J. SCOTT WANTLAND AND OTHER NOTICE OF APPEAL v. KENTUCKY STATE BOARD OF ELECTIONS AND TREY GRAYSON AS SUCCESSOR OF JOHN Y. BROWN III, KENTUCKY SECRETARY OF STATE
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
RENDERED: MAY 13, 2005; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
2004-CA-000508-MR
J. SCOTT WANTLAND AND OTHER
APPELLANTS AS NAMED IN THE
NOTICE OF APPEAL
APPELLANTS
APPEAL FROM FRANKLIN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE ROGER L. CRITTENDEN, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 02-CI-00569
v.
KENTUCKY STATE BOARD OF ELECTIONS
AND TREY GRAYSON AS SUCCESSOR
OF JOHN Y. BROWN III, KENTUCKY
SECRETARY OF STATE
APPELLEES
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
COMBS, CHIEF JUDGE; DYCHE AND KNOPF, JUDGES.
KNOPF, JUDGE:
The General Assembly’s 2002 reapportionment of
the House of Representatives assigned segments of Bullitt County
to four different legislative districts.1
1
KRS 5.200 – KRS 5.300.
District 18 comprises
all of Hancock and Breckinridge Counties and portions of
Daviess, Hardin, and Bullitt Counties.
District 27 comprises
Meade County and portions of Hardin and Bullitt Counties.
District 49 is contained entirely within Bullitt County.
And
District 50 comprises Nelson County and portions of Bullitt and
Spencer Counties.
In March 2002, eligible Bullitt County voters
from each of these districts brought suit in the Bullitt Circuit
Court seeking a declaration that the multiple divisions of
Bullitt County violated the county-integrity provision of § 33
of the Kentucky Constitution and that District 18 violated §
33’s district-contiguity requirement.2
The plaintiffs also
sought that the Secretary of State and the Board of Elections be
enjoined from implementing the allegedly unlawful apportionment.
2
Section 33 provides that “[t]he first General Assembly after
the adoption of this Constitution shall divide the State into
thirty-eight Senatorial Districts, and one hundred
Representative Districts, as nearly equal in population as may
be without dividing any county, except where a county may
include more than one district, which districts shall constitute
the Senatorial and Representative Districts for ten years. Not
more than two counties shall be joined together to form a
Representative District: Provided, In doing so the principle
requiring every district to be as nearly equal in population as
may be shall not be violated. At the expiration of that time,
the General Assembly shall then, and every ten years thereafter,
redistrict the State according to this rule, and for the
purposes expressed in this section. If, in making said
districts, inequality of populations should be unavoidable, any
advantage resulting therefrom shall be given to districts having
the largest territory. No part of a county shall be added to
another county to make a district, and the counties forming a
district shall be contiguous.”
2
After transfer to Franklin Circuit Court,3 the plaintiffs moved
for summary judgment.
By order entered February 27, 2004, the
trial court denied the plaintiffs’ motion and instead entered
summary judgment for the defendants.
The court ruled that the
apportioning of Bullitt County among four house districts did
not violate § 33 of the constitution and that the various
segments of District 18 are contiguous.
It is from that ruling
that the Bullitt County plaintiffs have appealed.
We affirm.
A fundamental principle of democracy is that each
person’s vote is to have the same weight.
To give substance to
this principle, both the federal and the Kentucky Constitutions
require that state legislative districts contain substantially
equal populations.4
Section 33 of the Kentucky Constitution also
envisions legislative districts comprising, for the most part,
undivided counties.
Our Supreme Court has held that “when the
goals of population equality and county integrity inevitably
collide, the requirement of approximate equality of population
must control.”5
3
Accordingly, the Court has adopted
See KRS 5.005.
4
Voinovich v. Quilter, 507 U.S. 146, 113 S. Ct. 1149, 122 L. Ed.
2d 500 (1993); Fischer v. State Board of Elections, 879 S.W.2d
475 (Ky. 1994).
5
Jensen v. Kentucky State Board of Elections, 959 S.W.2d 771,
774 (Ky. 1997).
3
plus-or-minus 5% as the maximum population
variation allowable in creating House and
Senate districts. . . . [T]he next priority
of a reapportionment plan is the
preservation of county integrity, which is
accomplished by dividing the fewest possible
number of counties.6
Applying these standards in Jensen v. Kentucky State
Board of Elections,7 our Supreme Court upheld the 1996 House
reapportionment notwithstanding the fact that several counties
whose populations exceeded that of the ideal district had been
subjected to multiple divisions such that no district lay
entirely within the county.
were unavoidable.
Such divisions, the Court said,
“No one now suggests that any redistricting
plan could be drafted without some such multiple divisions.”8
The appellants do not allege that the 2002
reapportionment violates the equality requirement or divides
more counties than necessary to achieve that goal.
Nor do they
complain about district 49, which lies entirely within Bullitt
County.
They argue rather, as did the appellants in Jensen,
that by attaching relatively small segments of their county to
districts (18, 27, and 50) dominated by other counties, the 2002
reapportionment dilutes the votes of the Bullitt countians by
6
Id. at 774-775 (citing Fischer v. State Board of Elections,
supra).
7
supra.
8
Id. at 776.
4
separating them from their community of interest and by making
it unlikely that they will be able to elect representatives of
their choice.
egregious.
District 18, they contend, is particularly
Beginning in the west, that district comprises
eastern Daviess County, all of Hancock and Breckinridge
Counties, and then continues to the east through a narrow strip
of Hardin and southern Bullitt Counties.
This ungainly
conglomeration of counties and pieces of counties, the
appellants insist, tends unfairly to favor the voters of
Breckinridge County and makes a mockery of the constitution’s
goal of county integrity.
Addressing the same concerns in Jensen, however, our
Supreme Court held that
the mere fact that a particular
apportionment scheme makes it more difficult
for a particular group in a particular
district to elect the representatives of its
choice does not render that scheme
constitutionally infirm. Unconstitutional
discrimination in reapportionment occurs
only when the electoral system is arranged
in a manner that will consistently degrade a
voter’s or group of voters’ influence on the
political process as a whole.9
As noted above, moreover, Jensen recognizes that
achieving the goal of population equality will sometimes
necessitate substantial deviations from the goal of county
integrity.
9
The constitution requires only that the General
Id. at 776.
5
Assembly divide as few counties as possible.
Within that
constraint, which counties to divide and how to arrange the
resulting pieces are matters of legislative discretion.
The
appellants do not allege that the General Assembly overstepped
that constraint.
Otherwise, as the trial court observed,
District 18 arguably “is a snaking, poorly shaped, and
regrettable House District that may have been better
fashioned.”10
Nevertheless, the Court’s “only role in this
process is to ascertain whether a particular redistricting plan
passes constitutional muster, not whether a better plan could be
crafted.”11
But district 18 violates the constitutional
requirement of county integrity in another way, the appellants
contend.
Section 33 provides in part that “the counties forming
a district shall be contiguous.”
The appellants argue that
under this provision, if a district includes parts of counties
then those parts must be contiguous with the rest of the
district.
District 18, which runs through Fort Knox, violates
this requirement, the appellants insist, because the federal
enclave divides it into non-contiguous eastern and western
portions.
10
Wantland, et al. v. Kentucky State Board of Elections, et al.,
No. 02-CI-00569, slip opinion at 9 (Jefferson Circuit Court
February 27, 2004).
11
Id. at 776.
6
The appellants’ argument depends upon the old notion
that a federal enclave constitutes a state within a state,
separate for all purposes from local government.
And it is true
that Kentucky has ceded jurisdiction over the “land and
premises” of Fort Knox to the federal government.12
The United
States Supreme Court, however, has long since discarded this
notion of a federal state within a state.13
Federal enclaves,
even those as completely ceded as Fort Knox, do not cease to be
geographical parts of the states and counties that contain
them.14
The appellants do not contend that the constitutional
“contiguity” requirement refers to anything other than physical
or geographical contiguity.
District 18 is geographically
contiguous, notwithstanding the fact that Fort Knox is
jurisdictionally distinct and may preclude intra-district travel
from one end of the district to the other.15
Because the
segments of district 18 are contiguous, we need not address
whether Section 33 of our constitution requires them (or only
the counties that contain them) to be so.
12
KRS 3.030; Lathey v. Lathey, 305 S.W.2d 929 (Ky. 1957).
13
Howard v. Commissioners of Sinking Fund of City of Louisville,
344 U.S. 624, 73 S. Ct. 465, 97 L. Ed. 617 (1953).
14
Evans v. Cornman, 398 U.S. 419, 90 S. Ct. 1752, 26 L. Ed. 2d
370 (1970).
15
In re Constitutionality of House Joint Resolution 25E, 863
So.2d 1176 (Fla., 2003).
7
In sum, in Jensen our Supreme Court upheld a
reapportionment scheme that subjected several counties to
multiple divisions such as Bullitt County has been subjected to
by the 2002 House reapportionment.
The Court recognized that
the overriding goal of population equality across districts
requires such divisions and that the resulting districts may in
some cases deviate substantially from the ideal of county
integrity.
We agree with the trial court that the appellants
have failed to distinguish the results of the 2002
reapportionment of which they complain from the results approved
in Jensen.
The appellants have not offered to show that the
apportionment fails to achieve substantial equality of district
population, that it divides more counties than necessary, or
that it tends to discriminate against them in a constitutionally
meaningful way.
Accordingly, we affirm the February 27, 2004,
summary judgment of the Franklin Circuit Court.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF AND ORAL ARGUMENT FOR
APPELLANTS:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE KENTUCKY
STATE BOARD OF ELECTIONS:
Joseph J. Wantland
Wantland Law Office
Shepherdsville, Kentucky
Frank F. Chuppe
Michelle D. Wyrick
Christopher W. Brooker
Wyatt Tarrant & Combs
Louisville, Kentucky
8
ORAL ARGUMENT FOR APPELLEE
KENTUCKY STATE BOARD OF
ELECTIONS:
Frank F. Chuppe
Louisville, Kentucky
9
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.