FREDERICK L. MILLER v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: JULY 22, 2005; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO.
2004-CA-000733-MR
FREDERICK L. MILLER
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM WARREN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE JOHN R. GRISE, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 03-CR-00014 & 03-CR-00379
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
McANULTY AND TACKETT, JUDGES; MILLER, SENIOR JUDGE.1
TACKETT, JUDGE:
Frederick Miller appeals from the judgment of
the Warren Circuit Court finding him guilty of failure to
register as a sexual offender.
Miller argues on appeal that he
cannot be convicted of the charged offense because he was not
properly informed of the duty to register and because he was
required to register under the prior version of the statute,
1
Senior Judge John D. Miller sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the
Chief Justice pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and
KRS 21.580.
which fixes the penalty for failure to register as a class A
misdemeanor.
We disagree and affirm.
Miller was originally convicted of criminal attempt to
commit sodomy in the first degree in 1987.
He was scheduled to
be released in April 2000, but was not actually released until
May 22 of that year.
sexual offender.
Upon release, Miller registered as a
Shortly after his release he moved to
Illinois, and Kentucky authorities informed Illinois authorities
of his change of address.
moving to Warren County.
Later, Miller returned to Kentucky,
In September 2002, the state police
discovered that Miller had obtained a Kentucky driver's license,
but had not registered upon his return from Illinois.
Miller
was indicted in January 2003 for the offense of failure to
register as a sexual offender, and was found guilty at trial in
February 2004.
He was sentenced to three years' imprisonment,
enhanced to ten years due to his status as a persistent felony
offender.
This appeal followed.
On appeal, Miller argues that the original sentencing
court had a duty to inform him of his duty to register as a sex
offender, and that because he was never informed of that duty by
the sentencing court, he cannot be charged with the offense.
Miller quotes several cases on statutory construction principles
which state that the word "shall" is mandatory language, as well
as Kentucky Revised Statute 446.010(29), which codifies that
-2-
principle.
See Alexander v. S&M Motors, Inc., 28 S.W.3d 303
(Ky. 2000), White v. Check Holders, Inc., 996 S.W.2d 496 (Ky.
1999).
The result urged by Miller would impose a duty on courts
that sentenced offenders before any version of the registration
requirement was enacted to go back and inform defendants
sentenced of their duty to register.
The Commonwealth notes
that "[t]he essence of statutory construction is to ascertain
and give effect to the intent of the legislature."
Combs, 30 S.W.3d 146, 151 (Ky. 2000).
Hale v.
Courts should, the
Commonwealth continues, reject a construction of a statute that
is unreasonable and absurd in preference for one that is
reasonable, rational, sensible and intelligent.
Commonwealth v.
Kash, 967 S.W.2d 37 (Ky. App. 1997), Estes v. Commonwealth, 952
S.W.2d 701 (Ky. App. 1997).
It is, in our view, unreasonable to
reach the result urged by Miller.
The statute that imposes a
duty on the sentencing court to inform the offender that he
will, on release, be required to register as a sex offender is
obviously intended to apply to courts sentencing offenders after
the effective date of the statute, and the language of the
statute implies no retroactive duty on courts that have already
sentenced offenders for crimes requiring registration.
Most importantly, Miller's argument overlooks the fact
that he did in fact register as a sexual offender upon his
release.
He had actual notice of his duty to comply with the
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continuing duty to update his registry under the statute, and
did not do so; to interpret the statute in the literal-minded
way urged by Miller would be to depart from reality.
Miller
further argues that in the alternative, he can at most be
charged with a misdemeanor, because he registered on March 3,
2000, prior to the effective date of the version of the statute
(April 11, 2000) under which he was charged.
He cites Peterson
v. Shake, 120 S.W.3d 707 (Ky. 2003) in support of his argument.
But Peterson involved a registrant who was released in 1998 and
charged under the 2000 version of the statute for failing to
update his registry when he relocated.
The Kentucky Supreme
Court rejected the Commonwealth's contention that there is no
difference between the duty to initially register and the duty
to continually register.
Miller argues that because he
initially completed the sex offender registry form in March
2000, he was not subject to the higher penalty.
We disagree.
Miller's registration did not become effective until he was
released from prison on May 22, 2000, well after the effective
date of the statute.
On the registry form that he was required
to fill out upon release, he is clearly notified that he is
required to notify the local Probation and Parole office prior
to any change of address, and that failure to comply is a Class
D felony.
The form filled out in March has no legal effect
here; he had a duty to register upon his release from prison.
-4-
This case is readily distinguishable from Peterson because of
the key fact of the date of Miller's release and the notice to
Miller of the consequences of failure to comply with the law's
requirements.
Also, the Kentucky Supreme Court has recently
held that the registration and notification statutes do not
violate the prohibition against ex post facto legislation, as it
is remedial in nature and not punitive.
"Registration is a
reasonable and proper means for achieving its purpose and is
completely consistent with the authority of the state to protect
. . . its people.
It does not punish the offender for past
criminal activity and it does not punish the offender twice for
the same activity."
Martinez v. Commonwealth, 72 S.W.3d 581,
584 (Ky. 2002).
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Warren
Circuit Court is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
Linda Roberts Horsman
Assistant Public Advocate
Frankfort, Kentucky
Gregory D. Stumbo
Attorney General of Kentucky
Brian T. Judy
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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