WILLIAM A. SHECKLES, JR. v. JAMES L. MORGAN; AND LT. ROGER SOWDER
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RENDERED:
DECEMBER 22, 2005; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2005-CA-000346-MR
WILLIAM A. SHECKLES, JR.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM BOYLE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE DARREN W. PECKLER, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 04-CI-00482
v.
JAMES L. MORGAN; AND
LT. ROGER SOWDER
APPELLEES
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
JOHNSON, KNOPF, AND VANMETER, JUDGES.
JOHNSON, JUDGE:
William A. Sheckles, Jr., pro se, has appealed
from an order of the Boyle Circuit Court entered on January 13,
2005, which dismissed his petition for declaration of rights 1
concerning a prison disciplinary matter.
Having concluded that
Sheckles received the due process of law to which he was
1
Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) 418.040.
entitled in the administration of the prison discipline, we
affirm.
On October 18, 2004, while imprisoned at the
Northpoint Training Center, a letter was found during a routine
search of Sheckles’s living quarters alluding to a sexual
relationship between him and a non-inmate canteen worker.
Because pursuing or developing such a relationship with a noninmate is a violation of CPP 2 15.2, Category IV, Section 21, a
prison adjustment hearing was held.
On October 28, 2004, Lt.
Roger Sowder, a prison adjustment officer, found Sheckles guilty
as charged.
Sheckles was required to forfeit 60 days of good-
time credit and to serve 45 days in disciplinary segregation,
which was suspended for 60 days.
Sheckles appealed these findings to the prison warden,
James L. Morgan.
On November 8, 2004, the warden concurred with
the adjustment officer’s findings and actions.
On November 29,
2004, Sheckles filed a petition for declaration of rights in the
Boyle Circuit Court.
Warden Morgan and Lt. Sowder filed a
response and motion to dismiss on January 10, 2005.
On January
13, 2005, the circuit court denied Sheckles’s petition.
This
appeal followed.
This Court has previously held that a motion to
dismiss a petition for declaratory judgment stemming from a
2
Kentucky Corrections Policies and Procedures.
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prison disciplinary proceeding is most appropriately addressed
as a motion for summary judgment. 3
The particular guidelines to
be used in reviewing cases such as this one have been set forth
as follows:
Where, as here, principles of
administrative law and appellate procedure
bear upon the court’s decision, the usual
summary judgment analysis must be qualified.
The problem is to reconcile the requirement
under the general summary judgment standard
to view as favorably to the non-moving party
as is reasonably possible the facts and any
inferences drawn therefrom, with a reviewing
court’s duty to acknowledge an agency’s
discretionary authority, its expertise, and
its superior access to evidence. In these
circumstances, we believe summary judgment
for the Corrections Department is proper if
and only if the inmate’s petition and any
supporting materials, construed in light of
the entire agency record (including, if
submitted, administrators’ affidavits
describing the context of their acts or
decisions), does not raise specific, genuine
issues of material fact sufficient to
overcome the presumption of agency
propriety, and the Department is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law. The court must
be sensitive to the possibility of prison
abuses and not dismiss legitimate petitions
merely because of unskilled presentations.
Jackson v. Cain, 864 F.2d 1235 (5th Cir.
1989). However, it must also be free to
respond expeditiously to meritless
petitions. By requiring inmates to plead
with a fairly high degree of factual
specificity and by reading their allegations
in light of the full agency record, courts
will be better able to perform both aspects
of this task. 4
3
Smith v. O’Dea, 939 S.W.2d 353, 355 n.1 (Ky.App. 1997).
4
Id. at 356.
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We further note that in prison disciplinary proceedings, due
process requires that a disciplinary committee’s decision to
impose sanctions for violations of prison rules must be
supported only by “some evidence.” 5
Sheckles raises two arguments.
His first claim is
that the disciplinary actions against him were initiated because
he was in possession of mail which violated prison policies.
However, we find Sheckles version of the proceedings against him
to be somewhat skewed.
The record reveals that the letter found during a
routine search of Sheckles’s living quarters alluded to a sexual
relationship that had occurred between him and a canteen worker
at the prison.
The canteen worker was not an inmate at the
prison, but had been employed by the Department of Corrections
until her termination in October 2004.
Sheckles claimed that
the canteen worker had not decided to send mail to him until
after her termination, and therefore the mail was sent from a
“free citizen of Kentucky” and was not illegal under prison
policy.
However, Sheckles was found guilty under CPP 15.2,
Category 4, Section 21, of pursuing a relationship with a noninmate.
As the circuit court stated “[Sheckles’s] argument that
5
Stanford v. Parker, 949 S.W.2d 616, 617 (Ky.App. 1996) (citing
Superintendent, Massachusetts Correctional Institution, Walpole v. Hill, 472
U.S. 445, 455, 105 S.Ct. 2768, 86 L.Ed.2d 356 (1985)).
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the person he had contact with was not an employee at the time
of the discovery of the violation is not relevant and without
merit.
The offense involved the contact, not the status of the
person.”
The prison policy clearly states that “[p]ursuing or
developing a relationship that is unrelated to correctional
activities with a non-inmate” is a violation punishable by
forfeiture of good time and disciplinary segregation.
letter satisfied the standard of “some evidence.”
The
The circuit
court correctly denied Sheckles’s petition on this issue.
Sheckles’s second argument relates to the circuit
court’s handling of his petition for declaratory judgment.
He
claims that he was denied his right to due process 6 when the
circuit court denied his petition for declaratory judgment
without allowing him an opportunity to file a responsive
pleading to the appellees’ motion to dismiss.
Sheckles claims in his brief that he was preparing a
response to the motion to dismiss when he received, by mail, the
circuit court’s order denying his petition.
Sheckles does not
indicate that his response would have included anything that was
not already available in the same record and exhibits that he
6
In Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 563-67, 94 S.Ct. 2963, 2978-982, 41
L.Ed.2d 935 (1974), the United States Supreme Court held that while prison
disciplinary proceedings are not subject to the full range of procedural
safeguards, inmates are entitled to certain minimum requirements of
procedural due process including advance written notice of the disciplinary
charges, a written statement by the fact-finders of the evidence relied upon
and the reasons for the disciplinary action, the opportunity to call
witnesses and present documentary evidence consistent with institutional
safety and correctional goals, and an impartial decision-making tribunal.
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utilized in filing his petition for declaratory judgment.
Consequently, there would have been no new information that
Sheckles had not already had the opportunity to address.
Accordingly, even assuming the circuit court erred in this
respect, we conclude that any such error is harmless and does
not constitute grounds for reversal.
Therefore, based on the foregoing reasons, the order
of the Boyle Circuit Court is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
William A. Sheckles, Jr.,
Pro Se
Burgin, Kentucky
No brief filed.
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