GREGORY HARRISON; KELLIE HARRISON v. GLEN MEADOWS HOMEOWNERS
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RENDERED:
SEPTEMBER 9, 2005; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2004-CA-001904-MR
GREGORY HARRISON;
KELLIE HARRISON
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM OLDHAM CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE KAREN A. CONRAD, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 99-CI-00457
GLEN MEADOWS HOMEOWNERS
ASSOCIATION
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: GUIDUGLI AND MINTON, JUDGES; ROSENBLUM, SENIOR JUDGE. 1
ROSENBLUM, SENIOR JUDGE:
Gregory Harrison and Kellie Harrison
appeal from an order of the Oldham Circuit Court requiring them
to remove a detached garage constructed on their property in
violation of Glen Meadows Subdivision’s deed restriction
covenants.
1
This Court has previously determined that the deed
Senior Judge Paul Rosenblum sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the
Chief Justice pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and
KRS 21.580.
restrictions provide that the design and plan for construction
of a detached garage is subject to the approval of the Glen
Meadows Homeowners Association (Homeowners Association), and
that the Association had reasonably denied the Harrison’s
proposed construction plans.
For the reasons stated below, we
affirm.
In August 1998, the Harrisons entered into a contract
to purchase a home in Glen Meadows Subdivision.
Prior to
closing, the Harrisons were given a copy of the subdivision’s
deed of restrictions.
Among other things, the restrictions
reserved to the Homeowners Association the right to approve or
disapprove the architectural design and plans of any structure,
including garages, prior to placement or alteration.
In
November 1998, the Harrisons submitted plans for an unattached
garage to the Homeowners Association for approval.
The
Homeowners Association denied approval of the plan, as well as
three subsequent plans filed by the Harrisons.
In September 1999 the Harrisons filed a complaint
against the Homeowners Association in Oldham Circuit Court
charging that the Association’s rejection of their plans was
arbitrary and capricious.
The Harrison’s sought a judgment that
they were entitled to construct a detached garage in accordance
with the plans previously rejected by the Homeowner’s
Association.
Following a trial on the matter, the trial court
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determined that the subdivision’s deed restrictions did not give
the Association the authority to deny the Harrisons' plans on
the basis of size or location.
The trial court’s order gave the
Harrisons permission to begin construction of the proposed
garage immediately, and the Homeowners Association appealed to
this Court (the Harrisons cross-appealed the trial court’s
denial of punitive damages, reimbursement of costs sustained,
and the dismissal of their claim for intentional infliction of
emotional distress).
On August 2, 2002, this Court entered an unpublished
opinion reversing the trial court (see Glen Meadows Homeowners
Association v. Harrison, 2001-CA-000811-MR and 2001-CA-000984MR).
The opinion determined that the Homeowners Association’s
actions in denying the Harrison’s plans were reasonable.
The
Harrison’s petition for discretionary review by the Supreme
Court was denied.
In the meantime, following the trial court’s
determination that the Harrisons were entitled to build a
garage, and while the appeal to this Court was pending, the
Harrisons constructed a garage of a plan and design which had
previously been rejected by the Homeowners Association.
On July 22, 2003, after the Supreme Court had denied
the Harrisons’ petition for discretionary review, the Homeowners
Association filed a motion seeking dismissal of the Harrisons’
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petition for declaratory judgment, enforcement of the deed
restrictions, and removal of the now completed detached garage.
On July 25, 2003, and September 9, 2003, the Harrisons filed
motions seeking a new trial on the basis that they did not have
an adequate opportunity to present their case at the original
trial or, in the alternative, for a new trial based upon newly
discovered evidence.
On December 2, 2003, the trial court entered an order
denying the Harrisons’ motion for a new trial and dismissing
their complaint against the Homeowners Association.
The order
further provided that “the [Homeowners Association’s] Motion to
Enjoin the construction of any detached garage without the
approval of the [Homeowners Association], and direct the
[Harrisons] to remove any structure in violation of the Deed
Restrictions is hereby denied for the present and [the
Harrisons] are entitled to submit plans for modification of the
structure to the Homeowners Association for approval.
Said
plans to be submitted within 30 days of entry of this Order.”
(Emphasis added.)
The Harrisons subsequently submitted modification
plans to the Homeowners Association, which were rejected.
On
February 3, 2004, the Homeowners Association renewed its motion
to require the Harrisons to remove the nonconforming garage from
their property.
On March 16, 2004, the trial court entered an
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order requiring the Harrisons to immediately remove the garage.
The Harrisons filed a motion to vacate and/or issue additional
findings of fact.
On August 25, 2004, the trial court entered
an order denying the motion.
This appeal followed.
First, the Harrisons contend that the trial court’s
December 2, 2003, order dismissing the underlying case (which,
as previously noted, also deferred the trial court’s decision on
the Homeowners Association’s motion to require removal of the
garage) became final 10 days following its entry, after which
the trial court lost jurisdiction over the matter.
The
Harrisons allege that, as a result, the trial court did not have
jurisdiction when it entered its March 16, 2004, order requiring
them to remove the detached garage.
As a general principle, a judgment becomes final ten
days after its entry by the trial court, see Kentucky Rules of
Civil Procedure (CR) 52.02, 59.04, 59.05, and it is axiomatic
that a court loses jurisdiction once its judgment is final.
Mullins v. Hess, 131 S.W.3d 769, 774 (Ky.App. 2004).
However,
the trial court’s order of December 2, 2003, was not a final
judgment because it specifically reserved for future
adjudication the approval of the Harrison’s modification plans
or entry of a ruling on the Homeowners Association’s motion to
remove the nonconforming structure
CR 54.01 defines a final judgment as follows:
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A judgment is a written order of a court
adjudicating a claim or claims in an action
or proceeding. A final or appealable
judgment is a final order adjudicating all
the rights of all the parties in an action
or proceeding, or a judgment made final
under Rule 54.02. Where the context
requires, the term "judgment" as used in
these rules shall be construed "final
judgment" or "final order". (Emphasis
added).
“[I]f an order entered in a cause does not put an end
to the action, but leaves something further to be done before
the rights of the parties are determined, it is interlocutory
and not final.”
Hubbard v. Hubbard, 303 Ky. 411, 197 S.W.2d
923, 924 (Ky. 1946).
As the trial court’s December 2, 2003,
order left something further to be done (i.e., approval of the
Harrison’s modification plans or entry of a ruling on the
Homeowners Association’s motion to remove the nonconforming
structure), it was not a final judgment, and accordingly the
principle that a trial court loses its jurisdiction ten days
following the entry of the final judgment is not applicable.
It
follows that the trial court retained jurisdiction to enter the
March 16, 2004, order requiring the Harrisons to remove the
unlawful garage.
The Harrisons also argue that the trial court’s March
16, 2004, order, in requiring the removal of the garage, went
beyond this Court’s August 2, 2002, opinion and, in addition,
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expanded the powers of the Homeowners Association beyond those
granted in the deed restrictions.
We disagree.
This Court’s Opinion of August 2, 2002, determined
that the Homeowners Association’s “actions in denying the
Harrison’s plans were reasonable.”
Glen Meadows Homeowners
Association v. Harrison, supra., Slip. Op. at 10.
The Opinion
also reversed the trial court’s determination that the Harrisons
were entitled to construct a garage in accordance with plans
previously submitted to, and rejected by, the Homeowners
Association.
Id.
It is accordingly the law of the case that
the garage constructed by the Harrisons during the pendency of
the appeal is in violation of the Subdivision’s deed
restrictions.
Ellis v. Jasmin, 968 S.W.2d 669, 670 (Ky. 1998)
(A final decision of Court of Appeals, whether right or wrong,
is the law of the case and is conclusive of the questions
therein resolved.
court.
It is binding upon the parties and the trial
It may not be reconsidered by prosecuting an appeal from
a judgment entered in conformity therewith.)
As such, the
garage constitutes an ongoing violation of the Subdivision’s
deed restrictions.
A Homeowners Association’s remedy under the
circumstances presented in this case was squarely addressed in
Colliver v. Stonewall Equestrian Estates Association, Inc., 139
S.W.3d 521 (Ky. App. 2003).
In that case, the Collivers
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constructed a detached garage on their property even though
their proposed construction plans had been rejected by the
Stonewall Equestrian Estates Association.
As in the present
case, plans for a detached garage were subject to approval of
the Homeowners Association.
The Stonewall Homeowners
Association filed a complaint in Fayette Circuit Court seeking
an injunction requiring the Collivers to remove the structure.
As in this case, the circuit court ordered the immediate removal
of the garage, and the Collivers appealed to this Court.
This
Court upheld the trial court’s order of removal.
The present case is indistinguishable from Colliver,
and we construe the case as affording a Homeowners Association
the remedy of the compelled removal of a nonconforming detached
garage constructed in violation of the subdivisions deed
restrictions and in derogation of the Association’s right of
approval.
In upholding the circuit court’s removal order in
Colliver, this Court stated as follows:
Despite the pending litigation and relief
sought, the Collivers continued with the
construction of the garage at their own
peril. They took an unwise risk and
expended a large amount of money in spite of
this litigation and the Association's clear
disapproval of their garage. Therefore, we
affirm the order of the circuit court
requiring the Collivers to remove the
structure in its entirety immediately.
Id. at 527.
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As did the Collivers, the Harrisons unwisely
constructed a garage while the circuit court’s order approving
the construction was on appeal.
The Harrisons did so at their
own peril.
While the Harrisons attempt yet again on this appeal
to challenge the actions of the Homeowners Association in
denying their construction plans, that issue is not properly
before us.
Ellis v. Jasmin, supra.
Pursuant to Colliver, we
are constrained to affirm the order of the circuit court
requiring the immediate removal of the unlawful garage.
For the foregoing reasons the judgment of the Oldham
Circuit Court is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Thomas K. Stone
Louisville, Kentucky
Thomas E. Roma, Jr.
Sarah J. Martin
Louisville, Kentucky
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