CHARLES E. VONSCHLUTTER, JR. v. BRENDA VONSCHLUTTER
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RENDERED: July 8, 2005; 10:00 a.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2004-CA-001776-MR
CHARLES E. VONSCHLUTTER, JR.
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM FAYETTE FAMILY COURT
HONORABLE TIMOTHY NEIL PHILPOT, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 03-CI-01336
BRENDA VONSCHLUTTER
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
GUIDUGLI AND TAYLOR, JUDGES; HUDDLESTON, SENIOR JUDGE.1
GUIDUGLI, JUDGE: Charles E. VonSchlutter appeals from findings
of fact, conclusions of law and order of the Fayette Family
Court in an action he initiated to dissolve his marriage with
Brenda VonSchlutter.
He contends that the trial court erred in
its award of maintenance, attorney fees, and computation of
1
Senior Judge Joseph R. Huddleston sitting as Special Judge by assignment of
the Chief Justice pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution
and KRS 21.580.
child support.
For the reasons stated below, we affirm the
order on appeal.
Charles and Brenda were married in 1976.
The marriage
produced three children, one of whom is still a minor.
Early in
the marriage, Brenda worked as a beautician while Charles sought
to obtain an associates’ degree from Eastern Kentucky
University.
Charles later took a job at an automobile
dealership parts department, where his income increased from
$7,600 per year in 1982 to $16,660 per year in 1990.
Charles also received income from coal royalties which
had been gifted to him by his family.
This income ranged from
$6,700 or so per year in the late 1970s up to approximately
$65,000 per year in the mid 1990s.
During the latter years,
Charles and Brenda apparently used these royalty proceeds as
their primary source of income, though Charles also worked as a
self-employed handyman and construction contractor earning up to
$19,000 per year.
In 1998, Charles inherited $125,000 in
securities and cash upon the death of his grandmother.
Brenda
stopped working outside the home in 1989 after the birth of the
parties’ third child, but returned to the workforce in 2001
where she earned about $16,000 per year.
In 2002, the coal and
gas royalties diminished to about $10,000 per year.
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At the time of dissolution, Charles was employed parttime as a church custodian working fewer than 20 hours per week.
Brenda was earning $1,645 per month.
On July 6, 2004, the Fayette Circuit Court rendered an
order styled “Opinion, Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law”
which addressed the classification of certain property as either
marital or non-marital, the extent and duration of maintenance,
and child support.
It awarded maintenance to Brenda in the
amount of $600 per month until such time that she might remarry.
It went on to order Charles to pay $5,500 in attorney fees, and
awarded to Brenda child support in the amount of $245.66 per
month.2
The child support award was based in part on the court’s
finding that Charles was voluntarily underemployed.
It imputed
to him an income in the amount of $2,000 per month.
The
parties’ motions to alter, vacate or amend the opinion were
denied, and this appeal followed.
Charles first argues that the trial court abused its
discretion and committed reversible error in its award of
maintenance to Brenda.
Specifically, he contends that her
income exceeds her monthly expenses; that the court improperly
imputed income to Charles for purposes of calculating the award;
that it failed to take into account Charles’ inability to meet
2
This figure was increased to $300 by way of an order rendered on August 18,
2004 to reflect the amount originally indicated by the court during the final
hearing.
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his own financial needs; that the award resulted from improper
gender bias; and, that the award constitutes an abuse of
discretion because Brenda is employed full-time and earns more
than Charles has ever earned.
In sum, Charles seeks an order
reversing the trial court’s award of maintenance.
As the parties are well aware, maintenance is governed
by Chapter 403.200.
It states as follows:
(1) In a proceeding for dissolution of
marriage or legal separation, or a
proceeding for maintenance following
dissolution of a marriage by a court which
lacked personal jurisdiction over the absent
spouse, the court may grant a maintenance
order for either spouse only if it finds
that the spouse seeking maintenance:
(a) Lacks sufficient property, including
marital property (apportioned to him, to
provide for his reasonable needs; and
(b) Is unable to support himself through
appropriate employment or is the custodian
of a child whose condition or circumstances
make it appropriate that the custodian not
be required to seek employment outside the
home.
(2) The maintenance order shall be in such
amounts and for such periods of time as the
court deems just, and after considering all
relevant factors including:
(a) The financial resources of the party
seeking maintenance, including marital
property apportioned to him, and his ability
to meet his needs independently, including
the extent to which a provision for support
of a child living with the party includes a
sum for that party as custodian;
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(b) The time necessary to acquire sufficient
education or training to enable the party
seeking maintenance to find appropriate
employment;
(c) The standard of living established
during the marriage;
(d) The duration of the marriage;
(e) The age, and the physical and emotional
condition of the spouse seeking maintenance;
and
(f) The ability of the spouse from whom
maintenance is sought to meet his needs
while meeting those of the spouse seeking
maintenance.
In order to properly award maintenance, the elements
of both KRS 403.200(1)(a) and 403.200(1)(b) must be met.3
In
other words, there must be a finding that the spouse seeking
maintenance lacks sufficient property, including marital
property, to provide for his or her reasonable needs; and, that
spouse must be unable to support himself or herself through
appropriate employment according to the standard of living
established during the marriage.
In the matter at bar, the parties income throughout
the marriage came primarily from “coal money” generated by the
properties of Charles’ family.
This income diminished to about
$10,000 per year, requiring the parties to generate their own
income.
3
The Family Court found that Brenda’s actual monthly
Drake v. Drake, 721 S.W.2d 728 (Ky.App. 1986).
-5-
income was $1,645 per month, and that Charles worked fewer than
20 hours per week as a church custodian.
It also found that
Charles suffered no health problems and had a degree from
Eastern Kentucky University.
These findings are supported by
the record.
Based on these findings, the court concluded that
Brenda was unable to support herself according to the standard
of living established during the marriage.
It also determined
that Charles was underemployed because he was capable of finding
full-time employment earning $24,000 per year.
for tampering with these conclusions.
We find no basis
A reviewing court may not
alter a trial court’s maintenance award unless the court abused
its discretion or based the award on findings of fact which are
clearly erroneous.4
While Charles contends that Brenda’s actual
income is somewhat higher than the amount found by the trial
court, we cannot conclude that the court’s finding was clearly
erroneous because evidence exists in the record to support the
finding.
Similarly, there is no dispute that Charles was
engaged in part-time employment at the time the trial court
rendered its opinion, and that he is capable of securing a fulltime position.
Since the record supports the trial court’s
findings and the conclusions of law drawn therefrom, we find no
error on this issue.
4
Perrine v. Christine, 833 S.W.2d 825, 826 (Ky. 1992); Browning v. Browning,
551 S.W.2d 823, 825 (Ky.App. 1977).
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Charles next argues that the trial court abused its
discretion when it ordered him to pay $5,500 of Brenda’s
attorney fees.
He maintains that Brenda filed numerous
frivolous motions that wasted valuable time and resources and
inflated her attorney fees.
He contends that when this fact is
considered in light of his limited income, the award constitutes
an abuse of discretion and must be reversed.
KRS 403.220 addresses attorney fees in dissolution
proceedings.
It states as follows:
The court from time to time after
considering the financial resources of both
parties may order a party to pay a
reasonable amount for the cost to the other
party of maintaining or defending any
proceeding under this chapter and for
attorney's fees, including sums for legal
services rendered and costs incurred prior
to the commencement of the proceeding or
after entry of judgment.
Allocation of court costs and attorney fees is
entirely within discretion of trial court.5
We cannot conclude
that the record supports Charles’ assertion that the trial court
abused its discretion on this issue.
The trial court expressly
considered the financial resources of both parties as the
statute requires.
The award of attorney fees was reasonable
given the complexity of tracing the parties’ assets and
5
Tucker v. Hill, 763 S.W.2d 144 (Ky.App. 1988).
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addressing the other issues raised during the course of the
proceedings.
The court did not abuse its discretion on this
issue, and we find no error.
Charles’ final argument is that the trial court erred
when it based his child support obligation on imputed income.
He maintains that there was no evidence in the record to support
the conclusion that he is voluntarily underemployed, and that it
was improper to impute to him a level of income which exceeds
the highest income he has ever earned.
He seeks an order
reversing this finding and remanding the matter for
recalculation of child support based on his actual income.
We find no error on this issue.
KRS 403.212(2)(d)
states as follows:
If a parent is voluntarily unemployed or
underemployed, child support shall be
calculated based on a determination of
potential income, except that a
determination of potential income shall not
be made for a parent who is physically or
mentally incapacitated or is caring for a
very young child, age three (3) or younger,
for whom the parents owe a joint legal
responsibility. Potential income shall be
determined based upon employment potential
and probable earnings level based on the
obligor's or obligee's recent work history,
occupational qualifications, and prevailing
job opportunities and earnings levels in the
community. A court may find a parent to be
voluntarily unemployed or underemployed
without finding that the parent intended to
avoid or reduce the child support
obligation.
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Whether a child support obligor is voluntarily
underemployed is a factual question for the trial court to
resolve.6
Such a finding cannot be set aside on appeal if it is
supported by substantial evidence.7
As we stated above in addressing the maintenance
issue, it is uncontroverted that Charles was working part-time
when the order on appeal was rendered; that he earned an
associate’s degree from Eastern Kentucky University; and, that
he suffers no health problems which would prevent him from
working full time.
While the coal money allowed both parties to
limit the extent of their employment, those funds have now
dwindled and the parties’ economic circumstances obviously have
changed.
These facts, each of which is contained in the record,
constitute substantial evidence in support of the trial court’s
finding that Charles is voluntarily underemployed.
The trial
court’s imputation of a $2000 income per month represents a 40
hour work week at an hourly wage of $12.50.
When considered in
light of the entire record, this imputation is not unreasonable
and does not run afoul of KRS 403.212(2)(d) or the supportive
case law.
As such, we find no error.
6
Gossett v. Gossett, 32 S.W.3d 109 (Ky.App. 2000).
7
Id.; CR 52.01.
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For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the July 6, 2004,
Opinion, Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law of the Fayette
Family Court.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Sharon K. Morris
James Michael Morris
Lexington, KY
Michael Davidson
Lisa Jean Oeltgen
Lexington, KY
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