BARNEY SUTTON; HON. REBECCA S. WARD, JUDGE, BULLITT DISTRICT COURT v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
RENDERED:
OCTOBER 21, 2005; 2:00 P.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2004-CA-002132-MR
BARNEY SUTTON; HON. REBECCA S. WARD,
JUDGE, BULLITT DISTRICT COURT
v.
APPELLANTS
APPEAL FROM BULLITT CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE THOMAS L. WALLER, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 04-CI-00901
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
REVERSING AND REMANDING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
GUIDUGLI AND MINTON, JUDGES; ROSENBLUM, SENIOR JUDGE. 1
ROSENBLUM, SENIOR JUDGE:
Barney Sutton (Sutton) brings this
appeal from an order of the Bullitt Circuit Court, entered
October 11, 2004, which granted the Commonwealth's writ of
prohibition, directing the Bullitt District Court to conduct a
suppression hearing on the admissibility of the Commonwealth's
breathalyzer test in Commonwealth v. Barney Sutton (Bullitt
1
Senior Judge Paul W. Rosenblum sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the
Chief Justice pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and
Kentucky Revised Statutes 21.580.
District Court Number 03-T-06491).
Based upon the facts of this
case, the circuit court erred by granting the Commonwealth's
petition.
Hence, we reverse and remand.
This case arises from Sutton's arrest and charge of
driving under the influence on September 18, 2003. 2
As the case proceeded, on April 30, 2004, the parties
entered into an agreed order stipulating to the following facts
with regard to the blood test requested by Sutton:
1. The selection of Hardin Memorial
Hospital to draw the blood of Defendant and
perform an alcohol blood analysis was made
solely by an agent of the Commonwealth,
following the request by the Defendant for a
blood test;
2. There is an inadequate chain of custody
for admission of the test results of the
blood drawn and tested at Hardin Memorial
Hospital, due to a failure of the records of
Hardin Memorial Hospital to identify said
person and to the inability of all potential
agents of Hardin Memorial Hospital who could
have drawn the sample to recall under oath
who drew the blood from the Defendant.
Several days later, based on the above stipulation
that an agent of the Commonwealth solely selected the place to
2
In contravention of Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure 76.12(4)(c)(iv) and
(v), and (d)(iii) and (iv), the parties fail to cite appropriately to the
record on appeal regarding their statements and arguments detailing the
arrest and subsequent hearings before the district and circuit courts. This
may be due to the omission from the record on appeal of any trial court
record on the arrest and any video or transcription of the hearings before
the district and circuit courts. We will not, therefore, address the facts
of the arrest, except for this limited statement which is stated by both
parties in their briefs. Furthermore, as to the omitted hearings, when the
complete record is not before the appellate court, we must assume that the
omitted record supports the decision of the trial court. Commonwealth v.
Thompson, 697 S.W.2d 143, 145 (Ky. 1985).
-2-
administer the blood test requested by Sutton, Sutton asked the
district court to dismiss the charges arguing that the
Commonwealth violated Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS)
189A.103(7) 3 which requires that the defendant be given his
choice as to who administers tests independent of those
administered at the direction of the police. 4
On June 17, 2004, the district court orally suppressed
Sutton's blood test and the Commonwealth's breathalyzer test. 5
Thereafter, on August 19, 2004, the district court
followed its oral ruling with a written order. 6
In its order,
3
KRS 189A.103(7): After the person has submitted to all alcohol
concentration tests and substance tests requested by the officer, the person
tested shall be permitted to have a person listed in subsection (6) of this
section of his own choosing administer a test or tests in addition to any
tests administered at the direction of the peace officer. Tests conducted
under this section shall be conducted within a reasonable length of time.
Provided, however, the nonavailability of the person chosen to administer a
test or tests in addition to those administered at the direction of the peace
officer within a reasonable time shall not be grounds for rendering
inadmissible as evidence the results of the test or tests administered at the
direction of the peace officer.
4
Presumably because the second stipulation admitted to the blood test's
inadmissibility, Sutton additionally argued against its suppression as a
Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963)
violation. The district court dismissed this argument, and the circuit court
agreed with the district court.
5
Although the hearing at which this ruling was made is not part of the record
on appeal, the district court makes reference to this ruling in its August
19, 2004, order.
6
Twice before the district court issued its written order, the Commonwealth
asked for reconsideration of the ruling which suppressed the breathalyzer
test. In its written order, the court concluded that although Sutton waived
any late filing by the Commonwealth, it did not have jurisdiction to
reconsider its oral order because the Commonwealth's motion was made outside
the ten day limit of Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure (CR) 59.05. In
granting the writ of prohibition, the circuit court concluded that the
district court was not precluded from reconsideration given that no trial
judgment was at issue and thus CR 59.05 was not applicable. Sutton conceded
-3-
the court made the following findings relevant to the issue
before this Court:
The Court believes that the first
stipulation of fact by the parties is
dispositive of the issue before the Court.
The stipulation states that the selection of
Hardin Memorial Hospital as a location for
the independent blood test was made solely
(emphasis added) by an agent of the
Commonwealth. . . .
Among the changes made in the Driving
Under the Influence statutory scheme in 2000
by the Kentucky General Assembly, was a
provision set forth in KRS 189A.103(7)
. . . .
It is apparent from the parties'
stipulation that the test at Hardin Memorial
Hospital did not meet the criteria for an
independent test and that therefore there
has been a violation of KRS 189A.103(7).
In arriving at this conclusion, the
Court turns to the recent Kentucky case of
Commonwealth v. Long, 118 S.W.3d 178
(Ky.App. 2003). In that case, the Court in
finding a violation of the right to an
independent test, stated, "we believe the
plain meaning and unambiguous intent
expressed by our legislature is that once an
individual has submitted to the state's
breath, blood or urine test to determine his
or her alcohol concentration, that
individual has a statutory right to have an
independent test by a person of his or her
own choosing within a reasonable time of the
arrest at the individual's own expense."
Long at p. 183.
this issue as well.
us on appeal.
We note, however, that this issue was not raised before
-4-
The Long court reviewed the holdings of
several states. . . . The Court has reviewed
these authorities and notes that they, like
Long, which the Kentucky Court of Appeals
affirmed, found that because an individual
is in police custody during the period when
he or she is entitled to an independent
blood test, the statute requires some level
of facilitation by the police to afford the
individual a right to an independent test.
In the case at bar, the stipulation is very
plain that the selection of the location for
the independent test was made solely by an
agent of the Commonwealth, which in this
Court's mind does not comport with the plain
meaning of KRS 189A.103.
The Court is troubled by the
Defendant's position that the only remedy in
this matter to sanction the Commonwealth for
the violation is dismissal of the charges.
In a review of authorities . . . it appears
that jurisdictions have imposed a variety of
sanctions, including suppression of the
Commonwealth's test. . . . The Court
believes that this sanction is appropriate
viewing the totality of the circumstances in
this case which indicates a violation of a
statutory right.
The Commonwealth thereafter petitioned the circuit
court for a writ of prohibition to stop the district court from
enforcing its order suppressing the Commonwealth's breathalyzer
test results.
It is important to note, however, that the
Commonwealth misstated the facts before the circuit court.
The
Commonwealth argued that the district court misstated the
parties' stipulation by adding "solely" before "by agent of the
Commonwealth."
This was actually a misstatement by the
Commonwealth, because the district court's order was based on an
-5-
agreed order signed by both the Commonwealth and Sutton which
contained the stipulations, and which included the word
"solely."
According to the circuit court's order, a hearing was
held on September 20, 2004, upon which the following findings
and order were entered the next day:
The District Court based its order in
this action on the two stipulations of fact
made by the parties on April 30, 2004;
specifically, that the selection of Hardin
Memorial Hospital to draw the blood of the
Defendant to perform an alcohol blood
analysis was made solely by an agent of the
Commonwealth. The parties stipulate that
there was no suppression hearing held that
resulted in the Court's oral order from the
bench. Evidence was offered in the way of
testimony of employees of Hardin Memorial
Hospital with respect to the Defendant's
motion to dismiss alleging a Brady violation
on behalf of the Commonwealth.
The Court . . . finds that a
suppression hearing should be held by the
District Court with respect to paragraph 1
of the agreed order that states:
"The selection of Hardin Memorial
Hospital to draw blood of Defendant and
perform an alcohol blood analysis was made
solely by an agent of the Commonwealth,
following the request of the Defendant for a
blood test."
In the event the Commonwealth is unable
at the suppression hearing to provide
evidence that the Defendant was not deprived
of his right to have the tests conducted by
a person of his own choosing in accordance
with KRS 189A.103(7), the Commonwealth's
blood analysis test should be suppressed.
-6-
Sutton's motion to make the circuit court's September 21, 2004,
order final and appealable was granted and entered on October
11, 2004.
This appeal followed.
Before us, Sutton argues that the circuit court erred
in issuing the writ 1) without exceptional circumstances and 2)
by setting aside the parties' stipulations of fact.
A writ of prohibition may be granted upon a showing
that 1) the lower court is proceeding or is about to proceed
outside of its jurisdiction and there is no remedy through an
application to an intermediate court; or 2) that the lower court
is acting or is about to act erroneously, although within its
jurisdiction, and there exists no adequate remedy by appeal or
otherwise and great injustice and irreparable injury will result
if the petition is not granted.
Hoskins v. Maricle, 150 S.W.3d
1, 10 (Ky. 2004).
The Commonwealth conceded in its petition that the
district court was acting within its jurisdiction in suppressing
the breathalyzer test.
The question before the circuit court,
therefore, was whether the district court acted erroneously in
doing so.
But while granting a writ of prohibition is ordinarily
within the discretion of the court, because of the exceptional
nature of a writ of prohibition, the court before whom the
-7-
petition is pending must first make a factual finding as a
condition precedent that there is no adequate remedy by appeal
or otherwise, and that without the writ there will be great
injustice and irreparable injury.
See Grange Mutual Insurance
Company v. Trude, 151 S.W.3d 803, 809-10 (Ky. 2004).
this type of finding is reviewed for clear error.
On appeal,
Id.
Herein,
the circuit court failed to make any factual finding as to these
conditions precedent.
As such, the circuit court's action in
granting the writ must be reversed.
With regard to the findings made by the circuit court,
based on the record before us, it is difficult to see how the
circuit court could find error in the district court's
conclusion that KRS 189A.103(7) was violated because the
district court's factual findings were based on the stipulation
agreed to by the parties that the selection of the Hardin
Memorial Hospital to administer the blood test requested by
Sutton was solely made by the police officer.
The sanction for
such a violation, suppression of the breathalyzer test, was well
within the discretion of the district court.
For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the Bullitt
Circuit Court and remand this matter for entry of an order
denying the Commonwealth's petition for a writ of prohibition.
ALL CONCUR.
-8-
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT BARNEY
SUTTON:
William R. Wilson
Shepherdsville, Kentucky
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Mark F. Bizzell
Shepherdsville, Kentucky
-9-
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.
