ALBERT BURNICE v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED:
SEPTEMBER 23, 2005; 2:00 P.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
2004-CA-001732-MR
ALBERT BURNICE
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE BARRY WILLETT, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 03-CR-000616
v.
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
DYCHE, KNOPF, AND TACKETT, JUDGES.
KNOPF, JUDGE:
Albert Burnice appeals from a judgment of the
Jefferson Circuit Court, entered June 14, 2004, convicting him
of theft by unlawful taking, over $300.00, 1 and giving a peace
officer a false name or address. 2
1
KRS 514.030(2).
2
KRS 523.110.
He was sentenced as a first-
degree persistent felon 3 to twelve years in prison.
Burnice
contends that the trial court erred by refusing to suppress
evidence derived from his unlawful arrest, by admitting
incompetent evidence as to the value of the stolen property, by
refusing to direct a verdict to the effect that the stolen
property was worth less than $300.00, by refusing to declare a
mistrial, and by incorrectly resolving the jury’s inconsistent
verdict.
Having determined that Burnice is not entitled to
relief on any of these grounds, we affirm the trial court’s
judgment.
Shortly after noon on January 27, 2003, an
administrator at Jewish Hospital encountered a black male
emerging from the president’s office on the fifteenth floor of
the Rudd Heart & Lung Center, one of the buildings in the Jewish
Hospital complex in downtown Louisville.
Dissatisfied with the
man’s account of his presence in the private, administrative
portion of the hospital (the man claimed to be looking for a
telephone), the administrator notified security personnel of a
possible intrusion.
A few minutes later, a security guard
apprehended Burnice on the ninth floor attempting to board a
staff elevator far removed from the elevators available to the
public.
Other security guards soon arrived, and one of them
removed a credit card from Burnice’s pants pocket.
3
KRS 532.080.
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Burnice
claimed that his girlfriend had given him the card, but when
asked his girlfriend’s name he said, “Valerie Johnson,” whereas
the name on the card was Maria Doyle.
Thereupon the guards
notified the Louisville Metro Police.
Two police officers arrived twenty to thirty minutes
later.
One of them testified at the suppression hearing that he
reported a possibly stolen card to the credit-card company and
obtained Ms. Doyle’s phone number.
He then called Ms. Doyle and
learned that earlier that day she had discovered that her
wallet, in which she carried the card, was missing.
Having
confirmed a likely theft, the officer placed Burnice under
arrest, transported him to police headquarters, and delivered
him to the custody of the detective assigned to investigate the
case.
The detective testified that after first claiming that
his name was Robertson and that he lived in Louisville, Burnice
later acknowledged his real name and that he was from Rochester,
New York.
He also admitted that that morning he had stolen a
wallet from a woman’s purse while riding with the woman on the
elevator in another building in downtown Louisville.
Burnice moved to suppress all the evidence derived
from his arrest at Jewish Hospital on the ground that the arrest
was illegal.
As Burnice notes, under KRS 431.005
[a] peace officer may make an arrest: . . .
(c) Without a warrant when he has probable
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cause to believe that the person being
arrested has committed a felony; or
(d) Without a warrant when a misdemeanor, as
defined in KRS 431.060, has been committed
in his presence.
Burnice contends that the arresting officer did not have
probable cause to believe that he (Burnice) had committed a
felony, because both the theft of a credit card and the theft of
property worth less than $300.00 are misdemeanors. 4
Nor, Burnice
further contends, had he committed a misdemeanor in the
arresting officer’s presence, for the hospital security guard
had already taken the card from his possession before the
officer arrived.
With this much of Burnice’s argument, we agree.
Although it is a felony to charge more than $100.00 to a stolen
credit card within a six-month period 5 or to steal property worth
more than $300.00, 6 the arresting officer apparently made no
attempt to ascertain whether Burnice may have used the card or
whether Ms. Doyle’s wallet contained other property the value of
which may have exceeded the felony threshold.
The facts before
the officer indicated only that Burnice may have been guilty of
a misdemeanor committed outside the officer’s presence.
4
KRS 434.580; KRS 514.030.
5
KRS 434.650(1).
6
KRS 514.030.
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We
agree with Burnice, accordingly, that his arrest violated KRS
431.005.
We do not agree, however, that the violation entitles
Burnice to the exclusionary remedy he seeks.
That remedy was
fashioned to vindicate constitutional rights, but is not
implicated by violations of statutes. 7
Burnice assumes that an
arrest contrary to Kentucky’s presence rule--that an officer may
not make a warrantless arrest for a misdemeanor committed
outside his or her presence--amounts to a constitutional
violation.
In Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 8 however, the
United States Supreme Court expressly declined to address that
issue, thus leaving in place decisions by other courts that the
presence rule is not a constitutional requirement. 9
According to
these courts, the Constitution requires only that warrantless
misdemeanor arrests, like warrantless felony arrests, be based
on probable cause.
We agree.
Both the United States and the
Kentucky Constitutions require that warrantless seizures be
reasonable.
If probable cause renders warrantless felony
arrests reasonable for constitutional purposes, we fail to see
7
Brock v. Commonwealth, 947 S.W.2d 24 (Ky. 1997); State v.
Eubanks, 196 S.E.2d 706 (N.C. 1973).
8
532 U.S. 318, 121 S.Ct. 1536, 149 L.Ed.2d 549 (2001).
9
Street v. Surdyka, 492 F.2d 368 (4th Cir. 1974); Wilcox v.
Elliott, 39 F.Supp.2d 682 (S.D.W.Va. 1999); People v. Burdo, 223
N.W.2d 358 (Mich.App. 1974); State v. Eubanks, supra.
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why, at least as a general rule, it does not do likewise for
warrantless arrests for misdemeanors, most of which, as in this
case, are far from trivial offenses involving important public
interests in peace and security.
While the General Assembly is
free to accord Kentucky citizens greater protection against
unfounded arrests than the Constitutions provide, we agree with
the Fourth Circuit that we should be “reluctant to adopt a
constitutional interpretation that would impede reform in this
area.” 10
Here, the arresting officer had probable cause to
believe that Burnice had committed the misdemeanor either of
taking a credit card, of receiving a credit card someone else
had taken, or of taking property worth less than $300.00.
Because Burnice’s arrest thus involved a statutory but not a
constitutional violation, the exclusionary remedy he seeks is
not available. 11
Burnice next contends that he was improperly convicted
of a felony theft as opposed to a misdemeanor.
As noted, the
more serious conviction required the Commonwealth to prove that
the value of the stolen property was at least $300.00.
Ms.
Doyle testified that the wallet Burnice took from her was worth
10
Street v. Surdyka, 492 F.2d at 372.
11
Burnice was not completely without a remedy, however; he may
have had a claim for false arrest or false imprisonment.
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between $20.00 and $50.00 and that it contained a restaurant
gift card worth $150.00 and her husband’s college class ring,
which, at the time of trial, it would have cost about $480.00 to
replace.
Mr. Doyle testified that he purchased the ten-carat
gold ring for about $200.00 in 1987, that he wore it every day,
and that it was still in good condition.
Burnice maintains that
Ms. Doyle’s testimony about the replacement cost of the ring was
not competent because it concerned the cost not at the time of
the theft, in January 2003, but at the time of trial in May
2004.
He further maintains that Mr. Doyle’s testimony was not
sufficient because of the long period between the purchase and
the theft.
As Burnice correctly notes, for the purposes of the
theft statutes, the general rule is that the value of stolen
property is the market value at the time of the theft. 12
Where
there is no standard market for the item, however, “the value
must be arrived at from the facts and circumstances and the uses
and purposes which the article was intended to serve.” 13
In that
case, the original cost; the scrap or pawn value, if any; and
12
Commonwealth v. Reed, 57 S.W.3d 269 (Ky. 2001).
13
Beasley v. Commonwealth, 339 S.W.2d 179, 181 (Ky. 1960).
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the replacement cost are all admissible as evidence tending to
establish the value. 14
Because there is no standard market for used,
personalized class rings, the trial court did not err by
admitting the Doyles’ evidence concerning original price and
replacement cost.
The fact that that evidence did not coincide
with the time of the theft bore on its weight, not its
admissibility.
That evidence, furthermore, was sufficient to
permit a rational juror to infer that the ring, which was not
much subject to depreciation and was still in good condition for
its intended use, was worth substantially more than its scrap
value as gold and at least as much a $150.00.
There was
sufficient evidence, therefore, to permit the finding that
Burnice’s theft exceeded the $300.00 felony threshold.
Burnice next contends that he was entitled to a
mistrial when, during her closing argument, the prosecutor both
referred to his prior crimes and misstated the law.
Commenting
on Burnice’s interview with the detective during which he
admitted having stolen the wallet, the prosecutor asserted that
Burnice had been polite and respectful because he “knew how to
play the game.”
Defense counsel objected that the remark
implied prior contact with the police and asked for an
admonition.
14
The trial court overruled the objection but
Id.
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cautioned the prosecutor not to make any reference to Burnice’s
prior crimes.
When the prosecutor nevertheless immediately
repeated her “knows how to play the game,” comment, the court
sustained defense counsel’s objection and admonished the jury to
disregard the comment.
A few minutes later, while discussing the elements of
theft by unlawful taking and arguing that Burnice should be
found guilty of a felony theft, the prosecutor urged the jury to
disregard the ring’s fair market value because that was “the
thief’s way” of valuing stolen property.
Defense counsel again
objected and moved for a mistrial because the prosecutor’s
characterization grossly misstated the law, which, as noted
above, is that the pertinent value of stolen property is its
market value.
The trial court denied the motion for a mistrial,
but did admonish the jury to disregard the “thief’s way”
comment.
The prosecutor then argued that in this case, where
there was no ready market value, the jury could and should give
greater weight to the prosecution’s evidence of replacement
value than to the defense’s evidence of scrap or pawn value.
Burnice maintains that the prosecutor’s improper
remarks denied him a fair trial and that his request for a
mistrial should have been granted.
A mistrial, however, is an
extreme remedy that is not to be granted absent an urgent and
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real necessity for it. 15
A mistrial or reversal for
prosecutorial misconduct in a closing argument is necessary
only if the misconduct is “flagrant” or if
each of the following three conditions is
satisfied: (1) Proof of defendant’s guilt is
not overwhelming; (2) Defense counsel
objected; and (3) The trial court failed to
cure the error with a sufficient
admonishment to the jury. 16
Misconduct is “flagrant” in this context not merely if it is
openly or defiantly improper, but only if it is “so prejudicial,
under the circumstances of the case, that an admonition could
not cure it.” 17
Here the prosecutor’s improprieties were not flagrant.
Her “knows how to play the game” remark was not likely without
more to alert the jury to Burnice’s criminal record, and the
trial court’s admonition ensured that that suggestion went no
further.
Similarly, “the thief’s way” remark was isolated by a
prompt objection and admonition, following which the prosecutor
made it clear that she was not urging the jury to disregard the
stolen property’s market value, but only the defendant’s
definition of market value as the scrap or pawn value.
Because
the prosecutor’s improprieties were thus not unduly prejudicial
15
Matthews v. Commonwealth, 163 S.W.3d 11 (Ky. 2005).
16
Barnes v. Commonwealth, 91 S.W.3d 564, 568 (Ky. 2002)
(citations omitted; emphasis in original).
17
Price v. Commonwealth, 59 S.W.3d 878, 881 (Ky. 2001).
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and were cured by sufficient admonitions, Burnice is not
entitled to relief on this ground.
Finally, Burnice contends that he is entitled to the
lesser of two inconsistent jury verdicts.
The jury initially
returned a guilty verdict on the felony-theft verdict form, but
left the misdemeanor-theft verdict form blank.
The jury foreman
explained to the court that, having found Burnice guilty of a
felony, the jury had deemed the misdemeanor question moot.
The
court accepted this explanation, but for formality’s sake asked
the jury to return to the jury room and complete the misdemeanor
verdict form, fully expecting them to find Burnice not guilty of
the misdemeanor.
Instead, however, the jury returned the second
time with both verdict forms marked guilty.
Arguing that an
inconsistent verdict must be resolved in the defendant’s favor,
Burnice then moved for judgment on the lesser offense.
The
trial court, however, again questioned the foreman, who
explained that because the jury had found Burnice guilty of the
greater offense, they believed that he was necessarily guilty of
the lesser included offense as well.
The court then polled the
jury, and each member stated that it was his or her verdict that
Burnice had stolen property worth more than $300.00.
entered judgment accordingly.
The court
Burnice maintains that once the
jury returned with the apparently inconsistent verdicts the
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court should have, as a matter of law, given effect to the
lesser.
In Beaty v. Commonwealth, 18 however, our Supreme Court
noted that in most circumstances the trial court is authorized
“to order the jury to make its verdict clear and consistent. . .
either by informal poll or direction to reconvene and
reconstitute the verdict.”
Here, when the direction to
reconvene did not have the desired effect, the court was
authorized to have the jury make its verdict clear and
consistent by informal poll.
The poll dispelled the apparent
inconsistency and left no doubt that the jury believed Burnice
guilty of a felony theft.
The trial court did not err by
entering judgment accordingly.
In sum, although Burnice was arrested in violation of
KRS 431.005 on probable cause of a misdemeanor that the
arresting officer did not observe, the arrest was not
unconstitutional and the statutory violation did not entitle
Burnice to an exclusionary remedy.
Otherwise, the Commonwealth
presented sufficient evidence of the value of the property
Burnice stole to support his conviction for a felony theft, and
the trial was not rendered unfair either by the prosecutor’s
improper remarks or the jury’s confusion over the verdict forms.
18
125 S.W.3d 196, 215-16 (Ky. 2003).
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Accordingly, we affirm the June 14, 2004, judgment of the
Jefferson Circuit Court.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Linda Roberts Horsman
Department of Public Advocacy
Frankfort, Kentucky
Gregory D. Stumbo
Attorney General of Kentucky
James C. Shackelford
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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