JENNIFER S. BALES (NOW MARTIN) v. RICHARD ALAN BALES
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RENDERED:
NOVEMBER 4, 2005; 2:00 P.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2004-CA-002214-ME
JENNIFER S. BALES (NOW MARTIN)
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM CAMPBELL CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE JULIE REINHARDT WARD, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 99-CI-00760
v.
RICHARD ALAN BALES
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
MINTON, SCHRODER, AND TAYLOR, JUDGES.
TAYLOR, JUDGE:
Jennifer S. Bales (now Martin) appeals from an
October 21, 2004, order of the Campbell Circuit Court awarding
sole custody of the parties’ child to Richard Alan Bales.
We
affirm.
Jennifer and Richard were married March 9, 1996.
child, Emmelina M. Bales (Emma), was born of the parties’
marriage on April 21, 1997.
In January 1998, the parties
One
adopted a child, Dennis A. Bales. 1
Thereafter, the parties
accepted teaching positions with Northern Kentucky University,
Chase College of Law and moved to Kentucky.
The parties were
divorced by decree of dissolution entered in the Campbell
Circuit Court on December 7, 1999.
The decree dissolved the
parties’ marriage but reserved issues of division of marital
property, assignment of debt, child support, and child custody.
Following several months of protracted litigation, the
parties entered into an agreed order on January 23, 2001.
The
order awarded Jennifer sole legal custody of Emma and awarded
Richard sole legal custody of Dennis.
visitation with Emma.
Dennis. 2
Richard was granted
Jennifer did not seek visitation with
The agreed order further provided that neither party
would:
[R]elocate their current residences outside
the Greater Cincinnati/Northern Kentucky
. . . for one (1) year; thereafter, either
party seeking to relocate at a distance more
than ten (10) miles . . . shall be obligated
to seek prior leave of court to be
determined on motion, responsive pleading,
and hearing on the motion and based upon
applicable law.
On October 23, 2001, Jennifer filed a motion
requesting leave of court to relocate to Massachusetts with
1
Dennis A. Bales was born in Russia and lived in a Russian orphanage until
age four when he was adopted by Jennifer and Richard.
2
Jennifer has chosen not to have any contact with Dennis since she and
Richard separated in the summer of 1999.
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Emma.
Jennifer asserted that the January 2002 relocation was
necessary to allow her to maintain employment as a law
professor.
Richard.
Jennifer proposed a revised visitation schedule for
On November 9, 2001, Richard filed a motion to modify
custody pursuant to Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) 403.340.
The matter was referred to the domestic relations commissioner
for a hearing.
Ky. R. Civ. P. (CR) 53.03(3).
On January 14, 2002, the court transferred temporary
residential custody of Emma from Jennifer to Richard.
On
October 16, 2003, Richard filed a Supplemental Motion for
Modification of Custody Decree.
Richard asserted that two years
had passed since the agreed custody order was entered; thus, KRS
403.340(2) no longer applied.
Richard argued the proper
standard for modification of the custody decree was the best
interest standard of KRS 403.340(3).
Following a five-day hearing, the commissioner filed a
thirty-three page report on May 26, 2004.
The commissioner
recommended that sole custody of Emma be awarded to Richard and
set forth a visitation schedule for Jennifer.
Both parties
filed exceptions, and by order entered September 24, 2004, the
circuit court adopted the commissioner’s report with only minor
modifications.
By order entered October 21, 2004, the order was
made final and appealable by inclusion of CR 54.02 language.
This appeal follows.
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Jennifer contends the circuit court erred by
misinterpreting the case law.
Specifically, Jennifer argues
that Wilson v. Messinger, 840 S.W.2d 203 (Ky. 1992) and Fenwick
v. Fenwick, 114 S.W.3d 767 (Ky. 2003) are controlling despite
the General Assembly’s 2001 amendment to KRS 403.340. 3
Jennifer
argues that although the statute was subsequently amended,
Wilson and Fenwick support a presumption that sole custodians
are entitled to relocate.
Jennifer further argues that these
cases support her assertion that the potential relocation may
not be considered when determining whether to modify custody.
KRS 403.340 governs modification of a custody decree
and was significantly altered by legislative action in 2001.
See Fowler v. Sowers, 151 S.W.3d 357 (Ky.App. 2004).
Prior to
the 2001 amendment, a change in custody was permitted only upon
a finding:
(1)[T]hat substantial harm would result to
the child's physical, mental, or emotional
health without a change of the custodial
arrangement and (2) that any harm caused by
the change would be outweighed by its
advantages.
Fowler, 151 S.W.3d at 359.
The 2001 amendment to KRS 403.340
relaxed the standards for modification of custody and expanded
the factors to be considered when making a modification to a
custody decree.
KRS 403.340(3) now permits custody to be
3
In Fenwick v. Fenwick, 114 S.W.3d 767 (Ky. 2003), the Court applied the pre2001 version of Kentucky Revised Statutes 403.340 as it was the version in
effect when the relevant orders were entered in the circuit court.
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modified if “a change has occurred in the circumstances of the
child or his custodian” and “the modification is necessary to
serve the best interests of the child.”
See Fowler, 151 S.W.3d
357.
In the case sub judice, the circuit court found that a
change in circumstances had occurred and that modification was
in Emma’s best interest.
The commissioner engaged in a thorough
analysis pursuant to KRS 403.340(3) and also addressed the more
stringent standard espoused in Fenwick that was in effect prior
to the 2001 amendment to KRS 403.340.
The circuit court adopted
those findings as well as the conclusion that Richard had met
his burden of proof. 4
Although Fenwick carries limited
precedential weight and does not apply to a case governed by the
current version of KRS 403.340, under either analysis, we
believe the circuit court properly determined that modification
of custody was appropriate.
See Fowler, 151 S.W.3d 357.
Jennifer next contends the circuit court erred by
misapplying KRS 403.340.
Jennifer specifically argues that no
modification of custody under KRS 403.340(3) is warranted since
no new supporting facts have arisen since the custody decree was
entered nor has there been disclosure of facts that were unknown
4
The circuit court adopted the commissioner’s finding that Richard had met
the burden of proof to establish that the child’s present environment with
Jennifer endangered seriously her physical, mental, moral or emotional health
and that the harm likely to be caused by the change in custody was outweighed
by the advantages.
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to the court when the decree was entered.
Jennifer asserts that
her relocation is not a “change in circumstances” contemplated
by KRS 403.340 and that the remaining factors considered were
known by the court before the agreed custody order was entered.
It has been held that a relocation involving
“considerable distance from Kentucky, is a change in
circumstances contemplated by [KRS 403.340].”
S.W.3d at 359.
Fowler, 151
Obviously, Jennifer’s relocation to
Massachusetts was one of “considerable distance” and, thus, was
properly considered as a change in circumstances pursuant to KRS
403.340(3).
See Fowler, 151 S.W.3d 357.
The court also
enumerated several other factors that constituted a “change in
circumstances” pursuant to KRS 403.340(3): (1) Jennifer
subsequently remarried and divorced; (2) Jennifer exposed Emma
to domestic violence; (3) Jennifer repeatedly violated court
orders regarding the children (i.e., child support, mediation
orders, etc...); and (4) Jennifer refused to foster the
relationship between Emma and Dennis.
We believe the court
properly determined that a change in circumstances had occurred
justifying a best interest determination pursuant to KRS
403.340(3)(c).
Jennifer also alleges that the testimony of Dr. Stan
Heck and Linda Mika should have been excluded by the circuit
court.
Jennifer specifically asserts that Dr. Heck was
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Richard’s personal therapist and should not be permitted to
testify regarding her.
It is well-established that an appellate court is
constrained from reviewing an allegation of error that was not
properly reserved for review.
CR 76.12(4)(c)(v); Combs v. Knott
County Fiscal Court, 283 Ky. 456, 141 S.W.2d 859 (1940).
In
this case, Jennifer did not object to Dr. Heck being offered as
an expert and did not object when his report was offered as a
trial exhibit.
Jennifer’s only objection at trial was “that Dr.
Heck had never seen [her] and therefore could not testify about
her.”
The commissioner overruled Jennifer’s objection based
upon Dr. Heck’s testimony that Jennifer had consented to and
participated in the evaluation and that Dr. Heck had seen her on
several occasions.
Jennifer did not take exception to the
commissioner’s ruling.
As such, we are of the opinion that
Jennifer waived the objection to Dr. Heck’s testimony.
See
Eiland v. Ferrell, 937 S.W.2d 713 (Ky. 1997).
Jennifer further contends the testimony of Linda Mika
should have been excluded.
Jennifer alleges that Mika “should
have been disqualified for lack of qualifications.”
Brief at 20.
this issue.
Appellant’s
This is the extent of Jennifer’s argument upon
Jennifer failed to state how this issue was
preserved for our review, failed to cite a single authority in
support of her assertion, and most importantly failed to supply
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this Court with sufficient facts to glean any understanding of
the issue.
See CR 76.12(4)(c)(v).
Based upon the foregoing, we
summarily reject Jennifer’s allegation on this issue.
Jennifer’s final argument is that the visitation
schedule established by the circuit court is “without support or
findings” and is “against the recommendations of the Guardian Ad
Litem.”
Appellant’s Brief at 22.
It is well-established that
an appellate court will not set aside a visitation schedule
unless it was “a manifest abuse of discretion” or was “clearly
erroneous in light of the facts and circumstances of the case.”
Drury v. Drury, 32 S.W.3d 521, 525 (Ky.App. 2000).
In this
case, the visitation schedule is very detailed, being some six
pages in length.
The court obviously gave a great amount of
consideration to the schedule which requires Emma to travel
extensively to visit with her mother.
Upon the whole, we simply
do not believe the circuit court abused its discretion or that
the decision was clearly erroneous.
For the foregoing reasons, the order of the Campbell
Circuit Court is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
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BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Steven J. Kriegshaber
Conliffe, Sandmann & Sullivan
Louisville, Kentucky
Kurt J. Meier
Tranter & Meier
Ft. Thomas, Kentucky
Mark A. Ogle
Ft. Mitchell, Kentucky
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