CARLTON SMITH v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED:
AUGUST 19, 2005; 10:00 a.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2004-CA-001743-MR
CARLTON SMITH
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM HOPKINS CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE CHARLES W. BOTELER, JR., JUDGE
ACTION NO. 03-CR-00299
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
HENRY AND VANMETER, JUDGES; MILLER, SENIOR JUDGE.1
MILLER, SENIOR JUDGE:
Carlton Smith (Smith) brings this appeal
from a "Judgment and Sentence on Plea of Not Guilty (Jury
Trial)" from the Hopkins Circuit Court, entered August 3, 2004,
adjudging him guilty of second-degree assault2 and first-degree
promoting contraband3 and sentencing him to five years and one
year, respectively, each sentence enhanced to ten years pursuant
1
Senior Judge John D. Miller sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the
Chief Justice pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and
Kentucky Revised Statutes 21.580.
2
Kentucky Revised Statutes 508.020, a class C felony.
3
Kentucky Revised Statutes 520.050, a class D felony.
to first-degree persistent felony offender (PFO I) status;4 the
enhanced sentences to run concurrently for a total of ten years'
incarceration.
We affirm.
The incident from which the charges arose took place
on August 14, 2003, in the Hopkins County Detention Center.
On
that day Smith and victim Rick Hill (Hill) were residents of an
eight man cell block consisting of a dayroom and four individual
bedrooms accommodating two inmates each.
About 11:00 a.m., Hill
and another inmate had just finished watching television in the
dayroom.
It was Hill's day to choose which program to watch
(the inmates alternated days on which to choose programs to
watch) when Smith came in dressed in his boxers and a t-shirt
and asked permission to watch a program.
Hill agreed.
An
argument ensued between Hill and Smith over the volume of the
television.
Smith left the dayroom and Hill reduced the volume.
Smith returned to the dayroom dressed in his prison
uniform and tennis shoes.
He approached Hill, who was
weaponless, with a stabbing motion.
Hill, noticing the point of
something protruding from Smith's hand, raised his hand to
deflect the blow from hitting him in the eye.
Smith stabbed
Hill near the temple with an ink pen, leaving a three-inch
opening from Hill's temple down to his cheek, where the pen tip
4
Kentucky Revised Statutes 532.080.
-2-
remained embedded.
Smith then stabbed Hill five times in the
throat, chest and hand, shattering the ink pen.
After being repeatedly stabbed, Hill swung back at
Smith.
Smith smashed a plastic coffee mug into Hill's face,
knocking two teeth out, splitting his lip and lacerating his
nose.
Smith departed and Hill was left with blood running down
his face.
Hill was treated at the prison medical facility for a
lacerated left temple, lacerated right nostril, cut lip, and the
loss of two teeth.
He also had a contusion on his right foot,
three scratches on his neck and two abrasions on his right
shoulder.
A search of the cellblock following the incident
yielded the cartridge of an ink pen, the top part of a pen, and
a plastic coffee cup with blood on it.
Hill's version of events was corroborated by three
inmates.
Not surprisingly, Smith's version of events differed
from Hill's.
According to Smith, the incident occurred
following a pattern of harassment and badgering by Hill.
Following the argument about the television volume, Smith says
that Hill stepped toward Smith and struck him in the jaw.
shoving match ensued.
A
Smith removed an ink pen cartridge from
Hill's hand to prevent from being stabbed with it.
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Upon
possession of the ink pen cartridge, and in self-defense, Smith
inadvertently struck Hill with the ink pen cartridge.
According
to Smith, he also suffered injuries.
Based on the above, on September 30, 2003, a Hopkins
County Grand Jury indicted Smith for the charges upon which he
was subsequently found guilty by a jury:
second-degree assault,
first-degree promoting contraband, and PFO I.
(Indictment No.
03-CR-00299).
Before us, Smith argues that the trial court abused
its discretion by 1) failing to grant a directed verdict on both
the second-degree assault and first-degree promoting contraband
charges, 2) failing to grant a new trial on the basis of newly
discovered evidence, and 3) denying his speedy trial motion.
Smith proffers several reasons why the trial court
erred in not granting his motion for a directed verdict.
Specifically, Smith claims insufficient evidence that the ink
pen constituted a dangerous instrument, that he was the
aggressor and not acting in self-defense, or that he even
possessed an ink pen.
Although the Commonwealth's argument is well taken
that Smith could have stated his motions for directed verdict
with more specificity, we nevertheless review the issues as the
motions appear to meet the minimum required under Pate v.
Commonwealth, 134 S.W.3d 593, 596-98 (Ky. 2004), and Kentucky
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Rules of Civil Procedure (CR) 50.01, and pursuant to the
palpable error standard of Kentucky Rules of Criminal Procedure
(RCr) 10.26, as stated in Perkins v. Commonwealth, 694 S.W.2d
721, 722 (Ky.App. 1985):
(A) conviction in violation of due process
constitutes '[a] palpable error which
affects the substantial rights of a party'
which we may consider and relieve though it
was insufficiently raised or preserved for
our review.
Therefore, we analyze this claim of error under the
standard articulated in Commonwealth v. Benham, 816 S.W.2d 186,
187 (Ky. 1991):
On motion for directed verdict, the trial
court must draw all fair and reasonable
inferences from the evidence in favor of the
Commonwealth. If the evidence is sufficient
to induce a reasonable juror to believe
beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant
is guilty, a directed verdict should not be
given. For the purpose of ruling on the
motion, the trial court must assume that the
evidence for the Commonwealth is true, but
reserv[e] to the jury questions as to the
credibility and weight to be given to such
testimony.
On appellate review, the test of a directed
verdict is, if under the evidence as a
whole, it would be clearly unreasonable for
a jury to find guilt, only then the
defendant is entitled to a directed verdict
of acquittal.
Smith's initial insufficiency argument pertains to the
second-degree assault conviction, which required a finding that
he intentionally caused physical injury to another person by
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means of a dangerous instrument as defined in Kentucky Revised
Statutes (KRS) 500.080(3), in this case, an ink pen; and, the
first-degree promoting contraband conviction, which required a
finding that while in the detention facility he knowingly
obtained or possessed dangerous contraband (which, pursuant to
KRS 520.010(3), can include dangerous instruments as defined in
KRS 500.080).
Smith contends that the evidence of a dangerous
instrument was insufficient, alleging that the only evidence
presented was that an ink pen cartridge was used, and that no
evidence was presented that an ink pen cartridge could cause
serious physical injury.
Contrary to Smith's assertion, testimony from Smith,
Hill, and the inmate witnesses that an ink pen was used in the
stabbing provide evidence that Smith used an ink pen, not an
ink pen cartridge, in his attack on Hill.
Additionally, KRS 500.080(3) defines a dangerous
instrument in relevant part as:
(A)ny instrument . . . article, or substance
which, under the circumstances in which it
is used, attempted to be used, or threatened
to be used, is readily capable of causing
death or serious physical injury . . .
KRS 500.080(15) defines serious physical injury as physical
injury (defined pursuant to KRS 500.080(13) as "substantial
physical pain or any impairment of physical condition") as that
creating a substantial risk of death or causing serious and
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prolonged disfigurement, prolonged impairment of health, or
prolonged loss or impairment of the function of any bodily
organ.
Contrary to Smith's assertion, there was also evidence
from Hill's treating physician that as a result of being stabbed
with an ink pen Hill suffered injuries to the head and neck that
were life-threatening.
As such, considering the evidence as a
whole, we do not find it unreasonable that the jury found that
Smith possessed a dangerous instrument.
Smith's second insufficient evidence allegation also
pertains to the second-degree assault conviction, more
specifically lack of evidence that he was the aggressor.
Smith
presented a theory of self-defense and the jury was given a
self-protection instruction.
Smith was the aggressor.
In contrast, Hill testified that
Inmate witnesses gave conflicting
statements and testimony as to who was the aggressor.
As
indicated above in Benham, in ruling on a directed verdict
motion questions as to the credibility and the weight to be
given testimony are reserved for the jury, which in this case
believed the testimony placing Smith as the aggressor.
Our
standard of review, however, is to look at the evidence as a
whole.
In so doing, we conclude that it was not clearly
unreasonable for the jury to find Smith as the aggressor and
thus guilty of second-degree assault.
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The trial court correctly
denied Smith's motion for directed verdict as to the seconddegree assault charge.
Smith's third insufficient evidence contention relates
to the first-degree promoting contraband conviction, but again
asserts lack of evidence that he possessed an ink pen.
As we
have concluded above that on the whole, it was not clearly
unreasonable for the jury to find that Smith possessed an ink
pen, we conclude that the trial court correctly denied Smith's
motion for directed verdict as to this issue.
Smith next argues that the trial court erred when it
denied his motion for a new trial based on newly discovered
evidence.
The newly discovered evidence consisted of an
affidavit and testimony of an inmate named Christian.
The
proffered evidence indicated that if Christian had testified at
trial, he would have stated that Hill was the aggressor.
He did
not, however, testify, because he was allegedly threatened and
coerced by detention facility officials.
At the hearing on the
new trial motion, the accused official disputed Christian's
allegation.
Additionally, testimony was presented that at the
trial the Commonwealth informed Smith's attorney that if he
called Christian the Commonwealth was prepared to rebut
Christian's testimony with that of another inmate who would
testify that he heard Smith telling Christian what to say.
-8-
As an additional ground for a new trial, Smith
presented the affidavit and testimony of a second inmate,
Killough, indicating that after the trial Killough corresponded
with Smith contradicting Killough's trial testimony as to Smith
being the aggressor.
At the hearing on the new trial motion,
however, evidence was presented that Killough did not recant
until he was moved back in the same facility with Smith.
After hearing the evidence, the trial court denied the
motion "find[ing] and conclud[ing] that the evidence presented
by the defense is not such that it raises a reasonable certainty
that if this case was retried it would produce a different
verdict."
Our standard of review of the trial court's denial of
a new trial motion is as follows:
Whether to grant a new trial on the basis of
newly discovered evidence is largely within
the discretion of the trial court, and the
standard of review is whether there has been
an abuse of that discretion.
Foley v. Commonwealth, 55 S.W.3d 809, 814 (Ky. 2000).
"(N)ewly
discovered evidence that merely impeaches the credibility of a
witness or is cumulative is generally disfavored as grounds for
granting a new trial." Id.
"The evidence 'must be of such
decisive value or force that it would, with reasonable
certainty, change the verdict or that it would probably change
the result if a new trial should be granted.'"
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Collins v.
Commonwealth, 951 S.W.2d 569, 576 (Ky. 1997) (quoting Coots v.
Commonwealth, 418 S.W.2d 752, 754 (Ky. 1967)).
We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in denial of the new trial motion, as the evidence
presented by both Christian and Killough amounts to cumulative
and impeaching testimony that would not change the result if a
new trial were granted.
See generally Epperson v. Commonwealth,
809 S.W.2d 835 (Ky. 1990); Coots v. Commonwealth, supra; Jeter
v. Commonwealth, 268 Ky. 285, 104 S.W.2d 979 (Ky. 1937).
As
stated in Foley, 55 S.W.3d at 814-15:
While some of these results may at first
blush seem harsh, they are based on the
principle that a defendant is entitled to
one fair trial and not to a series of trials
based on newly discovered evidence unless
that evidence is sufficiently compelling as
to create a reasonable certainty that the
verdict would have been different had the
evidence been available at the former trial;
and that mere hearsay evidence that a trial
witness made a post-trial statement
inconsistent with his previous testimony is
insufficient.
Finally, Smith claims a speedy trial violation.5
The
offense occurred on August 14, 2003, and Smith was indicted on
September 30, 2003.
He was arraigned in October, 2003, and in
November, 2003, trial was set for May 4, 2004, as well as an
alternative date of January 13, 2004, should a previously set
civil case settle.
5
When the alternative January date became
U.S. CONST. amend VI.
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available but the trial did not proceed, Smith filed a speedy
trial motion.
The trial was rescheduled and held on April 29,
2004, eight months from the incident, seven months from the
indictment, and three and one-half months from his demand.
In Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530, 92 S.Ct. 2182,
2192, 33 L.Ed.2d 101, 117 (1972), the United States Supreme
Court established four factors for a court to analyze to
determining whether a defendant's right to a speedy trial has
been violated: (1) the length of delay, (2) the reason for the
delay, (3) assertion of the right, and (4) prejudice caused by
the delay. The first step is to determine if the delay was
presumptively prejudicial to the defendant; if not, the
defendant's speedy trial rights were not violated and the
inquiry ends.
Dunaway v. Commonwealth, 60 S.W.3d 563, 569 (Ky.
2001), citing Barker, supra.
Whether a delay was presumptively
prejudicial depends on the nature of the charges and the length
of the delay.
Id.
We conclude that Smith was not denied the right to a
speedy trial.
Smith was indicted for second-degree assault,
first-degree promoting contraband, and PFO I.
While not a case
of great complexity, we do not perceive that the delay herein
was presumptively prejudicial.
Cf. Dunaway, 60 S.W.3d at 569.
As we conclude that the delay was not presumptively prejudicial,
no further analysis of the Barker factors is warranted.
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For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Hopkins
Circuit Court is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEFS FOR APPELLEE:
Jack N. Lackey, Jr.
J. Michael Hearon
Hopkinsville, Kentucky
Gregory D. Stumbo
Attorney General of Kentucky
Bryan D. Morrow
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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