SHERRIE DAWSON v. STATE AUTOMOBILE MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY D/B/A MERIDIAN MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY
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RENDERED:
NOVEMBER 23, 2005; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2004-CA-001773-MR
SHERRIE DAWSON
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM FRANKLIN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE WILLIAM L. GRAHAM, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 02-CI-00696
v.
STATE AUTOMOBILE MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY
D/B/A MERIDIAN MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
MINTON, SCHRODER, AND TAYLOR, JUDGES.
TAYLOR, JUDGE:
Sherrie Dawson brings this appeal from a March
17, 2004, judgment of the Franklin Circuit Court upon a jury
verdict dismissing her claim for underinsured motorists benefits
from State Automobile Mutual Insurance Company, d/b/a Meridian
Mutual Insurance Company (State Mutual).
We affirm.
In June 2000, appellant was involved in a low speed
collision with another car driven by Melissa Forman.
Forman’s
insurance carrier tendered to appellant the full amount of its
policy’s liability limits.
Thereupon, appellant filed the
instant action against State Mutual for recovery of underinsured
motorist benefits under her motor vehicle insurance policy.
She
claimed to have sustained personal injuries in excess of the
liability policy limits available upon Forman’s vehicle.
The
matter was tried by a jury, and the jury returned a verdict in
favor of State Mutual.
Appellant’s action was dismissed by
judgment of the circuit court entered on March 17, 2004.
Appellant filed a motion for judgment notwithstanding the
verdict and a motion for a new trial which was denied by order
entered August 5, 2004.
This appeal follows.
Appellant contends the circuit court committed
reversible error by failing to direct a verdict in her favor
upon the issue of whether she incurred at least the threshold
amount of $1,000.00 in reasonable medical expenses as required
by Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) 304.39-060(2)(b).
A directed
verdict is proper when viewing the evidence most favorable to
the nonmoving party, a reasonable juror could only conclude that
the moving party was entitled to a verdict.
Lee v. Tucker, 365
S.W.2d 849 (Ky. 1963).
Appellant cites to Bolin v. Grider, 580 S.W.2d 490
(Ky. 1979) for the proposition that once medical bills have been
submitted into evidence a rebuttable presumption arises that
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such bills are reasonable.
She particularly focuses upon the
following language:
In this case Bolin did nothing to impeach
the reasonableness of the amount of charges
for "medical expense", however, she did
strenuously attack the thesis that the
"medical expense" was reasonably needed as a
result of the collision which is the basis
of this suit. Under such circumstances the
probative force of the medical bills is so
persuasive on the issue of the
reasonableness of the amount of charges for
"medical expense" that there is nothing for
the jury to decide and the issue should not
have been submitted to them.
Id. at 491 (citation omitted).
Appellant emphasizes that there
exists a distinction between evidence impeaching the
reasonableness of the amount of medical expenses and evidence
contesting causation.
Appellant contends that State Mutual only
presented evidence contesting causation and failed to present
evidence attacking the reasonableness of her submitted medical
expenses.
As such, appellant argues that Bolin mandates a
directed verdict upon the reasonableness of the amount of
submitted medical expenses (some $1,900.00).
Even if the
circuit court erred by failing to grant a directed verdict upon
the reasonableness of the amount of medical expense, we are of
the opinion that such error was merely harmless.
(CR) 61.01.
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Ky. R. Civ. P.
In Bolin, the Court specifically pointed out:
We are unable to determine whether the
jury's negative answer to the submitted
question was based on their failure to be
satisfied on the illusory issue of amount or
on the real issue of causation or both.
Because we can not rule out amount as a
basis, we agree that a new trial is
required.
Bolin, 580 S.W.2d at 491.
Thus, the Bolin Court concluded that
the error was reversible because the jury instruction merged the
issue of the reasonableness of the amount of medical expense
with the issue of causation.
The Court was simply unable to
discern whether the jury believed that Bolin failed to prove
causation or failed to prove the threshold amount of reasonable
medical expense.
By contrast, in the case sub judice, the jury was
given a separate instruction upon causation which read as
follows:
Are you satisfied from the evidence
that plaintiff, Sherrie Dawson, sustained a
permanent bodily injury within reasonable
medical probability as a direct and
proximate result of the motor vehicle
accident of June 16, 2000?
The jury unanimously answered the above question in the
negative.
As the jury found that appellant failed to prove any
injury caused by the accident, the failure of the circuit court
to direct a verdict upon whether she met the $1,000.00 medical
expense threshold constituted harmless error.
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Accordingly, we
conclude the circuit court did not commit reversible error by
denying appellant’s motion for directed verdict upon the issue
of medical expenses.
Appellant next asserts the circuit court committed
reversible error by excluding evidence concerning the nature of
her claim against State Mutual and excluding evidence that State
Mutual was her underinsured motorist carrier.
The jury was informed that Forman was negligent in the
collision and that appellant had a policy of insurance with
State Mutual.
She believes, however, that her inability to
explain to the jury that she was pursuing underinsured motorist
benefits against State Mutual was prejudicial.
We disagree.
As
the jury found that appellant failed to prove causation, we
again believe any error by the circuit court was merely
harmless.
Simply put, there does not exists a reasonable
probability the verdict would have been different had the jury
been informed that appellant was pursuing an underinsured
motorist claim against State Mutual.
833 S.W. 2d 813 (Ky. 1992).
See Crane v. Commonwealth,
Upon the whole, we are of the
opinion the circuit court did not commit reversible error in
this regard.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the
Franklin Circuit Court is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
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BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Roy Church Gray
Martha C. Gray
Frankfort, Kentucky
Robert R. deGolian
TAYLOR & DEGOLIAN
Louisville, Kentucky
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