ROBERT CLARK v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY, CABINET FOR HEALTH AND FAMILY SERVICES
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RENDERED:
AUGUST 12, 2005; 2:00 p.m.
TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2005-CA-000575-ME
ROBERT CLARK
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON FAMILY COURT
HONORABLE HUGH SMITH HAYNIE, JUDGE
ACTION NOS. 97-FJ-001327, 04-J-504912, AND 04-J-504913
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY,
CABINET FOR HEALTH AND FAMILY SERVICES
APPELLEE
OPINION AND ORDER
DENYING MOTION TO DISMISS APPEAL
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
COMBS, CHIEF JUDGE; HENRY AND JOHNSON, JUDGES.
JOHNSON, JUDGE:
The matter below was a Dependency, Neglect, and
Abuse Petition.
Appellee moves the Court to dismiss this
expedited appeal based on its claim that the order entered on
February 3, 2005, from which the appeal was taken, is not final
and appealable and that a subsequent notice of appeal was not
filed from the dispositional order entered on March 9, 2005.1
Appellee argues that the appeal is taken from the wrong order
1
Appellee also argues that this appeal is untimely but the record shows that
the appeal was timely filed on the last day of the period provided under
Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure (CR) 73.02(1)(a). See CR 6.01.
but cites no authority that is directly on point to support its
argument.
In response, appellant invites the Court to apply the
“relation forward” principle adopted by the Kentucky Supreme
Court in Johnson v. Smith.2
has merit.
We believe that appellant’s argument
Therefore, it is ORDERED that appellee’s motion be
DENIED.
We note that the order of February 3, 2005, was
entered following the trial of the action.
It made the
determination that act(s) of domestic violence had occurred in
the presence of the children and that the County Attorney had
proven by a preponderance of the evidence that the children’s
exposure to the domestic violence placed them at risk as defined
in KRS 600.020.
Further, the order set a number of conditions
pending disposition to be made at a later date.
We believe that the “relation forward” concept may
properly be applied to this matter so as to allow what is a
premature notice of appeal from an intermediate order to proceed
even though a second notice of appeal was not taken from the
final order.
While the Kentucky Supreme Court applied the
concept in Johnson to a procedurally different situation, we
read language in that decision to suggest that we should apply
2
885 S.W.2d 944 (Ky. 1994).
-2-
that concept to the procedural posture of this case.
Accordingly, we now adopt that application.
In Johnson, the Court stated as follows:
In federal appellate practice a premature
notice of appeal (absent prejudice), in
reasonable circumstances, is deemed simply
to relate forward and become effective on
the date the trial court tenders its final
judgment. See FirsTier Mtge. v. Investors
Mortgage Ins. Co., 498 U.S. 269, 111 S.Ct.
648, 112 L.Ed.2d 743 (1991) [emphasis
original].3
Subsequently, the Supreme Court further discusses the federal
concept:
We deem the federal approach adopted in the
FirsTier Mtge. case, supra, appropriate for
present purposes. The U.S. Supreme Court
states the premature notice of appeal
protects the litigant who “reasonably but
mistakenly believes [the order or judgment
entered against him] to be a final judgment,
while failing to file a notice of appeal
from the actual final judgment.” 498 U.S. at
276, 111 S.Ct. at 652-53. This rule permits
a premature notice to be effective to invoke
the jurisdiction of the appellate court upon
final judgment where, as here, the
circumstances suggest filing a notice of
appeal would not be unreasonable.4
The above quote includes a footnote which adds that the federal
concept does not allow “a notice of appeal from a clearly
interlocutory decision-–such as a discovery ruling or a sanction
3
Johnson, 885 S.W.2d at 947.
4
Id. at 950.
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order.”5
However, this is not the type of ruling that is
challenged in the instant appeal.
We are of the opinion that it was not unreasonable for
appellant to believe that the order of February 3, 2005, was
final and appealable since it was entered following trial and
since it made the substantive findings required to be made to
bring the Petition to resolution.
In addition, it does not
appear to the Court that appellee will be prejudiced by our
decision.
Therefore, consistent with the principle articulated
in Johnson, we hold that the premature notice of appeal should
relate forward to the date of entry of the final order, thereby
allowing it to effectively invoke our jurisdiction.
This appeal
shall proceed with appellant’s brief being due no later than
thirty (30) days from the date of entry of this order.
ALL CONCUR.
ENTERED:
/s/ Rick A. Johnson
JUDGE, COURT OF APPEALS
August 12, 2005
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT:
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE:
Nellie M. Draus-Stallings
Louisville, Kentucky
Jason F. McGregor
Jefferson Co. Attorney’s Off.
Louisville, Kentucky
5
Id.
-4-
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