ROBERT NEAL RIEMENSCHNEIDER v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: May 6, 2005; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2004-CA-001456-MR
AND
NO. 2004-CA-001790-MR
ROBERT NEAL RIEMENSCHNEIDER
v.
APPELLANT
APPEALS FROM FAYETTE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE THOMAS CLARK, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 03-CR-00189
HONORABLE LEWIS PAISLEY, SPECIAL JUDGE
ACTION NO. 04-CR-00036
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
JUDGE.1
COMBS, CHIEF JUDGE; GUIDUGLI, JUDGE; MILLER, SENIOR
MILLER, SENIOR JUDGE:
Robert Neal Riemenschneider
(Riemenschneider) brings this consolidated appeal from 1) an
Order of the Fayette Circuit Court (Indictment No. 03-CR-00189),
entered June 23, 2004, overruling his motion, made pursuant to
Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure (CR) 60.02, to set aside his
1
Senior Judge John D. Miller sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the
Chief Justice pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and
Kentucky Revised Statutes 21.580.
felony conviction for failure to comply with sex offender
registration;2 and 2) a Judgment and Sentence of the Fayette
Circuit Court, entered August 12, 2004, (Indictment No. 04-CR00036), (amended August 17, 2004, to reflect a conditional
guilty plea pursuant to Kentucky Rules of Criminal Procedure
(RCr) 8.09), adjudging him guilty of one count of failure to
comply with sex offender registration and one count of seconddegree persistent felony offender (PFO II),3 and sentencing him
to one-year imprisonment, enhanced by PFO II to five-years
imprisonment.
The sole issue on appeal is whether, in both
cases, the 2000 version of the sexual offender registration
statute, which enhanced the penalty from a misdemeanor to a
felony, applied to Riemenschneider.
We affirm.
Indictment No. 03-CR-00189
On February 24, 2003, a Fayette County Grand Jury
indicted Riemenschneider for failure to comply with sex offender
registration, a class D felony, charging that he "fail(ed) to
notify the appropriate probation and parole officer of his
change of address while having been convicted as a sex offender
in Whitfield County, Georgia, in 1997."
Riemenschneider, with
advice of counsel, pleaded guilty and on April 8, 2003, final
judgment was entered, sentencing him to imprisonment for two-
2
Kentucky Revised Statutes 17.510.
3
Kentucky Revised Statutes 532.080.
-2-
years, probated for a period of three-years, subject to
conditions including registration as a sex offender.
On April
23, 2003, an order was entered modifying the final judgment to
reflect a three-year conditionally discharged sentence with an
additional condition of mental health treatment.
On April 9,
2004, Riemenschneider, through counsel, filed a CR 60.02(e)4
motion to set aside his felony conviction or amend it to a
misdemeanor, arguing that under Peterson v. Shake, 120 S.W.3d
707 (Ky. 2003), he was subject only to a misdemeanor.
The trial
court overruled his motion by order entered June 23, 2004,
finding that Riemenschneider was not required to be registered
until he came into Kentucky in March, 2001, after the effective
date of the 2000 amendment to Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS)
17.510 (enhancing failure to register from a misdemeanor to a
felony), and thus Peterson was distinguishable.
This appeal
(number 2004-CA-001456-MR) follows.
Indictment No. 04-CR-00036
On January 12, 2004, a Fayette County Grand Jury
indicted Riemenschneider for failure to comply with sex offender
registration, a class D felony, charging that he "fail(ed) to
notify the appropriate probation officer of his change of
4
On motion a court may, upon such terms as are just, relieve a party or his
legal representative from its final judgment, order, or proceeding upon the
following grounds: . . . (e) the judgment is void, or has been satisfied,
released, or discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it is based has been
reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that the judgment
should have prospective application.
-3-
address, while having been convicted as a sex offender in
Whitfield County, Georgia in 1997;" and also as a PFO II, based
on his previous conviction for failure to comply with sex
offender registration (Indictment No. 03-CR-00189).
On April 9,
2004,5 Riemenschneider, through counsel, filed a motion asking
either to dismiss the failure to comply charge or to amend it to
a misdemeanor, arguing as he did in Indictment No. 03-CR-00189
that under Peterson he was subject only to a misdemeanor.
On
June 28, 2004, the trial court's order overruling the motion was
entered.
In so ordering, the court found as did the court in
the previous indictment that Riemenschneider was required to
register when he entered Kentucky and thus the felony version of
KRS 17.510 applied to him.
Six weeks later Riemenschneider,
with advice of counsel, pleaded guilty as indicted and was
sentenced, by judgment entered August 12, 2004, to one-year
imprisonment, enhanced to five-years.
The judgment was later
amended, by order entered August 17, 2004, to reflect that the
plea was conditional.
This appeal (number 2004-CA-001790-MR)
follows.
On September 30, 2004, this Court granted
Riemenschneider's motion to consolidate the appeals.
On appeal,
Riemenschneider argues in each of his indictments that it was
error to apply the 2000 version of KRS 17.510.
5
We disagree.
This is the same date the CR 60.02(e) motion was filed in Indictment No. 03CR-00189.
-4-
We first note with regard to Indictment No. 03-CR00189, the applicability of CR 60.02 is limited to those issues
which could not be raised in other proceedings.
McQueen v.
Commonwealth, 948 S.W.2d 415, 416 (Ky. 1997), cert. denied, 521
U.S. 1130, 117 S.Ct. 2535, 138 L.Ed.2d 1035 (1997).
A CR 60.02
motion is not an opportunity to re-litigate issues which could
have reasonably been presented by direct appeal or, in
Riemenschneider's case, by a motion made pursuant to RCr 11.42.
Gross v. Commonwealth, 648 S.W.2d 853, 856-57 (Ky. 1983).
Despite this deficiency, we will address the issue on the merits
because it is identical to that in Indictment No. 04-CR-00036.
Riemenschneider does not argue that the trial courts'
findings of fact are incorrect.
The following is undisputed.
Riemenschneider 1) was indicted in the July, 1996, term,
Whitfield County, Georgia, Superior Court, for child
molestation;6 2) pleaded guilty on March 7, 1997 to an amended
charge of felony sexual battery and was sentenced to twelvemonths imprisonment; and 3) was released from Georgia custody in
January, 1998.
On March 8, 2001, he registered in Kentucky as a
sex offender, listing his current address as the Hope Center in
Lexington, Kentucky; listing a previous address in Little Rock,
6
Whitfield County, Georgia, Indictment No. 36320-T charged that
Riemenschneider, "between the 13th day of July, 1996 and the 16th day of July,
1996, did an immoral and indecent act to [AFM], a child under the age of
sixteen (16) years, by touching and rubbing her vagina and vaginal area, with
intent to arouse and satisfy the sexual desires of said accused . . . ."
-5-
Arkansas; and indicating his presence in Kentucky for vocational
purposes.
The registration form further listed Georgia as the
state requiring "lifetime" sex offender registration, describing
the Georgia conviction as "Sexual Assault:
Mr. Riemenschneider
self reports that he 'patted' a neighbor child [age 8] on her
buttocks while child was sleeping over at his house."
Riemenschneider bases his argument on the trial
courts' application of the law.
This court reviews a trial
court’s application of law de novo.
See generally Brown v.
Commonwealth, 40 S.W.3d 873, 875 (Ky.App. 1999).
For the
following reasons, we conclude that the trial courts herein
correctly applied the law.
At issue is the version of KRS 17.510, effective April
11, 2000, which upgraded the offense of failure to comply with
sex offender registration from a class A misdemeanor to a class
D felony.
Riemenschneider contends that this version of the
statute does not apply to him, arguing that the record is silent
as to when he actually came to Kentucky and was actually
required to register, and if he came to Kentucky and was thus
required to register before the effective date of the statute,
he is only subject to the prior misdemeanor versions of the
statute.
In Peterson at 709, the Kentucky Supreme Court held
that "the 2000 amendments [including the enhanced penalty] were
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only intended to apply to persons who were required to become
registrants following April 11, 2000."
It is undisputed that
Riemenschneider registered after that date, as he registered on
March 8, 2001.
There is no evidence in the record, and no
argument was made to either trial court, that Riemenschneider
entered the Commonwealth before April 11, 2000.
As indicated
above, on appeal Riemenschneider does not dispute the factual
findings of the trial courts, which are substantially supported
by the record.
As such, the trial courts' application of the
2000 (felony) version of KRS 17.510 to Riemenschneider is
correct.
This conclusion is further supported by Commonwealth
v. Newman, 145 S.W.3d 416 (Ky.App. 2004).
Newman cited the
legislative history of the 2000 amendments specifically
providing that the 2000 amendments apply to persons who after
April 11, 2000, "are required under [KRS 17.510] to become
registrants."
Id. at 418.
Although in Newman the Court found
that the 2000 version did not apply because Newman was not
required to become registered under section 2 of KRS 17.510, the
applicable sections herein are KRS 17.510 (6) and (7), which
apply to Riemenschneider and provide in pertinent part:
(6) Any person who has been convicted in a
court of another state . . . of a sex crime
. . . shall be informed at the time of his
or her relocation to Kentucky of the duty to
register under this section, and to comply
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with the requirements of subsection (4)(b)
of this section, by the interstate compact
officer of the Department of Corrections or
the Department of Juvenile Justice . . . .
(7) [I]f the person has been convicted of an
offense under the laws of another state
. . . that would require registration if
committed in this Commonwealth, that person
upon changing residence from the other state
. . . to the Commonwealth . . . shall comply
with the registration requirement of this
section . . . .
We decline to address Riemenschneider's arguments as
to whether the 1994 or 1998 misdemeanor versions of KRS 17.510
apply to him.
Not only were these theories not presented to
either trial court and not preserved for our review,7 (Shelton v.
Commonwealth, 992 S.W.2d 849, 852 (Ky.App. 1998)), our
conclusion that the 2000 version applies is dispositive of these
arguments as well.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment and the order
of the Fayette Circuit Court are affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Gene Lewter
Lexington, Kentucky
Gregory D. Stumbo
Kentucky Attorney General
Brian T. Judy
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
7
In fact, in arguing before the trial courts below that the misdemeanor
versions of the prior statutes applied to him, Riemenschneider effectively
conceded this issue.
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