THOMAS E. NECKEL, SR. V. JAMES E. SHARPE
Annotate this Case
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RENDERED: April 15, 2005; 10:00 a.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2004-CA-000429-MR
THOMAS E. NECKEL, SR.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM PULASKI CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE WILLIAM T. CAIN, JUDGE
CIVIL ACTION NO. 97-CI-00345
V.
JAMES E. SHARPE
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
JUDGE.1
COMBS, CHIEF JUDGE; MINTON, JUDGE; AND MILLER, SENIOR
MINTON, JUDGE:
I.
INTRODUCTION.
This case arose out of the aftermath of the 1996 sale
of Somerset Marine, Inc. (Somerset Marine), d/b/a Sumerset
Houseboats,2 by its sole owner, Appellee, James E. Sharpe, to
1
Senior Judge John D. Miller sitting as Special Judge by assignment
of the Chief Justice pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky
Constitution and KRS 21.580.
2
Somerset Marine manufactured houseboats.
Envy Houseboats, Inc. (Envy Houseboats), d/b/a Sumerset
Houseboats.3
The Appellant, Thomas E. Neckel, Sr., was then the
President and Chief Executive Officer of Envy Houseboats.
Neckel appeals from a December 31, 2003, judgment4
entered against him and in favor of Sharpe on claims of fraud
and conspiracy and as guarantor for a defaulted promissory note.
He asserts the following errors with respect to the judgment:
the trial judge who entered it improperly presided over the
action since he had previously disqualified himself from the
action; Neckel did not receive notice of the trial date until
one day before; he consented to a default judgment only on the
3
Envy Houseboats, subsequently, may have changed its name at least
once and may have sold its assets to, yet, another corporation. The
record is unclear on this point. For purposes of this opinion, we
shall continue to refer to the corporation as Envy Houseboats.
4
This judgment was later withdrawn and an amended judgment issued in
its place on February 2, 2004; but, as will be discussed later, the
trial court’s order substituting the new judgment stated that “the
date of the Original Judgment shall not be affected by the
amendment/correction of this judgment, nor shall the time for appeal
from the Original Judgment.” Hence, we will refer to this judgment
as being entered on December 31, 2003.
Curiously, the record in this case shows an order, entered May 22,
2003, which granted default judgment against Neckel on all claims.
This order imposed liability but stated that damages were to be
determined at a later date. On June 26, 2003, the trial court
denied Neckel’s motion to vacate this judgment. And there does not
appear to be any order in the record rescinding the May 22, 2003,
default judgment against Neckel. Nevertheless, Sharpe’s counsel
stated at oral argument that all of the parties and the trial court
treated this judgment and order as if it had been properly
rescinded. This is apparent from the record. In this unusual
circumstance where all of the parties and the trial court have
treated the May 22, 2003, judgment and order as if it were rescinded
and no one is seeking to rely upon that judgment, we will also treat
that earlier judgment and order as rescinded.
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promissory note, but the trial court improperly granted a
judgment on the pleadings on the conspiracy and fraud claims as
well; there is insufficient factual evidence to support the
judgment against Neckel on the fraud and conspiracy claims; and
the trial court’s February 2, 2004, order amending this judgment
improperly stated that the time for appeal would still run from
the date of the original judgment.
If any error occurred in the February 2, 2004, order
concerning the running of the time for appeal, it was harmless
since Neckel filed a timely appeal.
And Neckel is barred by the
doctrine of equitable estoppel by delay or laches from raising
any error concerning the trial judge’s disqualification because
he did not raise this error in a timely manner.
Similarly, he
failed to preserve any error concerning inadequate notice by not
raising this issue before the trial court.
Neckel’s remaining
points of appeal are disposed of by our conclusion that he
consented to a judgment against him on all claims just prior to
the December 31, 2003, judgment.
For all these reasons, we
affirm the judgment of the Pulaski Circuit Court against Neckel.
II.
BACKGROUND.
On May 14, 1997, Envy Houseboats filed suit against
Sharpe for violation of a non-competition agreement and for
tortious interference with a contract.
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Sharpe responded with a
counterclaim against Envy Houseboats for defaulting on a
promissory note which Sharpe had received in partial payment for
the sale of Somerset Marine.
This counterclaim was later
amended to add a claim that Envy conspired with Neckel;
Dr. Blair Vermillion, an Envy shareholder; and Lynn Turpin, an
accountant employed first by Somerset Marine and then by Envy
Houseboats, to defraud Sharpe.
According to this amended
counterclaim, they defrauded Sharpe by persuading him to reduce
the sales price for Somerset Marine by $4,000,000.00 and to
agree to accept a non-competition agreement in return for Envy
Houseboat’s promise to hire Sharpe’s two sons and son-in-law in
the same capacity that they had worked for Somerset Marine and
to provide them with “certain rights, privileges and benefits
including valuable interests in the business which survived the
purchase and sale transaction.”5
Sharpe also asserted that Envy
and Turpin conspired to defraud him and did defraud him of
$500,000.00 in corporate funds from Somerset Marine, which he
asserts were supposed to go to him in the sale of the business
but which went to Envy Houseboats instead.
He filed an
intervening complaint and amended intervening complaint
involving multiple claims against Third-Party Defendants,
5
Sharpe Amended Counterclaim, Count II, ¶ 5.
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Neckel, Vermillion,6 and Turpin.7
The claims against Sharpe
included conspiracy and fraud claims based on the same facts
alleged against Envy Houseboats.
There was also a claim against
him for liability for the defaulted promissory note since he was
an individual guarantor of the note.8
Neckel appeals the December 31, 2003, judgment against
him, styled a judgment on the pleadings, which adjudged Neckel
liable for $2,233,264.95 on the promissory note;9 $4,500,000.00
for fraud and conspiracy; and $1,000,000.00 in punitive
damages.10
Specifically, all of Neckel’s issues on appeal go
toward challenging the trial court’s finding of liability for
the fraud and conspiracy claims.
III.
A.
ANALYSIS.
Any error in amending the judgment is harmless.
6
All claims against Vermillion were dismissed in a December 18, 2003,
agreed order.
7
Turpin was granted summary judgment on all claims against Turpin and
dismissed from the case on January 23, 2003.
8
Vermillion was also a guarantor of the note.
9
Specifically, the trial court found Envy Houseboats and Neckel
jointly and severally liable on the promissory note; but Envy
Houseboats has not joined in this appeal.
10
We note that Neckel has not challenged the issue of punitive damages
on appeal, except to challenge liability on the fraud and conspiracy
claims supporting the punitive damages. Indeed, he has not
challenged the amount of any of the damages.
-5-
We begin by disposing of the issue concerning the
trial court’s amended judgment as entered by the February 2,
2004, order.
The trial court entered an order on February 2,
2004, striking the December 31, 2003, judgment and substituting
for it, in its entirety, an attached, amended judgment.
However, the February 2, 2004, order stated that “the date of
the Original Judgment shall not be [a]ffected by the amendment/
correction of this judgment, nor shall the time for appeal from
the Original Judgment.”
The changes in the amended judgment did not alter the
judgment against Neckel in any way.11
And any effect that the
language of the order stating that the time for appeal would
still run from the date of the original judgment, December 31,
2003, might have had on Neckel’s ability to appeal is moot.
It
is undisputed that he filed a timely appeal before this Court.
Therefore, any error which may have occurred is harmless since
Neckel suffered no prejudice as a result.
B.
11
Neckel is estopped from claiming disqualification
of the trial judge.
The amended judgment was entered on motion of Lynn Turpin removing
certain references implicating Turpin in Neckel’s fraud and
conspiracy. Turpin had originally been named as a third-party
defendant, like Neckel, in an intervening complaint by the
Defendant/Third Party Plaintiff, Sharpe, for claims of fraud,
conspiracy, and accounting malpractice. However, Turpin previously
had been granted summary judgment, dismissing all the claims against
Turpin.
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Next, we address Neckel’s claim that the judgment
against him was entered by a trial judge who should not have
been presiding over the case because he had previously
disqualified himself.
The relevant facts are as follows.
The original judge in this action from the time of its
May 14, 1997, filing until January 16, 1998, was the Honorable
William T. Cain.
Then, Judge Cain entered an order certifying
the need for the assignment of a special judge because he was
disqualified from presiding over the case by reason of
KRS 26A.015(2)(a).
KRS 26A.015(2) sets forth certain
circumstances under which “[a]ny justice or judge of the Court
of Justice . . . shall disqualify himself in any proceeding.”
KRS 26A.015(2)(a) specifically requires a judge to disqualify
himself from any proceeding “[w]here he has a personal bias or
prejudice concerning a party, or personal knowledge of disputed
evidentiary facts concerning the proceedings, or has expressed
an opinion concerning the merits of the proceeding.”
Judge Cain
did not further specify which of these three grounds of
disqualification was applicable.12
12
Neckel theorizes that the basis of the disqualification was a close
relationship between Judge Cain’s wife and Neckel’s then-wife, whom
Neckel allegedly divorced or was in the process of divorcing under
less than amicable circumstances while this case was ongoing.
However, this is purely speculative as there is no evidence in the
record to support this theory.
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According to the provisions of the Regional
Administration Program Charter,13 the Chief Regional
Administrative Judge of the Cumberland Region, the Honorable
Lewis B. Hopper, assigned the case to the Honorable Paul Barry
Jones, who presided over the case until his retirement in Spring
2000.
On April 13, 2000, Judge Hopper re-assigned the case to
the Honorable James G. Weddle, who presided over it until
May 31, 2000.
Then Judge Hopper issued an order reassigning the
case to Judge Cain, based on his understanding that this is what
Judges Cain and Weddle previously had agreed to.
This reassignment order made no mention of the fact
that Judge Cain had already disqualified himself from the case.
Likewise, Judge Cain did not address his previous disqualification upon his return to the case.
Similarly, none of the
parties filed a motion for him to recuse or otherwise objected
at that time.
Neckel first raised the issue some three and one-
half years later in his January 6, 2004, motion to alter, amend,
or vacate the December 31, 2003, judgment against him.
In Dotson v. Burchett,14
Kentucky’s highest court
declined to establish a per se rule forbidding a judge who has
13
The Regional Administration Program Charter was adopted pursuant to
§§ 110(5)(b) and 112(4) of the Kentucky Constitution to affect
regional administration of circuit, district, and family courts,
subject to the supervision and control of the Chief Justice of the
Kentucky Supreme Court.
14
301 Ky. 28, 190 S.W.2d 697 (1945).
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recused from a case from ever again presiding over the case,15
reasoning that “[j]urisdiction to make an order necessarily
carries with it the power of revision and of revocation when it
has been granted improvidently or erroneously, particularly an
interlocutory order.”16
The court was concerned with a situation
where a judge might recuse based on an erroneous assumption of
facts, such as a mistaken belief of kinship to one of the
parties, then discover the error or might recuse for a valid
reason which is later eliminated.17
But, recognizing the dangers
inherent in letting a judge who has recused reassume control of
a case, the Dotson court required that the facts supporting the
judge’s remittal of recusal be clearly shown in the record to
permit adequate judicial review.
The court explained as
follows:
It is not sufficient for the judge to enter
an order merely saying he is not
disqualified. Since an order refusing to
vacate when sufficient grounds have been
established is a reversible error, so is an
order by which jurisdiction of the case is
again assumed if it was not proper to do so.
Under such circumstances, we think it should
affirmatively appear that there is no
disqualifying fact at the time, the
15
Id. at 699-700.
16
Id. at 699.
17
Id.
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presumption to the contrary existing by
reason of the previous action and order.18
However, where a judge who has properly recused based on a
correct assessment of the facts and who remains disqualified
attempts to reassume control over a case, the rule is as set
forth in Wedding v. Lair:19
the judge, “having voluntarily
vacated the bench in this particular case, [loses] jurisdiction
forever in the absence of an agreement of the parties.”20
Judge Cain’s 1998 recusal created the presumption that
he remained disqualified.
Thus, when he reassumed control over
the case as a result of the Chief Regional Administrative
Judge’s May 31, 2000, order, Judge Cain had the burden to
establish affirmatively that he was no longer disqualifiedthat
his earlier disqualification had been based on erroneous facts
or that the reason for it had been eliminated.
occurred.
This never
The record does not even reveal which specific
provision of KRS 26A.015(2)(a) Judge Cain’s disqualification was
based on, much less whether this disqualification was based on
18
Id. at 700.
19
404 S.W.2d 451 (Ky. 1966).
20
Id. at 452-453. The judge in Wedding had disqualified himself for
previously assisting in the prosecution of the case. Id. at 452.
He was not mistaken about this fact; and this is not the type of
ground for disqualification which can be, subsequently, eliminated
through the passage of time. Therefore, he was permanently barred
from presiding over the case.
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mistake or the reasons for it later have been eliminated.
This
should be reversible error according to Dotson.
Yet, Dotson also qualifies when this affirmative
showing by the formerly disqualified judge of the elimination of
the disqualifying factor is required:
made.”21
“if timely objection is
Thus, we must consider the effect of Neckel’s failure
to challenge Judge Cain’s resumption of the case on May 31,
2000, until Neckel’s January 6, 2003, motion to alter, amend, or
vacate the judgment against him.
One possibility is that Neckel
waived his right to challenge Judge Cain’s failure to recuse.
But this Court explained in Small v. Commonwealth22 that the
waiver of the right to challenge a judge’s failure to disqualify
under KRS 26A.015(2)(a) “may be made under proper circumstances,
either in writing or on the record, but will not be presumed
from silence.”23
Our Supreme Court later acknowledged in
Commonwealth v. Carter that Small set forth the proper procedure
for waiver concerning violations of KRS 26A.015(2)(a).24
In
21
190 S.W.2d at 700.
22
617 S.W.2d 61 (Ky.App. 1981).
23
Id. at 62.
24
701 S.W.2d 409, 410-11 (Ky. 1985) (adding, however, that the burden
of demonstrating disqualification is on the defendant to show on the
record that the judge in question was aware of his connection with
the matter in controversy where the allegation is that the judge
previously rendered a legal opinion as an attorney in the matter in
controversy in violation of KRS 26A.015(2)(b)). See also,
Nichols v. Commonwealth, 839 S.W.2d 263, 266 (Ky. 1992) (holding
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Abell v. Oliver,25 the Supreme Court rejected an argument that
the defendant/appellant waived the issue of the trial judge’s
failure to disqualify herself under KRS 26A.015(2)(d); Supreme
Court Rule (SCR) 1.10(a); and SCR 4.300, the Kentucky Code of
Judicial Conduct, Canon 3E(1)(d)(ii),26 in part, because the
proper procedures for remittal of disqualification found in
CR 4.300, Canon 3F,27 were not followed, including the
requirement that the waiver or remittal be in writing.28
that the failure to state whether the question of recusal was
properly preserved is not necessarily fatal to judicial review of
the issue because of the rule set forth in Small and Carter). But
see Bussell v. Commonwealth, 882 S.W.2d 111, 113 (Ky. 1994) (stating
that “[a] motion for recusal should be made immediately upon
discovery of the facts upon which the disqualification rests.
Otherwise, it will be waived.”) (citations omitted). However, an
examination of Bussell suggests that this language with regard to
waiver is merely dicta because the case did not involve an alleged
waiver by silence; the party protesting the trial judge’s failure to
recuse made a prompt, explicit, oral waiver of the issue of recusal
on the record when the issue was first raised by the trial judge
which would satisfy Small, Carter, and Nichols. Id. at 112. Then
the party filed a written motion to recuse five months after his
oral waiver of the issue and only six days before trial. Id.
Therefore, Bussell is more properly considered a case about
equitable estoppel by delay or laches, as discussed below, rather
than waiver.
25
117 S.W.3d 661 (Ky.App. 2003).
26
The trial judge’s husband was an associate or employee of the law
firm representing the plaintiff/appellee. Id. at 662.
27
SCR 4.300, Canon 3(F) states as follows:
Remittal of Disqualification. A judge disqualified by the terms of
Section 3E may disclose on the record the basis of the judge’s
disqualification and may ask the parties and their lawyers to
consider, out of the presence of the judge, whether to waive
disqualification. If following disclosure of any basis for
disqualification other than personal bias or prejudice concerning a
party, the parties and lawyers, without participation by the judge,
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In the instant case, Neckel never waived any
disqualification of Judge Cain on the record or in writing.
Certainly, there was no remittal of a conflict under the
procedures set forth in SCR 4.300, Canon 3F.29
Under these
circumstances, this Court cannot conclude that Neckel waived his
right to object to Judge Cain’s participation in the case.
But our analysis does not end here.
We also must
consider whether Neckel is precluded from raising the issue of
Judge Cain’s disqualification because of equitable estoppel by
delay or laches.30
While a waiver is a voluntary and intentional
relinquishment of a known right, an equitable estoppel may arise
even absent the estopped party’s intention to relinquish or
all agree that the judge should not be disqualified, and the judge
is then willing to participate, the judge may participate in the
proceeding. The agreement, signed by all parties and lawyers, shall
be incorporated in the record of the proceeding.
28
Abell, supra at 663. The court’s holding was also based on the fact
that the court declined to impute the knowledge of counsel for the
defendant/appellant concerning the judge’s conflict to the
defendant/appellant. Id.
29
It is noteworthy that one of the three grounds for disqualification
included under KRS 26A.015(2)(a), the statutory provision which
Judge Cain cited in his initial order seeking the assignment of a
special judge, is personal bias or prejudice concerning a party.
But SCR 4.300, Canon 3F, specifically excludes the possibility of
remittal of a conflict based on personal bias or prejudice
concerning a party. Such a conflict cannot be waived, even with the
consent of the parties.
30
Though they once had distinct meanings, the nuances historically
separating laches from equitable estoppel by delay largely have been
lost such that the two are used virtually interchangeably now.
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change an existing right.31
Equitable estoppel has been defined
as “a judicial remedy by which a party may be precluded by [the
party’s] own act or omission from asserting a right to which
[the party] otherwise would have been entitled.”32
One
circumstance in which equitable estoppel may be invoked is where
a party’s unreasonable delay prejudices others such that it
would be inequitable to allow that party to reverse an earlier
course of action.33
Or, as Kentucky’s highest court has stated
on equitable estoppel, “[i]t is often the case that a man may be
denied a right which he may have asserted because of his neglect
to do something which he should have done at a proper time.”34
Delay without prejudice does not warrant equitable estoppel.35
But what measure of delay with prejudice merits equitable
estoppel is a question of fact to be determined by the
circumstances of each case.36
31
28 Am.Jur.2d Estoppel and Waiver § 36 (2000). However, the line
dividing waiver and equitable estoppel often becomes blurred where
the matter concerns implied rather than express waiver. Id. at
§ 37.
32
Id. at § 28.
33
Colston Inv. Co. v. Home Supply Co., 74 S.W.3d 759, 768 (Ky.App.
2001) (using the term “laches” rather than “equitable estoppel”).
34
P.V. & K. Coal Co. v. Kelly, 301 Ky. 180, 191 S.W.2d 231, 234 (Ky.
1945).
35
Fightmaster v. Leffler, 556 S.W.2d 180, 183 (Ky.App. 1977).
36
Weiand v. Board of Trustees of Kentucky Ret. Sys., 25 S.W.3d 88, 9192 (Ky. 2000).
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In the instant case, Neckel waited a little over three
and one-half years after Judge Hopper’s May 31, 2000, order
reassigning the case to Judge Cain before raising the issue of
Judge Cain’s earlier disqualification from the case.
In fact,
he waited until his motion to alter, amend, or vacate the
judgment was entered against him on December 31, 2003.
Meanwhile, Sharpe litigated the case in good faith, attempting
to bring it to resolution, expending legal fees in the process.
During this time, Neckel filed a continuance less than one month
before a scheduled trial,37 failed to show up on numerous
occasions,38 and made himself unavailable for deposition,39
delaying the preparation of the case to the detriment of Sharpe.
His waiting over three and one-half years until after judgment
was rendered against him to argue that Judge Cain was
37
This motion, which was subsequently granted, was filed January 29,
2003. Despite the fact that Neckel, apparently, had shared counsel
with Envy Houseboats since the case’s inception in 1997, Neckel
claimed that circumstances had changed and he needed separate
counsel. Almost immediately after Neckel obtained separate counsel,
his new attorney moved to withdraw from the case in April 2003
because he had been unable to communicate with Neckel since shortly
after the hearing in which he was granted a continuance.
38
Neckel failed to appear at, or send a legal representative to, a
pretrial conference on May 16, 2003; a court-ordered deposition on
November 24, 2003; a show-cause hearing on December 5, 2003, about
the failure to appear at the deposition; the rescheduled courtordered deposition on December 19, 2003 (notably rescheduled at the
request of Neckel’s own attorney); and a trial date on December 30,
2003. Each time he pled lack of notice or lack of sufficient
notice.
39
See n.38.
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disqualified from presiding over the case appears to be, yet,
another attempt to delay the resolution of the case.
Under
these circumstances, we find that Neckel is now barred from
raising the issue of Judge Cain’s disqualification by the
doctrine of equitable estoppel by delay.
C.
Neckel waived the issue of any error concerning
notice of the December 29, 2003, trial date.
Neckel also challenges the judgment against him on the
ground that he had insufficient notice of the December 30, 2003,
trial date.
The trial, initially scheduled for a later date,
was rescheduled for December 30, 2003, in a December 23, 2003,
order.
This order was entered shortly after Neckel failed to
appear for a court-ordered deposition for the second time.40
The
distribution list for the order indicates that a copy was sent
to Neckel at his Florida address.41
On December 29, 2003, Neckel
sent a fax to Sharpe’s counsel, John G. Prather, and to the
trial court, stating that he had just been apprised of the trial
date scheduled for the following day by his former attorney.42
40
Id.
41
Neckel has never disputed that this address is his correct address.
Indeed, it is the address listed on his correspondence with the
trial court, including a letter, dated December 1, 2003, and the fax
of December 29, 2003.
42
He also claimed to have been unaware of his former counsel’s
withdrawal until then. This attorney orally was granted permission
to withdraw by the trial court on December 19, 2003, as reflected in
the trial court’s December 23, 2003, order.
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He claimed that he had no money and would be unable to travel43
or attend the trial.
He further stated that he lacked the money
for an attorney but, regardless, would be unable to find anyone
to represent him with less than twenty-four hours’ notice.
He
asserted that even if he could borrow money to pay for an
attorney, he would need time to do so and to locate an attorney.
Then, he made the following statements:
“I have no alternative
but to consent to a default judgment regarding this case at this
time.
I consent to that default judgment, with the under-
standing there will be no contempt charges and this case is
over.”
As is discussed below, Neckel failed to appear at trial;
and a judgment was entered against him on all claims.
Neckel asserts that his due process rights were
violated because he did not have sufficient notice of the
December 30, 2003, trial date.
However, he has waived any error
concerning notice which may have occurred.44
While he complained
43
Neckel resided at this time in Florida. As for his finances, Sharpe
speculated that Neckel was planning to declare bankruptcy; although,
there is no evidence in the record to support this.
44
We make no decision concerning whether or not any error occurred
with regard to notice. But we note that some evidence in the record
suggests that if Neckel failed to receive actual notice of the trial
date prior to December 29, 2003, it may have been due to his own
conduct. On December 30, 2003, Sharpe’s counsel introduced into
evidence a photocopy of an envelope addressed to Sharpe at his
Florida address with the return address of Sharpe’s counsel.44 This
envelope, which, apparently, was postmarked November 29, 2003, and
sent by certified mail, was returned to Sharpe’s counsel as
unclaimed, despite notations by the post office that attempts to
notify Neckel or deliver the letter had been made on 12-01, 12-6,
and 12-16. Sharpe’s counsel testified that letters sent to Neckel
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of receiving short notice of the trial date in his December 29,
2003, fax, Neckel never asked for a continuance.
Moreover, in
his pro se motion to alter, amend, or vacate the December 31,
2003, judgment against him, Neckel raises many issues but makes
no mention of any deficiency in notice.
“It is a matter of
fundamental law that the trial court should be given an
opportunity to consider an issue, so an appellate court will not
review an issue not previously raised in the trial court."45
Because Neckel failed to preserve the issue of notice before the
trial court, we may not review it now.
D.
Neckel fully consented to the judgment.
Next, we address Neckel’s claim that he consented to a
default judgment only on the promissory note.
He asserts that
the trial court improperly exceeded the scope of this consent by
entering a judgment on the pleadings on all of the claims
against Neckel.
When Neckel failed to appear at trial,46
Sharpe’s counsel moved for a judgment against Neckel based on
at his Florida address via certified mail and bearing the return
address of the law firm, repeatedly had been returned as unclaimed.
However, when they sent Neckel a “ghost” letter, a letter in an
unmarked envelope, mailed first-class postage but not certified, to
the same address, it was not returned. This suggests that Neckel
was intentionally refusing to claim or accept what appeared to be
legal correspondence concerning this case.
45
Marksberry v. Chandler, 126 S.W.3d 747, 753-754 (Ky.App. 2003).
46
No legal representative appeared on Neckel’s behalf because he was,
once again, between attorneys.
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the fax sent the previous day.
When the trial court indicated
its willingness to grant a default judgment by consent against
Neckel based on this fax, Sharpe requested that the judgment be
styled a “judgment on the pleadings” since he did not think that
“default judgment” was the appropriate term since Neckel had
made an appearance in the case.
Sharpe also specifically
indicated that he wanted a judgment on the fraud claim because
he feared that Neckel was planning to file bankruptcy.47
The
December 31, 2003, judgment states that after finding that
Neckel “would consent to a default judgment, ‘with the
understanding that there will be no contempt charges’ and the
Defendant/Third Party Plaintiff [Sharpe] having agreed to
withdraw [his] Motion for sanctions for contempt,” the trial
court heard evidence and made the following additional findings:
1.
2.
47
That the Third Party Defendant Thomas
Neckel has agreed to a default judgment
in this matter and that the Court would
therefore grant the same to the Third
Party Plaintiff [Sharpe];
That the Third Party Plaintiff has
requested that, in lieu of a default
judgment, that the Court deem the
defenses of the Third Party Defendant
withdrawn and grant a Judgment on the
Pleadings to the Third Party Plaintiff,
and the Court now so orders, and the
Third Party Defendant [sic] is granted
Judgment against the Third Party
Sharpe’s assumption here, rightly or wrongly, is that Neckel would
not be able to discharge a judgment based on fraud in bankruptcy.
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Defendant on all causes, and against
the Plaintiff [Envy Houseboats] on all
issues regarding the promissory note.48
Neckel does not object to the judgment against him on
the promissory note.
But he asserts that the judgment entered
against him on the fraud and conspiracy claims exceeded his
consent granted in the December 29, 2003, fax.
He asserts that
he consented only to a judgment against him on the promissory
note.
A consent agreement is a type of contract and, as
such, is governed by contract law.49
The trial court’s role is
merely to determine what the parties agreed upon and enter a
judgment encompassing the terms of this consent agreement.50
The
construction and interpretation of a contract are questions of
law.51
Therefore, we apply de novo review to the trial court’s
interpretation of the consent agreement as contained in the
consent judgment.52
In the absence of ambiguity, a written
contract is to be interpreted strictly according to its terms,
48
Clearly, the trial court intended to state that the third party
plaintiff is granted judgment against the third party defendant and
the plaintiff.
49
Island Creek Coal Co. v. Wells, 113 S.W.3d 100, 103 (Ky. 2003).
50
46 Am.Jur. 2d Judgments § 208 (1994).
51
First Commonwealth Bank of Prestonsburg v. West, 55 S.W.3d 829, 835
(Ky.App. 2000).
52
Island Creek Coal Co., supra at 103.
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consistent with the ordinary meaning of language, and without
resort to extrinsic evidence.53
Neckel asserts that the scope of his consent was
limited specifically to a default judgment concerning the
promissory note and did not extend to the claims of fraud or
conspiracy.
But, in his fax, he stated as follows:
“I have no
alternative but to consent to a default judgment regarding this
case at this time.
I consent to that default judgment, with the
understanding there will be no contempt charges and this case is
over.”
This agreement is unambiguous and should be
interpreted strictly according to its own terms.
Nowhere does
Neckel limit his consent to the promissory note or state that he
does not consent to a judgment concerning the fraud and
conspiracy claims.
“this case.”
Instead, he twice refers to a judgment in
Based on its ordinary meaning, “this case” means
the case as a whole, not an individual claim in a case with
multiple claims.
This meaning is made even clearer by Neckel’s
demand that after the judgment is entered that “this case is
over.”
This demonstrates a desire for finality which would not
be served by merely consenting to a judgment on one claim while
leaving the other claims undecided.
Also, he expressly stated
his condition that there be no contempt charges.
53
If he wanted
Frear v. P.T.A. Indus., Inc., 103 S.W.3d 99, 105 (Ky. 2003).
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to avoid judgment on the fraud and contempt claims, he could
have reserved that as an express condition, as well.
Neckel asserts that Sharpe’s counsel made a material
misrepresentation to him that the default judgment would only be
on the promissory note.54
of the consent agreement.
Thus, he seeks to attack the validity
However, Neckel never raised the
issue of material misrepresentation in his motion to alter,
amend, or vacate at the trial level.
And he may not raise this
issue for the first time before this Court.55
Based on the principles of contract law, the trial
court correctly interpreted the consent agreement between Neckel
and Sharpe to mean that Neckel agreed to have a judgment entered
against him on all claims in return for Sharpe’s agreement to
drop contempt charges and for finality in the case.
This is the
agreement which the trial court incorporated into its consent
judgment.
The fact that the trial court called it a “judgment
on the pleadings,” pursuant to Sharpe’s wishes, rather than a
consent judgment, does not change the fact that the court
properly entered this judgment based on the consent of the
parties.
Likewise, Sharpe’s motivation for seeking a judgment
on the fraud claim is irrelevant because Neckel had consented to
54
At oral argument, Sharpe’s counsel denied ever having any such
discussion with Neckel.
55
See Kennedy v. Commonwealth, 544 S.W.2d 219, 222 (Ky. 1976) (stating
that “[t]he appellants will not be permitted to feed one can of
worms to the trial judge and another to the appellate court”).
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a judgment against him on all of the claims, including the fraud
claim.
Therefore, we affirm the trial court’s December 31,
2003, judgment as a proper consent judgment.
The disposition of the case on the ground that the
trial court entered a valid consent judgment disposes of
Neckel’s claim that there was insufficient factual evidence to
support the judgment against him on the fraud and conspiracy
claims.
“Consent excuses error and ends all contention or
controversy between the parties within the scope of the
judgment.
It leaves nothing for the court to do, but to enter
what the parties have agreed upon, and when so entered, the
parties themselves are concluded.”56
Since this judgment was
based on the consent of the parties, the factual evidence, or
lack thereof, supporting liability on the merits of the fraud
and conspiracy claims is not relevant.
IV.
DISPOSITION.
For all of the reasons discussed in this opinion, we
affirm the judgment of the Pulaski Circuit Court against the
Appellant Thomas E. Neckel, Sr.
ALL CONCUR.
56
46 Am.Jur. 2d Judgments § 208 (1994).
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BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
Brian P. Gilfedder
Lexington, Kentucky
BRIEF AND ORAL ARGUMENT FOR
APPELLEE:
John G. Prather, Jr.
Winter R. Huff
Somerset, Kentucky
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