MICHAEL POUND v. LARRY CHANDLER, WARDEN
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RENDERED: AUGUST 5, 2005; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO.
2004-CA-001625-MR
MICHAEL POUND
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM OLDHAM CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE PAUL W. ROSENBLUM, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 04-CI-00248
v.
LARRY CHANDLER, WARDEN
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING IN PART
AND
VACATING AND REMANDING IN PART
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
HENRY, McANULTY AND MINTON, JUDGES.
HENRY, JUDGE:
Michael Pound appeals from an order of the Oldham
Circuit Court dismissing his declaratory judgment action.
On
review, we affirm in part, and vacate and remand in part.
On or around February 7, 2004, Terry Wright, an inmate
at the Kentucky State Reformatory (“KSR”) in LaGrange, Kentucky,
was found in possession of a cellular telephone, which is
considered “dangerous contraband” under prison rules and not
allowed in the possession of inmates.
On or around February 10,
2004, Pound was placed into segregation under suspicion of being
the person who owned the cell phone.
According to Pound, he was
subsequently read his Miranda rights and questioned by Sgt.
Richard DeWeese and Capt. Kenneth Martin as to what he knew
about the cell phone.
questions.
However, Pound refused to answer any
Further investigation, including a subpoena of the
cell phone’s records, revealed that Pound was the owner of the
phone and that he frequently used it to make calls on prison
grounds.
The investigation also revealed that Pound had been
allowing other inmates to use the cell phone in exchange for
tobacco products.
Pound was subsequently subjected to prison
disciplinary proceedings on March 12, 2004, and was found guilty
by the KSR adjustment committee of the institutional infractions
of “hindering an investigation” and “charging another inmate for
services.”
He was assigned to disciplinary segregation for
thirty days and forfeited sixty days of “good time” for the
former infraction and fifteen days disciplinary segregation for
the latter.
Pound appealed these findings to KSR warden Larry
Chandler, but Chandler concurred with the committee’s
conclusions based upon the evidence presented during the
adjustment committee hearing.
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On March 31, 2004, Pound filed a “Petition for
Declaration of Rights Pursuant to KRS Chapter 418.040” in the
Oldham Circuit Court against Chandler, Bill Searcy (KSR
adjustment chairman), Cathy Buck (KSR correctional officer), and
Steve Thomas (KSR classification treatment officer).
In this
petition, Pound sought rulings on whether his due process rights
were violated when he was charged for hindering an investigation
after invoking his Fifth Amendment right to remain silent,
whether his due process rights were violated when he was denied
witnesses during the course of his disciplinary proceedings, and
whether the evidence produced against him at his disciplinary
proceedings was reliable.
The petition also sought compensation
for mental anguish, attorney’s fees, and costs.
On June 29, 2004, the circuit court entered orders
denying Pound’s motion for an evidentiary hearing and personal
appearance, denying his petition for declaratory judgment, and
granting a motion to dismiss that was filed by the Appellees on
June 21, 2004.
Pound apparently was not afforded the
opportunity to file a responsive pleading to the motion to
dismiss before the orders were issued.
On July 9, 2004, Pound
filed a motion to reconsider pursuant to CR 12.03, primarily
relying on the fact that he was not allowed to tender a response
to the Appellees’ motion to dismiss before the circuit court
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issued its rulings.
On this same day, the court entered an
order denying said motion.
This appeal followed.
Pound’s initial two contentions relate to the circuit
court’s handling of his petition for declaratory judgment.
He
first argues that he was denied his right to due process when
the circuit court granted the Appellees’ motion to dismiss his
petition for declaratory judgment without allowing him an
opportunity to file a responsive pleading.
In reviewing the
record, we see that the same essential arguments raised by Pound
in his response to the motion to dismiss tendered after the
circuit court entered its orders were also made in his petition
for declaration of rights and in his memorandum of law in
support of said petition.
We also note that the documents
attached as exhibits to the Appellees’ motion to dismiss were
from the administrative record, and that Pound also relied upon
exhibits from that same record in his petition for declaratory
judgment.
Consequently, there was nothing “new” presented by
the Appellees that Pound did not have the opportunity to
address.
Accordingly, even assuming that the circuit court
erred in this respect, we believe that any such error is of a
harmless nature and does not constitute grounds for reversal.
Pound next contends that the circuit court erred in
denying his motion for a full evidentiary hearing on his
petition for declaratory judgment.
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Under Kentucky law,
challenges to Department of Corrections’ disciplinary
proceedings are properly made via petitions for declaratory
judgment pursuant to KRS 418.040, the mechanism that Pound
employed here.
Smith v. O’Dea, 939 S.W.2d 353, 355 (Ky.App.
1997), citing Polsgrove v. Kentucky Bureau of Corrections, 559
S.W.2d 736 (Ky. 1977); Graham v. O’Dea, 876 S.W.2d 621 (Ky.App.
1994).
“While technically original actions, these inmate
petitions share many of the aspects of appeals.
They invoke the
circuit court's authority to act as a court of review.
The
court seeks not to form its own judgment, but, with due
deference, to ensure that the agency's judgment comports with
the legal restrictions applicable to it.”
Id., citing American
Beauty Homes Corp. v. Louisville & Jefferson County Planning and
Zoning Comm'n., 379 S.W.2d 450 (Ky. 1964).
With this in mind, the focal point for a court
reviewing an administrative decision is the administrative
record itself, not some new record made initially in the
reviewing court.
Id. at 356, citing Florida Power & Light Co.
v. Lorion, 470 U.S. 729, 743, 105 S.Ct. 1598, 1607, 84 L.Ed.2d
643 (1985), in turn citing Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S. 138, 93 S.Ct.
1241, 36 L.Ed.2d 106 (1973).
“The circuit court's fact-finding
capacity is required only if the administrative record does not
permit meaningful review.
Even then, ‘the proper course, except
in rare circumstances, is to remand to the agency for additional
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investigation or explanation.’"
Id., citing Florida Power, 470
U.S. at 744, 105 S.Ct. at 1607; American Beauty Homes, supra.
Accordingly, we must reject Pound’s contention that
the circuit court erred in failing to conduct an evidentiary
hearing on his petition.
“Its reliance on the agency's record
was not only proper but required in its role as reviewer of the
administrative decision.”
Id., citing Florida Power, supra;
American Beauty Homes, supra.
If we conclude that additional
fact-finding is necessary, this matter ultimately must be
remanded to the Department of Corrections for additional
investigation.
Pound’s remaining contentions relate to the
disciplinary charges against him and the manner in which the
Department of Corrections’ disciplinary hearing was conducted.
We first note Pound’s argument that the Appellees’ motion to
dismiss should have been treated as one asking for summary
judgment.
We agree, as our courts have held that motions for
summary judgment, in most cases, provide the most appropriate
procedure and standards for addressing petitions for declaratory
judgment stemming from a prison disciplinary proceeding.
939 S.W.2d, at 355 n.1.
Smith,
The particular guidelines to be used in
reviewing cases such as this one have been set forth as follows:
Where, as here, principles of administrative
law and appellate procedure bear upon the
court's decision, the usual summary judgment
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analysis must be qualified. The problem is
to reconcile the requirement under the
general summary judgment standard to view as
favorably to the non-moving party as is
reasonably possible the facts and any
inferences drawn therefrom, with a reviewing
court's duty to acknowledge an agency's
discretionary authority, its expertise, and
its superior access to evidence. In these
circumstances we believe summary judgment
for the Corrections Department is proper if
and only if the inmate's petition and any
supporting materials, construed in light of
the entire agency record (including, if
submitted, administrators' affidavits
describing the context of their acts or
decisions), does not raise specific, genuine
issues of material fact sufficient to
overcome the presumption of agency
propriety, and the Department is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law. The court must
be sensitive to the possibility of prison
abuses and not dismiss legitimate petitions
merely because of unskilled presentations.
Jackson v. Cain, 864 F.2d 1235 (5th
Cir.1989). However, it must also be free to
respond expeditiously to meritless
petitions. By requiring inmates to plead
with a fairly high degree of factual
specificity and by reading their allegations
in light of the full agency record, courts
will be better able to perform both aspects
of this task.
Id. at 356.
We further note that in prison disciplinary
proceedings, due process requires that a disciplinary
committee's decision to impose sanctions for violations of
prison rules must only be supported by "some evidence."
Stanford v. Parker, 949 S.W.2d 616, 617 (Ky.App. 1996), citing
Superintendent, Massachusetts Correctional Institution, Walpole
v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 455, 105 S.Ct. 2768, 2774, 86 L.Ed.2d 356
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(1985).
With this general background in mind, we turn to
Pound’s other contentions.
Pound first raises a general argument that he was
unfairly denied the opportunity to question witnesses that he
requested be produced at his hearings, specifically Sgt.
Deweese, one of the officers who initially questioned him about
the cell phone.
However, the administrative record with which
we have been provided—specifically Pound’s “adjustment committee
appeal forms”—gives no indication that this particular issue was
presented on appeal to KSR warden Larry Chandler after Pound’s
administrative hearings.
The failure to raise an issue before
the administrative body precludes an inmate litigant from
asserting that issue in an action for judicial review of the
agency's action.
O'Dea v. Clark, 883 S.W.2d 888, 892 (Ky.App.
1994), citing Personnel Board v. Heck, 725 S.W.2d 13 (Ky.App.
1986).
Consequently, we find that this particular argument is
not preserved for our review.
We next address Pound’s argument regarding the
disciplinary action taken against him for charging other inmates
for services.
He specifically contends that the confidential
informant information provided to the committee was unreliable
because the inmates giving said information “were looking for
away [sic] out of trouble making them less reliable.”
He
further asserts that the “adjustment committee never did
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determine the reliability of the confidential information.”
We
disagree with these contentions.
In Gilhaus v. Wilson, 734 S.W.2d 808 (Ky.App. 1987),
this court examined the use of confidential information in the
prison disciplinary setting and addressed an argument identical
to the one Pound makes here.
Gilhaus specifically holds that
the “verification procedure [for informant information] need not
be comprehensive, the committee need only include some reference
to verification.”
Id. at 810, citing Goble v. Wilson, 577
F.Supp. 219, 220 (W.D.Ky. 1983).
Here, the adjustment committee
found Pound guilty of charging inmates for services based upon
statements given by multiple inmates that he was responsible for
the cell phone and that he was charging other inmates tobacco
products for use of the phone.
The incident report containing
this information also contains a statement finding the inmates’
statements to be reliable because they all gave the same account
of the incidents leading up to the disciplinary charge against
Pound.
Nothing more is required under Gilhaus.
Accordingly, we
conclude that the adjustment committee satisfactorily examined
the reliability of the confidential information in question.
further conclude that there was sufficient evidence to find
Pound guilty of charging other inmates for services under the
“some evidence” standard followed by our courts.
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We
Pound also offers a vague contention that the trial
court erred in not declaring that he had a viable equal
protection claim, because some inmates who were questioned about
the cell phone received fewer days of segregation time than he
did.
We have found nothing within the administrative record
with which we have been provided to suggest that Pound raised
this argument during the administrative process.
Again, we note
that the failure to raise an issue before the administrative
body precludes an inmate litigant from asserting that issue in
an action for judicial review of the agency's action.
883 S.W.2d at 892 (Citation omitted).
O'Dea,
Consequently, we find
that this issue is not preserved for review.
Even if the issue
had been preserved, our “[c]ourts have consistently held that
the difference in treatment of incarcerated persons does not
constitute a denial of equal protection of the laws, in the
absence of a showing of suspect classification.”
Carter, 938 S.W.2d 575, 577 (Ky. 1997).
Mahoney v.
As no such showing has
been made by Pound here, we see no substantive merit in his
equal protection argument.
Pound’s next group of arguments revolve around the
disciplinary action taken against him for hindering an
investigation, specifically, for his refusing to answer any
questions posed to him about his knowledge and possible
ownership of the cell phone even though the investigating
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officers allegedly read his Miranda rights before questioning
Pound.
In examining this contention, we must first determine
whether the 5th Amendment of the U.S. Constitution or Section 11
of the Kentucky Constitution securing the privilege against
self-incrimination is applicable to the situation here.1
“The privilege has been held to protect a person from
being forced to put forth evidence against himself or herself
and ‘the availability of the privilege does not turn upon the
type of proceeding in which its protection is invoked, but upon
the nature of the statement or admission and the exposure which
it invites.’"
Welch v. Commonwealth, 149 S.W.3d 407, 410 (Ky.
2004), quoting In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 49, 87 S.Ct. 1428, 1455,
18 L.Ed.2d 527 (1967).
“Moreover, the privilege is not limited
to criminal proceedings and protects in circumstances where the
person's freedom is curtailed.”
Id., citing Miranda v. Arizona,
384 U.S. 436, 467, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 1624, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966).
Miranda warnings are only required when a custodial
interrogation is involved.
Id., citing Miranda, supra.
CPP2 15.6(VI)(C)(4)(b)(2)(a) sets forth that during the
course of an investigator’s review of an incident that may
constitute a disciplinary infraction, the investigator shall
1
Kentucky decisions generally hold Section 11 to be coextensive with the
Fifth Amendment. See Hourigan v. Commonwealth, 962 S.W.2d 860, 864 (Ky.
1998); Commonwealth v. Cooper, 899 S.W.2d 75, 78 (Ky. 1995); Newman v.
Stinson, 489 S.W.2d 826, 829 (Ky. 1972).
2
Corrections Policies and Procedures
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“[g]ive the inmate the Miranda warnings for purposes of criminal
prosecution, if criminal charges may be filed.”
Here, Pound has
alleged that Officers DeWeese and Martin read him his Miranda
warnings before they questioned him about the cell phone.
If
this is indeed the case, it would indicate that Pound was
subjected to what could possibly constitute a custodial
interrogation by state officials about a crime for which he
could be charged.
The question then becomes whether invoking
his right to remain silent in this situation is something for
which Pound could receive an administrative punishment.
The United States Supreme Court specifically held in
Miranda that "it is impermissible to penalize an individual for
exercising his Fifth Amendment privilege when he is under police
custodial interrogation."
Miranda, 384 U.S. at 465 n. 37, 86
S.Ct. 1602, 1624, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966).
To penalize Pound for
“hindering an investigation” on the sole grounds that he invoked
his right to remain silent would appear to violate this
principle, particularly in a situation where he perceived that
he faced possible criminal charges.
Indeed, the U.S. Supreme
Court has held that the 5th Amendment "not only protects the
individual against being involuntarily called as a witness
against himself in a criminal prosecution but also privileges
him not to answer official questions put to him in any other
proceeding, civil or criminal, formal or informal, where the
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answer might incriminate him in future proceedings."
Lefkowitz
v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70, 77, 94 S.Ct. 316, 322, 38 L.Ed.2d 274
(1973).
To the degree that it suggests otherwise, CPP 15.6 is
invalid.
However, the record with which we have been presented
is inconclusive as to whether or not Pound was actually read his
Miranda rights before being questioned by Officers DeWeese and
Martin.
The adjustment committee waived the appearance of these
officers due to having their statements in the disciplinary
reports.
We note that these reports say nothing about whether
or not they read Pound his Miranda rights before questioning him
about the cell phone.
Accordingly, the portion of the order of
the Oldham Circuit Court which denied Pound relief from the
decision of the Kentucky Department of Corrections assessing
administrative penalties against Pound for hindering an
investigation is vacated, and the matter is remanded to the
Oldham Circuit Court with directions that the matter be remanded
to the Department of Corrections for further fact-finding as to
this issue.
See Smith, 939 S.W.2d at 356.
If the facts show
that Pound’s disciplinary charge for hindering an investigation
resulted solely from his invoking his Miranda rights when faced
with a custodial interrogation that could lead to criminal
charges, the charge is impermissible as being violative of the
5th Amendment of the United States Constitution and Section 11 of
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the Kentucky Constitution and should therefore be dismissed.
The Order and Judgment of the Oldham Circuit Court is affirmed
except as stated above.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Michael Pound
LaGrange, Kentucky
Emily Dennis
Frankfort, Kentucky
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