DOROTHY MILLER v. JEWISH HOSPITAL HEALTHCARE SERVICES, INC., D/B/A JEWISH HOSPITAL
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
RENDERED:
OCTOBER 7, 2005; 2:00 P.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2004-CA-001832-MR
DOROTHY MILLER
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE MARTIN F. McDONALD, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 02-CI-009034
v.
JEWISH HOSPITAL HEALTHCARE SERVICES,
INC., D/B/A JEWISH HOSPITAL
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
BARBER AND JOHNSON, JUDGES; MILLER, SENIOR JUDGE. 1
JOHNSON, JUDGE:
Dorothy Miller has appealed from the August 26,
2004, final judgment of the Jefferson Circuit Court, which
dismissed her negligence action against Jewish Hospital
following a jury verdict in favor of the hospital.
Having
concluded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
making various evidentiary rulings, we affirm.
1
Senior Judge John D. Miller sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the
Chief Justice pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and
KRS 21.580.
On February 6, 2002, Miller presented to her family
physician 2 with complaints of shortness of breath and other upper
respiratory symptoms, 3 which she had been having for five days.
After reviewing a chest x-ray, the doctor suspected that Miller
had pneumonia in her left, lower lung, and admitted Miller to
Jewish Hospital.
Miller was initially diagnosed with
exacerbation of chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (COPD).
On February 26, 2002, after being hospitalized for approximately
two weeks, Miller’s condition began to deteriorate, causing
Jewish Hospital to call in Dr. Lawrence Rouben, a lung
specialist, and Dr. Julio Melo, an infectious disease
specialist.
Because a culture was not taken when Miller was
admitted, she was diagnosed with nosocomial 4 atypical pneumonia.
On February 28, 2002, a bronchoscopy was performed, in which
several pieces of tissue were removed from Miller’s lung and
tested.
Cultures performed on the tissue revealed the presence
2
There is some dispute as to which physician Miller saw on this date. Miller
claims in her brief she saw “Dr. Jones”, while Jewish Hospital states that
Miller “incorrectly identifies the doctor whom she visited . . . as ‘Dr.
Jones[,]” and instead refers to Miller treating with Dr. Julie Brown.
3
Miller has a long history of chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (COPD),
including brocheictasis, which led to the surgical removal of a portion of
her lung, and since 1988 Miller had been seen for severe lung problems by Dr.
Robert Scharff.
4
Nosocomial refers to a condition that originates or takes place in a
hospital environment.
-2-
of several organisms, 5 including aspergillus flavus, 6 aspergillus
fumigatus, and norcardia. 7
Because the bronchoscopy did not
reveal the cause of Miller’s pneumonia, her physicians conducted
a lung biopsy on March 16, 2002, wherein an even larger portion
of the affected lung tissue was removed.
It was determined that
these tissues did not show aspergillosis, the disease caused by
aspergillus.
In order to diagnose aspergillosis, it is common
practice to perform fungal stains in order to find the organism
that causes the inflammatory reaction in the lungs.
Stains
performed on Miller’s tissue were negative for the presence of
fungal organisms.
Because Miller’s physicians were unable to
determine the exact cause of her illness, they treated her with
empiric therapy 8 for nocardiosis and aspergillosis.
Miller was
treated with antifungal and antibiotic medications, 9 in order to
aggressively treat the many possible causes of her pneumonia.
Miller was continually treated for this condition at
5
The organisms initially resembled norcardia and striptonyces. The pathology
report reported the organisms as aspergillus flavus and scedosporium.
6
Aspergillus is a fungus that is found throughout the environment and
includes many common molds.
7
Norcardia is a bacteria that is most commonly found in soil.
difficult to grow and diagnose.
8
It is
Empiric therapy is treatment for a disease that has yet to be determined,
when the benefits outweigh the risks.
9
These medications included Sporanox and Bactrim.
-3-
Jewish Hospital until March 16, 2002, when she was discharged
and sent to Frazer Rehab Center.
The following day, Miller
suffered respiratory failure and was immediately transferred
back to Jewish Hospital, where she was diagnosed with invasive
asperigillosis.
A critical dispute in this case is whether
Miller was colonized 10 before she was admitted to Jewish
Hospital, or whether she contracted the infectious disease while
in the hospital. 11
She continued treatment for pulmonary
aspergillosis at Jewish Hospital until May 3, 2002, when she was
again discharged to Frazer Rehab Center.
Ultimately, Miller
recovered and her pulmonary function returned to the same level
after her recovery from the pneumonia as it had been prior to
her illness.
Further facts will be developed as necessary
throughout this Opinion.
Miller filed this action against Jewish Hospital on
November 27, 2002.
In her amended complaint, Miller alleged
that “[a]s a result of the unsafe and unsanitary conditions of
the rooms in Jewish Hospital and Jewish Hospital’s lack of care,
Miller was exposed to Aspergillus spores and other bacterial and
fungal organisms and contracted aspergillosis, norcardiosis and
10
Colonization refers to a situation where organisms are present in the
respiratory tract or lungs, but the organisms are not causing disease.
11
According to testimony from Miller and her children, the two rooms Miller
stayed in at Jewish Hospital were unclean. They testified that housekeeping
never dusted either of the rooms, there were old pills and bloody gauze
bandages lying underneath the beds, and the family had to bring in cleaning
supplies to sanitize the room for their own safety.
-4-
other nosocomial infections.”
A jury trial was held August 10,
2004, through August 13, 2004.
At trial, Miller offered expert testimony from Dr.
George Nichols, this state’s former Chief Medical Examiner.
Dr.
Nichols opined that more likely than not the cause of Miller’s
acquiring aspergillus and nocardia while she was a patient at
Jewish Hospital was her exposure to dust and dirty carpet.
Miller and her children, Linda Ferguson and Bobby Miller,
testified that the hospital was unclean during Miller’s stay at
the hospital. 12
Jewish Hospital offered the testimony of several
experts, including Dr. Rouben and Dr. Melo.
Both Dr. Rouben and
Dr. Melo discussed Miller’s medical history prior to her
hospitalization.
Based on this history, both physicians opined
within a reasonable degree of medical probability that Miller
was colonized with both aspergillus and norcardia at the time
she was admitted to Jewish Hospital; that she was treated
empirically; that Jewish Hospital did not place Miller in an
unsafe environment; and that Jewish Hospital did nothing to
cause injury to Miller.
Jewish Hospital also offered expert
testimony from Dr. William Shaffner, the hospital epidemiologist
12
Neither Dr. Rouben, nor Dr. Melo, testified that Miller or any member of
her family complained to them about the condition of Miller’s hospital rooms.
-5-
at Vanderbilt University. 13
Dr. Shaffner confirmed the opinions
of Dr. Rouben and Dr. Melo. 14
The jury was presented with the following jury
instruction:
You will find for Dorothy Miller if you
believe from the evidence . . . that by
reason of the presence of aspergillus and/or
nocardia [sic] at the hospital, the hospital
was not in a reasonably safe condition for
Dorothy Miller; and . . . that Dorothy
Miller’s injuries were caused by aspergillus
and/or nocardia [sic] at the hospital. If
you do not believe the above scenario
occurred based on the evidence, you will
find for the Defendant, Jewish Hospital.
The jury found in favor of Jewish Hospital; and pursuant to that
verdict, final judgment dismissing Miller’s action against
Jewish Hospital was entered on August 26, 2004.
This appeal
followed.
Miller raises three evidentiary issues on appeal:
(1)
that the testimony of Dr. Rouben was not admissible because he
violated The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act
of 1996 (HIPPA) and the Kentucky Rules of Medical Ethics; (2)
that it was an abuse of discretion for the trial court to
exclude the testimony of her proffered expert witness, William
13
Dr. Shaffer did not treat Miller, but formed his opinion based on medical
records and his education and experience.
14
All three physicians testified that Miller did not need a specialized
environment. Dr. Shaffner testified that this was because Miller had normal
circulation of white blood cells.
-6-
Nellis; and (3) that the trial court abused its discretion in
excluding from evidence, certain of Jewish Hospital’s business
documents.
“[A]buse of discretion is the proper standard of
review of a trial court’s evidentiary rulings” [citations
omitted]. 15
“Rulings upon admissibility of evidence are within
the discretion of the trial [court]; such rulings should not be
reversed on appeal in the absence of a clear abuse of
discretion.” 16
“The test for abuse of discretion is whether the
trial [court’s] decision was arbitrary, unreasonable, unfair, or
unsupported by sound legal principles” [citations omitted]. 17
TESTIMONY OF DR. ROUBEN
The trial court’s civil jury trial order, entered on
January 16, 2004, required both parties to exchange a list of
witnesses, along with a brief description of their anticipated
testimony, 90 days prior to trial.
Expert witnesses were to be
disclosed by Jewish Hospital 30 days prior to trial.
On April
26, 2004, Jewish Hospital filed its witness list, identifying
Dr. Rouben as an expert witness to testify on its behalf at
trial.
On that same date, Jewish Hospital filed a disclosure of
Dr. Rouben’s testimony and stated as follows:
15
Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Thompson, 11 S.W.3d 575, 577 (Ky. 2000).
16
Simpson v. Commonwealth, 889 S.W.2d 781, 783 (Ky. 1994).
17
Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 11 S.W.3d at 581.
-7-
Dr. Rouben is a board certified
pulmonologist and one of Dorothy Miller’s
treating physicians. It is anticipated that
Dr. Rouben will testify as Ms. Miller’s
treating physician. It is further
anticipated that Dr. Rouben will testify
that Ms. Miller was colonized with
Aspergillus prior to admission at Jewish
Hospital. It is anticipated that he will
explain the physiology of Ms. Miller’s
underlying pulmonary conditions, such as
COPD. It is anticipated that he will
testify that Aspergillus colonization is not
unusual for patients with COPD, and that in
Ms. Miller’s case, she did not suffer from
nosocomial invasive pulmonary aspergillosis.
He is expected to testify about the
significance of Ms. Miller’s multiple other
medical issues, and that Jewish Hospital in
no way caused any harm to Ms. Miller.
Neither party deposed Dr. Rouben, 18 nor was he subpoenaed to
appear at trial.
Miller did not file a motion in limine, nor
did Miller object 19 to his testimony until her cross-examination,
when Dr. Rouben testified that he spoke with Jewish Hospital’s
counsel without obtaining Miller’s consent.
A bench conference
ensued and the trial court overruled Miller’s objection.
Miller argues to this Court that Dr. Rouben’s ex parte
conversations with Jewish Hospital were violations of both HIPPA
and the Kentucky Rules of Medical Ethics.
She states that,
while she provided several medical records to Jewish Hospital
with the notice of intent to use them at trial, she did not
18
Miller opted not to take his deposition due to the exorbitant cost.
19
Miller’s objection was based on an alleged violation of HIPPA.
-8-
provide consent for Jewish Hospital to consult Dr. Rouben, to
access additional medical records, or to allow Jewish Hospital
to call Dr. Rouben as a witness.
Jewish Hospital denies that any of its actions in
relation to Dr. Rouben constituted a violation of HIPPA.
Further, Jewish Hospital argues that Miller must have known at
the time of its disclosure of Dr. Rouben as a witness that it
would talk to him before he testified.
Further, while Miller
could have brought any objection before the trial court at any
time from April 26, 2004, until 30 days prior to trial, 20 she
waited until the jury had heard Dr. Rouben’s direct examination
testimony and her cross-examination had begun.
For the above
reasons, Jewish Hospital argues that Miller failed to preserve
this issue for appeal.
We agree.
In reviewing the record in this case, it appears that
Miller’s objection to Dr. Rouben’s testimony at trial was based
on a violation of the rules of HIPPA.
There was no mention of a
violation of medical ethics until this appeal.
Therefore, the
alleged violation of medical ethics was not preserved for
appellate review. 21
Further, we also conclude that Miller’s
20
The trial court’s civil jury trial order indicated that all motions in
limine were to be filed 30 days prior to trial.
21
See Crain v. Dean, 741 S.W.2d 655, 657 (Ky. 1987)(stating that “[o]n
request, a party must state the grounds for his objection or request and
inform the court of its actual basis. If a party chooses to state grounds in
the absence of a request from the court, he is bound thereby”).
-9-
objection to Dr. Rouben’s testimony based on alleged HIPPA
violations, including ex parte discussions with Jewish Hospital,
was not timely presented.
KRE 103(a)(1) and (c) state, in relevant part, as
follows:
(a)
Effect of erroneous ruling. Error may
not be predicated upon a ruling which
admits or excludes evidence unless a
substantial right of the party is
affected; and
(1)
(c)
Objection. In case the ruling is
one admitting evidence, a timely
objection or motion to strike
appears of record, and upon
request of the court stating the
specific ground of objection, if
the specific ground was not
apparent from the context; or
. . .
Hearing of jury. In jury cases,
proceedings shall be conducted, to the
extent practicable, so as to prevent
inadmissible evidence from being
suggested to the jury by any means,
such as making statements or offers of
proof or asking questions in the
hearing of the jury.
The general scope of Dr. Rouben’s trial testimony was
clear from Jewish Hospital’s disclosures.
In her brief, Miller
raises objections to Dr. Rouben’s testimony that she was
colonized with aspergillus prior to admission to the hospital
and that she was treated empirically during her hospital stay,
as this testimony was the product of ex parte communications
-10-
with Jewish Hospital.
However, this exact testimony was offered
by Jewish Hospital as part of its direct examination of Dr.
Rouben, and no objection was made at that time.
While it is
proper to wait until cross-examination for a party to object to
a witness’s testimony if the error required cross-examination to
develop, 22 there was no need for such delay in this case.
Regardless, of the appropriateness of Dr. Rouben’s
testimony, we conclude that even if the trial court did abuse
its discretion in allowing the testimony, this error was not
responsible for Miller obtaining an adverse verdict, and thus
was harmless error. 23
In reviewing the evidence in the case
before us, the expert testimony overwhelmingly supported the
jury’s verdict.
Therefore, even if Dr. Rouben’s testimony was
improperly admitted, such an error was harmless error.
EXCLUSION OF NELLIS’S TESTIMONY
Miller argues that the trial court abused its
discretion in excluding Nellis’s testimony at trial without
holding a Daubert 24 hearing on Jewish Hospital’s motion in
22
Commonwealth, Department of Highways v. Riley, 388 S.W.2d 128, 129-30 (Ky.
1965).
23
See Conley v. Fannin, 308 Ky. 534, 215 S.W.2d 122, 123 (1948) (quoting
Honaker v. Crutchfield, 247 Ky. 495, 57 S.W.2d 502, 504 (1933)) (stating that
‘“ admission of incompetent evidence is harmless if the facts are otherwise
shown by proper evidence, or when the verdict or judgment is supported by
other sufficient evidence’”).
24
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 592, 113 S.Ct.
2786, 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993).
-11-
limine.
Miller disclosed Nellis as an expert on her witness
list filed on May 7, 2004, stating that Nellis had expertise in
the area of hospital administration, particularly on the issue
of the standard of care applicable to infection control in
hospitals.
Jewish Hospital took Nellis’s deposition on May 11,
2004, which revealed that he had neither a clinical background,
nor formal education in health care or hospital administration,
and at that time Nellis had not reviewed Jewish Hospital’s
policies and procedures.
On July 9, 2004, Jewish Hospital filed a motion in
limine to exclude Nellis’s testimony arguing that Nellis’s
testimony was not based on personal knowledge, training, or
experience.
Further, Jewish Hospital argued that Nellis had
failed to rely upon any type of specific standard or specialized
knowledge to opine that Jewish Hospital had committed violations
of infection control standards, but rather resorted to “common
sense”, and that he was unable to testify as to causation.
Miller argued in response that Jewish Hospital’s arguments went
merely to the weight of Nellis’s testimony, rather than its
admissibility. 25
Miller further argued that Nellis’s testimony
would have established the standard of care and proof of breach
25
Miller cited Washington v. Goodman, 830 S.W.2d 398, 400 (Ky.App. 1992), in
support of this argument.
-12-
and, even if the proof were limited to the proper procedures,
the testimony would have still assisted the jury. 26
The trial court agreed with Jewish Hospital and on
August 3, 2004, entered an order prohibiting Nellis from
testifying.
At the trial on August 12, 2004, Miller asked the
trial court to reconsider its exclusion of Nellis and offered
portions of his deposition into evidence.
At this time the
trial court held a Daubert hearing, during which the trial court
reviewed Nellis’s deposition and heard arguments from counsel
for both parties.
Based on all the information before the trial
court, it upheld its order to exclude Nellis’s testimony. 27
Initially, this Court must conduct a de novo review
of whether the trial court used the proper legal test in
excluding Nellis’s expert testimony. 28
“While the [trial] court
has discretion in the manner in which it conducts its Daubert
analysis, there is no discretion regarding the actual
performance of the gatekeeper function” [emphases original]. 29
If we determine the trial court used the proper legal test, we
26
Miller further argued that Jewish Hospital’s experts testified that the
standard to be used is not ordinary common sense. Miller argued that while
it is common sense that a hospital should be kept clean, the proper
procedures to follow in accomplishing the appropriate cleanliness are more
than common sense.
27
Miller ultimately placed Nellis’s deposition in the record by avowal.
28
Goebel v. Denver & Rio Grande Western Railroad Co., 215 F.3d 1083, 1087
(10th Cir. 2000).
29
Id.
-13-
then review the trial court’s decision to admit the testimony
under the abuse of discretion standard. 30
“[T]he decision as to the qualifications of an expert
rests in the discretion of the trial court” [citations
omitted]. 31
The party offering expert testimony has the burden
of proving by preponderance of the evidence that the testimony
of his or her expert is reliable. 32
“[T]he trial [court] must
determine at the outset . . . whether the expert is proposing to
testify to (1) scientific knowledge that (2) will assist the
trier of fact to understand or determine a fact in issue.” 33
“The appropriate test of admissibility depends on the
trial court’s determination of a reliable foundation and
relevance to the issues at trial.” 34
“Expert opinion evidence is
admissible so long as: (1) the witness is qualified to render an
opinion on the subject matter[;] (2) the subject matter
30
Id.
31
Ford v. Commonwealth, 665 S.W.2d 304, 309 (Ky. 1983) (cert. denied, 469
U.S. 984, 105 S.Ct. 392, 83 L.Ed.2d 325 (1984)).
32
Wellman v. Norfolk & Western Railway Co., 98 F.Supp.2d 919, 923 (S.D. Oh.
2000).
33
Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592; see also KRS 702 (stating that “[i]f scientific,
technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to
understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified
as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may
testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise”). See also Lawson,
The Kentucky Evidence Law Handbook, § 6.15, p. 293 (3d ed. 1993)(stating that
in evaluating whether the expert is qualified, “Kentucky’s case law clearly
indicates that the decision required of the trial judge is to determine if an
expert has ‘adequate’ rather than ‘outstanding’ qualifications”).
34
Marbled Murrelet v. Babbitt, 83 F.3d 1060, 1066 (9th Cir. 1996).
-14-
satisfies the requirements of [Daubert][;] (3) the subject
matter satisfies the test of relevancy set forth in KRE 401,
subject to the balancing of probativeness against prejudice
required by KRE 403[;] and (4) the opinion will assist the trier
of fact per KRE 702.” 35
Miller argues that the trial court abused its
discretion by failing to hold a hearing on Jewish Hospital’s
motion in limine, prior to striking Nellis’s testimony.
Our
Supreme Court in Commonwealth v. Christie, 36 stated as follows:
This assessment does not require a trial
court to hold a hearing on the admissibility
of the expert’s testimony. . . . But a
trial court should only rule on the
admissibility of expert testimony without
first holding a hearing “when the record
[before it] is complete enough to measure
the proffered testimony against the proper
standards of reliability and relevance”
[citation omitted].
“Usually, the record upon which a trial court can make an
admissibility decision without a hearing will consist of the
proposed expert’s reports, affidavits, deposition testimony,
existing precedent, and the like” [citations omitted]. 37
In reviewing the record in the case before us, it
appears that in fact a Daubert hearing was held on the issue and
35
Stringer v. Commonwealth, 956 S.W.2d 883, 891 (Ky. 1997) (cert. denied, 523
U.S. 1052, 188 S.Ct. 1374, 140 L.Ed. 522 (1998)).
36
98 S.W.3d 485, 488 (Ky. 2002).
37
Christie, 98 S.W.3d at 488-89.
-15-
at that time the trial court, within its discretion, determined
that Nellis’s testimony should be excluded.
“It is axiomatic
that an expert, no matter how good his credentials, is not
permitted to speculate.” 38
The trial court determined that
Nellis’s opinion regarding the infection issues was not based on
any type of specific standard or specialized knowledge and was
nothing more than speculation based on common sense.
We cannot
say that in so finding the trial court abused its discretion.
We reject Miller’s argument that Nellis would have provided a
scientific basis for his opinion, if he had been allowed to
testify.
The burden was on Miller to present the grounds for
his expert opinion to the trial court so it could determine if
he were qualified to testify as an expert.
EXCLUSION OF VARIOUS DOCUMENTS
Lastly, Miller argues that the trial court abused its
discretion in granting Jewish Hospital’s motions in limine to
exclude various business records, including three state hospital
inspection reports completed on January 14, 2000, August 16,
2001, and June 10, 2002, the surveyor notes upon which those
reports were based, and a letter dated October 24, 1995, to the
CEO of Jewish Hospital from a consultant microbiologist
outlining recommendations for preventing aspergillosis at the
hospital.
38
Miller argues that because she was the plaintiff in
Goebel, 215 F.3d at 1088.
-16-
this premises liability case, 39 and it was her burden to show
Jewish Hospital’s breach of its duty to keep the hospital
sanitary, 40 these documents were relevant to proving the elements
of her claim, 41 and that the documents provided detailed
instances of Jewish Hospital’s breach of duty to its patients.
Miller acknowledges that the dates of the reports and the
39
The parties stipulated prior to trial that Miller was a business invitee of
Jewish Hospital during the time of the alleged injury. Restatement (Second)
of Torts § 343 (1965 & Supp. 2005) stated as follows:
A possessor of land is subject to liability for
physical harm caused to his invitees by a condition
on the land if, but only if, he
(a)
knows or by the exercise of reasonable
care would discover the condition, and
should realize that it involves an
unreasonable risk of harm to such
invitees, and
(b)
should expect that they will not discover
or realize the danger, or will fail to
protect themselves against it, and
(c)
fails to exercise reasonable care to
protect them against the danger.
40
Martin v. Mekanhart Corp., 113 S.W.3d 95, 98 (Ky. 2003)(stating that “the
customer retains the burden of proving that: (1) he or she had an encounter
with a foreign substance or other dangerous condition on the business
premises; (2) the encounter was a substantial factor in causing the accident
and the customer’s injuries; and (3) by reason of the presence of the
substance or condition, the business premises were not in a reasonably safe
condition for the use of business invitees” [citations omitted]).
41
The jury instruction stated the standard as “exercise ordinary care to keep
and maintain the hospital in a reasonably safe condition for its patients.”
See Vick v. Methodist Evangelical Hospital, 408 S.W.2d 428, 430 (Ky.
1966)(stating that a hospital patient is entitled to “such reasonable care
and attention for his safety as his mental and physical condition known or
discoverable by the exercise of ordinary care may require”); see also Berry
v. Jorris, 303 Ky. 799, 803, 199 S.W.2d 616, 618 (1947)(stating that “[a]
negligent act cannot be said to be the proximate cause of an [injury] unless
the [injury] could have been avoided in the absence of such negligent act”).
-17-
alleged occurrences were not within the time period she was in
the hospital.
However, she argues that this fact goes to the
weight, not the relevance, of the evidence.
In response, Jewish Hospital argues that the survey
reports are irrelevant to any facts at issue, as none of the
reports covers the time period in which Miller was actually a
patient in the hospital, nor do any of them involve the area of
the hospital where Miller was prior to being diagnosed with her
illness.
As to the 1995 and 1996 reports, Jewish Hospital makes
several points.
First, Miller was not in the same category of
patients who experienced problems in the mid-1990’s.
Second,
the hospital was undergoing a large construction project in the
mid-1990’s in which brick was being removed from the exterior of
the building and a new facade put into place.
Also, there had
not been any unusual increases in positive aspergillus cultures
at Jewish Hospital since 1995 and 1996.
We must determine whether the trial court abused its
discretion by excluding this evidence at trial.
KRE 402 states
that “[a]ll relevant evidence is admissible,” except as
otherwise provided by law.
“The term ‘relevant’ as applied to
evidence means that the evidence tends to establish or disprove
an issue in litigation.
‘Where there is nothing in the issues
presented to warrant the proof offered, it is properly
-18-
excluded.’” 42
“There is no precise test of relevancy, but it is
a determination which rests largely in the discretion of the
trial court and must be exercised according to the teachings of
reason and judicial experience, considering its probative
value.” 43
KRE 404(2)(b) states as follows:
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is
not admissible to prove the character of a
person in order to show action in conformity
therewith. It may, however, be admissible:
(1)
If offered for some other purpose, such
as proof of motive, opportunity,
intent, preparation, plan, knowledge,
identity, or absence of mistake or
accident; or
(2)
If so inextricably intertwined with
other evidence essential to the case
that separation of the two (2) could
not be accomplished without serious
adverse effect on the offering party.
The general rule regarding evidence of other acts is
set out in Massie v. Salmon, 44 wherein this Court stated as
follows,
“[E]vidence of other acts, even of a similar
nature, of the party whose own act or
conduct or that of his agents and employees
is in question, of other similar
42
O’Bryan v. Massey-Ferguson, Inc., 413 S.W.2d 891, 893 (Ky. 1966) (quoting
20 Am.Jur. Evidence § 247). See KRE 401.
43
Glens Falls Insurance Co. v. Ogden, 310 S.W.2d 547, 549 (Ky. 1958) (citing
31 C.J.S. Evidence §§ 158-159).
44
277 S.W.2d 49, 51(Ky. 1955) (quoting 20 Am.Jur. Evidence § 302); see also
Moore v. Bothe, 479 S.W.2d 634 (Ky. 1972).
-19-
transactions with which he has been
connected, of a former course of dealing, of
his conduct or that of his agents and
employees on other occasions, or of his
particular conduct upon a given occasion is
not competent to prove the commission of a
particular act charged against him, unless
the acts are connected in some special way,
indicating a relevancy beyond mere
similarity in certain particulars. This
rule obviously excludes evidence of all
collateral facts or of those which are
incapable of affording any reasonable
presumption or inference as to the principal
fact or matter in dispute.”
Given the highly deferential standard governing our
review, under the circumstances of this case, we hold that it
was not an abuse of discretion for the trial court to refuse to
admit the business documents as evidence under the knowledge
exception of KRE 404(2)(b)(1), or that the documents were so
inextricably intertwined with other evidence essential to the
case to be admissible under KRE 404(2)(b)(2).
Having concluded that the Jefferson Circuit Court did
not abuse its discretion in any of the evidentiary rulings at
issue in this case, its judgment is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
-20-
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Laurence J. Zielke
Nancy J. Schook
Hays Lawson
Louisville, Kentucky
Karen L. Keith
Shannon M. Gordon
Louisville, Kentucky
ORAL ARGUMENT FOR APPELLANT:
ORAL ARGUMENT FOR APPELLEE:
Laurence J. Zielke
Louisville, Kentucky
Karen L. Keith
Louisville, Kentucky
-21-
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.