CONSOLIDATED MORTGAGE, INC. v. DEPARTMENT OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
RENDERED: March 4, 2005; 10:00 a.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2004-CA-001094-MR
CONSOLIDATED MORTGAGE, INC.
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM FRANKLIN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE WILLIAM L. GRAHAM, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 03-CI-01515
DEPARTMENT OF FINANCIAL
INSTITUTIONS
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
GUIDUGLI, McANULTY, AND MINTON, JUDGES.
GUIDUGLI, JUDGE:
Consolidated Mortgage, Inc. (hereinafter
“Consolidated”) has appealed from the Franklin Circuit Court’s
Opinion and Order affirming the final order of the Department of
Financial Institutions (hereinafter “the Department”), which
revoked its mortgage broker licenses and imposed a $15,000 fine
for violations of KRS Chapter 294.
The sole issue on appeal is
the validity of an ex parte administrative subpoena the
Department issued and served on a third party financial
institution in order to access Consolidated’s bank account
records.
We affirm.1
For our recitation of the facts of this case, we shall
rely upon the Hearing Officer’s findings of fact, which were
adopted by the Commissioner in the Department’s final order:
1. The Department of Financial Institutions
is an administrative agency in the
Commonwealth of Kentucky which regulates
state-chartered banks, savings and loan
institutions, credit unions, consumer
loan companies, mortgage lenders,
mortgage companies and mortgage loan
brokers in the Commonwealth of Kentucky.
2. The Respondent, Consolidated Mortgage,
Inc., has operated a mortgage loan
brokering business under license number
501-B since May 22, 1991. The current
location of the business and its
registered address is 2401 Regency Road,
Suite 202, Lexington, Kentucky 40503.
Consolidated’s agent for service of
process is Donald A. Clark, whose address
is the same.
3. On December 15, 1993, the Department
granted Consolidated a license to operate
a branch office at 1717 Dixie Highway,
Suite 100, Fort Wright, Kentucky 41011,
and assigned license number 559-B to this
mortgage brokering business.
1
We take judicial notice of our unpublished opinion in Consolidated Mortgage,
Inc. v. Department of Financial Institutions, appeal No. 2003-CA-002122-MR,
rendered December 10, 2004. In that case, a different three-judge panel
affirmed the revocation of Consolidated’s mortgage broker licenses by a
default order. Following the events in this case, two of Consolidated’s
officers opened another escrow account in a different bank, and then failed
to pay off prior creditors in five loan closings. Although not yet final, at
the time of this writing no further review of that opinion has been sought in
the Supreme Court and the time has expired to do so. Therefore,
Consolidated’s mortgage broker licenses shall remain revoked regardless of
our ruling in the present appeal.
-2-
4. James C. Clay, Esq., is a real estate
attorney who practices in Lexington,
Kentucky. Mr. Clay’s practice includes
closings for residential mortgage loans,
and he has performed residential mortgage
loan closings for Consolidated since
1999. In these closings, Mr. Clay
received the loan proceeds, deposited the
proceeds [in]to his firm’s escrow
account, then issued a check in the
amount of the loan proceeds to
Consolidated. In turn, Consolidated, not
Mr. Clay, was expected to disburse the
proceeds to the payees listed in the HUD1 Settlement Statement. This arrangement
was unique among the various mortgage
brokers serviced by Mr. Clay in his
mortgage loan practice, and it was
initiated at Consolidated’s behest in
1999.
5. Mortgage loan proceeds typically are
disbursed by the lender of the loan
proceeds or its closing agent.
6. Mr. Clay always attempted to deliver the
loan proceeds to Consolidated as promptly
as possible after the closing, even hand
delivering the check at times rather than
mail delivery. Payment needed to be made
as promptly as possible to cut off
accrued interest, which was normally paid
by the person refinancing their (sic)
mortgage loan.
7. In March or April of 2002, Mr. Clay met
with representatives of the FBI
concerning allegations that certain
mortgage holders had not been paid in a
timely manner or had not been paid at
all.
8. Mr. Clay ceased to close loans for
Consolidated on or about April 1, 2002.
Shortly thereafter, and based on
information provided by Mr. Clay, the
Department initiated an investigation
-3-
into Consolidated’s business practices at
its Lexington and Fort Wright offices.
9. E. Martin Bryan has served as a Certified
Financial Institutions Examiner with the
Department for over five (5) years.
Prior to joining the Department, Mr.
Bryan served as a bank examiner, a
commercial loan broker and a residential
mortgage loan broker.
10.
Mr. Bryan conducted three (3)
examinations of Consolidated.
Approximately two (2) to three (3)
weeks prior to this first meeting on
May 10, 2002, Consolidated was served
with a Department “Examination Request
List.” The List asks the company to
have available and provide to the
Department at the examination, among
other information, “all accounts
maintained by the licensee for the past
twelve (12) months, together with all
canceled and voided checks.” Mr.
Bryan’s examination was intended to
address allegations that Consolidated
was maintaining an escrow account into
which it deposited loan proceeds and
paid from this account prior liens and
expenses of closing. By this point,
the Department was also investigating
allegations that Consolidated was
delaying the payoff of prior mortgages.
11.
Suspecting that the funds which
Consolidated should have used to
discharge liens were being used to
operate Consolidated’s business or were
being used for personal purposes by
Consolidated’s officers, Mr. Bryan and
Mr. Shelby Merritt, the Department’s
Compliance Director, met with
Consolidated’s representatives on May
10, 2002, and requested that these
representatives produce records of its
operating account, #10245618 Central
Bank, Lexington, Kentucky, and its
-4-
escrow account, #10277011 Central Bank,
Lexington, Kentucky. Ms. Brenda F.
Gentry, Consolidated’s
Secretary/Treasurer, informed
Consolidated’s representatives that the
records were with the company’s
accountant, who was out of the country.
This information was false.
12.
Mr. Bryan returned to Consolidated’s
offices on May 15, 2002, to retrieve
canceled checks and bank statements.
The checks were supplied to Mr. Bryan,
but Ms. Gentry informed Bryan that no
bank statements were available since
the company accountant had shredded
them. This information was false.
13.
On May 22, 2002, Mr. Bryan telephoned
Ms. Gentry and reported that he had
spoken with the company’s accountant at
his office in Lexington, Kentucky; thus
he was not out of the country. Mr.
Bryan further reported to Ms. Gentry
that the accountant represented he only
dealt with Consolidated’s payroll
account and he never had any records on
its operating or escrow account. When
confronted with this information, Ms.
Gentry informed Mr. Bryan that she had
spoken with Ms. Barber Clark, an owner
of Consolidated and a company VicePresident, and the requested records
would be forthcoming.
14.
The review of the canceled checks
supplied by Consolidated on its escrow
account revealed to the Department
officials alterations of the dates of
the checks themselves. Similarly, the
bank statements supplied by
Consolidated for its operating and
escrow accounts contain numerous
alternations.
15.
After its preliminary review of these
checks and bank statements, the
-5-
Department sought to compare these
documents with the bank records on both
Consolidated’s operating and escrow
accounts from Central Bank in
Lexington, Kentucky. The Department
obtained Central Bank’s records
pursuant to subpoena.
16.
After comparing the documents provided
by Central Bank with those provided by
Consolidated, Mr. Bryan quickly
concluded that the original check was
dated accurately, but the “original” as
supplied by Consolidated had the date
changed to coincide with the date when
funds were received from Mr. Clay and
deposited into Consolidated’s account.
17.
From Mr. Bryan’s testimony, coupled
with the Hearing Officer’s review of
the bank’s records, the Hearing Officer
finds that over 100 of the checks and
statements had been altered when
Consolidated finally provided the
Department the requested canceled
checks and bank statements for its
escrow and operating accounts. For
example, there are approximately 115
different transactions which evidence
deposits made into Consolidated’s
escrow account on a date certain.
However, the date for the check written
by Consolidated to pay off the prior
mortgage from its escrow account has
been altered to reflect that it was
written simultaneously with the
deposit. In fact, the check would not
clear the bank until two (2) to four
(4) weeks thereafter.
18.
. . . .
19.
. . . .
20.
. . . .
21.
. . . .
-6-
22.
Based upon the testimony presented by
Mr. Merritt, coupled with the financial
records themselves, the Hearing Officer
finds that Consolidated’s activities
resulted in a financial situation where
it would have to wait on the next
closing to pay the loans from a prior
closing. Mr. Merritt, a thirteen (13)
year veteran of the Department,
characterized Consolidated’s conduct
during the Department’s investigation
as “the most egregious case I have ever
encountered in trying to conceal from
the Department what the actual
situation was.”
23.
Based on testimony presented by Ms.
Gentry on the second day of the
administrative hearing, it is clear
that Consolidated’s officers either
personally altered the subject checks
and bank statements, or knew of and
reviewed the alterations when they were
being made.
24.
Consolidated’s officers repeatedly
failed to disclose to Mr. Bryan or
other Department officials the
existence of Consolidated’s escrow
account #10277011 used to disburse loan
proceeds, which is the subject of this
administrative action.
25.
Had Department officials known of the
existence of Consolidated’s escrow
account used to disburse loan proceeds,
it would have at least asked
Consolidated to cease using it for such
purpose or would have required
Consolidated to post a higher surety
bond, as it was performing the
functions of a mortgage loan company
(i.e., raise the bond principal amount
from the $50,000.00 required of
mortgage brokers to the $100,000.00
required of mortgage loan companies).
-7-
26.
When Department officials learned of
the existence of Consolidated’s escrow
account #10277011 and requested of
Consolidated records on that account,
Consolidated’s officers deliberately
misled the Department concerning the
location of bank statements for the
account.
27.
Consolidated’s purpose in altering bank
statements was, in part, to hide the
existence of insufficient funds checks
written by Consolidated.
Consolidated’s purpose in altering the
checks was to make it appear checks
were mailed out to pay off creditors on
mortgage loan closings simultaneously
with the date when funds were deposited
to cover such payments. The evidence
discloses that these altered checks did
not actually clear the bank for periods
of time up to four (4) weeks after
deposit of the funds from the loan
closing.
28.
All transactions complained of in this
administrative action occurred in the
Commonwealth of Kentucky.
29.
The Department filed an Administrative
Complaint against Consolidated on July
11, 2002. The Department alleged that
Consolidated committed three (3)
separate categories of violations of
KRS Chapter 294; to wit, that
Consolidated concealed an escrow
account used for deposits of loan
closing funds, that it failed to supply
documents when requested by the
Department, and that it supplied
numerous altered checks and bank
statements to the Department during its
investigation.
-8-
Ultimately, Consolidated’s mortgage broker licenses were revoked
and a $15,000 fine was imposed.
At the beginning of the administrative hearing,
Consolidated moved the Hearing Officer to strike all of the
documentary evidence obtained pursuant to the subpoena.
Consolidated’s position was that the agency did not have
investigative subpoena power under KRS 294.180 unless the
subpoena was served with the same notice as under a hearing
subpoena.
Furthermore, Consolidated argued that the statute was
arbitrary and capricious, and therefore unconstitutional,
because it did not provide a procedure to challenge the
subpoena.
After considering the parties’ arguments, the Hearing
Officer stated that he interpreted KRS 294.180 to encompass
third parties, that he knew that other agencies had ex parte
investigative subpoena power, and that he was not convinced that
the agency’s investigative subpoena power in this case should be
quashed.
After the Commissioner entered a Final Order adopting
the Hearing Officer’s findings of fact, conclusions of law and
recommended order, Consolidated filed a Petition for Review in
the Franklin Circuit Court.
In its petition and other filings,
Consolidated argued that the ex parte subpoena caused a denial
of its due process rights, that KRS 294.180 is arbitrary and
capricious, that the attorney-client privilege attached to
-9-
protect communications between attorney Clay and its
representatives, and that the findings of fact were not
supported by substantial evidence.
The circuit court entered an
Opinion and Order on May 24, 2004, affirming the Final Order.
Regarding the propriety of the investigative subpoena at issue
before this Court, the circuit court held as follows:
The law does not support
[Consolidated’s] argument [that the
Department violated [its] federal and state
constitutional rights]. In SEC v. Jerry T.
O’Brien, 467 U.S. 735 (1984), the Court
declared that an agency’s authority to issue
a subpoena to a third-party without notice
to the targeted party does not violate the
United States Constitution. At least one
state, Colorado, interprets its constitution
to require notice to targets for subpoenas
issued for the target’s bank records. See
Colorado v. Lamb, 732 P.2d 1216 (Colo.
1987)(finding that customers have a
reasonable expectation of privacy in their
bank records). This Court refuses to
similarly read Kentucky’s constitution.
Unlike the Colorado courts, the Kentucky
Supreme Court indicated in Deemer v.
Commonwealth, Ky., 920 S.W.2d 48 (1996),
that customers do not have a reasonable
expectation of privacy in their bank
records. Although Deemer ruled that a
defendant had no expectation of privacy in
film negatives delivered to a developer, the
Court based its ruling on the holding in
United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443
(1976), that customers do not have a
reasonable expectation of privacy in their
bank records under the United States
Constitution. Deemer, 920 S.W.2d at 50.
[Consolidated] also cites Geary v.
Schoering, 979 S.W.2d 134 (1994), but that
case is inapplicable because it involved
subpoenas for a pending civil action, not
-10-
subpoenas for investigative purposes by an
administrative agency.
Similarly, the circuit court found no merit in Consolidated’s
attorney-client privilege or substantial evidence arguments.
This appeal followed.
On appeal to this Court, Consolidated limits its
arguments to the propriety of the investigative subpoena.
Rather than continuing its previous argument that KRS 294.180 is
unconstitutional, Consolidated asserts that the Department’s use
of that statute was unauthorized because of lack of notice.
In
a related argument, Consolidated argues that Central Bank is
expressly exempt from all provisions of KRS Chapter 294.
As did the Department, we shall address Consolidated’s
second argument first.
Consolidated argues that KRS
294.020(1)(a) specifically exempts Central Bank from the
investigative subpoena power conferred by KRS 294.180.
We agree
with the Department that Consolidated is precluded from raising
this issue for the first time on appeal to this Court.
Even if
we were to consider this argument, it is clear that it has no
merit; banks are regulated under a different chapter of Kentucky
Revised Statutes, so there would be no need for them to be
regulated under KRS Chapter 294.
-11-
We shall next address Consolidated’s argument that the
Department’s use of the ex parte investigative subpoena denied
its due process rights.
Again, we disagree.
KRS 294.180 provides, in relevant part, as follows:
(1)
In the conduct of any examination,
investigation, or hearing, the
commissioner or an officer designated
by him may compel the attendance of any
person or obtain any documents by
subpoena; administer oaths or
affirmations in the examination of the
directors, officers, agents, employees
of any mortgage loan company, or
mortgage loan broker or any other
person concerning the business and
conduct of affairs or any person
subject to the provisions of this
chapter, and in connection therewith
may require and compel the production
of any books, records, papers, or other
documents relevant to the inquiry.
(2)
In the contumacy by, or refusal to obey
a subpoena issued to, any person,
Franklin Circuit Court, upon
application by the commissioner, may
issue to the person an order requiring
him to appear before the commissioner,
or the officer designated by him, there
to produce documentary evidence if so
ordered or to give evidence touching
the matter under investigation or in
question. Failure to obey the order of
the court may be punished by the court
as a contempt of court.
Under the authority of KRS 294.180(1), the Commissioner signed a
subpoena ordering Central Bank to produce documents on an
attached list.
These documents included copies of checking
account statements for Consolidated’s escrow and operating
-12-
accounts from December 31, 2000, through April 30, 2002, as well
as front and back copies of approximately 100 tendered original
checks.
Pursuant to the testimony at the hearing, the
Department sought these documents to compare to the documents
supplied by Consolidated’s officers.
Consolidated relies primarily on this Court’s opinion
in Geary v. Schoering,2 which concerned a defendant’s attempt to
obtain an unrestricted medical authorization from the plaintiff
in a pending civil action.
While the case turned on the use of
the Civil Rules of Procedure as a means of obtaining discovery,
the Court likened an executed medical authorization to an ex
parte subpoena:
“It would allow Grant and Welding to obtain
medical information without any notice to Geary and without any
means for Geary to protect her legitimate privacy interests.”3
However, in relation to this case, it does not appear that
Consolidated has any privacy interest in the bank records
produced pursuant to the subpoena, and there was no action
pending at the time it was issued.
In United States v. Miller,4 the United States Supreme
Court addressed the propriety of subpoenas issued for bank
records that were served without notice to the account holder
under investigation.
2
3
4
After stating that the documents
979 S.W.2d 134 (Ky.App. 1998).
Id. at 136.
425 U.S. 435, 96 S.Ct. 1619, 48 L.Ed.2d 71 (1976).
-13-
subpoenaed were not Miller’s private papers, but were rather the
banks’ business records, the Supreme Court indicated that it
could “perceive no legitimate ‘expectation of privacy’ in their
contents.”5
The Supreme Court went on to state, “[a]ll of the
documents obtained, including financial statements and deposit
slips, contain only information voluntarily conveyed to the
banks and exposed to their employees in the ordinary course of
business.”6
Finally, the Supreme Court made it clear that “[t]he
depositor takes the risk, in revealing his affairs to another,
that the information will be conveyed by that person to the
Government.”7
The Supreme Court of Kentucky adopted this
reasoning in Deemer v. Commonwealth,8 holding that the criminal
defendant lost any expectation of privacy he might have had in
undeveloped film when he delivered it to Walgreens for
processing.
In the present case, Consolidated clearly had no
legitimate privacy interest in Central Bank’s bank records.
In
opening accounts with Central Bank and using those accounts to
conduct its business, Consolidated gave up its right to any
privacy as to those bank documents.
It is also notable that the
documents obtained pursuant to the subpoena were not used for
the information the documents themselves contained, but rather
5
6
7
8
Id. at 441-42.
Id. at 442.
Id.
920 S.W.2d 48 (Ky. 1996).
-14-
were used merely to compare to the suspected altered documents
provided by Consolidated.
Furthermore, Consolidated’s officers
had to know that the Department would attempt to verify the
accuracy of the checks and bank statements they provided when
they had obviously been altered.
As an aside, we note that
although the subpoenaed records verified the Department’s
suspicions that the documents had been altered, those same
records could have supported Consolidated’s claims that they had
not been altered, other than to clarify the printing or
handwriting.
Because Consolidated did not have a legitimate
privacy interest in the subpoenaed bank records, it could not
have been deprived of its due process rights by not receiving
notice of the investigative subpoena.
The circuit court
properly upheld the administrative ruling denying Consolidated’s
motion to strike those records.
For the foregoing reasons, the Opinion and Order of
the Franklin Circuit Court is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Robert F. Ristaneo
Lexington, KY
Aubrey R. Mooney
Office of Financial
Institutions
Frankfort, KY
-15-
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.