KIRK D. MORGAN, M.D. v. KENTUCKY BOARD OF MEDICAL LICENSURE
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RENDERED: JULY 29, 2005; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO.
2004-CA-001609-MR
KIRK D. MORGAN, M.D.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE LISABETH HUGHES ABRAMSON, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 03-CI-008051
v.
KENTUCKY BOARD OF MEDICAL
LICENSURE
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
HENRY, McANULTY, AND MINTON, JUDGES.
HENRY, JUDGE:
Kirk D. Morgan, M.D., appeals to this court from
the Opinion and Order of the Jefferson Circuit Court upholding
an Order of Indefinite Restriction entered against him by the
Kentucky Board of Medical Licensure (KBML).
We affirm.
Dr. Morgan graduated from the University of Louisville
School of Medicine in 1971.
He became the first family
physician in Kentucky to be both residency trained and boardcertified.
He was briefly Director of the Family Medicine
Residency program at the University of Louisville School of
Medicine.
He was engaged in practice as a family physician in
Louisville from 1977 until 2000.
Primarily because of his
persistence in incorporating non-approved alternative forms of
therapy into his practice1, Dr. Morgan has practiced medicine
under certain restrictions set out in Agreed Orders with the
KBML since 1989.
On March 16, 2000, the KBML filed an administrative
complaint against Dr. Morgan alleging that he had failed: 1) to
conform to prescribed standards for record-keeping; 2) to workup life threatening situations; 3) to provide complete care for
his patients; 4) to monitor patients adequately for sideeffects; 5) to follow up on abnormal laboratory values, and 6)
to provide preventative health care.
The KBML also alleged that
Dr. Morgan had used “less effective” or alternative therapies
with several patients.
These allegations if proved would
constitute violations of KRS2311.595(13) and KRS 311.595(9) as
illustrated by KRS 311.597(2), 311.597(3) and 311.597(4).
The
same date the KBML issued an Emergency Order of Suspension,
suspending Dr. Morgan from practicing medicine.
After an
emergency hearing on April 18, 2000, the hearing officer
1
Beginning in 1989 Dr. Morgan’s practice was restricted by agreed orders with
the KBML limiting his use of chelation therapy and the use of hydrogen
peroxide and hair analysis. In 1994 an agreed order of restriction was
entered prohibiting Dr. Morgan’s use of EDTA (ethylenediaminetetraacetic
acid), chelation therapy, intravenous hydrogen peroxide, and/or intravenous
germanium.
2
Kentucky Revised Statutes
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affirmed the Emergency Order, finding that Dr. Morgan had
violated the terms of an Agreed Order of Probation under which
he had been practicing for several years.
A final hearing on
the March 16, 2000 complaint was scheduled for July, 2000, but
both sides requested extensions of time to complete discovery,
resulting in a delay of over two years.
During this time, while
the parties were exploring an informal adjustment of the
complaint, they agreed that Dr. Morgan would submit to an
assessment by the Colorado Personalized Education for Physicians
(CPEP) program, which he did.
The final hearing was held
February 27-28, 2003, and on May 12, 2003, the hearing officer
entered Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and a Recommended
Order.
Although the hearing officer found that most of the
allegations against Dr. Morgan were not supported by substantial
evidence, she did find that Dr. Morgan had breached the required
standard of care, and that there was substantial evidence to
support a finding that Dr. Morgan had violated the Agreed Order
under which KBML had allowed him to practice.
The hearing
officer felt that the three years Dr. Morgan had already been
suspended from practice was sufficient punishment and
recommended that he be allowed to return to practice on
probation, with restrictions designed to rehabilitate his skills
and protect the public.
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The KBML reviewed the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of
Law and Recommended Order of the hearing officer, and the
exceptions filed thereto by both parties, and on August 12,
2003, issued its final order.
Although the KBML adopted most of
the hearing officer’s findings and conclusions, a few were
modified or supplemented.
The KBML declined to accept the
hearing officer’s recommendation that Dr. Morgan be allowed to
resume practicing medicine and instead entered an Indefinite
Order of Restriction.
Under the terms of that order, Dr. Morgan
is only permitted to apply for reinstatement of his license if
he either: 1) successfully completes an approved residency
training program in family practice; 2) successfully completes a
CPEP Education Course and Post Education Evaluation; or 3)
successfully passes the American Board of Family Practice
examination for Board Certification in Family Practice.
Dr.
Morgan appealed to the Jefferson Circuit Court, and on July 20,
2004, that court entered its Opinion and Order affirming the
order of the KBML.
This appeal followed.
On appeal, Dr. Morgan urges us to reverse the orders
of the Jefferson Circuit Court and the KBML because: 1) the KBML
failed to render its final order within the 90-day time period
required by KRS 13B.120(4); and 2) the KBML’s final order is
arbitrary and capricious and not supported by substantial
evidence.
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We agree with the Jefferson Circuit Court’s assessment
of the standard of appellate review of the actions of
administrative boards, set out in Aubrey v. Office of Attorney
General, 994 S.W.2d 516 (Ky.App. 1998):
Where the legislature has designated an
administrative agency to carry out a
legislative policy by the exercise of
discretionary judgment in a specialized
field, the courts do not have the authority
to review the agency decisions de novo.
American Beauty Homes Corp. v. Louisville
and Jefferson Co. Planning and Zoning
Comm’n, 379 S.W.2d 450, 458 (Ky. 1964).
Judicial review of the administrative action
is confined to a determination of whether
the action taken was arbitrary. City of
Louisville v. McDonald, 470 S.W.2d 173, 178
(Ky. 1971). So long as the agency's
decision is supported by substantial
evidence of probative value, it is not
arbitrary and must be accepted as binding by
the appellate court. Starks v. Kentucky
Health Facilities, 684 S.W. 2d 5 (Ky.
1984). Substantial evidence is defined as
evidence of substance and relevant
consequence, having the fitness to induce
conviction in the minds of reasonable
persons. O’Nan v. Ecklar Moore Express,
Inc., 339 S.W.2d 466 (Ky. 1960). In its
role as a finder of fact, an administrative
agency is afforded great latitude in its
evaluation of the evidence heard and the
credibility of witnesses, including its
findings and conclusions of fact. Kentucky
State Racing Comm’n v. Fuller, 481 S.W.2d
298, 309 (Ky. 1972). However, this Court is
authorized to review issues of law on a de
novo basis. Mill St. Church of Christ v.
Hogan, 785 S.W.2d 263, 266 (Ky.App. 1990).
Id. at 518-19.
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KRS 13B.120(4) states as follows:
(4) Except as otherwise required by federal
law, the agency head shall render a final
order in an administrative hearing within
ninety (90) days after:
(a)
The receipt of the official record of
the hearing in which there was no
hearing officer submitting a
recommended order under KRS 13B.110; or
(b)
The hearing officer submits a
recommended order to the agency head,
unless the matter is remanded to the
hearing officer for further
proceedings.
It is clear that subparagraph (b) of the statute
applies to the case before us.
The hearing officer’s
recommended order was submitted to the KBML on May 12, 2003.
There was no remand to the hearing officer from the Board.
The
ninetieth day following May 12, 2003, was Sunday, August 10.
Therefore the final order should have been entered no later than
Monday August 11, 2003.
See KRS 446.030.
The circuit court held that by issuing its final order
only one day late, the KBML substantially complied with the
law’s requirements.
We agree.
As the court stated,
“[t]ypically, the law requires strict compliance in situations
where conferral of jurisdiction is at issue”.
For example,
“[w]hen grace to appeal is granted by statute, a strict
compliance with its terms is required."
Board of Adjustments of
the City of Richmond v. Flood, 581 S.W.2d 1, 2 (Ky. 1979);
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B.L.
Radden & Sons, Inc. v. Copley, 891 S.W.2d 84, 86 (Ky.App. 1995).
But where compliance is not jurisdictional, if there is an
attempt to comply with the requirements of the statute, the
agency’s action will usually be upheld under the doctrine of
substantial compliance.
See Bentley v. Aero Energy, Inc., 903
S.W.2d 912 (Ky.App. 1995);
Coleman v. Eastern Coal Corp., 913
S.W.2d 800 (Ky.App. 1995).
In addition, compliance with time
periods by administrative agencies usually does not affect the
validity of the proceeding unless the statute both expressly
requires compliance and establishes a consequence for failure to
comply.
Bentley at 914, citing Coleman v. United Parcel
Service, 155 Vt. 646, 582 A.2d 151 (1990).
We can find no
penalty in the statute for failure to comply with KRS
13B.120(4); nor do we find evidence of a legislative intent that
compliance with the 90-day period set out in KRS 13B.120 is
either mandatory or a prerequisite to valid agency action;
neither has Dr. Morgan demonstrated that he has suffered any
significant prejudice as a result of the KBML having issued the
order one day past the deadline.
We are persuaded that the KBML
attempted to comply with the deadline, and that the minimal
delay in issuing the final order does not invalidate the board’s
action.
In support of his contention that the KBML’s final
order is arbitrary, capricious and not supported by substantial
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evidence, Dr. Morgan complains that the final order relies on
matters outside the record.
Dr. Morgan also alleges that the
KBML wrongfully considered the length of time Dr. Morgan has
been away from the practice of medicine as a reason to continue
his suspension, even though it resulted at least in part from
his exercising his procedural rights in the case.
The circuit
court carefully reviewed these allegations and found them to be
without basis.
Instead it appears that the KBML merely
amplified some of the hearing officer’s findings by including
some additional matter that was already contained in the record.
As the circuit court pointed out, KRS 13B.120(2) permits the
KBML to “adopt [the hearing officer’s recommended order] as the
agency’s final order, or ... reject or modify [it] in whole or
in part, ...
or ... remand the matter, in whole or in part, to
the hearing officer for further proceedings as appropriate”.
We find nothing to indicate that the KBML considered “matters
outside the record” in making its ruling.
It does not appear that the length of Dr. Morgan’s
absence from the practice of medicine was given undue weight by
the KBML.
Rather, it was considered as one of several factors.
When discussing the issue, the KBML stated that “delays in the
proceedings caused by or agreed to by the licensee shall not in
themselves affect the appropriate disciplinary determination”.
As pointed out in the KBML’s brief, contrary to the opinion
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stated by the hearing officer in her recommended order, the
duration of the emergency suspension, by itself, is not a proper
measure of appropriate disciplinary action in a matter involving
a license to practice medicine.
The KBML’s primary goal, and
its obligation to the public, is to establish that the
respondent is competent to practice medicine without undue risk
to patients.
The Opinion and Order of the Jefferson Circuit Court
is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF AND ORAL ARGUMENT FOR
APPELLANT:
BRIEF AND ORAL ARGUMENT FOR
APPELLEE:
Jason R. Segeleon
Kevin C. Burke
Louisville, Kentucky
L. Chad Elder
Louisville, Kentucky
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