RICHARD A. SMITH v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED:
OCTOBER 28, 2005; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO.
2004-CA-002099-MR
RICHARD A. SMITH
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM MUHLENBERG CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE DAVID H. JERNIGAN, JUDGE
INDICTMENT NO. 04-CR-00085
v.
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
HENRY, TACKETT, AND VANMETER, JUDGES.
HENRY, JUDGE:
Richard A. Smith was sentenced to five years
imprisonment by the Muhlenberg Circuit Court in a judgment
entered on September 21, 2004 following his conditional guilty
plea to a number of pending criminal charges.
Smith appeals
from the trial court’s August 20, 2004 order denying his motion
to suppress evidence following an August 2, 2004 suppression
hearing.
On review, we affirm.
On June 4, 2004, the Muhlenberg County Grand Jury
indicted Smith on counts of first and second-degree possession
of a controlled substance, possessing drug paraphernalia, and
being a first-degree persistent felony offender. 1
Following his
arrest and entry of a “not guilty” plea, Smith filed a motion to
suppress the evidence obtained from his residence on the grounds
that the search of his home and the seizure of the abovereferenced items were unreasonable, illegal, and in violation of
the 4th Amendment to the United States Constitution and Section
10 of the Kentucky Constitution.
On August 2, 2004, the trial court conducted a
suppression hearing in which the following facts were given: On
May 29, 2004, Probation and Parole Officer Cameron Laycock, who
had been supervising Smith—a parolee—since July 21, 2003,
received a telephone call from Smith’s brother, Curtis Smith,
advising that he had found drug paraphernalia that he believed
belonged to Smith and that he believed Smith was using illegal
drugs while he was on parole.
Laycock contacted Muhlenberg
County Sheriff Jerry Mayhugh and requested that Mayhugh
accompany him on a home visit for security reasons, pursuant to
department policy.
The two men went to the Central City area of
Muhlenberg County to look for Smith, and they eventually went to
the residence of Smith’s sister, Tracy Neal.
1
There, Neal and
Smith had previously been convicted of one count of first-degree possession
of a controlled substance and two counts of trafficking in marijuana. The
first-degree PFO count was later amended to a second-degree count.
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her husband, Wayne Neal, advised Laycock and Mayhugh that they
were fixing up the building behind their home so that it could
serve as a place where Smith could reside as a tenant.
They
also led Laycock to believe that Smith may have stayed there on
previous occasions, and they also indicated that they believed
that Smith had relapsed and was using drugs because they had
observed drug paraphernalia in the building. 2
In fact, Tracy
Neal testified that in January 2004, she contacted Laycock to
report other possible drug-related parole violations by Smith.
Neither Laycock nor Mayhugh recalled anyone telling them that
Smith was paying rent to stay in the building when they talked
to the Neals.
However, Wayne Neal acknowledged that Smith had
paid him $200.00 for rent about a week-and-a-half before his
arrest.
The Neals gave Laycock and Mayhugh permission to enter
the building, which was vacant, and look for evidence of drugs
or related items.
Neither man had a warrant of any kind.
Mayhugh testified that he did not go into the building, and he
said that he indicated to the Neals that he would be violating
Smith’s rights if he did so.
However, the Neals both testified
that Mayhugh did enter the building, and Tracy Neal stated that
2
It is unclear whether this concern was expressed to Laycock before or after
he entered the building in question.
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Mayhugh removed a syringe that she had pointed out to him. 3
Laycock described the interior of the building as resembling
that of a one-bedroom apartment.
along with a number of boxes.
but there was no bed.
He noticed a couch and a TV
A refrigerator was also present,
Laycock then went to a closet, where he
found a plastic bag inside of a leather jacket that contained
four or five syringes, with one of the syringes appearing to
have been used.
He showed what he had found to the Neals and
placed the syringes back into the jacket.
The Neals
acknowledged that they had previously seen syringes in the
building.
Mayhugh then gave them his cell phone number, and the
Neals told him that they would call if Smith came to the
property later.
That same evening, Mayhugh received a call from Tracy
Neal indicating that Smith was in the building.
He and Laycock
returned to the property, and when they knocked on the door of
the building, it was Smith who answered.
Mayhugh and Laycock
asked if they could come in, and Smith gave them permission to
do so.
Another individual named Clint Brewer, who was also on
parole, was in the building.
After Mayhugh and Laycock
explained to Smith that they were there because they had been
told that he had been using drugs and possibly had some in the
3
It should be noted that Mayhugh acknowledged that he did enter the building
when he and Laycock made their subsequent visit later that evening, and he
further testified that he confiscated a syringe from another man who was
there at the time.
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building, Smith admitted that he had been using drugs and showed
them the syringes that were in his jacket pocket and also a
bottle containing Dilaudids and Lortabs, both controlled
substances.
Mayhugh testified that Smith was “very cooperative”
but also “very talkative.”
He also expressed the opinion that
Smith was “really out there” as a result of being “strung out on
drugs.”
Mayhugh then read Smith and Brewer their Miranda rights
(He had observed Brewer with a syringe) and detained them.
Smith was subsequently taken to the Muhlenberg County
Jail by Muhlenberg County Deputy Sheriff Jarrod Kirkpatrick, and
Smith was read his statement of rights.
Smith signed an
acknowledgment and a waiver of rights and proceeded to give a
statement to Kirkpatrick whereby he admitted to using drugs and
being in the possession of Lortabs, Dilaudids, and syringes.
On August 20, 2004, the trial court entered factual
findings and an order denying Smith’s motion to suppress.
Smith
subsequently entered into a conditional guilty plea on all
charges, while reserving the right to appeal the suppression
issue to this court.
On September 9 and September 21, 2004, the
trial court entered orders consistent with this plea and
sentenced Smith to five years imprisonment.
This appeal
followed.
We initially note that the standard for appellate
review of a motion to suppress is that we first review the
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factual findings of the trial court under a “clearly erroneous”
standard.
Welch v. Commonwealth, 149 S.W.3d 407, 409 (Ky.
2004), citing Ornelas v. U.S., 517 U.S. 690, 699, 116 S.Ct.
1657, 1663, 134 L.Ed.2d 911 (1996).
After reviewing the record
and the trial court’s order denying Smith’s motion to suppress,
we are satisfied that the court’s factual findings as a whole
are not “clearly erroneous.”
Accordingly, we next turn to the
second step of the standard, which requires us to review de novo
the trial’s court’s applicability of the law to its factual
findings.
Id., citing Ornelas, supra.
Smith raises a number of arguments focused upon the
trial court’s conclusions of law.
However, we focus on the
contention that Laycock and Mayhugh violated his 4th Amendment
rights by entering and searching his residence without
reasonable suspicion or consent when Smith was not there.
This
argument, of course, refers to Laycock’s visit in which he went
inside the building in question without Smith being present and
found syringes in his jacket pocket.
“While residence searches generally require both
probable cause and a warrant, the ‘special needs’ of supervised
release reduce probationers’ and parolees’ reasonable
expectations of privacy.”
745, 752 (Ky. 2003).
Coleman v. Commonwealth, 100 S.W.3d
Our Supreme Court has recognized that
"[w]hen an officer has reasonable suspicion that a probationer
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subject to a search condition is engaged in criminal activity,
there is enough likelihood that criminal conduct is occurring
that an intrusion on the probationer's significantly diminished
privacy interests is reasonable."
Riley v. Commonwealth, 120
S.W.3d 622, 627 (Ky. 2003), quoting U.S. v. Knights, 534 U.S.
112, 121, 122 S.Ct. 587, 593, 151 L.Ed.2d 497 (2001). “The
United States Supreme Court has thus held that a warrantless
search of a probationer’s residence is reasonable under the
Fourth Amendment when the search is supported by reasonable
suspicion and authorized by a condition of probation.”
Coleman,
100 S.W.3d at 752, citing Knights, supra; Griffin v. Wisconsin,
483 U.S. 868, 107 S.Ct. 3164, 97 L.Ed.2d 709 (1987).
Our
Supreme Court has similarly recognized that warrantless searches
of parolees may be constitutional when authorized by the terms
and conditions of parole.
Id. at 752-53, citing Wilson v.
Commonwealth, 998 S.W.2d 473 (Ky. 1999); Clay v. Commonwealth,
818 S.W.2d 264 (Ky. 1991).
Pursuant to statutory authority, 4 regulations and
policies have been implemented by the Justice Cabinet and the
Kentucky Department of Corrections allowing Kentucky parole
officers to conduct a warrantless search of the person and
property of a parolee upon reasonable suspicion that the parolee
4
See Kentucky Revised Statutes (“KRS”) 196.030, KRS 196.035, KRS 196.075, KRS
439.348, and KRS 439.470.
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is violating a condition of supervision—for example, being in
possession of contraband.
See CPP 5 27-16-01 (Search; Seizure;
Chain of Custody; Disposal of Evidence) (VI)(1)(A)(1),
incorporated by reference in 501 KAR 6 6:020E § 1(c).
CPP 27-16-
01 defines “reasonable suspicion” as “a less stringent standard
than probable cause and shall require that the acting authority
be able to point to specific and articulable facts that, taken
together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably
warrant a belief that a condition of supervision has been or is
being violated.” CPP 27-16-01(IV)(6).
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals has specifically
noted that this definition comports with the federal definition
of “reasonable suspicion,” U.S. v. Payne, 181 F.3d 781, 786 (6th
Cir. 1999), and has reiterated the United States Supreme Court’s
holding that “reasonable suspicion” is based on the totality of
the circumstances and requires "articulable reasons" and "a
particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular
person ... of criminal activity."
Id. at 788, quoting U.S. v.
Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417-18, 101 S.Ct. 690, 66 L.Ed.2d 621
(1981).
Here, Smith signed a parole agreement that contained
the following acknowledgement: “I agree that I may be subject to
5
Kentucky Corrections Policies and Procedures.
6
Kentucky Administrative Regulations.
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search and seizure if my officer has reason to believe that I
may have illegal drugs, alcohol, volatile substance [sic], or
other contraband on my person or property.”
By signing this
release agreement, Smith knowingly agreed to conditions that, as
a parolee, reduced his expectation of privacy to the extent that
his parole officer could conduct a search upon "reasonable
suspicion" that he was in possession of contraband.
120 S.W.3d at 627-28.
See Riley,
Accordingly, with this diminished
expectation of privacy established, we evaluate the merits of
Smith’s constitutional challenge by determining whether the
search in question was accomplished in accordance with the
applicable policy—i.e., by determining whether there was
“reasonable suspicion” that “the performance of the search may
produce evidence to support the alleged violation [of Smith’s
parole].” CPP 27-16-01(V)(1); see also Coleman, 100 S.W.3d at
754.
After a review of the record and the applicable case
law, we conclude that there was adequate “reasonable suspicion”
to support the search in this case. 7
Laycock was advised by a
known source with whom he was personally familiar—Smith’s own
brother, Curtis Smith—that he believed his brother was using
drugs again, in violation of the terms of his parole.
7
Curtis
In reaching this conclusion, we are operating under the assumption that the
building in question can actually be considered Smith’s “residence”—even
though the evidentiary record is far from conclusive as to this issue. We do
so because this issue is not of relevance in our ultimate analysis.
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specifically advised Laycock that he had found a syringe in the
subject building shortly before making the phone call to
Laycock, and that Smith had appeared to be under the influence
of drugs in a number of interactions that Curtis had had with
him.
Our Supreme Court has distinguished anonymous from
non-anonymous tips for purposes of analyzing “reasonable
suspicion,” and has concluded that non-anonymous tips require a
lesser amount of corroboration because the veracity, reputation,
and basis of knowledge of a known informant can be readily
assessed.
See Collins v. Commonwealth, 142 S.W.3d 113, 115 (Ky.
2004), citing Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 332, 110 S.Ct.
2412, 2417, 110 L.Ed.2d 301, 310 (1990); see also Florida v.
J.L., 529 U.S. 266, 270, 120 S.Ct. 1375, 1378, 146 L.Ed.2d 254
(2000).
Here, the tip was not anonymous because Laycock was
advised by Smith’s own relative that he appeared to be using
drugs in violation of his parole.
Moreover, that relative gave
a detailed basis for his knowledge—namely, that he was doing
renovation work in a building in which his brother had
essentially taken up residence, and that he had found a syringe.
Given these facts, and the fact that Smith had a lesser
expectation of privacy because of the terms of his parole, we
agree with the trial court that “reasonable suspicion” existed
for a search of Smith’s person or property.
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In a related argument, Smith contends that the search
in question should be invalidated because he was absent at the
time it occurred.
While this issue appears to be one of first
impression in Kentucky, we note that whether or not a parolee
was absent when a parole officer conducted a warrantless search
of his residence has not been considered by other jurisdictions
to be a significant factor in analyzing the validity of the
search under the Fourth Amendment.
See Philip E. Hassman,
“Validity, Under Fourth Amendment, of Warrantless Search of
Parolee or His Property by Parole Officer,” 32 A.L.R.Fed. 155, §
12 (2005).
While a parolee’s failure to give contemporaneous
consent to a search almost certainly makes any subsequent search
subject to the provisions of the Fourth Amendment, see Coleman,
100 S.W.3d at 752 (Citations omitted), we similarly see no
reason why a parolee’s absence or presence should be a
significant factor in analyzing a warrantless search of a
parolee as long as reasonable suspicion is present and as long
as the terms of parole or probation allow for residential
searches.
Accordingly, we must reject Smith’s contentions in
this respect.
Smith also tenders the arguments that Officer Laycock
“was acting as an agent of the police and was merely costumed as
a parole officer,” and that Laycock did not consult with his
District Supervisor before initiating the search of the building
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in
question,
as
set
forth
in
CPP
27-16-01.
However,
after
reviewing the record, we do not see where these arguments were
ever presented to the trial court, and we have not been asked to
consider them under the “palpable error” standard set forth in
RCr 8
10.26.
“An appellate court will not consider a theory
unless it has been raised before the trial court and that court
has been given an opportunity to consider the merits of the
theory.”
Shelton v. Commonwealth, 992 S.W.2d 849, 852 (Ky. App.
1998) (citing Hopewell v. Commonwealth, 641 S.W.2d 744, 745 (Ky.
1982).
"Regardless
of
the
merits
of
this
argument,
these
grounds, being different from those asserted in the court below,
are not properly preserved for appellate review."
Commonwealth, 572 S.W.2d 861, 863 (Ky. 1978).
Daugherty v.
Accordingly, we
find that these issues are unpreserved for our review.
Given our ruling that the trial court’s decision can
be upheld on the grounds that “reasonable suspicion” existed for
a search of Smith’s person or property, and that his terms of
parole allowed for such a search, we do not address the
remaining arguments and issues raised by the parties.
judgment of the Muhlenberg Circuit Court is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
8
Kentucky Rules of Criminal Procedure.
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The
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Patrick F. Graney
Frankfort, Kentucky
Gregory D. Stumbo
Attorney General of Kentucky
Robert E. Prather
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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