CHARLES E. COOPER III v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED:
SEPTEMBER 30, 2005; 10:00 a.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2004-CA-001737-MR
CHARLES E. COOPER III
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE THOMAS B. WINE, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 03-CR-002645
v.
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
BARBER AND JOHNSON, JUDGES; MILLER, SENIOR JUDGE. 1
BARBER, JUDGE:
On March 16, 2003, Appellant, Charles E. Cooper,
III, visited the Oxmoor Mall in Louisville, Kentucky, and
entered the Gymboree store.
Appellant allegedly entered into a
rear storage room that contained an office, took items from
employees’ purses, and then left the store upon discovery by an
employee.
1
Appellant was indicted on October 13, 2003 on one
Senior Judge John D. Miller sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the
Chief Judge pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and
KRS 21.580.
count of burglary in the third degree and for being a persistent
felony offender in the first degree.
Appellant filed a motion
to dismiss the burglary in the third degree charge on April 7,
2004.
This motion was not heard by the court because Appellant
accepted a plea agreement from the Commonwealth.
Appellant
agreed to plead guilty to persistent felony offender in the
second degree and conditionally plead guilty to the charge of
burglary in the third degree, pursuant to RCr 8.09.
The trial
court entered judgment on the guilty plea on April 20, 2004, but
preserved Appellant’s right to appeal the sole issue of the
burglary in the third degree charge.
Subsequently, Appellant
was sentenced by judgment entered July 26, 2004 to a total of
six years on the charges, but was granted probation for five
years.
This appeal followed.
Appellant asks us to determine whether his alleged
acts fit within the definition of burglary in the third degree.
Interpretation of statutes is a matter of law, and proper
judicial function.
Keeton v. City of Ashland, 883 S.W.2d 894,
896, (Ky.App. 1994), review denied; see also, Floyd County Bd.
of Educ. v. Ratliff, 955 S.W.2d 921, 925, (Ky. 1997).
Kentucky Revised Statute 446.080(1) states “All
statutes of this state shall be liberally construed with a view
to promote their objects and carry out the intent of the
legislature, and the rule that statutes in derogation of the
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common law are to be strictly construed shall not apply to the
statutes of this state and (2) there shall be no difference in
the construction of civil, penal, and criminal statutes.”
See
Hoy v. Kentucky Indus. Revitalizations Auth., 907 S.W.2d 766,
768, (Ky. 1994), (quoting Commonwealth v. Shivley, 814 S.W.2d
572, 573, (Ky. 1991).
Also, the cardinal rule of statutory
construction is that intention of legislature should be
ascertained and given effect.
Commonwealth, Cabinet for Human
Resources, Interim Office of Health Planning and Certification
v. Jewish Hosp. Healthcare Services, Inc., 932 S.W.2d 388, 390,
(Ky.App. 1996), (citing Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. Comm. Revenue
Cabinet, 689 S.W.2d 14 (Ky. 1985).
We next turn to the Penal
Code for direction on how to interpret its statutes.
Kentucky Revised Statute 500.030 states “All
provisions of this code shall be liberally construed according
to the fair import of their terms, to promote justice, and to
affect the objects of the law.”
Also, Kentucky Revised Statute
500.100 states “The commentary accompanying this code may be
used as an aid in construing the provisions of this code.”
See
Cooper v. Commonwealth, 550 S.W.2d 478, 479-480 (Ky. 1977).
Based on the foregoing, we will interpret the statute liberally
considering the intentions of the General Assembly.
Kentucky Revised Statute 511.040(a) states that “A
person is guilty of burglary in the third degree when, with the
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intent to commit a crime, he knowingly enters or remains
unlawfully in a building.”
The commentary for all burglary
statutes is contained in the commentary of KRS 511.020, burglary
in the first degree.
The relevant sections of said commentary
as are follows:
“Burglary in the third degree:” This
offense, as defined in KRS 511.040, is the
basic burglary crime . . . The crime must be
committed in a ‘building,’ defined in KRS
511.010 in such a way as to include all
structures in which people lodge, work, or
otherwise conduct business. With this
definition, burglary is designed to
encompass all unlawful intrusions which are
accompanied by alarm and danger to
occupants. . . .
[A] burglar must ‘knowingly enter or
remain unlawfully in a building.’ This
requirement, as it is defined in KRS
511.090, is intended to accomplish the
following:
(i) It eliminates ‘breaking’ as an
element of the offense of burglary. At
common law this requirement served no
legitimate purpose and only complicated the
law. . . .
(iii) It expands the traditional
burglary offense through a provision that
any person who enters property under
privilege may still commit an offense to
burglary if he remains on that property
beyond the termination of his
privilege. . . .
Finally, after a showing that an
accused knowingly entered or remained
unlawfully in a building, a conviction of
burglary in the third degree is appropriate
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only upon proof that his intrusion was with
intent to commit a crime. . . .
The provisions of this chapter, by
eliminating ‘breaking’ as an element of
burglary, provide a general change in
direction. . . .
The [prior] statutory burglary offense
were more like crimes seeking to protect
against the theft of property than crimes
seeking to deal with the danger that
accompanies an unlawful intrusion into a
place where people live and work. The new
provisions change this. . . .” (Official
Commentary to KRS 511.020).
The statutes contain other essential definitions.
Kentucky Revised Statute 511.010 defines, in relevant part,
“building” as follows:
”Building, in addition to its ordinary
meaning, means any structure, vehicle, watercraft, or aircraft:
(b)Where people assemble for purposes of business . . . Each
unit of a building consisting of two (2) or more units
separately secured or occupied is a separate building.”
(Emphasis added.)
The term “enters or remains unlawfully” is
defined in KRS 511.090(1) as “A person ‘enters or remains
unlawfully’ in or upon premises when he is not privileged or
licensed to do so.
Kentucky Revised Statute 511.090(3) further
provides that “A license or privilege to enter or remain in or
upon premises which are only partly open to the public is not a
license or privilege to enter or remain in or upon a part of the
premises which is not open to the public.”
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(Emphasis added.)
Commentary exists for this statute also.
The commentary for KRS
511.090 provides in relevant part:
“‘Enters or remains unlawfully’ is an
essential element of each offense of
burglary. The provisions of this section
make the element more understandable. The
first subsection is self-explanatory. . . .
The third subsection provides that a person
who is lawfully on one portion of some
premises or in one part of a building may
commit an offense of burglary or trespass by
entering or remaining unlawfully on another
portion or in another part.” (Official
Commentary to KRS 511.090).
We now turn to Appellant’s argument that his alleged
actions did not rise to the level of burglary in the third
degree.
Appellant argues that he did not “enter or remain
unlawfully in” the Gymboree as required under KRS 511.040(1).
Appellant claims that KRS 511.090(3) does not apply because the
store room was open to the public.
There are no Kentucky cases
directly on point with this issue.
The Appellant relies
primarily upon a case out of Kansas, which we will examine in a
moment.
The Commonwealth cites to several cases throughout the
country.
Two of those are particularly similar to the facts we
have before us.
The Commonwealth directs us to Hawaii v. Vowell, 837
P.2d 1308 (Haw. Ct. App. 1992), review denied, 843 P.2d 144
(table) (1992).
In this case, a former employee of a nightclub
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entered into back rooms inhabited by the owner (a bedroom and
bathroom) and attacked her while the owner was in the shower.
There were no postings on either door and the door the former
employee entered was unlocked.
The court found her guilty of
burglary in the first degree.
The court found burglary in the first degree was
committed when “(1) a person intentionally enters or remains
unlawfully in a building, with intent to commit therein a crime
against a person or against property rights, and: (b)
intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly inflicts or attempts to
inflict bodily injury on anyone in the course of committing the
offense; . . .”
Id. at 309, (citing Haw. Rev. Stat. 708-810).
Hawaii has two statutory definitions related to burglary that
are identical to Kentucky’s.
Hawaii Revised Statute 708-800
defines “building” to include “any structure. . . .; each unit
of a building consisting of two or more units separately secured
or occupied is a separate building.”
Rev. Stat. 708-800).
Id. at 311, (citing Haw.
This same statute defines “enter or remain
unlawfully” as when a person enters or remain unlawfully in or
upon premises when he is not licensed, invited, or otherwise
privileged to do so.
Id. at 311.
It continues that a license
or privilege to enter or remain in a building which is only
partly open to the public is not a license or privilege to enter
or remain in that part of the building which is not open to the
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public.
Id. at 312.
The court affirmed the burglary charge
because under the Hawaiian Penal Code the back rooms constituted
a “building” not open to the public, which defendant was not
privileged to enter.
Another jurisdiction with similar burglary
statutes is Colorado.
In Colorado v. Ridenour, 878 P.2d 23 (Col. Ct. App.
1994), review denied (Col. 1994), a defendant threatened another
customer to help him to gain access to a movie theater manager’s
office so that he could rob it.
He did in fact rob the office.
Surprisingly, the defendant had purchased a movie ticket prior
to the theft.
During appeals, defendant argued that he could
not be convicted of burglary because the manager’s office was a
public place and he had a right to be there as a ticket
purchaser.
The court disagreed.
Colorado Revised Statute 18-4-201(3) defined “unlawful
entry” as when a person who, regardless of his intent, enters or
remains in or upon premises which are at the time open to the
public does so with license and privilege. . . .
A license or
privilege to remain in a building which is only partly open to
the public is not a license or privilege to enter or remain in
that part of the building which is not open to the public.
at 26.
Id.
Colorado appellate courts had also defined the term
“open to the public” as premises which would cause a reasonable
person to believe no permission to enter or remain is required.
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Colorado v. Bozeman, 624 P.2d 916, 918, (Colo. App. 1980).
Colorado law also provided, by statute, the definition of a
“separate building.”
Colorado Revised Statute 18-4-201(2)
stated a separate building means each unit of a building
consisting of two or more units separately secured or occupied.
The court affirmed the conviction because the manager’s office
was a part of the building not open to the public.
There are
also other jurisdictions which have upheld a burglary conviction
under similar circumstances.
See Evans v. Texas, 677 S.W.2d 814
(Tx. Ct. App. 1984) and New Mexico v. Sanchez, 735 P.2d 536
(N.M. 1987).
We will now turn to Appellant’s argument.
In support of his claim, Appellant directs us to
Kansas v. Hall, 3 P.3d 582 (Kan. Ct. App. 2000).
In that case,
the defendant was found not guilty of burglary when he stole
merchandise from a K-mart store room.
The court reasoned that
the building was open to the public at the time of the crime and
therefore no burglary could occur because he had authority to
enter the building which housed the storeroom.
Id. at 586.
In
Kansas, criminal statutes are to be strictly construed in favor
of the accused.
Id. at 585.
There is additional reasoning for
this ruling in Kansas v. Hall, 14 P.3d 404 (Kan. 2000).
The Kansas Supreme Court cites the concurrence in the
Kansas Court of Appeals opinion and states that the Kansas
Legislature should consider revising the Kansas burglary statute
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so that it treats the subparts of a structure as separate
structures within the Kansas burglary statute.
Id. at 406,
(citing Kansas v. Hall, 3 P.3d 582, 586, (Kan. Ct. App. 2000)).
The applicable burglary statute was K.S.A. 21-3715 which stated
in relevant part “Burglary is knowingly and without authority
entering into or remaining within any: . . . (b) building,
manufactured home, mobile home, tent or other structure which is
not a dwelling, with intent to commit a felony, theft or sexual
battery therein; . . .”
The Kansas legislature provided no
additional definitions for building in the state’s statutes.
The court also explains why their ruling differed from
that of other jurisdictions, including Hawaii and Colorado.
In
discussing State v. Vowell, the court states “We note that
unlike our statute, the Hawaii statute treats subparts of a
building as separate buildings.”
Id. at 407.
In discussing
various Colorado cases, the court notes the difference is the
“enters unlawfully” or “remains unlawfully” definition because
Colorado’s statute states that a license or privilege to enter
or remain in a building that is only partly open to the public
is not a license or privilege to enter or remain in that part of
the building that is not open to the public.
Id.
In other
words, the statutory definitions applicable to the burglary
statutes in those jurisdictions were significantly different
than that of the Kansas statute.
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Another case with similar facts is Arabie v. Alaska,
699 P.2d 890 (Alaska Ct. App. 1985).
In that case, the
defendant went to the back of a store into a walk-in cooler not
open to the general public and attempted to steal beer by
leaving through a rear door.
employee.
He was stopped by a store
Defendant appealed his conviction arguing he did not
“enter or remain unlawfully in a building.”
The court found in order to “enter or remain
unlawfully” a defendant had to enter or remain in or upon
premises . . . when the premises . . ., at the time of the entry
of remaining, is not open to the public and when the defendant
is not otherwise privileged to do so. . . .”
(citing Alaska Stat. 11.46.350(a)).
Id. at 892,
The purpose of the “open to
the public” clause was to bring the law of burglary closer to
its common law ancestor.
Id. at 893-894.
Alaska Revised
Statute 11.81.900(b)(3) stated a building, in addition to its
usual meaning, includes any propelled vehicle or structure
adapted for overnight accommodation of person or for carrying on
business; when a building consists of separate units, including
apartment units, offices, or rented rooms, each unit is
considered a separate building.
Id. at 892.
The Alaska
statutes did not distinguish buildings that were only partially
open to the public.
Id. at 894 n.8.
The court reversed the
defendant’s conviction because the entire store building was
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open to the public when the defendant entered and neither the
walk-in cooler nor the rear storage area could be considered a
separate building under the statutory definition.
Id. at 895.
Based on the various jurisdictions, we believe the
courts which have found that an individual can burglarize a
portion of a public building are more in sync with Kentucky’s
statutes.
We believe the General Assembly specifically enacted
KRS 511.090(3) to deal with this exact situation.
Therefore, we
believe Appellant was properly charged with burglary in the
third degree.
However, Appellant argues that the store room was open
to the public because it had no identification to the contrary.
As such, Appellant states KRS 511.090(3) does not apply.
Even
assuming we accepted this argument, there is case law which
would support a burglary conviction in this instance.
Kentucky Revised Statute 511.090(2) applies to
situations concerning privilege and license in the context of
premises open to the public.
Kentucky Revised Statute
511.090(2) states “A person who, regardless of his intent,
enters or remains in or upon premises which are at the time open
to the public does so with license or privilege unless he defies
a lawful order not to enter or remain personally communicated to
him by the owner of such premises or other authorized person.”
The Kentucky Supreme Court has held that “implicit in this
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statute is the concept that license or privilege expires once
the person commits an act inconsistent with the purposes of the
business.
A license to be on the premises terminates when one
commits criminal acts.”
293, 307, (Ky. 1997).
Bowling v. Commonwealth, 942 S.W.2d
The Kentucky Supreme Court ruled as such
despite commentary to the statute stating the second subsection
“eliminates the possibility of prosecuting an individual for
burglary when he enters a building that is open to the public,
despite his intention to commit a crime.”
to KRS 511.090.
Official Commentary
The court’s ruling appears to contradict the
purpose of the statute.
However, failure of the legislature to
amend a judicially interpreted statute strongly implies
legislative agreement with the interpretation.
934 S.W.2d 257, 262, (Ky. 1996).
Rye v. Weasel,
With this proposition in mind,
the moment Appellant took items not belonging to him from the
rear storage room, his license to be at the premises would have
terminated.
Therefore, Appellant could have properly been
charged with burglary in the third degree even if we designated
the rear store room as being open to the public.
For the reasons set forth above, we believe the facts
were sufficient to charge Appellant with burglary in the third
degree.
Therefore, we affirm the Jefferson County Circuit
Court’s conviction and sentence.
MILLER, SENIOR JUDGE, CONCURS.
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JOHNSON, JUDGE, CONCURS IN RESULT ONLY.
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Julia K. Pearson
Assistant Public Advocate
Frankfort, Kentucky
Gregory D. Stumbo
Attorney General of Kentucky
Frankfort, Kentucky
James C. Shackelford
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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