BRENNAN J. ROUSE v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED:
DECEMBER 22, 2005; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
2004-CA-002461-MR
BRENNAN J. ROUSE
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM McCRACKEN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE CRAIG Z. CLYMER, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 01-CR-00024
v.
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING IN PART, VACATING IN PART AND REMANDING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
GUIDUGLI, KNOPF, AND McANULTY, JUDGES.
KNOPF, JUDGE:
By judgment entered April 1, 2002, the McCracken
Circuit Court convicted Brennan Rouse of murder and sentenced
him in accord with the jury’s recommendation to life in prison.
Rouse was accused of the December 30, 2000, handgun slaying of
Delvecchio Ware at Jerry and Marjorie’s Bar and Grill at Seventh
and Adams Streets in Paducah.
Our Supreme Court affirmed
Rouse’s conviction and sentence in a not-to-be-published opinion
rendered December 18, 2003. 1
In July 2004, Rouse moved for
relief from his conviction pursuant to RCr 11.42.
He alleged
that retained trial counsel neglected a viable alternativeperpetrator defense because of a conflict of interest and
complained of numerous other instances of counsel’s alleged
ineffective assistance.
The trial court summarily denied
Rouse’s motion by order entered November 4, 2004.
that order that Rouse has appealed.
It is from
He contends that the trial
court erred by deeming the trial record sufficient to refute his
claims.
We agree with Rouse that an evidentiary hearing is
necessary to consider counsel’s performance during the penalty
phase of Rouse’s trial.
Otherwise, we affirm.
At trial, the Commonwealth presented evidence tending
to show that Ware had embarked upon a relationship with Rouse’s
on-again off-again girl friend, La Dawn White, and that Rouse
had of history of reacting violently to White’s relationships
with other men.
Three eye-witnesses familiar with both men
testified that they saw Rouse approach Ware, heard the shot, saw
Ware fall, and saw Rouse immediately flee from the bar.
One of
those witnesses testified that when Rouse approached Ware, she
saw Rouse raise his arm and, at the same time as the shot, saw
sparks or fire flash from Rouse’s jacket as though a gun had
gone off inside his jacket pocket.
1
Rouse’s aunt testified that
Rouse v. Commonwealth, 2002-SC-0298-MR (December 18, 2003).
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she spoke with Rouse on the telephone a few hours after the
shooting, that she urged him to turn himself in, and that he
said, “I didn’t mean to do it; I was drunk.”
Against this formidable evidence Rouse argued that
because he had several girl friends in addition to White he had
no reason to be jealous of Ware; that several other young men
had been close to Ware in the crowded and confused bar, any one
of whom could have shot him; and that his departure from Paducah
a few hours after the shooting was not flight but was rather a
trip to South Carolina he had planned two days earlier.
As
noted, the jury was convinced by the Commonwealth’s proof and
found Rouse guilty of murder.
Eugene Thomas was one of the other young men in the
bar that night.
Several minutes after the shooting, when most
of the guests had left the bar and gathered in the parking lot,
Thomas fired three shots into the air.
He later admitted that
act to the police and was initially considered a suspect in
Ware’s killing.
The police investigation quickly focused on
Rouse, however, so that Thomas was never arrested.
testify for either side.
Nor did he
Nearly three years after the shooting,
however, after Thomas had died, and after Rouse had spent time
in prison with Thomas’s brother Tyrell Thomas, Tyrell gave Rouse
an affidavit averring that Eugene had admitted to Tyrell that he
(Eugene) had shot and killed Delvecchio Ware.
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Rouse contends
that trial counsel’s failure to discover and make use of this
exculpatory evidence was ineffective and that it resulted from
counsel’s conflict of interest.
Apparently, Tyrell Thomas was summoned to testify
before the grand jury that indicted Rouse.
At the time Tyrell
was represented by another attorney in the firm that employed
Rouse’s attorney.
Although Rouse’s attorney had left that firm
by the time of Rouse’s trial, and though Rouse’s attorney never
represented Tyrell, Rouse argues that counsel was precluded by
her former firm’s duty of loyalty to Tyrell from using him as a
source of information about Eugene’s involvement in the crime.
Rouse is correct, of course, that the Sixth Amendment
right to effective assistance of counsel encompasses the right
to counsel that is free from conflicts of interest. 2
That right
is violated if counsel actively represents conflicting
interests, and if the conflict adversely affects counsel’s
performance. 3
To prove that counsel’s performance was adversely
affected, a defendant “must demonstrate that some plausible
alternative defense strategy or tactic might have been pursued,
and that the alternative defense was inherently in conflict with
2
Wood v. Georgia, 450 U.S. 261, 101 S.Ct. 1097, 67 L.Ed.2d 220
(1981).
3
Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 100 S.Ct. 1708, 64 L.Ed.2d
333 (1980).
-4-
or not undertaken due to the attorney’s other loyalties or
interests.” 4
Rouse apparently maintains that counsel did not pursue
the tactic of calling Tyrell as a witness and asking him about
Eugene’s involvement due to her conflicting duty not to divulge
Tyrell’s confidences to her former partner.
Even assuming that
counsel would have had such a duty in these circumstances, we
agree with the trial court that the record refutes conflict as
the basis for counsel’s decision not to question Tyrell.
It is
clear, rather, that Tyrell did not make his allegations against
his brother until pressed to do so by Rouse long after the fact
and after Eugene’s death.
Rouse does not allege, and Tyrell did
not aver, that Eugene made his confession prior to Rouse’s
trial, much less that Tyrell told his attorney about it by then.
Counsel cannot have been burdened by a conflict about which she
did not know.
Accordingly, we agree with the trial court that
Rouse is not entitled to relief on this ground.
Nor is he entitled to relief for any of counsel’s
other alleged errors during the guilt phase of the trial.
As
the parties note, to be entitled to such relief a defendant must
show both that counsel’s performance was below an objective
standard of reasonableness and that the deficient performance
4
United States v. Schwarz, 283 F.3d 76, 92 (2nd Cir. 2002)
(citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
-5-
prejudiced the defendant. 5
To satisfy this second condition, the
defendant must show “that there is a reasonable probability
that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the
proceeding would have been different.
A reasonable probability
is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the
outcome.” 6
Rouse’s allegations do not meet this standard.
Both Rouse and Ware are African-American.
Noting that
all the African-Americans in the venire were excluded from the
petit jury because of their familiarity with one or both of the
families involved, Rouse contends that counsel should have
anticipated the exclusion of local African-Americans and moved
for a change of venue.
He does not allege that African-
Americans were excluded on the basis of race or otherwise
improperly, and the record makes clear that the trial court had
no difficulty seating an impartial jury untainted by pretrial
publicity or inflamed community atmosphere.
Rouse was not entitled to a jury of any particular
racial composition. 7
He was entitled rather to an impartial jury
5
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80
L.Ed.2d 674 (1984).
6
Id. at 694.
2002).
See Bowling v. Commonwealth, 80 S.W.3d 405 (Ky.
7
Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69
(1986).
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from which African-Americans had not been invidiously excluded. 8
This he received.
In these circumstances counsel’s decision not
to seek a change of venue cannot be said to have been
objectively unreasonable.
resulted in any prejudice.
And Rouse has failed to show that it
The trial court correctly,
therefore, denied relief on this ground.
Similarly, none of the other guilt-phase errors Rouse
alleges, either alone or cumulatively, is reasonably likely to
have altered the result of the proceeding.
In light of the eye-
witness identifications of Rouse as the assailant and his
confession to his aunt, counsel’s alleged failures to
investigate Rouse’s conversation with Ware earlier that evening,
his stops at Renisha Horn’s and Darwin Rouse’s residences before
leaving Paducah after the shooting, and phone company records
detailing numerous calls to and from his mother’s residence in
the hours immediately following the shooting are not reasonably
likely to have affected the result.
Nor is it reasonably likely that counsel’s opening
statement or cross-examinations of Shay la King (the eye-witness
who saw the gun fire) and Geraldine Rouse (Rouse’s aunt)
affected the result.
During her opening statement, counsel
argued persuasively that Rouse was not jealous of Ware, as the
Commonwealth alleged, did not shoot him, and was suspected only
8
Id.
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because in the chaos of the crowded bar he had been
misidentified.
She elicited cross-examination or presented
evidence tending to substantiate all of these claims.
Her
opening was not tainted by unfulfilled promises.
That the Commonwealth’s evidence ultimately
overwhelmed this defense was not the result of counsel’s
ineffective assistance.
In particular, it was not the result of
counsel’s failure to learn before trial that eye-witness Shay la
King was prepared to make a much more positive identification
than she had initially reported to the police.
King’s testimony
would have been just as damning even had counsel known about it
beforehand.
Nor was it the result of counsel’s failure to call
an expert witness to attack Geraldine Rouse’s testimony
concerning Rouse’s confession.
The record refutes Rouse’s claim
that Geraldine’s testimony was confused.
And furthermore, Rouse
has failed to give “any proof that he knows of a specific expert
who is willing to testify in a manner helpful to the defense or
what such testimony would consist of.” 9
Absent such proof, our
Supreme Court has held, an RCr 11.42 movant will not be
permitted to engage in a fishing expedition. 10
Nor, at last, was
it the result of counsel’s “failure” to introduce evidence of
Ware’s marijuana possession or Rava Rouse’s hearsay statements
9
10
Mills v. Commonwealth, 170 S.W.3d 310, 329-30 (Ky. 2005).
Id.
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or counsel’s candor with the jury about Rouse’s lifestyle.
Counsel does not err by not introducing inadmissible evidence.
And candor is an obviously legitimate trial tactic.
Finally, however, we agree with Rouse that the trial
court should have conducted an evidentiary hearing to determine
whether counsel’s assistance was reasonably effective during the
penalty phase of Rouse’s trial.
Rouse contends that counsel’s
failure to introduce mitigating evidence was deficient and
prejudicial.
Our Supreme Court has explained that
[a]n attorney has a duty to conduct a
reasonable investigation, including an
investigation of the defendant’s background,
for possible mitigating evidence. In
evaluating whether counsel has discharged
this duty to investigate, develop, and
present mitigating evidence, we follow a
three-part analysis. First, it must be
determined whether a reasonable
investigation should have uncovered such
mitigating evidence. If so, then a
determination must be made whether the
failure to put this evidence before the jury
was a tactical choice by trial counsel. If
so, such a choice must be given a strong
presumption of correctness, and the inquiry
is generally at an end. If the choice was
not tactical and the performance was
deficient, then it must be determined
whether there is a reasonable probability
that, but for counsel’s unprofessional
errors, the result would have been
different. 11
11
Hodge v. Commonwealth, 68 S.W.3d 338, 344 (Ky. 2001). See
also, Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 123 S.Ct. 2527, 156
L.Ed.2d 471 (2003) (discussing counsel’s duty to investigate and
present mitigation evidence).
-9-
Here, as Rouse notes, counsel introduced no mitigating
evidence and according to Rouse never talked to him about the
penalty phase of the trial.
Rouse maintains that family
members, the mothers of his children, and his minister would
have testified about his background, his role as a provider for
his children, and his church attendance.
The Commonwealth
contends that counsel may have had tactical reasons for
eschewing this evidence, but the only reason suggested on the
record was counsel’s comment that Rouse and his family were so
upset after the guilty verdict that their testimony may have
“done more harm than good.”
We do not believe that that is a
sufficient reason for the complete abdication of advocacy.
There may have been other reasons, of course, but they are not
apparent from the record, and, as our Supreme Court has noted,
“[b]efore any possible mitigating evidence can be weighed in a
meaningful manner, that evidence first must be determined and
delineated.
This is the proper function of an evidentiary
hearing.” 12
A hearing will permit the trial court to determine
what mitigating evidence was available, whether counsel had
sufficient reason not to use it, and, if not, whether that
evidence is reasonably likely to have lessened Rouse’s life
sentence.
If so, then Rouse will be entitled to be sentenced
anew.
12
Id. at 345.
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Accordingly, we affirm the November 4, 2004, order of
the McCracken Circuit Court in all respects except its denial of
an evidentiary hearing on the issue of counsel’s effectiveness
during the penalty phase of Rouse’s trial.
With respect to that
issue, we vacate the trial court’s order and remand for an
evidentiary hearing consistent with this opinion.
If Rouse is
indigent, he will be entitled, if he so requests, to appointed
counsel to assist with the hearing. 13
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Brennan J. Rouse, pro se
West Liberty, Kentucky
Gregory D. Stumbo
Attorney General
Dennis W. Shepherd
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
13
Fraser v. Commonwealth, 59 S.W.3d 448 (Ky. 2001).
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