EDNA FAYE MILLER v. JULIE HOPE BAKER
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RENDERED: APRIL 29, 2005; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
2004-CA-001679-MR
EDNA FAYE MILLER
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM OLDHAM CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE PAUL W. ROSENBLUM, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 03-CI-00444
v.
JULIE HOPE BAKER
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
BUCKINGHAM, KNOPF, AND TAYLOR, JUDGES.
KNOPF, JUDGE:
In May 2002, Julie Baker, an attorney, filed suit
in Jefferson Circuit Court on behalf of Edna Miller against
Norton Hospitals, Inc.
The complaint alleged that Miller
suffered injuries as a result of negligent treatment in separate
incidents in the hospital’s wound center and in its emergency
room.
As of July 2004, Miller’s complaint against Norton was
still pending.
In July 2003, Miller sued Baker.
She alleged
that Baker had negligently failed to join two physicians to the
medical negligence claim with the result that any recovery from
the physicians had become barred by the statute of limitations.
By orders entered June 15 and July 2, 2004, the Jefferson
Circuit Court dismissed as premature Miller’s claim against
Baker.
That claim would not accrue, the court ruled, until the
underlying medical negligence action became final.
those orders that Miller has appealed.
It is from
We affirm.
A professional negligence claim does not accrue until
there has been a negligent act and until reasonably definite and
non-speculative damages have been incurred.1
Attempting to
fashion a bright-line rule, our Supreme Court has held that when
the claim is that an attorney has been negligent in the course
of formal litigation, the injury does not become definite and
non-speculative until the underlying litigation is final.2
Miller acknowledges this rule, but contends that it
should not apply in her case because the hospital is apt not to
be liable for the physicians’ negligence and thus any recovery
against the hospital is apt not to compensate her for the full
extent of her losses.
We are convinced, however, that this is
precisely the sort of speculation our Supreme Court has sought
to exclude from attorney negligence cases.
1
Even if it were
Faris v. Stone, 103 S.W.3d 1 (Ky. 2003).
2
Michels v. Sklavos, 869 S.W.2d 728 (Ky. 1994); Hibbard v.
Taylor, 837 S.W.2d 500 (Ky. 1992).
2
certain that Miller was entitled to recover against the
physicians, the amount of that recovery, and hence the extent of
Baker’s potential liability, could not be determined until the
underlying litigation concluded.
We agree with the trial court,
therefore, that this case is not an exception to the rule our
Supreme Court has crafted.
Accordingly, we affirm the June 15
and July 2, 2004, orders of the Oldham Circuit Court.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
George R. Carter
Louisville, Kentucky
James P. Grohmann
O’Bryan, Brown & Toner
Louisville, Kentucky
3
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