WILLIAM TERRY BADHAM II v. AMY O. BADHAM (NOW OAKLEY)
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RENDERED: May 27, 2005; 10:00 a.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2004-CA-001520-MR
WILLIAM TERRY BADHAM II
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM FRANKLIN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE REED RHORER, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 99-CI-00424
AMY O. BADHAM (NOW OAKLEY)
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING IN PART,
REVERSING IN PART AND REMANDING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
JUDGE.1
COMBS, CHIEF JUDGE; GUIDUGLI, JUDGE; MILLER, SENIOR
GUIDUGLI, JUDGE:
William Terry Badham appeals from an order of
the Franklin Circuit Court denying his motion to enforce a
settlement agreement in a dissolution of marriage proceeding
initiated by Amy O. Badham (now Oakley).
For the reasons stated
below, we affirm in part, reverse in part and remand.
Badham and Oakley were married on August 31, 1992.
The marriage produced three children, born in 1993 and 1994.
1
On
Senior Judge John D. Miller sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the
Chief Justice pursuant to Section 100(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and
KRS 21.580.
August 5, 1999, the Franklin Circuit Court entered a decree of
dissolution dissolving the marriage.
The order provided in
relevant part that the parties would share joint custody of the
children.
On January 9, 2001, Badham filed a motion seeking to
have himself designated as primary custodian2 for the children
and to modify visitation and support.
A hearing on the motion
was scheduled for February 26, 2001.
Before the hearing was conducted, the parties entered
into an oral agreement without benefit of counsel, the terms of
which settled custody, support, and visitation issues.
Under
the agreement, the parties would retain a joint custodial
arrangement but Badham would begin serving as “primary
residential parent”.
Oakley was also to begin paying child
support in the amount of $630.90 per month (by way of a
reduction in her entitlement to Badham’s 401k) until such time
as she obtained a degree.
After obtaining a degree, the parties
were to negotiate new child support terms.
At the February 26,
2001, hearing, the agreement was read into the record and both
parties affirmatively stated that they consented to its terms.
Shortly thereafter, the agreement was reduced to
writing.
After reading the agreement, Oakley determined that
2
The parties and the trial court interchangeably use the terms primary
caretaker, primary care provider, primary custodial parent, and primary
residential parent.
-2-
she did not agree with the terms concerning her weekly
visitation rights.
She refused to sign the agreement.
On March 16, 2001, Badham filed a motion seeking an
order requiring the parties to comply with the oral agreement.
On August 29, 2001, Oakley moved to dismiss the motion, arguing
that it failed to comply with certain statutory provisions.
Upon considering the motions, the trial court entered an order
denying the motion to have Badham designated as primary
custodian as set forth in the oral agreement, and denying
Badham’s request for child support as provided by the agreement.
Both parties appealed to the Court of Appeals.
After
considering the written arguments, a panel of this court
rendered an opinion on November 7, 2003.
The panel reversed the
trial court’s order and remanded the matter for enforcement of
the oral agreement, holding that it was enforceable because the
parties and the trial court may rely on affirmative declarations
made in open court.
During the pendency of the first appeal, the trial
court entered an order on July 10, 2003, temporarily adjudging
that the children would primarily reside with Badham.
It went
on to order that neither party would be responsible for child
support.
On January 13, 2004, Badham filed a motion seeking an
order designating him as “primary residential parent”.
-3-
He also
sought a nunc pro tunc order requiring Oakley to pay $630.90 per
month in child support.
Lastly, on June 29, 2004, the trial court entered an
order denying Badham’s motion to designate him as primary
residential parent, and further denying his request for child
support.
This appeal followed.
Badham now argues that the trial court improperly
failed to enforce the oral agreement on remand.
Specifically,
he maintains that he is entitled to child support from Oakley
(which was to take the form of a reduction in Oakley’s
entitlement to his 401k account) beginning on the date that the
oral agreement was entered into the record.
He notes that the
agreement was clear and unambiguous, and further that a panel of
the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court on this issue and
remanded the matter for enforcement of the agreement.
In the
alternative, he argues that irrespective of the foregoing, he
has been the de facto primary care provider since 2001 and is
entitled child support in the amount of $630.90 per month.
The issues Badham now raises may be resolved by
reference to the record.
First, it is uncontroverted that the
parties orally agreed that Badham would become primary custodian
(while retaining a joint custodial arrangement), and that Oakley
would pay $630.90 per month in child support.
Second, it should
also be clear that the opinion and order of this Court rendered
-4-
on November 7, 2003, stated in unambiguous terms that the
settlement agreement was binding on the parties and that the
trial court erred in failing to so rule.
In the previous
appeal, this Court stated that, “ . . . the settlement agreement
should have been enforced to the extent the parties had agreed
upon the meaning of the terms . . . .”3
The order on appeal was
reversed and the matter remanded for the purpose of correcting
the error.
Despite being directed to correct the error, the
Franklin Circuit Court has not given effect to the agreement as
ordered.
The court failed either to permanently designate
Badham as primary custodian or to give effect to the child
support arrangement agreed upon by the parties.
The reasoning set forth in the November 7, 2003,
opinion speaks for itself and need not be restated herein.
On
remand, the Franklin Circuit Court shall recognize and give
effect to the November 7, 2003, opinion of this Court.
That
opinion specifically held, in relevant part:
In the case sub judice, the settlement
agreement between the mother and the father
covered several issues including child
support, tax-related matters, the
designation of the father as primary
residential custodian, and the mother’s
visitation rights. However, the only
disputed term related to the mother’s weekly
visitation rights. We hold that this
3
Badham v. Badham (now Oakley), 2001-CA-002380-MR and 2001-CA-002447-MR,
rendered November 7, 2003, slip opinion at p. 9.
-5-
provision of the settlement agreement in
question is severable from the other terms.
Accordingly, the trial court erred by not
enforcing those terms of the settlement
agreement to which there was no dispute
between the parties, including the provision
designating the father as the primary
residential parent.4
We believe that the prior opinion of this Court is now the law
of the case and must be followed.
While we are reluctant to micromanage the
implementation of the agreement, and recognize that due respect
must be afforded the trial court in the exercise of its
discretionary power, the circuit court’s failure to implement
the November 7, 2003, opinion of this court must also be
considered.
Accordingly, we reverse numerical paragraphs (1)
and (2) of the Franklin Circuit Court’s June 29, 2004, order and
remand the matter for entry of an order designating Badham as
primary custodian and implementing child support payments in
accordance with this opinion.
The order is in all other
respects affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Michael L. Judy
Frankfort, KY
Mark A. Bubenzer
Frankfort, KY
4
Slip opinion at pp. 7-8.
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