CHRISTY C. MORGAN v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
RENDERED: JULY 29, 2005; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2004-CA-001204-MR
CHRISTY C. MORGAN
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM HART CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE CHARLES SIMMS, III, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 03-CR-00143
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
BARBER, BUCKINGHAM, AND JOHNSON, JUDGES.
JOHNSON, JUDGE:
Christy C. Morgan has appealed from the
judgment of conviction and sentence entered by the Hart Circuit
Court on June 15, 2004, following her conditional plea of guilty
to the charge of possession of a controlled substance in the
first degree (methamphetamine).1
Having concluded that the trial
court’s findings of fact in support of its order denying
Morgan’s motion to suppress evidence are supported by
1
Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) 218A.1415.
substantial evidence and that its application of the law to
those facts is correct as a matter of law, we affirm.
On October 8, 2003, at approximately 1:00 a.m.,
Officer Ron Lafferty of the Horse Cave Police Department was
informed by Officer Gerald Cox of the Cave City Police
Department that Morgan’s vehicle had been observed parked behind
a funeral home next to the Scottish Inn where Morgan had been
arrested earlier that year on drug charges.
Officer Cox
suspected that Morgan may have parked her vehicle at the funeral
home instead of the motel parking lot because of her arrest for
previous drug activity at the motel.
Officer Lafferty on October 11, 2003, personally
observed Morgan’s vehicle in Horse Cave.
When he attempted to
follow Morgan to observe her driving, she successfully avoided
him by taking what he believed to be evasive action.
On October
16, 2003, Officer Lafferty was informed by Officer Kevin Webb of
the Cave City Police Department that Morgan was a suspect in the
theft of generic Sudafed pills from a BP station in Cave City.
On October 17, 2003, the day Morgan was arrested on
the charge at issue in this case, Officer Lafferty once again
attempted to follow Morgan’s vehicle in Horse Cave.
Morgan took
what Officer Lafferty believed to be evasive action; and he
notified Officer Alan Shirley of the Horse Cave Police
Department that he believed Morgan, and a male passenger in
-2-
Morgan’s vehicle, were attempting to avoid him and “acting
suspicious.”
He requested assistance from Officer Shirley.
Shortly thereafter, the officers noticed Morgan’s
vehicle turn into a convenience store parking lot, and they
followed it into the parking lot.
The male passenger, who was
identified as Dale Mansfield, was now driving and Morgan was in
the passenger seat.
After Morgan’s vehicle stopped in the
convenience store parking lot, another male got into the back
seat.
Morgan and Mansfield got out of Morgan’s vehicle and
walked toward the entrance to the store.
Officer Shirley
approached Mansfield and Officer Lafferty approached Morgan.
When Officer Lafferty asked Morgan for her driver’s license, she
responded that she needed to go to the restroom.
Officer
Lafferty insisted that she remain with him and produce her
driver’s license.
While the officers ran a check of Morgan’s
and Mansfield’s driver’s license, Officer Lafferty asked Morgan
for consent to search her purse, which she gave.
The records
search revealed that Morgan had a valid driver’s license, but
Mansfield had a suspended license.
After they learned that
Mansfield’s driver’s license was suspended, Officer Lafferty
stopped his search of Morgan’s purse to assist Officer Shirley
in arresting Mansfield for operating a motor vehicle on a
suspended license.
Morgan was told to get back into her car.
-3-
The officers observed Mansfield reach into his pocket
and throw a metal object across the road.
thrown object was “just marijuana”.
Mansfield claimed the
A search incident to the
arrest of Mansfield revealed a pair of brass knuckles.
Mansfield was charged with driving on a suspended license,
tampering with physical evidence, and carrying a concealed
deadly weapon and was placed in Officer Shirley’s vehicle.
While Officer Shirley was arresting Mansfield, he
observed Morgan reach for something, as she sat in the passenger
seat of her vehicle.
Morgan and the passenger in the backseat,
Kenneth Downey, were told to exit the vehicle.
Officer Lafferty
conducted a pat down search of Downey and a large plastic bag of
white powder was observed in his left jacket pocket.
Officer
Lafferty removed the bag and asked Downey what was in the bag,
and he admitted it was crushed Sudafed.
Downey was arrested for
possession of a controlled substance in the first degree,
possession of drug paraphernalia, and possession of a
methamphetamine precursor.
While Officer Lafferty was arresting Downey, he
noticed Morgan toss something toward the front of the vehicle.
Officer Lafferty retrieved the item, which was a black phone
book.
He opened the book and discovered, in a compartment
inside the book cover, a small bag containing a white powdery
substance and two pieces of aluminum foil.
-4-
Morgan denied any
knowledge of the phone book, but Officer Lafferty arrested her
for possession of a controlled substance in the first degree.
On December 1, 2003, a Hart County grand jury indicted
Morgan for possession of a controlled substance in the first
degree, and for having no insurance.2
On January 6, 2004, Morgan
filed a motion to suppress the evidence seized at the time of
her arrest.
She alleged that the officers did not have
reasonable and articulable suspicion of criminal activity to
justify detaining her at the convenience store prior to her
arrest.
An evidentiary hearing was held on March 16, 2004, and
Officer Lafferty was the only witness.
At the conclusion of the
hearing, the trial court denied Morgan’s motion to suppress the
evidence.3
On March 29, 2004, Morgan entered a conditional
guilty plea pursuant to CR4 8.09, reserving her right to appeal
the denial of her motion to suppress evidence.5
On June 15,
2004, the trial court entered the “Final Judgment of
Conviction”, convicting Morgan of one count of possession of a
2
KRS 304.33-080.
3
An order denying the motion to suppress was not entered until April 14,
2004.
4
Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure.
5
The record includes the “Commonwealth’s Offer on a Plea of Guilty” dated
March 29, 2004, which was signed by Morgan and her attorney.
-5-
controlled substance in the first degree, and sentencing her to
prison for one year.6
This appeal followed.
Morgan contends the trial court erred in denying her
motion to suppress the evidence because the information gathered
by the officers prior to her being detained at the convenience
store was insufficient to support the reasonable and articulable
suspicion of criminal activity required to justify an
investigatory stop under Terry v. Ohio.7
We disagree.
Our standard of review in reviewing a trial court’s
decision on a motion to suppress evidence is well-established.
We must “first determine whether the trial court’s findings of
fact are supported by substantial evidence.
they are conclusive.8
If they are, then
Based on those findings of fact, we must
then conduct a de novo review of the trial court’s application
of the law to those facts to determine whether its decision is
correct as a matter of law.”9
In Ornelas v. United States,10 the
Supreme Court of the United States “recognized that police may
draw inferences of illegal activity from facts that may appear
6
The charge for not having insurance was dismissed.
7
392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968).
8
Kentucky Rules of Criminal Procedure (RCr) 9.78.
9
Commonwealth v. Neal, 84 S.W.3d 920, 923 (Ky.App. 2002) (citing Adcock v.
Commonwealth, 967 S.W.2d 6, 8 (Ky. 1998); and Commonwealth v. Opell, 3 S.W.3d
747, 751 (Ky.App. 1999)).
10
517 U.S. 690, 699, 116 S.Ct. 1657, 1663, 134 L.Ed.2d 911, 920 (1996).
-6-
innocent to a lay person and that a reviewing court should give
due weight to the assessment by the trial court of the
credibility of the officer and the reasonableness of the
inferences.”11
The presence or absence of reasonable suspicion
is a question of law to be determined on appeal under a de novo
standard of review.12
The protections to be free from unreasonable search
and seizure as guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment to the United
States Constitution and Section 10 of the Kentucky Constitution
are not violated by a police officer merely approaching an
individual in a public place, by asking him to identify himself,
and “by putting questions to him if the person is willing to
listen[.]”13
If there is a reasonable and articulable suspicion
that criminal activity is afoot,14 a police officer may briefly
detain an individual in a public place, even though there is no
probable cause to arrest him.
“[A] police officer can subject
anyone to an investigatory stop if he is able to point to some
specific and articulable fact which, together with rational
inferences from those facts, support ‘a reasonable and
11
Commonwealth v. Whitmore, 92 S.W.3d 76, 79 (Ky. 2002).
12
Kotila v. Commonwealth, 114 S.W.3d 226, 232 (Ky. 2003) (citing Ornelas, 517
U.S. at 698-99; and Commonwealth v. Banks, 68 S.W.3d 347, 349 (Ky. 2001)).
13
Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 497, 103 S.Ct 1319, 75 L.Ed.2d 229 (1983);
Baker v. Commonwealth, 5 S.W.3d 142, 145 (Ky. 1999).
14
Terry, 392 U.S. at 21.
-7-
articulable suspicion’ that the person in question is engaged in
illegal activity” [emphasis original].15
In concluding that Officer Lafferty had reasonable and
articulable suspicion of criminal activity to justify his
detention of Morgan, the trial court relied upon the totality of
circumstances and the reasonable inferences and deductions drawn
by the police officer.
The facts relied upon by the trial court
included Morgan’s prior criminal history involving drugs; an
officer’s observation earlier that month of her vehicle being
parked during the early morning hours in the funeral home
parking lot next door to the Scottish Inn where she had
previously been arrested for drug activity; Morgan’s being a
suspect in a recent theft of a methamphetamine precursor in a
nearby city; Morgan’s evasive actions in driving her vehicle;
and that Morgan was no longer driving her vehicle when it turned
into the convenience store parking lot.
We recognized that most of these actions are as
consistent with legal activities as illegal ones, but that is
not the test.16
For an investigatory stop to be constitutional,
15
Simpson v. Commonwealth, 834 S.W.2d 686, 687 (Ky.App. 1992) (citing Terry,
392 U.S. at 21).
16
Baker v. Commonwealth, 5 S.W.3d 142, 146 (Ky. 1999) (stating that
“[a]lthough Appellant’s conduct prior to the seizure may have been as
consistent with innocent activity as with criminal activity, that fact in and
of itself did not preclude Officer Richmond from entertaining a reasonable
suspicion that criminal activity could have been occurring once Appellant
failed to comply with the request to remove his hands from his pockets”).
-8-
it “must be justified by some objective manifestation that the
person stopped is, or is about to be, engaged in criminal
activity.”17
There is no requirement that the person actually be
engaged in criminal activity at the time of the investigatory
stop or before that time.
The analysis of whether a particular
investigatory stop is constitutionally permissible “proceeds
with various objective observations, information from police
reports, if such are available, and consideration of the modes
or patterns of operation of certain kinds of lawbreakers.
From
these data, a trained officer draws inferences and makes
deductions – inferences and deductions that might well elude an
untrained person.”18
In Creech v. Commonwealth,19 this Court noted that
among the grounds for a constitutional detention of a citizen by
a police officer is “some articulable suspicion that the
motorist is unlicensed or that the vehicle or an occupant is
subject to seizure for violation of some law.”20
In the case
before us, Officer Lafferty certainly had reasonable suspicion,
although it in fact was wrong, that Morgan was operating a motor
vehicle on a suspended license since she had evaded him and
17
United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417, 101 S.Ct. 690, 66 L.Ed.2d 621
(1981).
18
Cortez, 449 U.S. at 418.
19
812 S.W.2d 162, 163-64 (Ky.App. 1991).
20
Id. (citing Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 663, 99 S.Ct. 1391, 1401, 59
L.Ed.2d 660 (1979)).
-9-
switched drivers.
Thus, based on the information Officer
Lafferty gathered about Morgan and his inferences and
deductions, there was sufficient evidence to support the trial
court’s factual findings; and the trial court’s application of
the law concerning an investigatory stop to those facts in
denying Morgan’s motion to suppress evidence was correct.
Based on the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the
Hart Circuit Court is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Kim Brooks Tandy
Covington, Kentucky
Gregory D. Stumbo
Attorney General
Ken W. Riggs
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
-10-
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.