ROBERT JOHNSON v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY, CABINET FOR FAMILIES AND CHILDREN (NOW KNOWN AS CABINET FOR HEALTH AND FAMILY SERVICES); MARK A. ROSEN, APPOINTING AUTHORITY; COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY, PERSONNEL BOARD
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RENDERED: April 15, 2005; 10:00 a.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2004-CA-000995-MR
ROBERT JOHNSON
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM FRANKLIN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE ROGER L. CRITTENDEN, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 02-CI-01199
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY,
CABINET FOR FAMILIES AND
CHILDREN (NOW KNOWN AS
CABINET FOR HEALTH AND
FAMILY SERVICES); MARK A. ROSEN,
APPOINTING AUTHORITY;
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY,
PERSONNEL BOARD
APPELLEES
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: COMBS, CHIEF JUDGE; McANULTY, JUDGE; MILLER, SENIOR
JUDGE.1
MILLER, SENIOR JUDGE:
Robert Johnson appeals from an order and
opinion of the Franklin Circuit Court affirming a decision by
the Kentucky Personnel Board, which upheld Johnson’s termination
1
Senior Judge John D. Miller sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the
Chief Justice pursuant to Section 110.(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and
KRS 21.580.
from his employment with the Cabinet for Human Resources
(Cabinet).2
For the reasons stated below, we affirm.
On February 14, 1989, Johnson was hired by the Cabinet
as a Child Support Office Manager in Jefferson County.
At the
end of his six-month probationary period, his immediate
supervisor, Patricia Niceley, recommended Johnson's termination.
Johnson was given an additional 30 days to improve his job
performance and reach merit status.
However, on September 26,
1989, Niceley again recommended that Johnson be removed as
office manager.
On Johnson's first employee evaluation, completed by
Niceley, for the period of January 1, 1990, to June 30, 1990, he
received a "fails to meet" rating in all five categories:
1)
job knowledge/skills; 2) quality of work; 3) productivity; 4)
improvement in performance; and 5) employee conduct.
As a
result, he received a mid-year performance rating of "fails to
meet."
Because of his poor job performance, on July 31, 1990,
the Cabinet demoted Johnson to the position of Child Support
Specialist, a non-supervisory position.
His next evaluation
covered January 1, 1990, to December 31, 1990, and thus
encompassed his work as both an office manager and a case
2
The Cabinet for Human Resources was later known as the Cabinet for Families
and Children, and is currently known as the Cabinet for Health and Family
Services.
2
worker.
Niceley again rated him as "fails to meet" in all
categories and overall.
Johnson's final evaluation covered January 1, 1991, to
June 30, 1991.
the evaluation.
The new office manager, Louise Hulker, completed
Johnson again received only "fails to meet"
ratings and a "fails to meet" mid-year rating of performance.
Johnson appealed his evaluations and demotion to the
Personnel Board to challenge their validity.
The Personnel
Board found that Johnson's demotion was appropriate based on his
failure to follow the work schedule and process 138 cases
monthly with an error rate equal to or less than 15%.
Regarding
the three evaluations, the Personnel Board determined that the
Cabinet was justified in rating Johnson as "fails to meet" in
the areas of job knowledge and skills, quality of work,
productivity, and improvement in performance.
As to the category of employee conduct, however,
the Personnel Board determined that the ratings for Johnson's
employee conduct for the January 1, 1990, to December 31, 1990,
and January 1, 1991, to June 30, 1991, evaluations should be
changed to "meets," and, as a corollary, that he receive an
overall rating of "meets" for these two evaluations
The Cabinet appealed the Personnel Board’s decision to
the Franklin Circuit Court, which reversed the Board’s decision
and reinstated the “fails to meet” rating for the two
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evaluations.
Johnson appealed to this Court, whereupon we
upheld the circuit court’s decision reinstating the two “fails
to meet” evaluations.
Johnson v. Cabinet for Human Resources,
Case No. 95-CA-2004-MR, Opinion Rendered November 8, 1996.
In the meantime, on July 24, 1991, while Johnson’s
appeal from the two “fails to meet” evaluations was pending, the
Cabinet terminated Johnson from his employment as a Child
Support Specialist pursuant to KRS 18A.112(14)3 based upon his
two successive “fails to meet” evaluations.
Johnson appealed
his dismissal to the Personnel Board, and that appeal was held
in abeyance pending the appeal proceedings addressing the
validity of the two “fails to meet” evaluations.
After this
Court’s decision in Case 95-CA-2004-MR became final, the
Personnel Board dismissed Johnson’s appeal challenging his
termination without having conducted an evidentiary hearing.
Johnson appealed the Personnel Board’s dismissal of
his challenge of his termination to Franklin Circuit Court
wherein he asserted a right to an evidentiary hearing before the
Board regarding “just cause” for dismissal under KRS 18A.095(2)
(A classified employee with status shall not be dismissed,
demoted, suspended, or otherwise penalized except for cause).
On June 20, 2000, the circuit court entered an order reversing
3
KRS 18A.112(14) was repealed effective July 14, 2000.
4
the Board’s order and remanding the case for an evidentiary
hearing.
On March 19, 2002, an evidentiary hearing was held
before Personnel Board Hearing Officer Don C. Meade on the
Cabinet’s dismissal of Johnson.
On July 10, 2002, the Hearing
Officer issued Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and a
Recommended Order wherein he concluded that the Cabinet had
carried its burden of proof by demonstrating just cause for
termination of Johnson’s employment.
The Hearing Officer also
concluded that the dismissal was not arbitrary or excessive
under the circumstances of the case, and recommended that the
Personnel Board uphold Johnson’s dismissal.
On August 12, 2002, the Personnel Board entered an
order adopting the Hearing Officer’s recommendations.
Johnson
subsequently appealed the Personnel Board’s decision to Franklin
Circuit Court.
On April 22, 2004, the circuit court issued an
opinion upholding the decision of the Personnel Board.
This
appeal followed.
First, Johnson argues that the Personnel Board’s order
upholding his dismissal is not supported by substantial evidence
because the Cabinet failed to meet its burden of proving just
cause for dismissal of Johnson.
When reviewing the action of an administrative agency,
a court is concerned with whether the agency's action was
5
arbitrary, which is defined as "clearly erroneous"; clearly
erroneous means not supported by substantial evidence.
Kentucky
Bd. of Nursing v. Ward, 890 S.W.2d 641, 642 (Ky.App. 1994).
"Substantial evidence" is evidence which, when taken alone or in
light of all the evidence, has sufficient probative value to
induce conviction in the minds of reasonable persons.
Bowling
v. Natural Resources and Environmental Protection Cabinet, 891
S.W.2d 406, 409 (Ky.App. 1994).
In reviewing whether an agency's decision is supported
by substantial evidence, the reviewing court must adhere to the
principle that the agency, as fact finder, is afforded great
latitude in its evaluation of the evidence heard and the
credibility of the witnesses appearing before it.
Kentucky
State Racing Commission v. Fuller, 481 S.W.2d 298, 308 (Ky.
1972).
In addition to the principles established by case law,
the judicial review process of Kentucky's administrative
procedures act at KRS 13B.150(2) circumscribe the scope of
judicial review of factual determinations made in an agency's
due process hearing, as follows: "The court shall not substitute
its judgment for that of the agency as to the weight of the
evidence on questions of fact."
What constitutes cause for
dismissing a merit employee is a fact question for determination
by the Personnel Board.
Perkins v. Stewart, 799 S.W.2d 48, 51
(Ky.App. 1990).
6
In the case at hand, the Personnel Board properly
placed the burden of proof and the ultimate burden of persuasion
on the Cabinet to demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence
the propriety of the penalty it had imposed for Johnson’s work
performance.
KRS 13B.090(7); Commonwealth, Transportation
Cabinet v. Woodall, 735 S.W.2d 335 (Ky.App. 1987).
There is substantial evidence in the record in support
of the Cabinet’s decision to terminate Johnson’s employment.
The record is replete with evidence that Johnson was incompetent
first as a Child Support Office Manager, and, following his
demotion, as a Child Support Specialist.
The record
demonstrates that Johnson was unable to process his quota of
child support cases within the error rate guidelines of the
Cabinet and that he repeatedly performed his job functions at a
substandard level.
These factors comprise substantial evidence
supporting the Cabinet’s decision.
In addition, we believe that
the circuit court carefully addressed this matter and adopt its
discussion of the issue:
[Johnson] argues that the Board’s Order is
not supported by substantial evidence. He
underscores that fact that the Cabinet
merely produced one witness, Mr. Hanson
Williams, during the evidentiary hearing.
Mr. Williams was the personnel attorney for
the Cabinet at the time of Johnson’s
dismissal. [Johnson] asserts that Mr.
Williams did not know what considerations
the appointing authority used in arriving at
the decision to dismiss rather than demote.
7
This does not appear to be the case. Mr.
Williams testified that he provided legal
advice to Ms. Georgia Lutcavish, the
appointing authority, which she relied upon
when making her decision to dismiss Johnson.
He advised Ms. Lutcavish that she should or
could dismiss Johnson based upon Johnson’s
two successive “fails to meet” evaluations
as required by KRS 18A.112(14). Mr.
Williams also testified that he felt the
evidence in the record was sufficient to
uphold the “fails to meet” evaluations.
Indeed, the administrative record is replete
with evidence that indicates Johnson’s
performance was substandard. In general the
record indicates that his supervisors
observed that Johnson had not learned the
concepts of the program, failed to perform
his duties and did not demonstrate a
willingness to improve. Mr. Adriel Harrod,
a supervisor, provides an example of
Johnson’s work performance when he commented
about his inability to review casework for
errors. He stated, “these duties could be
taught to almost anyone and Mr. Johnson
continued to have problems even with these
tasks.” Mr. Harrod concluded, “Mr. Johnson
is more of a hindrance than help.”
Overwhelming evidence supports the Board’s
decision to dismiss Johnson.
Next, Johnson argues that the Personnel Board’s order
upholding his dismissal is not supported by law on the basis
that KRS 18A.112(14) requires that the two successive
evaluations supporting a dismissal must be successive
evaluations for the same position and for the full rating
period, whereas for the rating period of January 1, 1990, to
December 31, 1990, five months of the period were for the period
8
his job title was “Child Support Specialist” and seven months
were for his tenure spent as an office manager.
The statute relied upon by the Cabinet in its
termination of Johnson, KRS 18A.112(14), which was repealed
effective July 14, 2000, provided as follows:
If an employee receives a "fails to meet
performance requirements" rating in all
categories on two (2) successive
evaluations, he shall be:
(a) Demoted to a position commensurate with
his abilities; or
(b) Terminated.
The words used in a statute are to be given their
customary meaning, and the statute is to be given effect as
written if it is both unambiguous and plain.
Commonwealth, Ky., 902 S.W.2d 813, 814 (1995).
Lynch v.
KRS 18A.112(14)
has previously been interpreted as mandating that if an employee
receives two successive unsatisfactory performance evaluations,
he must be either demoted or terminated.
Wade v. Com., Dept. of
Treasury, 840 S.W.2d 215, 217 (Ky.App. 1992).
KRS 18A.112(14), on its face, includes no language
which would require the two successive “fails to meet”
evaluations to be for the same job category.
The statute speaks
in terms of two successive evaluations only -- not two
successive evaluations for the same job category.
Courts are
not at liberty to add or subtract from a legislative enactment,
9
nor to discover meaning not reasonably ascertainable from the
language used.
Beckham v. Board of Education of Jefferson
County, Ky., 873 S.W.2d 575, 577 (1994).
The interpretation
urged by Johnson would require us to read into the statute a
proviso not apparent from the face of its text, and which the
legislature could have easily expressed if such were its intent
in enacting the statute.
Finally, Johnson contends that the evidentiary hearing
on remand did not comply with the June 20, 2000, opinion of the
Franklin Circuit Court.
Johnson contends that the Franklin
Circuit Court set forth five areas on which Johnson had the
right to be heard:
whether demotion would have been more proper
than dismissal; whether dismissal was excessive under the
circumstances; whether his prior demotion should have been
considered by the Board; whether two year-end evaluations were
required under KRS 18A.112(14) rather than a year-end and midyear; and the Cabinet had the burden of proof to show cause for
his dismissal, and to show why dismissal was selected over
demotion.
While the Hearing Officer’s Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law, and Recommended Order does not specifically
address each of the five issues mentioned in the Franklin
Circuit Court order, Johnson does not cite us to any evidentiary
ruling by the Hearing Officer which would have precluded him
10
from raising the issues, nor does he claim that he was precluded
from raising the issues.
As previously discussed, the Personnel
Board’s decision contains substantial evidence supporting the
Cabinet’s decision to terminate his employment.
Any failure by
the Personnel Board to further discuss the specific issues
identified by Johnson in its decision was harmless error.
R. Civ. P. 61.01.
Ky.
In addition, we adopt the circuit court’s
discussion of this issue:
The Petitioner argues that the Board’s Order
must be rejected as a matter of law since it
did not address five specific points as
mandated by the Circuit court Order.
But
Johnson misinterprets the Order. The
Court’s Order required the Board allow the
issues to be raised during the evidentiary
hearing but did not compel findings to be
made concerning each point. The Board
complied with the Court’s ruling by
providing Johnson the opportunity to present
these issues.
For the foregoing reasons the judgment of the Franklin
Circuit Court is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
Donald Duff
Frankfort, Kentucky
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE CABINET FOR
HEALTH AND FAMILY SERVICES:
Cynthia Kloeker
Office of the General Counsel
Covington, Kentucky
11
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