KAREN SOUTHWOOD; DAVID SOUTHWOOD v. CHARLES DENNEY; PAULINE DENNEY
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RENDERED: MARCH 18, 2005; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2004-CA-000612-MR
KAREN SOUTHWOOD;
DAVID SOUTHWOOD
v.
APPELLANTS
APPEAL FROM WAYNE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE VERNON MINIARD, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 01-CI-00201
CHARLES DENNEY;
PAULINE DENNEY
APPELLEES
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: VANMETER, JUDGE; HUDDLESTON AND MILLER, SENIOR JUDGES.1
MILLER, SENIOR JUDGE:
Karen Southwood and David Southwood
appeal from the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and
Judgment of the Wayne Circuit Court in this boundary and quiet
title dispute involving tracts of land located in the Eadsville
1
Senior Judges Joseph R. Huddleston and John D. Miller sitting as Special
Judges by assignment of the Chief Justice pursuant to Section 110.(5)(b) of
the Kentucky Constitution and KRS 21.580.
Community in Wayne County, Kentucky.
For the reasons
hereinafter stated, we affirm.
On July 6, 2001, Charles H. Denney and Pauline Denney
filed a petition to quiet title to three tracts of land located
in Wayne County, Kentucky, in the Eadsville Community in Wayne
County near Highway 789.
David Southwood and Karen Southwood
were named as defendants in the action.
The petition also
sought damages for the Southwoods’ trespass onto the real
property and an injunction enjoining the Southwoods from further
trespass.
On July 18, 2001, the Southwoods filed their answer
denying the Dennys’ claim of ownership to the property and a
counterclaim asserting ownership to portions of the property
claimed by the Denneys by deed and/or adverse possession and
seeking to quite title therein in their favor.
The Southwoods
also sought damages for lost sales to a subdivision development
they alleged were brought about by actions of the Denneys, the
additional expense for running electric lines because of the
Denneys’ interference by the Denneys with work already begun
upon the property.
Several tracts of property are involved in this
action.
The Denneys claim title to three tracts:
2
a 20.31 acre
tract located on the north side2 of Kentucky Highway 789; a 57
acre tract located on the south side of Kentucky Highway 789;
and a 4 acre tract located on the south side of Kentucky Highway
789, which is contiguous with the aforementioned 57 acre tract.
The Southwoods claim ownership of a 110 acre tract
located on the north side of Highway 789.
This tract and the
20.31 acre tract claimed by the Denneys are adjacent to each
other.
The Southwoods claim that a portion of their 110 acre
tract description covers approximately 12 acres south of Highway
789 which overlaps the 57 acre tract claimed by the Denneys.
In
addition, the Southwoods claim title to an approximately 9 1/2
acre tract (the Matthews tract) located on the North side of
Highway 789, which lies between their 110 acre tract and a
gravel road (Ridge Road) and which is a portion of the 20.31
acre tract claimed by the Denneys.
The Southwoods also claim
title to the entire 20.31 acre tract (which includes the
Matthews tract) by adverse possession.
On October 1 and 2, 2003, the case was tried before
Judge Donald H. Byrom.
On November 24, 2003, Judge Byrom’s
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Judgment was entered.
Judge Byrom determined that the Denneys had failed to adduce
sufficient evidence to establish their property lines and
2
For consistency we have conformed with the direction descriptions as used by
the parties and the circuit court; however, we note that these direction
descriptions are notably imprecise.
3
dismissed their claims; that the Southwoods had established the
property lines to their 110 acre tract and quieted title in them
to that tract; and dismissed the various claims for trespass and
damages.
Each side filed motions to alter, amend or vacate
pursuant to Ky. R. Civ. P. (CR) 59.05.
In the meantime, Judge
Byrom was replaced by Judge Vernon Miniard.
The Southwoods
filed a motion requesting that Judge Miniard recuse himself from
the case on the basis that Karen Southwood had filed a complaint
with the Attorney General in connection with Judge Miniard’s
conduct in his previous capacity as County Attorney of Wayne
County.
Following referral of the issue to the Chief Justice,
Judge Miniard denied the motion to recuse.
On February 27, 2004, Judge Miniard, in addressing the
motions to alter, amend or vacate, rendered his own Findings of
Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Judgment.
The decision again
quieted title to the 110 acre tract in favor of the Southwoods,
but amended Judge Byrom’s decision by quieting title to the
three tracts claimed by the Denneys in their favor.
The
judgment also awarded $15,000.00 in punitive damages to the
Denneys based upon the Southwoods’ trespass to their property
and the destruction of a barn thereon.
This appeal followed.
First, the Southwoods contend that Judge Miniard erred
by failing to recuse himself from the case.
4
The Southwoods
allege that recusal was required on the basis that during Judge
Miniard’s tenure as County Attorney of Wayne County, Karen
Southwood had filed a complaint against him with the Attorney
General’s office criticizing his decision not to pursue criminal
complaints as a result of actions allegedly directed against her
by three individuals.
Judge Miniard recalled the incident and
referred to the matter in the parties’ initial appearance before
him.
The Southwoods contend that Judge Miniard’s animosity
toward them was demonstrated by his comment that when he
received a copy of the complaint from the Attorney General’s
office, he “just threw it in the trash.”
The Southwoods moved for Judge Miniard to disqualify
himself, which the Judge denied.
The matter was referred to the
Chief Justice pursuant to Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS)
26A.020.
On January 28, 2004, the Chief Justice rendered an
order which stated, in relevant part, as follows:
Upon due examination of the affidavit of
defendants which seeks recusal of Honorable
Vernon Miniard, Jr., and the response of
plaintiffs,
IT IS HEREBY ADJUDGED that the affidavit is
insufficient to demonstrate any
disqualifying circumstance which would
require the appointment of a special judge
pursuant to KRS 26A.020.
The request for disqualification is denied
without prejudice of any party to seek
appellate review after entry of a final
judgment.
5
Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) 26A.015(2) requires
recusal when a judge has "personal bias or prejudice concerning
a party ... [,]" or "has knowledge of any other circumstances in
which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned."
KRS
26A.015(2)(a) and (e); see Supreme Court Rule 4.300, Canon
3C(1).
The burden of proof required for recusal of a trial
judge is an onerous one.
There must be a showing of facts "of a
character calculated seriously to impair the judge's
impartiality and sway his judgment."
Foster v. Commonwealth,
348 S.W.2d 759, 760 (Ky. 1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 993, 82
S.Ct. 613, 7 L.Ed.2d 530 (1962); see also Johnson v. Ducobu, 258
S.W.2d 509 (Ky. 1953).
The mere belief that the judge will not
afford a fair and impartial trial is not sufficient grounds for
recusal.
Stopher v. Commonwealth, 57 S.W.3d 787, 794-795 (Ky.
2001), cert. denied, 122 S.Ct. 1921, 535 U.S. 1059, 152 L.Ed.2d
829; Webb v. Commonwealth, 904 S.W.2d 226 (Ky. 1995);
Judge Miniard’s decision as County Attorney not to
pursue criminal charges was within his discretion and does not,
in and of itself, reflect bias against Karen Southwood.
Once
assuming the circuit court bench and upon the parties appearing
in his court, Judge Miniard appropriately raised his prior
connection with Mrs. Southwood.
While Judge Miniard’s comment
regarding his having “thrown the complaint in the trash” may
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have been inconsiderate, we are not persuaded that this comment
reflects personal bias or prejudice against the Southwoods so as
to have required his recusal.
The Southwoods, in this matter,
have failed to meet the requisite burden to demonstrate facts
"of a character calculated seriously to impair the judge's
impartiality and sway [Judge Miniard’s] judgment.”
Next, the Southwoods contend that “it was error for
Judge Miniard to try the case de novo; ignore the findings of
fact, conclusions of law, and judgment of Judge Byrom; and enter
a completely new judgment.”
Judge Byrom issued his decision only a few days prior
to leaving office.
Each side subsequently filed motions to
alter, amend or vacate pursuant to CR 59.05.
Thus, Judge
Miniard had assumed the bench by the time the motions were
heard.
A motion under CR 59.05 is the proper remedy where an
earlier court judgment is believed to be incorrect.
Security
Federal Sav. & Loan Ass'n of Mayfield v. Nesler, 697 S.W.2d 136
(Ky. 1985).
Moreover, a court has unlimited power to amend and
alter its own judgments.
Henry Clay Min. Co., Inc. v. V & V
Min. Co., Inc., 742 S.W.2d 566, 567 (Ky. 1987); Pattie A. Clay
Infirmary v. First Presbyterian Church, 605 S.W.2d 52, 54
(Ky.App. 1980).
7
Upon assuming the bench of Wayne Circuit Court, we
discern no bar to Judge Miniard treating Judge Byrom’s decision
as though it were his own, and deciding the motions to alter,
amend or vacate with the unrestricted powers vested in a circuit
court judge when considering such a motion.
Moreover, the
modifications to Judge Byrom’s decision were within the scope of
the issues raised in the parties’ motions to alter, amend or
vacate.
Judge Miniard’s handling of the motions was not error.
Next, the Southwoods contend that the trial court
erred by not quieting title in them to the 12 acres claimed by
them on the south side of Highway 789 and the 20.31 acre tract
on the north side of the Highway.
This is a case of the trial judge sitting without a
jury.
In such cases the findings of the trial judge may not be
set aside unless clearly erroneous with due regard being given
to the opportunity of the trial judge to consider the
credibility of the witnesses.
S.W.2d 1, 3 (Ky. 1995).
CR 52.01; Lawson v. Loid, 896
Findings of fact are not clearly
erroneous if supported by substantial evidence.
Company v. Greene,
385 S.W.2d 954 (Ky. 1964).
Black Motor
The test for
substantiality of evidence is whether the evidence, when taken
alone, or in the light of all the evidence, has sufficient
probative value to induce conviction in the minds of reasonable
persons.
Kentucky State Racing Commission v. Fuller, 481 S.W.2d
8
298, 308 (Ky. 1972); Janakakis-Kostun v. Janakakis, 6 S.W.3d
843, 852 (Ky.App. 1999).
boundary disputes.
This Court has applied this rule in
"It is the rule that, where this Court
cannot say on an appeal from the decree in an action involving a
boundary dispute that the Chancellor's adjudication is against
the weight of the evidence, the decree will not be disturbed."
Croley v. Alsip, 602 S.W.2d 418, 419 (Ky. 1980) (quoting Rowe v.
Blackburn, Ky., 253 S.W.2d 25, 27 (Ky. 1952)).
The trial court’s determination that these tracts are
not encompassed within the Southwoods' deed descriptions is
supported by substantial evidence.
The Denneys do not dispute
that the Southwoods own a 110 acre tract.
The Southwoods’ deed
to this tract, however, has calls establishing the “western”
boundary of their 110 acre tract as the Matthews line.
The
trial court reasonably concluded from this that their deed does
not encompass the Matthews tract.
Moreover, the deed
establishes the “southern” boundary as Highway 789.
The trial
court reasonably concluded from that that their 110 acre tract
does not include property on the other side of 789.
Hence the
trial court’s determination that the Southwoods do not have
title by deed to either the Matthews tract or any property on
the opposite side of Highway 789 is supported by substantial
evidence.
9
The Southwoods also claim the Matthews tract, the
remaining acreage of the 20.31 acre tract on the opposite side
of Ridge Road, and the twelve acres on the opposite side of
Highway 789 by adverse possession.
One may obtain title to real property by adverse
possession for the statutory period of time of fifteen years
even when there is no intention by the adverse possessor to
claim land not belonging to him.
280 S.W.2d 150, 152 (Ky. 1955).
KRS 413.010; Tartar v. Tucker,
There are, however, five
elements, all of which must be satisfied, before adverse
possession will bar record title:
1) possession must be hostile
and under a claim of right, 2) it must be actual, 3) it must be
exclusive, 4) it must be continuous, and 5) it must be open and
notorious.
Appalachian Regional Healthcare, Inc. v. Royal Crown
Bottling Co., Inc., 824 S.W.2d 878, 879-880 (Ky. 1992).
The
party claiming title through adverse possession bears the burden
of proving each element by clear and convincing evidence.
Phillips v. Akers, 103 S.W.3d 705, 709 (Ky.App. 2002).
Suffice to say that there was conflicting evidence on
the Southwoods’ claim of adverse possession.
Charles Denney and
many local residents testified that the Southwoods had not
exclusively occupied these properties for the required statutory
period.
It was the trial court’s prerogative to believe Charles
Denny and his witnesses and to disbelieve the evidence presented
10
on the issue by the Southwoods.
The trial court’s finding that
the Southwoods did not meet the requisites to establish title to
the property at issue by adverse possession was not clearly
erroneous.
Next, the Southwoods contend that Judge Miniard erred
in quieting title in the Denneys to the 57 acre tract, the 20.31
acre tract, and the 4 acre tract.
In association with this
argument the Southwoods allege that Judge Miniard erroneously
applied the exception to proving title contained in Jones v.
Wheeldon, 309 Ky. 184, 217 S.W.2d 221 (1949); and that that the
trial court erred because it did not locate upon the ground the
various tracts quieted in favor of the Denneys.
As previously noted, the Southwoods have failed to
establish claim to either the 57 acre tract, the 20.31 acre
tract, or the 4 acre tract by either deed or adverse possession.
In a quiet title action, defendants, such as the
Southwoods, are not entitled to affirmative relief under their
counterclaim when they fail to show title in themselves.
Vogler
v. Salem Primitive Baptist Church, 415 S.W.2d 72, 74-75 (Ky.
1967).
Moreover, it is essential to the right of appeal that
the party seeking review must represent an interest which is
direct, pecuniary, and substantial.
Citizen,
Cooper v. Kentuckian
258 S.W.2d 695, 696 (Ky. 1953).
11
As the Southwoods have failed to establish any claim
to the tracts at issue, they are entitled to no affirmative
relief in this action; and, moreover, they are in no way
prejudiced by the trial court’s quieting of title in the three
tracts in favor of the Denneys.
Consequently, we discern no
benefit to them in a reversal of the trial court’s decision.
Neither does it appear that anyone else challenges the Denneys’
claim to these tracts.
While this issue appears to be mooted by the
Southwoods’ failure on their claims, we nevertheless note that
substantial evidence supports the trial court’s decision.
The
Denneys presented the testimony of a licensed surveyor who
expressed his opinion that the three tracts claimed by the
Denneys were encompassed within their deeds.
Moreover, the
testimony of Charles Denney and various members of the community
established the boundaries by reputation.
For these reasons we
reject the Southwoods’ argument on this issue and find no error
in the trial court’s decision.3
Next, the Southwoods contend that the trial court
erred by disallowing certain testimony of John D. Lyons and by
failing to award damages.
3
The Denneys did not attempt in this action to quiet title to the three
tracts by adverse possession. Based upon the trial court’s findings of fact,
however, we note that the evidence strongly suggests that a claim under this
theory would have been successful.
12
Contemporaneous with the eruption of this property
dispute the Southwoods were developing Blue Water Heights
Subdivision on the northern portion of their 110 acre tract.
In
conjunction with the development the Southwoods sought to widen
Ridge Road, and hired a bulldozer operator to that end.
At
trial, Charles Denney testified that he approached the dozer
operator and said to him that the “road and land was in
dispute.”
According to the Southwoods, this statement started a
“wildfire of rumors that the access road to Blue Water Heights
Subdivision was in question.”
The Southwoods maintain that
Charles Denney “attached a stigma to the Subdivision that killed
the sale of lots.”
In their counterclaim, the Southwoods sought
damages for lost lot sales allegedly associated with Charles
Denney’s casting of a cloud over access to the subdivision.
In an effort to prove damages resulting from the
alleged lost sales, the Southwoods relied upon the testimony of
licensed real estate broker John D. Lyons.
Lyons calculated
damages to the Southwoods by comparing sales at the Blue Water
Heights Subdivision with sales at another subdivision, Sunset
Point, over the same period of time.
Lyons testified that
whereas the developers of Sunset Heights had sold 76% of their
lots during the period of time, the Southwoods had sold only 29%
of Blue Water Heights lots.
Lyons concluded that had Blue Water
Heights lots sold at the same rate as Lots in Sunset Heights, an
13
additional 31 lots would have been sold.
Lyons then applied the
Southwoods’ asking price of $14,000.00 per lot to the 31 lost
sales and concluded that the Southwoods had suffered damages of
$434,000.00.
The trial court rejected the Southwoods’ theory that
Charles Denney’s isolated statement to the bulldozer operator
caused any loss to the Southwoods regarding the sale of lots in
Blue Water Heights Subdivision.
We agree that the evidence does
not establish causation between the alleged lost sales and
Charles Denney’s comment.4
As noted by Lyons, there may be other
reasons for the differential in sales rates between the two
developments, including different marketing schemes; different
property characteristics such as size of lots; and access and
distance to Lake Cumberland and Beaver Creek Resort, a dock
facility located on Lake Cumberland.
Given the multiplicity of relevant variables, any loss
in lot sales associated with Charles Denney’s comment – if any –
is purely speculative.
The trial court’s finding that the
Southwoods had failed to sustain their burden of proof with
regard to this issue was not clearly erroneous.
With regard to
the allegedly excluded testimony of Lyons, the Southwoods do not
4
We moreover note that the bulldozing project called for the widening of
Ridge Road. As the Denneys own the land on both sides of the road on the
Highway 789 end, it necessarily follows that any widening would encroach upon
their land. In this respect, there was significant truth in the statement of
Charles Denney that there was a dispute concerning the road.
14
cite us to his avowal testimony preserving this issue, and we
will not further address the matter.
Charash v. Johnson, 43
S.W.3d 274, 281 (Ky.App. 2000).
Next, the Southwoods contend that the trial court
erroneously found that they recognized the Denneys’ claim by
putting the electric lines running to their subdivision
development on their 110 acre tract instead of along the ridge
road.
Specifically, in its February 27, 2004, opinion the trial
court stated as follows:
The Plaintiff, Charles Denney, testified to
having talked to the Defendant, David
Southwood, concerning widening the Ridge
Road and placing electric lines on the
Plaintiff’s property. The Court finds from
this testimony that the Defendants
recognized that the Plaintiffs were claiming
an interest to the property in question.
The Court finds of more compelling interest,
the fact that the electric lines were
ultimately not placed on the Ridge Road, but
on the Defendants’ 110 acre tract.
The Southwoods state that the locating of the lines on
their 110 acre tract came about because the Denneys made the
electric company aware of the existing property dispute, and
that the electric company accordingly refused to run the lines
along the Ridge Road due to the controversy.
The Southwoods
allege that they had no choice in the matter if they wanted the
lines run, and that their decision regarding the lines certainly
was not recognition of the Southwoods claim to the property.
15
The Southwoods seem to be missing the point of the
finding.
We construe this finding as relevant only insofar as
the trial court determined that the Southwoods acted with malice
in entering onto the Matthews tract and destroying the barn
located thereon.
We do not construe the finding as a finding
that the Southwoods were conceding the superiority of the
Denneys claim, but, rather, we construe the finding as evidence
that the Southwoods were aware of the claim, and, despite this
awareness of the Denneys’ claim, nevertheless unilaterally
entered upon the property and destroyed the barn.
relevant evidence as to malice.
This is
As the trial court’s conclusion
regarding the discussions between Charles Denney and David
Southwood, and the electric company’s honoring of the Denneys’
claim, was reasonable, we cannot agree that the finding was
clearly erroneous.
Finally, the Southwoods contend that the trial court
erroneously concluded that the appellants acted maliciously, and
in awarding the Denneys punitive damages for said acts.
KRS 411.184(1)(c) defines malice as “either conduct
which is specifically intended by the defendant to cause
tangible or intangible injury to the plaintiff or conduct that
is carried out by the defendant both with a flagrant
indifference to the rights of the plaintiff and with a
16
subjective awareness that such conduct will result in human
death or bodily harm.”
A reasonable interpretation of the evidence is that
despite their knowledge of the Denneys’ claim to the Matthews
tract, the Southwoods nevertheless unilaterally hired someone to
enter onto the property and destroy the barn located thereon.
This conduct could reasonably be construed as conduct
specifically intended to cause tangible injury to the Denneys,
and as being carried out with a flagrant indifference to their
rights.
As such, the trial court’s finding that the Southwoods
acted with malice was not clearly erroneous.
For the foregoing reasons the judgment of the Wayne
Circuit Court is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
John T. Mandt
Somerset, Kentucky
John Paul Jones II
Monticello, Kentucky
17
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