TERESA ELLEN DENTON v. WILLIAM BRIAN DENTON
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
RENDERED: JUNE 24, 2005; 10:00 a.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2004-CA-000619-MR
TERESA ELLEN DENTON
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM HENDERSON FAMILY COURT
HONORABLE SHEILA NUNLEY-FARRIS, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 02-CI-00514
WILLIAM BRIAN DENTON
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
JOHNSON AND McANULTY, JUDGES; HUDDLESTON, SENIOR JUDGE.1
JOHNSON, JUDGE:
Teresa Ellen Denton, pro se, has appealed from
the March 9, 2004, order of the Henderson Family Court which
granted a motion filed by William Brian Denton and ordered that
he be allowed to claim the parties’ two children as dependents
for tax exemption purposes for 2003 and all subsequent years.
Having concluded that the family court did not abuse its
1
Senior Judge Joseph R. Huddleston sitting as Special Judge by assignment of
the Chief Justice pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution
and Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) 21.580.
discretion when it awarded both the tax exemptions to William,
we affirm.
Teresa and William were married on August 25, 1989.
They separated on June 14, 2002, and Teresa filed a verified
divorce petition on June 20, 2002.
Two children were born of
the marriage, namely Abbie Denton (DOB May 24, 1990), and Keely
Denton (DOB July 26, 1991).
with Teresa.
The children have primarily resided
The child support paid by William of $194.79 per
week was based on his earnings constituting 79.7% of the
parties’ total income.
On April 14, 2003, the family court entered an order
providing that William could claim the parties’ minor children
as dependents for tax exemption purposes for the 2002 tax year.
The family court ordered William to file his state and federal
tax returns as married filing separately, claiming both children
as dependents.
However, the family court reserved the issue of
the future tax exemptions for the children to be determined in
the final order addressing child custody and property division.
On June 2, 2003, the family court entered its first
set of findings of fact, conclusions of law and order.
The
family court awarded sole custody of the minor children to
Teresa, with specific visitation for William, and found that
since Teresa was employed part-time William was not required to
-2-
pay maintenance.2
This order did not address the issue of future
tax exemptions for the children.
Both parties filed motions
seeking clarifications of various findings of the family court,
but neither party requested a finding on the issue of the tax
exemptions.
The family court addressed both motions in an order
entered on July 3, 2003, but there was no mention of the tax
exemption issue.
On July 10, 2003, the family court issued a
second set of findings of fact and conclusions of law, as well
as a decree of dissolution dissolving the parties’ marriage,
which also did not address the tax exemption issue.
On February 18, 2004, William moved the family court
to enter an order awarding him the tax exemptions for both
children for the tax year 2003 and all subsequent years.
The
family court held a hearing on March 1, 2004, and it granted
William’s motion.
The family court determined that the amount
of money William would receive in the form of a tax refund by
claiming both children as dependents was a significantly higher
amount than the amount he would receive if he were only
permitted to claim one of the children as a tax exemption.
The
family court also stated that so long as William continued to
earn 79.7% of the parties’ total income and remained current on
his child-support payments, he would be entitled to claim both
2
The family court found that Teresa was employed part-time by Windy Way
Apartments, in Henderson, Kentucky, as an on-site manager, earning $1,100.00
per month. William was employed full-time by General Electric, in
Madisonville, Kentucky, earning $4,200.00 per month.
-3-
children as dependants for tax exemption purposes for the 2003
tax year as well as all future years.
An order to that effect
was entered on March 9, 2004, and this appeal followed.
The sole issue in this appeal is whether the family
court abused its discretion by awarding the tax exemptions for
both children to William.
It is well-settled law in Kentucky
that a family court has the authority to allocate between former
spouses the tax exemption for a child of the dissolved marriage.3
Further, “[a] trial court should allocate the exemption so as to
maximize the amount available for the care of the children”
[footnote omitted].4
Teresa argues that, under the current tax code as the
primary and sole custodian, she is entitled to claim both
children as dependents for tax exemption purposes.
She asserts
that 26 U.S.C. § 152(e) creates a presumption in favor of
awarding the exemption to the custodial parent.
Therefore,
Teresa contends that the family court abused its discretion by
allowing William to claim both children as dependents.
We
disagree.
In Hart,5 this Court held that 26 U.S.C. § 152(e) does
not prohibit a state court from allocating a tax exemption
3
Marksberry v. Riley, 889 S.W.2d 47, 48, (Ky.App. 1994).
4
Hart v. Hart, 774 S.W.2d 455, 457 (Ky.App. 1989).
5
744 S.W.2d at 456-57.
-4-
between a custodial and non-custodial parent.
State courts
retain the authority to allocate the exemption between the
parties as a factor in setting child support.
In the case
before us, the family court noted that based upon the childsupport guidelines William pays 79.7% of the support for the two
children.
Thus, the family court concluded that allowing
William to claim both children as dependents would provide a
greater financial benefit to the children than if Teresa were
allowed to claim only one child as a dependent.
Teresa argues
that Hart does not leave the question of allocating the
exemptions entirely to the discretion of the trial court.
This Court in Hart specifically stated:
Congress, however, did not, expressly or by
implication, prohibit state courts from
allocating the exemption and did not, we
believe, intend to tread into an area
traditionally left to the states courts to
adjudicate. The allocation of the exemption
has, or at least should have, a bearing on
the amount of money available as child
support. A trial court should allocate the
exemption so as to maximize the amount
available for the care of the children
[footnote omitted]. This power in no way
conflicts with the intent of our U.S.
Congress to avoid IRS involvement in the
issue of which parent should be able to
claim the exemptions [citation omitted].6
Accordingly, the family court correctly exercised its discretion
in allocating the exemptions to William.
6
Hart, 774 S.W.2d at 457.
-5-
At the March 1, 2004, hearing William testified that
if he were to claim both children as exemptions on his tax
returns he would receive a refund of $2,708.00 from the federal
government and pay $57.00 to the state.
However, if he were to
claim only one of the children as an exemption, he would receive
a refund of $945.00 from the federal government and pay the
state $77.00.
At this same hearing, Teresa testified that if
she were to claim only one child as a tax exemption she would
receive a refund of $4,900.00 from the federal government, but
if she did not claim either child, she would receive a refund in
the amount of $4,400.00.
Teresa further stated that there would
be only a $20.00 difference in the state refund between the two
filings.
Thus, the family court determined that William would
maximize the amount of money he retained by claiming both
children as tax exemptions.
Based on this determination, which
is supported by substantial evidence, it is clear that the
standard set forth in Hart was met by the family court.
Hence,
the family court correctly allocated the tax exemptions to the
parent who could best utilize it as additional support for the
children and did not abuse its discretion.
Based on the foregoing reasons, the order of the
Henderson Circuit Court is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
-6-
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Teresa Ellen Denton, Pro Se
Henderson, Kentucky
Susie H. Moore
Henderson, Kentucky
-7-
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.
