DOUGLAS C. NORDIKE v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED:
OCTOBER 21, 2005; 2:00 P.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2004-CA-001500-MR
DOUGLAS C. NORDIKE
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM WARREN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE JOHN R. GRISE, JUDGE
INDICTMENT NOS. 02-CR-00726 & 02-CR-00726-004
v.
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
BUCKINGHAM, DYCHE, AND TAYLOR, JUDGES.
DYCHE, JUDGE:
Douglas C. Nordike is currently serving a ten
year sentence for two counts of knowingly possessing anhydrous
ammonia in other than an approved container (KRS 250.991) and
one count of complicity to manufacture methamphetamine (KRS
218A.1432(1)(a) and KRS 502.020).
arguments.
He appeals, making five
We affirm.
Nordike was the owner of record of less than ten acres
in Warren County, Kentucky.
Of this acreage, approximately four
were tillable; there were two wooden structures on the property;
the property looked otherwise abandoned.
On May 23, 2002, with
the permission of an adjoining landowner, the Kentucky State
Police and Warren County Drug Task Force conducted surveillance
of Nordike’s property.
The police were able to verify a
tipster’s representation that a large tank of anhydrous ammonia
was present on the property.
Although the large tank was a
legal anhydrous ammonia container, its contents were being
transferred into several smaller (1,000 gallon), unauthorized
containers which were partially buried in pits dug into the
ground of an old hog barn.
The barn itself was completely open
to view on one side.
By day’s end, the surveillance team witnessed the
manufacture of methamphetamine by several men.
Although Nordike
was not a party to the actual mixing of ingredients, he was
present on the property during part of the day, he owned the
property, he and another were the purchasers of the anhydrous
ammonia, he off loaded the anhydrous ammonia into the smaller
tanks, he returned the nurse tank to the farm supply store
whence it came, and he owned the vehicle driven by one of the
manufacturers of methamphetamine.
All were indicted for their
part in the illegal manufacturing of methamphetamine.
Nordike’s
indictment included seven counts; he was convicted of three and
was sentenced as previously mentioned.
On appeal Nordike first complains that he was
improperly denied a directed verdict of acquittal on the charge
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of manufacturing methamphetamine by complicity.
He maintains
that the Commonwealth’s proof was “absolutely lacking” or
“circumstantial at best” in regard to any covert act which would
tie him to the cooking of methamphetamine.
On motion for directed verdict, the
trial court must draw all fair and
reasonable inferences from the evidence in
favor of the Commonwealth. If the evidence
is sufficient to induce a reasonable juror
to believe beyond a reasonable doubt that
the defendant is guilty, a directed verdict
should not be given. For the purpose of
ruling on the motion, the trial court must
assume that the evidence for the
Commonwealth is true, but reserving to the
jury questions as to the credibility and
weight to be given to such testimony.
On appellate review, the test of a
directed verdict is, if under the evidence
as a whole, it would be clearly unreasonable
for a jury to find guilt only then the
defendant is entitled to a directed verdict
of acquittal.
Commonwealth v. Benham, 816 S.W.2d 186, 187 (Ky. 1991)(citation
omitted).
In addition to the facts already disclosed, the
Commonwealth introduced evidence that there were no crops
planted (nor had there ever been) on Nordike’s farm; that, in
spite of his four tillable acres, he purchased enough anhydrous
ammonia to fertilize eighty to one hundred acres; that in 2002
anhydrous ammonia sold for up to $1,000 per gallon, and Nordike
had 2,250 gallons for sale.
There was additional evidence that
this was not the first but the second methamphetamine cook
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attended by Nordike.
Thus, “[t]he prosecution produced evidence
that was considerably more than a mere scintilla and the case
was properly presented to the jury for determination.”
Id. at
188.
Nordike argues next that the trial court erred in its
instruction to the jury on complicity to manufacture
methamphetamine.
Nordike bases this argument on Kotila v.
Commonwealth, 114 S.W.3d 226 (Ky. 2003), cert. denied, 540 U.S.
1198 (2004), superceded by statute in KRS 218A.1432(1)(b) (2005)
(now requiring possession of only two or more chemicals or items
of equipment).
(Ky. 2004).
See also Varble v. Commonwealth, 125 S.W.3d 246
Nordike ignores KRS 218A.1432(1)(a), which allows
for conviction if a defendant manufactures methamphetamine
rather than simply possesses the chemicals or equipment
necessary for its production.
S.W.3d 563, 568 (Ky. 2004).
See Johnson v. Commonwealth, 134
As the Johnson court stated,
A necessary inference from proof of actual
manufacture is that, at some point in time,
he must have had possession of both all the
equipment and all the ingredients necessary
to manufacture methamphetamine. In other
words, just as you can't make an omelet
without breaking some eggs, you can't make
methamphetamine without having possession of
the necessary chemicals and equipment. Nor,
as demonstrated in the next section, is it
likely that someone would inadvertently
combine the chemicals and use the equipment
to manufacture methamphetamine by accident.
Thus, intent to manufacture can be inferred
from the act of manufacturing as well.
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Therefore, we hold that there was sufficient
evidence to convict [appellant] . . . .
There was no error.
Id.
We likewise find no error in the instruction.
The third issue is whether Nordike was properly denied
his motion to suppress the introduction of evidence (including
photographs) concerning the offending tanks used to store the
anhydrous ammonia.
Nordike complains that, because the tanks
were destroyed prior to trial, he was “undermined of an
opportunity to have an expert testify on his behalf who could
indicate whether the containers did or did not conform to the
statutory requirements of KRS 250.482(4).”
Nordike continues
that the error was compounded by the trial court’s failure to
instruct the jury on missing evidence.
Appellant fails to demonstrate that inspection of the
tanks would have yielded exculpatory evidence.
There was
overwhelming evidence that the tanks did not comply with the
statutory requirements, and Nordike offers no argument that
inspection by the defense would have altered that evidence in
any way.
The trial court correctly denied Nordike’s motion to
suppress.
Nordike’s fourth argument disregards the trial court’s
duty to instruct on lesser included offenses.
See Parker v.
Commonwealth, 952 S.W.2d 209, 211 (Ky. 1997).
We decline to
discuss it further.
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Nordike lastly urges that he was entitled to a
directed verdict of acquittal on the two counts of possessing
anhydrous ammonia in other than an approved container.
He
insists that there was insufficient evidence that he possessed
the chemical for anything other than agricultural use.
To the
contrary, there was more than sufficient evidence of Nordike’s
guilt of those two offenses, and a directed verdict of acquittal
on either would have been improper.
Benham, supra.
The judgment of the Warren Circuit Court is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Kenneth A. Meredith, II
Bowling Green, Kentucky
Gregory D. Stumbo
Attorney General of Kentucky
Gregory C. Fuchs
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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