S.R.D. V. T.L.B., FORMERLY T.L.D.
Annotate this Case
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RENDERED: SEPTEMBER 2, 2005; 10:00 A.M.
ORDERED PUBLISHED: OCTOBER 14, 2005; 10:00 A.M.
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2004-CA-001309-MR
S.R.D.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON FAMILY COURT
HONORABLE KEVIN L. GARVEY, JUDGE
CIVIL ACTION NO. 96-FC-006997
V.
T.L.B., FORMERLY T.L.D.
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
HENRY, McANULTY, AND MINTON, JUDGES.
MINTON, JUDGE:
A finding in the divorce decree recognized the
uncontested assertion that the marriage of S.D. and T.B.
produced three minor children.
The decree also incorporated a
joint custody agreement that designated T.B. as primary
residential custodian and obligated S.D. to pay child support.
Six years post-decree, S.D. moved the family court to set aside
the parentage finding as to the youngest child because DNA
testing confirmed that she was not his child.
Although S.D.
wanted to continue in his role as a father to the child in every
way except for the financial support of the child, the family
court denied S.D.’s motion to end child support.
Relying on
equitable estoppel principles, the family court concluded that
S.D. waited too long to deny his full role as parent.
Consistent with the best interests of the child standard, the
family court concluded that any financial or emotional
disruption of the parent-child relationship with the youngest
child would be seriously detrimental to all three children.
We
find no abuse of discretion by the family court and affirm the
order.
S.D. and T.B. were married in 1988.
marriage, T.B. gave birth to three children:
During the
R.D., born
December 9, 1989; B.D., born February 21, 1993; and H.D., born
May 17, 1995.
Although T.B. “threatened and intimated” to S.D.
during their marriage that he was not H.D.’s father, S.D.
treated each of the three children as his own.
In his petition
for dissolution, S.D. alleged that R.D., B.D., and H.D. were all
born of the parties’ marriage; T.B. did not deny the allegation.
And on dissolution of the marriage, S.D. agreed to joint custody
and to pay child support for all three children.
For over six years after the divorce, S.D. did not
challenge his paternity of H.D.
But for reasons undisclosed in
the record, in November 2003, S.D. had all three of the children
DNA tested.
The results indicated that while there was a
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99.98 percent probability S.D. was the biological father of R.D.
and B.D., there was no chance he was H.D.’s natural father. 1
Despite this knowledge, S.D. entered into an agreed
order on January 22, 2004, modifying the existing parenting
schedule for all three children and indicating his desire to
continue in his paternal role.
The parties also agreed to meet
with Mitch Charney, a court-ordered parenting coordinator.
In Charney’s report to the family court, he
acknowledged that DNA testing proved S.D. was not the biological
father of H.D.
Charney also noted that S.D. stated he was only
willing to continue child support for R.D. and B.D. but wanted
to have visitation and a parental relationship with all three
children.
Based on this information, Charney stated he felt it
was “too late for [S.D.] to deny his role as a parent.”
Therefore, Charney recommended that S.D. maintain his present
financial and custodial role.
Charney further noted that if the
court chose to relieve S.D. of his financial responsibilities
towards H.D., he should also be relieved of his parental rights
and that T.B. should be given the sole care, custody, and
control of the child.
1
Under this circumstance, Charney
According to S.D.’s affidavit, filed on May 20, 2004, he and T.B.
entered into an “Agreed Confidentiality Statement” in which they
recited their agreement not to disclose the DNA test results to any
of the children. But during oral argument, counsel revealed that
the parties had recently told H.D. that S.D. was not her biological
father.
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cautioned that the court should arrange for “appropriate mental
health intervention” for all three children.
S.D. responded to Charney’s report with a CR 60.02
motion to set aside the original finding declaring him to be
H.D.’s biological father and with exceptions to the report
itself.
In his motion, S.D. argued that he “has no legal
obligation to pay support for [H.D.], as he is not her
biological father.
However, [he] is the only father [whom]
[H.D.] has ever known and to deny her the right to have
visitation with him would cause her irreparable harm.”
This
arrangement, S.D. argued, was in H.D.’s best interest.
The family court denied S.D.’s motion.
Agreeing with
Charney’s recommendations, the court stated that “there is no
doubt that the best interest of the child is for the fatherdaughter relationship to continue in the same manner as it has
to this point in time.
Any disruption in that relationship,
financial or emotional[,] would pose potentially serious
ramifications for the child.”
The court also ruled that S.D.
was estopped from seeking relief under CR 60.02(d) and (f) “in
light of his own behavior.”
Because S.D. had held himself out
as H.D.’s father for over nine years, 2 even after the paternity
2
The dissent disagrees with our conclusion that S.D. has held himself
out as H.D.’s father for over nine years. H.D. was born in 1995.
S.D. continued to portray himself as H.D.’s father until sometime in
either 2004 or 2005, after he filed this appeal. Therefore,
according to our calculations, S.D. has portrayed himself to H.D.,
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test revealed otherwise, the court concluded that S.D. was
H.D.’s legal father.
As such, the court denied S.D.’s motion,
reasoning that to do otherwise “would not be in the best
interest of the child and could result in serious detriment to
her, contrary to statutory law and public policy.”
S.D. argues on appeal to this Court that the Jefferson
Family Court abused its discretion by denying his CR 60.02
motion.
S.D. claims “that pursuant to CR 60.02(d) and (f) the
trial court had the clear authority to set aside the previous
order of support as it pertained to the youngest child [H.D.].”
In two published opinions, this Court has held that a
CR 60.02 motion is a proper vehicle for challenging a judgment
of paternity.
In Cain v. Cain, 3 a man filed a motion under
CR 60.02(d) twelve years after entry of the decree of
dissolution.
The motion came in response to allegations made
two years earlier by the man’s ex-wife that he was not the
biological father of their youngest son.
We held that the two-
year lapse between the man learning of his questionable
paternity and the filing of the CR 60.02 motion was a reasonable
amount of time.
And we concluded that the motion was proper and
paternity could be reconsidered.
her siblings, and to the public as H.D.’s father for over nine
years.
3
777 S.W.2d 238 (Ky.App. 1989).
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In Spears v. Spears, 4 a married couple separated in
June 1975 but did not petition for divorce until 1985.
The
husband testified that the parties had no children; however, the
wife filed an entry of appearance wherein she claimed a daughter
was born of the marriage in August 1975.
The husband allegedly
had no knowledge of the child and had never acknowledged the
child as his own.
The trial court granted the divorce and
concluded that because the child was born of the marriage, the
husband was presumed to be the biological father.
On appeal, we
reversed, concluding that because the husband had never held
himself out as the child’s father and because no demand had ever
been made on him for support, “it would be highly unfair and
unjust” to refuse the CR 60.02 motion.
The facts of our case are distinguishable from the
facts presented in Cain and Spears.
In Cain, the father waited
two years after learning he may not be his child’s natural
parent before filing his CR 60.02 motion to reconsider
paternity; here, S.D. waited over six years after he was first
put on notice that he may not be H.D.’s father before filing his
petition.
In an affidavit filed before the family court, S.D.
noted that T.B. informed him during the course of their marriage
when H.D. was two years old that he may not be the child’s
4
784 S.W.2d 605 (Ky.App. 1990).
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father.
Because he “could not deal with it and chose not to
deal with it,” he did not have DNA tests performed at that time.
In fact, he waited some six years, until 2003, to file his
CR 60.02 motion.
In Spears, the father never held himself out as the
child’s father; rather, he first became aware of his child’s
existence some ten years after the child was born.
In the case
at hand, S.D. assumed the role of H.D.’s father from the time
she was born.
Moreover, S.D. has not established the grounds
necessary under CR 60.02(d) or (f) to relieve him of his child
support obligation.
Under CR 60.02(d), a party must prove
“fraud affecting the proceedings, other than perjury or
falsified evidence” to obtain relief from a final judgment.
S.D. argues T.B. perpetrated a fraud upon the court by failing
to deny in her response to his allegation in the divorce
petition that three children were born of the marriage.
But
S.D. himself made the allegation in his verified petition for
divorce, even though he was previously notified by T.B. that he
might not be H.D.’s father.
Further, CR 60.02(f) provides relief when there is
proof of “any other reason of an extraordinary nature justifying
relief.”
We do not believe this situation is of such an
“extraordinary nature” to grant S.D.’s motion.
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As noted, S.D.
had knowledge, albeit constructive knowledge, that H.D. may not
be his child.
father.
Yet, he continued to portray himself as her
The fact that he “chose not to deal” with the situation
until some six years after he first learned of his questionable
parentage does not, in our minds, constitute a reason of an
extraordinary nature.
While we agree that the trial court had “clear
authority” under CR 60.02 to set aside the previous order of
support, it was within the court’s discretion not to exercise
that authority.
Rather than grant S.D.’s motion, the court held
that S.D. was “estopped from seeking relief pursuant to
CR 60.02(d) and (f) in light of his own behavior."
We agree
with this conclusion.
Kentucky courts have yet to apply the doctrine of
estoppel to a paternity dispute.
We believe the matter presents
an important issue of first impression; therefore, we will
discuss the implications fully.
The substance of S.D.’s argument is best summarized in
his own words, as follows:
In the case at bar as [S.D.] is not the
biological father of [H.D.] he should not be
under a court order to pay support for said
child and he should have an order entered
stating that he is not her biological
father.
However, [notwithstanding] his position on
this issue, the [sic] [S.D.] wishes the
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court to realize that he loves [H.D.] and he
wants to continue to have a relationship
with her. He does not wish to disrupt her
life or for her to think he loves her any
less than her two older siblings. This is
why [S.D.] wants to continue to be an
integral part of her life and to continue to
have rights of visitation.
Kentucky adheres to the “presumption of legitimacy,”
which assumes that a child born during lawful wedlock is the
product of the husband and the wife. 5
conclusive. 6
This presumption is not
“‘Though the presumption of paternity and
legitimacy is one of the strongest known to law, it . . . is
rebuttable and may be overcome by factual evidence.’” 7
The
evidence necessary to overcome the presumption must be “‘so
clear, distinct and convincing as to remove the question from
the realm of reasonable doubt.’” 8
The doctrine of equitable estoppel is predicated upon
the theory that
[w]here one has, by a course of conduct,
with a full knowledge of the facts with
5
Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) 406.011.
6
Bartlett v. Commonwealth, 705 S.W.2d 470, 472 (Ky. 1986).
7
Id. at 472, quoting Tackett v. Tackett, 508 S.W.2d 790 (Ky. 1974);
see also, KRS 406.011, which states that “a child born out of
wedlock includes a child born to a married woman by a man other than
her husband where evidence shows that the marital relationship
between the husband and wife ceased ten (10) months prior to the
birth of the child.”
8
Bartlett, 705 S.W.2d at 472, quoting Simmons v. Simmons, 479 S.W.2d
585 (Ky. 1972).
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reference to a particular right or title,
induced another, in reliance upon such
course of conduct, to act to his detriment,
he will not thereafter be permitted in
equity to assume a position or assert a
title inconsistent with such course of
conduct, and if he does he will be estopped
to thus take advantage of his own wrong. 9
The doctrine is often stated in terms of the following factors:
(1) Conduct, including acts, language and silence, amounting to
a representation or concealment of material facts; (2) the
estopped party is aware of these facts; (3) these facts are
unknown to the other party; (4) the estopped party must act with
the intention or expectation his conduct will be acted upon; and
(5) the other party in fact relied on this conduct to his
detriment. 10
As stated, equitable estoppel has yet to be applied to
a custody dispute in Kentucky.
But other jurisdictions have
employed the doctrine to prevent a man who has held himself out
as a child’s father from denying paternity. 11
9
Farmer v. Gipson, 201 Ky. 477, 257 S.W. 1, 2 (Ky. 1923).
10
J. Branham Erecting & Steel Service Company, Inc. v. Kentucky
Unemployment Insurance Commission, 880 S.W.2d 896, 898 (Ky.App.
1994).
11
See J.C. v. J.S., 826 A.2d 1 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2003) (petitioner who
held himself out as child’s biological father for approximately six
years, even though he knew he was not the child’s father, was
estopped from later denying his child support obligations); Monmouth
County Division of Social Services v. R.K., 334 N.J.Super. 177,
757 A.2d 319 (N.J.Super. 2000) (man who acted as psychological
father to ex-girlfriend’s children was equitably estopped from
denying paternity even though DNA tests revealed he was not the
biological father); Crago v. Kinzie, 106 Ohio Misc.2d 51, 733 N.E.2d
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In adopting the equitable estoppel theory in this
case, we are persuaded by M.H.B. v. H.T.B., 12 a case with a fact
pattern practically indistinguishable from the present case.
In
1219 (Ohio Misc. 2000) (putative father’s “voluntary and
unequivocal” actions towards children from the time of their birth
constituted a “binding acknowledgement” and estopped him from
denying paternity); Pietros v. Pietros, 638 A.2d 545 (R.I. 1994)
(father was equitably estopped from denying paternity based on his
past conduct even though DNA tests proved he was indisputably not
the child’s father); D.L.B. v. D.J.B., 814 P.2d 1256 (Wyo. 1991)
(father equitably estopped from denying paternity after he
acknowledged paternity on child’s birth certificate and voluntarily
promised to pay child support); Nygard v. Nygard, 156 Mich.App. 94,
401 N.W.2d 323 (Mich. Ct. App. 1986) (petitioner, who assumed status
as child’s father from time of birth until child was ten-years-old,
estopped from denying paternity); Wade v. Wade, 536 So.2d 1158 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1988) (father who signed child’s birth certificate,
“had the child baptized as his son, carried the son as a military
dependent and as a dependent for income tax purposes, and named the
child as his son in his will,” even though he knew he was not the
biological father, estopped from denying paternity); In re Marriage
of Johnson, 88 Cal.App.3d 848 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1979) (father
estopped from denying paternity after acknowledging and holding son
out as his own for almost seven years); but see Quintela v.
Quintela, 4 Neb.App. 396, 544 N.W.2d 111 (Neb.App. 1996) (father,
who shared household with non-biological child for less than one
year, not equitably estopped from denying paternity upon divorce
from child’s mother as there was no proof of detriment to the
child); Berrisford v. Berrisford, 322 N.W.2d 742 (Minn. 1982)
(father not estopped from denying paternity where relationship with
child was short-lived and child could not have known of father’s
misrepresentations).
Several courts have refused to apply the estoppel doctrine without
proof that the father’s denial of paternity would result in economic
detriment to the child. See B.E.B. v. R.L.B., 979 P.2d 514 (Alaska
1999) (holding that doctrine of “paternity by estoppel” may not be
employed without proof of financial detriment or prejudice);
Knill v. Knill, 306 Md. 527, 510 A.2d 546 (Md. 1986) (father not
estopped from denying paternity of child without proof of financial
detriment to the child); Wiese v. Wiese, 699 P.2d 700 (Utah 1985)
(father not estopped from denying paternity when there was no proof
that father’s actions precluded son from pursuing a child support
claim against his biological father).
12
100 N.J. 567, 498 A.2d 775 (N.J. 1985).
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M.H.B., a child, K.B., was born during wedlock.
Shortly after
the child’s birth, the husband, Henry, became aware that he
might not be the biological father.
Nevertheless, for the
remainder of the marriage and for five years following the
couple’s divorce, Henry “consistently conducted himself as the
child’s father, successfully gained the child’s love and
affection, and established himself as the little girl’s parental
provider of emotional and material support.” 13
As in the present case, three children were born
during the couples’ marriage.
Although Henry questioned his
paternity of K.B., he nevertheless served as joint custodian
with his ex-wife, Marilyn, for all three children.
And, as in
the present case, Henry eventually petitioned the court for
primary custody of the children.
Marilyn responded with a
motion for an increase in child support.
Shortly thereafter,
Henry filed a counterclaim, alleging that he should be under no
duty to provide child support for K.B.
According to the Court,
“[t]his was the first time that Henry had ever attempted to
repudiate his paternal relationship with K.B.,” 14 even though, at
this point, the child was five years old.
A later paternity
test revealed that Henry was not K.B.’s biological father.
13
Id. at 775.
14
Id. at 777.
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In denying Henry’s motion to discontinue his child
support obligation, the Supreme Court of New Jersey noted that
Henry had knowledge since the child’s birth that he may not be
the biological father; that his actions proved he “intended” to
be the child’s father; and that the child relied on this fact.
The Court concluded that the child would suffer “irreparable
harm” if Henry were permitted to disclaim his paternity.
And,
relying on the doctrine of equitable estoppel, the Court held
that Henry was precluded from denying the duty to provide child
support for his youngest child.
The Court held:
By both deed and word, Henry repeatedly and
consistently recognized and confirmed the
parent-child relationship between himself
and K.B. He acted in every way like a
father toward his own child. He also
stipulated to the child’s paternity. At the
time of his divorce he promised to pay child
support, which obligation was incorporated
into the judgment of divorce.
The volitional nature of Henry’s conduct is
underscored by Henry’s persistent attempts
to gain custody of K.B., efforts that he
continued on appeal from the trial court’s
award of custody to Marilyn. He thus sought
child custody even after blood tests
conclusively demonstrated that,
biologically, he was not K.B.’s father.
Consequently, there can be no suggestion
that Henry’s prior actions were merely
accidental or inadvertent. His actions
attest to the previously well-developed
father-daughter bond, and convey all
possible indicia of an affirmative and
purposeful representation of continuing
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support, which constitutes a primary element
of equitable estoppel. 15
In the present case, we agree that from a purely
genetic standpoint, S.D. is not H.D.’s father.
But there is no
doubt that a man can be a child’s “legal father” without
actually being her “biological father.”
As defined by Black’s
Law Dictionary, a “legal father” is simply “[t]he man recognized
by law as the male parent of a child.” 16
S.D. acknowledged his
paternity of H.D. in both the petition for dissolution and the
separation agreement.
He also conducted himself as H.D.’s
father for a period of over nine years.
The record indicates
that S.D. has continuously held himself out as H.D’s father
since the child’s birth in 1995; and, as S.D. himself admits, he
has played “an integral part” throughout H.D.’s life.
The factors relevant to equitable estoppel apply to
this case.
S.D. represented to H.D. that he was her father,
even though he was aware this representation may be a biological
fiction; H.D. was unaware of this fact; S.D. acted with the
intention that H.D. would consider him as her father; and H.D.
relied upon S.D.’s conduct to her detriment.
15
Id. at 778.
16
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2004).
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Simply put, S.D.
made a material misrepresentation to H.D., upon which H.D.
relied, to H.D.’s detriment and prejudice. 17
The dissent argues that our opinion unreasonably
extends the New Jersey court’s decision in M.H.B.
Relying on
the case of J.W.P. v. W.W., 18 the dissent claims we have
compromised the obligations of H.D.’s natural father by
requiring S.D. to continue providing financial support.
In
J.W.P., the mother, J.W.P., was involved in an extramarital
affair with W.W.
J.W.P. and W.W. were both married at the time,
but they separated from their respective spouses and moved in
with each other for several months.
During the course of their
relationship, J.W.P. became pregnant.
But W.W. denied
paternity; and J.W.P. moved back into her marital residence with
her husband, J.H.P.
Although J.H.P. was aware J.W.P. was
pregnant with W.W.’s child, he “was still interested in
preserving their marriage.” 19
Six months later, J.W.P. gave
17
The dissent makes much of the fact that H.D. is not a “party” to her
parent’s divorce action and, therefore, not relevant to the
equitable estoppel argument. While this may be true, Kentucky law
clearly holds that the child’s interest is paramount in a custody
dispute. Should S.D. be permitted to abandon his parental
obligations, his actions would undoubtedly have a profoundly
detrimental effect not only upon H.D., but R.D. and B.D., as well.
In those jurisdictions where equitable estoppel is applied to
paternity actions, the courts have held that the object of the
reasonable reliance for purposes of establishing estoppel is the
affected child. See M.H.B. v. H.T.B., 498 A.2d at 778.
18
255 N.J.Super. 185, 604 A.2d 695 (1990).
19
Id. at 187.
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birth.
A paternity test later revealed that W.W. was, with all
certainty, the father of J.W.P.’s child.
Although W.W. denied his paternity, he also refused to
relinquish his rights to allow J.H.P. to adopt the child. 20
But
when J.W.P. sought financial support from W.W., W.W. refused to
comply, arguing instead that J.H.P. should be estopped from
denying paternity under the presumption of legitimacy.
The New Jersey Superior Court disagreed.
Citing its
previous decision in Miller v. Miller, 21 the court held that the
doctrine of paternity by estoppel was not “intended to
compromise the natural parent’s obligation.” 22
Rather, estoppel
should be “used to provide a safety net for the child whose
stepfather has affirmatively interfered with his right to be
supported by his natural father.” 23
Referring to its decision in
M.H.B., the court noted:
[T]he equitable estoppel doctrine
articulated in Miller has been applied in
cases in which a custodial mother has sought
continued support for her children from
their stepfather. Its application has
consistently served the compelling need of
the child to receive continuing financial
support when the child has been effectively
20
Id. at 188.
21
97 N.J. 154, 478 A.2d 351 (1984).
22
J.W.P., 604 A.2d at 191.
23
Id. (emphasis in original).
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foreclosed from obtaining support from a
natural parent by the stepfather’s conduct. 24
As the dissent notes, the record in the present case
makes no mention of H.D.’s natural father.
From what we can
ascertain, H.D. has not met and does not know who her natural
father is.
We do not know if the natural father wants to be
involved in H.D.’s life, or if he is even alive.
The dissent
asserts that the questionable status of H.D.’s natural father
should preclude S.D. from further financial obligations for
H.D.; the dissent also claims our opinion “extends New Jersey
law further than New Jersey is willing to extend its own law.”
We must disagree with that contention.
The facts of
this case, like the facts in M.H.B., indicate that S.D.’s
conduct towards H.D.⎯i.e., continuing his role as her father,
even though he had knowledge he may not be⎯effectively
foreclosed H.D. from obtaining support from her natural father.
Had S.D. chosen to conduct a paternity test at the time he first
learned in 1997 that paternity was questionable, our conclusion
may have differed.
In that situation, H.D. would have had the
opportunity to learn the identity of her natural father and,
perhaps, to form a bond with him.
But, as it stands, because
S.D. has continuously held himself out as H.D.’s father since
the child’s birth, he has prevented H.D. from having a
24
Id. at 190-91 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
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relationship, financial or otherwise, with her natural father.
These facts differ from the facts in J.W.P. where the natural
father was known to both parties and available to provide
financial support to the child.
Therefore, we agree with the New Jersey Superior
Court’s reasoning in M.H.B. and hold that in light of his past
behavior and previous acknowledgement of H.D. as his own child,
S.D. is estopped from seeking relief under CR 60.02.
We further
hold that because he is estopped from seeking relief, S.D. is
obligated to continue paying child support for the child.
Regardless of the DNA results, S.D. is H.D.’s “male parent”
under the law; and since parenthood comes with economic, as well
as emotional and physical responsibilities, S.D. cannot be
relieved of H.D.’s financial support.
We believe our decision clearly comports with the
“best interest of the child” standard. 25
KRS 403.270 states that
custody disputes shall be determined “in accordance with the
best interests of the child.”
This standard is the guiding
principle in custody determinations.
As the family court found,
allowing S.D. to renounce his fatherhood of H.D. and withdraw
25
In a footnote, the dissent questions whether the application of
equitable estoppel to paternity actions would be better addressed by
the legislature rather than the courts. Although Kentucky does not
have a particular statute addressing paternity by estoppel, the
overriding statutory concern in custody actions is the best interest
of the child. We believe that our decision best comports with this
statutory requirement in ensuring that the best interests of H.D.
are met. See Dissent, n.37.
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all financial support “would pose potentially serious
ramifications for the child.”
As the California District Court
of Appeals noted in Clevenger v. Clevenger:
There is an innate immorality in the conduct
of an adult who for over a decade accepts
and proclaims a child as his own, but then,
in order to be relieved of the child’s
support, announces, and relies upon, his
bastardy. This is a cruel weapon, which
works a lasting injury to the child and can
bring in its aftermath social harm. The
weapon should garner no profit to the
wielder; the putative father should earn no
premium by the assertion of the illegitimacy
of the child . . . . 26
The relationship of father and child is too
sacred to be thrown off like an old cloak,
used and unwanted. We are dealing with the
care and education of a child during his
minority and with the obligation of the
party who has assumed as a father to
discharge it. The law is not so insensitive
as to countenance the breach of an
obligation in so vital and deep a relation,
undertaken, partially fulfilled, and
suddenly sundered. 27
For the foregoing reasons, we hold that the doctrine
of equitable estoppel precludes S.D. from denying his paternity
and child support obligations towards H.D.
promotes the best interest of the child.
This decision
Thus, the opinion of
the family court is affirmed.
McANULTY, JUDGE, CONCURS.
26
189 Cal.App.2d 658, 664 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1961).
27
Id. at 674.
-19-
HENRY, JUDGE, DISSENTS AND FILES SEPARATE OPINION.
HENRY, JUDGE, DISSENTING:
I respectfully dissent.
With our holding in this case, it is now the law in
Kentucky that a married woman who has given birth to a child
conceived in an extramarital affair need only show a possibility
of emotional harm to the child in order to legally estop her
husband from denying paternity even though DNA evidence proves
conclusively that he cannot be the child’s father.
This places
Kentucky at the extreme margin of the minority of states which
have approved the doctrine of “paternity by estoppel.”
We have
established this rule in this case even though the potential
harm—that the child will discover that she is illegitimate—has
been rendered moot by the child having been told that S.R.D. is
not her real father.
See n.1 supra.
Until now, Kentucky law has consistently held that a
putative father who can show that he is not biologically related
to a child has no obligation for its support.
In the last
seventeen years, in three published cases, we have granted
CR 60.02 relief from child support obligations when putative
fathers were able to show conclusive scientific proof that they
were not biologically related to the child.
See Cain v. Cain,
777 S.W.2d 238 (Ky.App. 1989); Spears v. Spears, 784 S.W.2d 605
(Ky.App. 1990); and Crowder v. Commonwealth ex rel. Gregory,
745 S.W.2d 149 (Ky.App. 1988).
No Kentucky case holds
-20-
otherwise.
The attitude of our courts on this issue was
expressed in Crowder as follows:
“Justice is the court’s
constant destination, relentlessly pursued.
It is not arrived
at where a court in a paternity action adjudicates a man to be
the father of a child while knowing full well that the
biological relationship has been clearly disestablished.”
Crowder at 151.
In order to maintain the integrity of the family unit,
spare children the legal and social stigma of illegitimacy, and
cast the financial burden for child support on individuals
rather than society, the common law has for many centuries
recognized a presumption that children born during a marriage
are children of the marriage. 28
codified at KRS 29 406.011.
In Kentucky this presumption is
Although the presumption is “one of
the strongest known to law,” it may be overcome but “only by
evidence so clear, distinct and convincing as to remove the
question from the realm of reasonable doubt."
Bartlett v.
Commonwealth ex rel. Calloway, 705 S.W.2d 470, 472 (Ky. 1986),
citing Simmons v. Simmons, 479 S.W.2d 585, 587 (Ky. 1972).
In
Bartlett, the presumption was overcome by HLA 30 testing, which
established with a probability of 99.93 percent that a man other
28
See Kristen Santillo, Disestablishment of Paternity and the Future
of Child Support Obligations, 37 Fam.L.Q. 503, 505 (2003).
29
Kentucky Revised Statutes.
30
Human Leukocyte Antigen, a type of blood test.
-21-
than the husband was the child’s father.
Id. at 472; see also
KRS 406.111.
In Bartlett, the child was born during wedlock; but
the husband and wife had been divorced for several years.
The
wife filed a paternity action against the biological father, who
raised the KRS 406.011 presumption as a defense.
The biological
father argued that the husband had never denied paternity of the
child.
Id. at 473.
The court observed that “[f]or centuries,
because it was so difficult to determine paternity, the court
has always opted for the husband as the father of the child
where that possibility existed.”
Id. at 472.
In holding that
the biological father was obligated to support the child instead
of the husband, the court continued:
Truth and justice are irrevocably bound.
They are Siamese twins sharing a single
heart beat. Neither can survive very long
without the other. When the advances of
science serve to assist in the discovery of
the truth, the law must accommodate them.
The law cannot pick and choose when truth
will prevail.
Id. at 473.
Many states which have adopted the doctrine of
paternity by estoppel have applied the doctrine in lieu of the
paternity presumption.
While traditional estoppel doctrine
requires three elements:
(1) conduct or words amounting to
representation; (2) reasonable reliance; and (3) resulting
-22-
prejudice, courts have differed on what type of resulting
prejudice is necessary in order to estop a party from
disestablishing paternity. 31
As applied in Kentucky in other
areas of law, the doctrine of equitable estoppel has been used
against an opposing party and has included an element of
detrimental reliance by the innocent party.
See majority
opinion, supra p. 10, citing J. Branham Erecting & Steel Service
Company Inc. v. Kentucky Unemployment Insurance Commission,
880 S.W.2d 896, 898 (Ky.App. 1994).
In addition to the fact
that a child is not a party to a divorce action between its
parents, 32 we also face the difficulty that courts of other
states have faced in deciding what kind of prejudice must be
shown in order to estop S.R.D. from disestablishing his
paternity.
In this case, the family court relied on the report of
the parenting coordinator to the effect that if the court should
“relieve [S.R.D.] of his responsibility as [H.D.’s] father, then
there needs to be some plan set up for both [H.D.] and the
parties’ other two children, with the assistance of an approved
mental health professional, as all three children will have
difficult emotional issues to deal with when informed that the
Petitioner is not [H.D.’s] father.”
The family court referred
31
Santillo, supra n.28 at 506.
32
Commonwealth of Kentucky ex rel. Hansard v. Schackleford, 908 S.W.2d
671, 672 (1995).
-23-
several times to the potentially serious detriment to the child
if the status quo was interrupted; but no proof was placed in
the record regarding the nature or extent of any emotional or
psychological damage to the child, nor did the court cite any
learned treatises or studies relating to such damage.
The
nature and extent of the damage was assumed and treated as a
matter to be judicially noticed without further discussion.
Having made this assumption, it was then easy for the family
court to conclude that “[i]n light of the facts of this
particular matter, there is no doubt that the best interest of
the child is for the father-daughter relationship to continue in
the same manner as it has to this point in time.”
While it is
beyond doubt that it is shocking and traumatic for a child to
learn that the person she had known as her father is not
biologically related to her, it is also inevitable that she will
find out the truth, just as H.D. already has in this case.
There are also psychological costs connected with lying to a
child, and there are sound reasons why our courts should not
support or condone deception.
When the family court’s decision
was rendered, H.D. had not been told that S.R.D. was not her
biological father.
The family court, in essence, penalized
S.R.D. for deceiving H.D. by requiring him to continue to pay
child support and then ordered him to continue to deceive her in
order to maintain the status quo.
-24-
Legal reasoning aside, such a
ruling strains common sense.
How a family decides to deal
internally with the mess created when one of the parents has an
affair which produces a child, it seems to me, is very much
their business and very little of this Court’s.
This Court’s
business in this case is primarily to determine whether, and if
so upon what legal basis, we will order S.R.D to continue to pay
child support.
do.
In the final analysis that is all we are able to
We may grant S.R.D. rights relating to H.D., but we cannot
reasonably require him to avail himself of those rights if he
turns against her.
An order of any court directing a man to
continue to “be a father” to a child, once he has learned that
the child resulted from an act of infidelity by his wife, is
impractical, unenforceable, and unjust.
In this connection, the Alaska Supreme Court wondered
in B.E.B. v. R.L.B., 979 P.2d 514 (Alaska 1999), whether
compelling the husband to continue to pay support might result
in more harm than good.
In that case, after thoroughly
examining the “prejudice” element of paternity by estoppel in
those states which follow the doctrine, the court overruled an
earlier case 33 which had approved “emotional harm” as sufficient
to establish the element of prejudice and ruled that thereafter
it would require a finding of “financial harm.”
Id. at 520.
arrive at this result, the Alaska Supreme Court rejected the
33
Wright v. Black, 856 P.2d 477 (Alaska 1993).
-25-
To
reasoning of Clevenger v. Clevenger, 189 Cal.App.2d 658,
11 Cal.Rptr. 707 (1961).
That case approved emotional harm,
without more, as sufficient to establish the prejudice element
of estoppel.
Clevenger’s reasoning is followed by a minority of
the states which have approved the doctrine of paternity by
estoppel.
The Alaska Supreme Court chose instead to follow the
reasoning of Knill v. Knill, 306 Md. 527, 510 A.2d 546 (1986),
and Miller v. Miller, 97 N.J. 154, 478 A.2d 351 (1984).
In
those cases, the courts of Maryland and New Jersey,
respectively, rejected the Clevenger court’s emotional harm
standard in favor of a financial harm standard of prejudice.
In
discussing why emotional harm is not sufficient to invoke the
doctrine of paternity by estoppel, the Miller court said:
[T]o hold otherwise would create enormous
policy difficulties. A stepparent who tried
to create a warm family atmosphere with his
or her stepchildren would be penalized by
being forced to pay support for them in the
event of a divorce. At the same time, a
stepparent who refused to have anything to
do with his or her stepchildren beyond
supporting them would be rewarded by not
having to pay support in the event of a
divorce.
Miller v. Miller, 97 N.J. at 168, 478 A.2d at 358.
The Alaska Supreme Court concluded that the emotional
harm rule of Clevenger:
centering as it does on a child's emotional
well-being after the break-up of a marriage,
tacitly assumes that requiring a non-
-26-
biological parent to pay post-divorce
support will encourage a lasting emotional
bond. This assumption is highly
questionable.
It is far from obvious that precluding a
non-biological father from challenging
paternity can effectively protect his
child's emotional well-being. An order
requiring the father to pay support or
barring him from challenging paternity will
hardly prevent him from publicly claiming
that he is not actually the child's father.
Of course, it is arguable that if the father
knows that he will not be able to shirk his
support obligation by challenging paternity,
he might be deterred from attempting the
challenge. But any such deterrence would be
more than offset by the risk that a court
order requiring the non-biological father to
pay support might itself destroy an
otherwise healthy paternal bond by driving a
destructive wedge of bitterness and
resentment between the father and his child.
In short, the Clevenger rule is not grounded
in reality. To encourage ongoing bonds
between a non-biological father and son is
certainly desirable; but, as a practical
matter, Clevenger's emotional harm standard
is not likely to accomplish this commendable
goal.
B.E.B. v. R.L.B., 979 P.2d at 519 (emphasis added).
In our case, to make a new rule changing Kentucky law,
the majority relies on M.H.B. v. H.T.B., 100 N.J. 567, 498 A.2d
775 (1985), in which an equally divided New Jersey Supreme Court
affirmed a trial court’s decision to apply the doctrine of
paternity by estoppel.
The decision was strongly criticized in
the dissent for ignoring the requirement of Miller v. Miller
“that when the natural parent can be located and is financially
-27-
able, he or she remains principally responsible to pay permanent
child support.”
Id., 100 N.J. at 583-584, 498 A.2d at 783-784
(Pollock, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), citing
Miller, 97 N.J. at 169, 478 A.2d at 351.
In J.W.P. v. W.W,
255 N.J.Super. 185, 604 A.2d. 695 (1990), a biological father
asserted the marital presumption and the doctrine of equitable
estoppel in an attempt to avoid his obligation to support a
child he had fathered in an extramarital affair.
The husband
had held himself out to be the child’s father even though he
knew he was not.
The court declined to extend the holding of
M.H.B. v. H.T.B, and, referring to the paternity by estoppel
doctrine adopted in Miller said that:
[t]he doctrine was not intended to
compromise the natural parent's obligation.
Indeed, the Supreme Court emphasized that
the natural parent remained the primary
recourse for child support. Rather,
equitable estoppel was used to provide a
safety net for the child whose stepfather
has affirmatively interfered with his right
to be supported by his natural father.
Id. at 255 N.J.Super. 191, 604 A.2d 698 (Italics in
original), citing Miller v. Miller, 97 N.J. at 169-70, 478 A.2d
at 351.
New Jersey courts hold that paternity by estoppel
should be cautiously applied and that the natural parent is
primarily obligated for support if he or she can be found and is
financially able to support the child.
-28-
By our holding, we
extend New Jersey law further than New Jersey is willing to
extend its own law.
In this case, neither the report of the parenting
coordinator nor the judgment of the family court makes any
mention whatsoever of the natural father of H.D.
Who he is,
where he is, what he does for a living, whether or not he is
willing or able to pay support, whether or not he wishes to be
involved in H.D.’s life, or even whether or not he is alive, we
cannot tell.
Even though it is perfectly plain that along with
T.L.B., he is the person most directly responsible for H.D.’s
predicament, he appears in this case only as “The Little Man Who
Wasn’t There.” 34
The two factors that apparently complicate this case
are S.R.D.’s request to be relieved of the obligation for H.D.’s
support while continuing to have parental rights and his delay
in requesting a DNA test.
There is no proof that S.R.D. had any
reason to suspect that H.D. was illegitimate until she was
already a toddler, two years old. 35
34
35
One would expect that by
Last night I saw upon the stair
A little man who wasn't there
He wasn't there again today
Oh, how I wish he'd go away . . . (etc.)
Hughes Mearns (1875-1965)
The family court, and the majority, charge S.R.D. with having held
himself out as H.D.’s father for over nine years. However, H.D. was
born in 1995; and the decree of dissolution was entered in 1997.
The DNA test results became available in late 2003. The test was
requested less than seven years after S.R.D. first had reason to
suspect he might not be H.D.’s father. The Motion to Set Aside
-29-
that time a strong bond of affection would have already formed
between S.R.D. and H.D., making S.R.D.’s dread of learning the
truth understandable.
Around that time, the couple began having
serious marital difficulty; and T.L.B. began to taunt S.R.D.
with “intimations” that he might not be the child’s father.
Until now, such “intimations” hurled in the heat of marital
strife have rarely resulted in DNA testing; but from henceforth,
prudent family lawyers will advise husbands to obtain DNA tests
as soon as their children are born and have nothing to do with
the child if the results are unfavorable.
This state of affairs
hardly serves to maintain the integrity of family life. 36
I can agree with the majority that parental rights and
the obligation of support go hand-in-hand.
I can admit that a
sound argument can be made that S.R.D. did not file his motion
for CR 60.02 relief within a “reasonable time” as we have
decided that issue in other cases.
I cannot agree that S.R.D.
deserves to be penalized for trying to maintain the harmony of
his family and for supporting H.D. as he has done until now.
If
the family court was unwilling to grant S.R.D.’s unusual
request, it would seem that an analysis of the child’s best
interest would have led the court to at least consider the
Child Support was filed six months after S.R.D. received the
results, in the midst of ongoing custody, visitation, and support
litigation.
36
See Santillo, supra n.28 at 508.
-30-
possibility of terminating the support obligation while granting
S.R.D. liberal visitation rights, which is within the court’s
authority.
See Simpson v. Simpson, 586 S.W.2d 33 (Ky. 1979).
The prejudice element of the doctrine of paternity by
estoppel, as it has been applied in all other states where the
doctrine has been adopted, is completely missing in this case.
No emotional harm can be shown because H.D. already knows that
S.R.D. is not her natural father.
No financial harm can be
shown because there is no proof that any effort has been made to
bring the natural father before the court and determine his
ability or willingness to pay support.
Even if it was shown
that Kentucky law would be improved by the adoption of paternity
by estoppel, which I submit is a dubious premise, 37 this is not
the case by which to do it.
I respectfully dissent.
BRIEFS AND ORAL ARGUMENT FOR
APPELLANT:
BRIEF AND ORAL ARGUMENT FOR
APPELLEE:
David L. Vish
Louisville, Kentucky
John H. Helmers, Jr.
Troy DeMuth
Louisville, Kentucky
37
Another question that bears asking is whether this issue would be
better addressed to the legislature than the courts; see, e.g., the
Uniform Parentage Act, Art. 6, Part 1, § 608 (2002 Rev.), and Ga.
Code Ann. § 19-7-54 (2002).
-31-
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