Motherhouse Infirmary, 19 S.W.3d 122, 126 (Ky.App. 2000).
Therefore, we believe there is no merit to Brooklawn’s argument.
The final argument made by Brooklawn is that the WCB
erred in its second opinion by affirming the ALJ’s order on
remand making a conclusion of law that the medical opinion of
Dr. Baker supports entitlement to the 1.5 enhancement multiplier
based upon loss of physical capacity to return to the type of
work Haneberg performed prior to the injury.
As stated above, Brooklawn’s failure to appeal the
WCB’s original opinion caused the WCB’s interpretation of the
law related to KRS 342.730(1)(c)(1), specifically that the term
“type of work” means a claimant’s actual pre-injury job, to
become the law of the case.
Whittaker, supra 52 S.W.3d at 569.
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As such, the decision of the WCB was controlling at all
subsequent stages of the litigation, and the question to be
considered following the remand was limited to whether the ALJ
properly construed and applied the Board’s mandate.
Inman,
supra 648 S.W.2d at 849.
The WCB opined that the applicable case law in
Haneberg’s matter was Ford Motor Company v. Forman, 142 S.W.3d
141 (Ky. 2004).
Using Forman, the WCB directed the ALJ to
determine whether Haneberg retained the ability to return to her
actual pre-injury job which included restraining children.
With
this instruction, the ALJ stated the following in her Order on
Remand:
This Administrative Law Judge having
reviewed the Opinion and being sufficiently
advised finds that under the reasoning of
Ford Motor Company v. Forman, Ky., 142
S.W.3d 141 (Ky. 2004), [Haneberg] would not,
under Dr. Baker’s restrictions be able to
restrain unruly children and is therefore
not able to return to [her] actual preinjury job. Therefore, the 1.5 multiplier
of KRS 342.730(1)(c)1 as it existed at the
time of the injury is appropriate and will
be applied.
When a claimant succeeds in her burden of proof in a
workers compensation claim, and an adverse party appeals, the
question before the court is whether the decision of the ALJ is
supported by substantial evidence.
Poe, 69 S.W.3d 60, 62 (Ky. 2001).
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Transportation Cabinet v.
Substantial evidence is
evidence of relevant consequence sufficient to induce conviction
in the minds of reasonable people.
Id.
The ALJ has the sole
authority to determine the weight, credibility, and substance of
the evidence and to draw reasonable inferences from the
evidence.
Id., see also KRS 342.285.
The ALJ has the
discretion to choose whom and what to believe.
Id., (citing
Pruitt v. Bugg Brothers, 547 S.W.2d 123, 125 (Ky. 1977)).
The
ALJ, as fact-finder, may reject any testimony and believe or
disbelieve various parts of the evidence, regardless of whether
it comes from the same witness or the same adversary party’s
total proof.
Burton v. Foster Wheeler Corp., 72 S.W.3d 925, 929
(Ky. 2002), (citing Caudill v. Maloney’s Discount Stores, 560
S.W.2d 15, 16 (Ky. 1977)).
The actual bodily condition of the claimant is proven
through medical evidence, but lay testimony may be used on the
question of the extent of disability which has resulted from the
bodily condition.
Hush v. Abrams, 584 S.W.2d 48, 50 (Ky. 1979).
Disability is a question of fact and there is no rule which
requires the employee to produce medical proof.
Id. at 51.
The ALJ relied upon the restrictions of Dr. Baker in
concluding that the 1.5 multiplier of KRS 342.730(1)(c)(1) to be
applicable to Haneberg.
We now turn to evidence submitted
relevant to Dr. Baker.
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In the report from the March 28, 2002 IME, Dr. Baker
noted:
I discussed the job duties 8 with
[Haneberg]. She does not feel that she has
the ability to be able to undertake the
physical capacity that may be necessary in
order to restrain an unruly child. When
dealing with pain, we have to take the
patient’s word for their inability to
accomplish tasks.
. . .
On my examination, [Haneberg] did not
show any exaggeration or inappropriate
behavior in an attempt to magnify her pain
during the physical examination. For
example, there were no positive Waddell’s
signs.
In Dr. Baker’s April 22, 2002, deposition, he
testified that subjectively, based on what Haneberg told him,
she would be unable to restrain people.
Dr. Baker continued
that he did not find any “obvious signs of exaggeration,
malingering, and things like that” by Haneberg.
Dr. Baker also
opined Haneberg was not trying “to pull the wool over [his]
eyes.”
Dr. Baker then performed a second IME on Haneberg
following her second back surgery.
In his IME report he made
the following comments:
As stated in my initial IME of March
28, 2002, I cannot find any objective reason
8
Dr. Baker noted he had a very detailed job description in the record
concerning the duties of a residential counselor, including the necessity to
be able to restrain children, at times.
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why she could not perform her job duties,
but from the patient’s point of view and her
continued subjective complaints she is in no
position to undertake the responsibility of
restraining an unruly child.
. . .
Finally, during my most recent history
and physical examination, [Haneberg] did not
display any type of abnormal pain behavior
or show any signs of attempting to magnify
her alleged pain symptoms, in my opinion.
Dr. Baker’s testimony could have provided a basis for
the conclusion sought by Brooklawn, but it also provided a basis
for the determination of Haneberg being unable to return to her
actual pre-injury job.
The ALJ may choose which evidence to
believe when it is conflicting, even when it is from the same
witness.
Caudill v. Maloney’s Discount Stores, 560 S.W.2d 15,
16 (Ky. 1977).
The ALJ chose to believe Dr. Baker’s testimony
that subjectively Haneberg would be unable to restrain children
based upon statements made by her to him during the physical
examination.
We believe the ALJ’s finding that Haneberg was
unable to return to her actual pre-injury job was supported by
substantial evidence.
As such, it was appropriate for the ALJ
to apply the 1.5 multiplier of KRS 342.730(1)(c)(1) to Haneberg.
Based on the foregoing, the decision of the WCB is
affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
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BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
James G. Fogle
Jane Ann Pancake
Louisville, Kentucky
Robert M. Lindsay
Louisville, Kentucky
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