IRVIN THOMAS JENKINS, JR. v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED:
OCTOBER 7, 2005; 2:00 P.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2004-CA-001487-MR
IRVIN THOMAS JENKINS, JR.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM HARDIN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE JANET P. COLEMAN, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 95-CR-00018
v.
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING IN PART,
VACATING IN PART,
AND REMANDING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
DYCHE AND SCHRODER, JUDGES; ROSENBLUM, SENIOR JUDGE. 1
SCHRODER, JUDGE:
This is an appeal from an order denying
appellant’s RCr 11.42 motion without an evidentiary hearing.
Appellant argues that his counsel on his guilty plea was
ineffective for failing to advise him of the availability of the
1998 amendment to KRS 532.110 to mitigate his sentence.
Because
the record established that appellant’s counsel on the guilty
1
Senior Judge Paul W. Rosenblum sitting as Special Judge by assignment of
the Chief Justice pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution
and KRS 21.580.
plea rendered ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to
so advise appellant, we vacate appellant’s sentence and remand
the matter for re-sentencing pursuant to KRS 532.110(1)(c).
On February 24, 1995, appellant, Irvin Jenkins, was
indicted on 10 counts of first-degree rape and 5 counts of
first-degree sodomy.
The offenses were committed between 1992
and 1994, and the victim was Jenkins’ fifteen-year-old
stepdaughter.
The first trial ended in a mistrial.
date was then set for May 21, 2001.
A new trial
However, at the conclusion
of a hearing to revoke or re-set Jenkins’ bond, Jenkins
indicated that he wanted to enter a guilty plea.
On May 4,
2001, Jenkins entered a guilty plea to the ten counts of firstdegree rape and five counts of first-degree sodomy without
benefit of a plea bargain.
During the plea colloquy, Jenkins
specifically acknowledged that he had been fully advised that he
could receive ten to twenty years on each count.
Likewise, the
guilty plea form stated that the penalty range was ten to twenty
years on each count, and specified that there was “no agreement
on sentence.”
Subsequently, on June 20, 2001, Jenkins filed a
motion to withdraw his guilty plea which was denied the next
day.
The court held a penalty phase hearing on July 9,
2001.
Jenkins testified, as well as the victim.
Jenkins
admitted that he had sexual relations with the victim, but
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asserted that it was consensual.
The victim testified that each
act of rape and sodomy was forcible, and described each act in
some detail.
On July 27, 2001, Jenkins was sentenced to
eighteen years on each count of rape and sodomy, to run
consecutively, for a total of 270 years’ imprisonment.
Jenkins
thereafter appealed to the Supreme Court which affirmed, noting
that the plea was entered voluntarily and that Jenkins had not
preserved the issue of whether he should have been sentenced
under the 1998 amendments to KRS 532.110 because the issue was
not raised before the trial court.
On May 28, 2003, Jenkins filed a CR 60.02 motion to
amend his sentence pursuant to the 1998 amendments to KRS
532.110.
The trial court denied this motion, reasoning that the
failure to apply the 1998 amendments to KRS 532.110 in his
sentence did not constitute a miscarriage of justice.
No appeal
was taken from this order.
On February 5, 2004, Jenkins filed an RCr 11.42 motion
alleging that his counsel on the guilty plea was ineffective for
failing to advise him about the 1998 amendments to KRS 532.110.
The lower court denied the motion without an evidentiary
hearing.
This appeal followed.
Jenkins’ sole argument on appeal is that his counsel
on the guilty plea was ineffective for failing to advise him
that he could consent to the application of KRS 532.110(1)(c) to
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mitigate his sentence.
To prevail on a claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel on a guilty plea, the defendant must show
that his counsel’s performance was deficient relative to current
professional standards, and that but for the deficient
performance, he would not have pled guilty but would have
insisted on going to trial.
Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 106
S. Ct. 366, 88 L. Ed. 2d 203 (1985); accord, Sparks v.
Commonwealth, 721 S.W.2d 726 (Ky.App. 1986).
KRS 532.110(1)(c), as amended in 1998, limits a term
of years on a sentence to the longest aggregate consecutive
sentence authorized by KRS 532.080 for the highest class of
crime for which any of the sentences is imposed.
In the present
case, if KRS 532.110(1)(c) had been applied to Jenkins’
sentencing, the maximum term to which he could have been
sentenced would have been fifty years.
KRS 532.080(6)(a).
However, Jenkins committed the offenses in this case between
1992 and 1994.
Hence, KRS 532.110(1)(c) could only be applied
retroactively in Jenkins’ case pursuant to KRS 446.110 which
provides in part:
If any penalty, forfeiture or punishment is
mitigated by any provision of the new law,
such provision may, by the consent of the
party affected, be applied to any judgment
pronounced after the new law takes effect.
See Commonwealth v. Phon, 17 S.W.3d 106 (Ky. 2000).
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As noted by our Supreme Court in their opinion on
Jenkins’ direct appeal, pursuant to KRS 446.110, Jenkins was
required to consent to the application of the amended version of
KRS 532.110(1)(c), and where he failed to so consent or
otherwise raise the issue below, the issue was not preserved for
review on direct appeal.
The Court added in dicta, “No
conceivable trial strategy would have suggested foregoing the
clearly ameliorative effect of KRS 446.110 on Appellant’s
sentence.”
The Commonwealth argues that even if the performance
of Jenkins’ counsel on the guilty plea was deficient for failing
to advise Jenkins about the availability of KRS 532.110(1)(c) or
request that KRS 532.110(1)(c) be applied to his sentencing,
Jenkins was not prejudiced thereby because the court would not
have been required to apply the amended version of KRS 532.110
if Jenkins had so requested below.
The Commonwealth reasons
that the “may” language in KRS 446.110, which is permissive and
not mandatory, does not require the lower court to apply the
current mitigating statute.
The Commonwealth further points out
that at sentencing, the trial judge specifically remarked that,
given the facts of the case, it was a prime case for the
defendant to receive the maximum sentence.
Our Supreme Court has taken a different view of KRS
446.110.
In Bolen v. Commonwealth, 31 S.W.3d 907 (Ky. 2000),
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the defendant asked the trial court to allow him to take
advantage of the amended version of KRS 532.080 which would have
precluded the Commonwealth from enhancing his conviction for
possession of drug paraphernalia as a persistent felony offender
(“PFO”).
Nonetheless, the trial court instructed the jury on
first-degree PFO as to the offense.
The Court held that because
the amended statute was definitely mitigating, “clearly [the
defendant] was entitled to take advantage of the statute” under
KRS 446.110.
Id. at 909.
Although the Court did not
specifically discuss the use of the word “may” in KRS 446.110,
it is apparent from the Court’s opinion that the “may” refers to
the defendant being permitted to avail himself of the mitigating
statute, rather than the court being permitted to apply the
statute at its discretion.
To prove that counsel was constitutionally deficient,
the defendant must show that his counsel’s performance fell
below an objective standard of reasonableness under prevailing
professional norms.
Bowling v. Parker, 344 F.3d 487 (6th Cir.
2003), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 125 S. Ct. 281, 160 L. Ed. 2d
68 (2004).
In our view, failing to apprise Jenkins of the
availability of KRS 532.110(1)(c) or request that the court
apply that statute to mitigate Jenkins’ sentence constituted
deficient performance.
Counsel has a duty to make a thorough
investigation of the law as it relates to the facts of the case
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and to advise his client accordingly.
Skaggs v. Parker, 235
F.3d 261 (6th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 943, 122 S. Ct.
322, 151 L. Ed. 2d 241 (2001).
And, as noted by the Supreme
Court on direct appeal, there was no conceivable strategic
reason for failing to seek the mitigating benefit of KRS
532.110(1)(c) in this case.
Because Jenkins’ counsel on the
guilty plea failed to argue that KRS 532.110(1)(c) should be
applied retroactively via KRS 446.110 at sentencing, Jenkins
received a 270-year sentence instead of a 50-year sentence.
Thus, prejudice has been shown.
However, because the
ineffective assistance affected only the penalty phase of the
case, and not the guilty plea itself, which our Supreme Court
has already adjudged was voluntary, we vacate the judgment in
part and remand for re-sentencing pursuant to KRS 532.110(1)(c).
For the reasons stated above, we affirm in part as to
the guilty plea, and vacate in part and remand for re-sentencing
proceedings consistent with this opinion.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Irvin Thomas Jenkins, Jr.
pro se
Gregory D. Stumbo
Attorney General
Gregory C. Fuchs
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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