JERRY W. LEONARD V. CITY OF LEBANON JUNCTION; GEORGE HALK, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS MAYOR OF CITY OF LEBANON JUNCTION, KENTUCKY; JOHN R. OLLER, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS CHIEF OF POLICE OF CITY OF LEBANON JUNCTION, KENTUCKY; AND BILLY MARAMAN, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS COUNCIL MEMBER OF CITY OF LEBANON JUNCTION, KENTUCKY
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RENDERED:
FEBRUARY 11, 2005; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2004-CA-000328-MR
JERRY W. LEONARD
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM BULLITT CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE THOMAS L. WALLER, JUDGE
CIVIL ACTION NO. 02-CI-00197
V.
CITY OF LEBANON JUNCTION;
GEORGE HALK, INDIVIDUALLY
AND AS MAYOR OF CITY OF
LEBANON JUNCTION, KENTUCKY;
JOHN R. OLLER, INDIVIDUALLY
AND AS CHIEF OF POLICE OF CITY
OF LEBANON JUNCTION, KENTUCKY;
AND BILLY MARAMAN, INDIVIDUALLY
AND AS COUNCIL MEMBER OF CITY
OF LEBANON JUNCTION, KENTUCKY
APPELLEES
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
COMBS, CHIEF JUDGE; JOHNSON AND MINTON, JUDGES.
MINTON, JUDGE:
The involuntary dismissal of a civil action is a
severe sanction for a trial court to impose.
But when a party
willfully fails to answer interrogatories, the trial court may
do so in the exercise of its sound discretion.
Jerry W. Leonard
made the conscious decision to disregard the circuit court’s
order compelling him to answer interrogatories.
The question we
are asked to review is whether the trial court abused its
discretion by involuntarily dismissing Leonard’s action for so
doing.
Since we hold that the trial court did not abuse its
discretion, we affirm.
FACTUAL SUMMARY
Leonard was hired as a probationary police officer for
the City of Lebanon Junction.
Although Leonard disputes the
“probationary” nature of his employment, the record clearly
reflects and the trial court affirmatively found that on June 8,
2001, Leonard signed a document indicating his position would be
probationary for a period not to exceed six months.
On
December 6, 2001, two days before the six-month probationary
period ended, Leonard was asked to resign.
resign.
He refused to
So the City fired him.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Leonard filed his complaint pro se on March 6, 2002,
in Bullitt Circuit Court.
The complaint alleged wrongful
termination, defamation, slander, and damage to reputation and
standing.
Before either party had taken any discovery, Leonard
filed a Motion for Summary Judgment.
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The court denied the
motion because it was premature.
Leonard then filed a Motion
for Reconsideration, which was also denied.
The parties proceeded with discovery.
Leonard
submitted lengthy interrogatories to the City and to each
individual defendant.
The City objected to the entire set
interrogatories; specifically, it claimed that the
interrogatories violated CR1 33.01(3).
The court ordered a
hearing for December 2, 2002, to consider all objections and
responses.
Less than a week later and over a month before the
objections were to be heard, Leonard filed a motion to compel
discovery.
He also filed a “Motion for Order of Judgment Lien
Lis Pendens Records” (sic), a motion for a protective order to
prevent the taking of his deposition, and a motion to disqualify
counsel for the City.
In the interim, the City responded to Leonard’s
requests for admissions.
Thereafter, Leonard filed a Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment.
On December 2, 2002, the hearing was held regarding
the City’s objections to interrogatories; the City was ordered
to state specifically its objection to each interrogatory.
second hearing was scheduled to ensure the City’s compliance
A
with the court’s order.
1
Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure.
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On December 6, 2002, the City filed a motion to
schedule a hearing on all pending, unresolved motions.
And on
December 30, 2002, the City filed answers and objections to
Leonard’s interrogatories.
the City’s answers.
Leonard apparently disagreed with
So he filed another motion to compel
answers to his interrogatories, asserting the defendants
“wrongly filed objections and claimed objections and, for the
most part, refused to answer Plaintiff’s Interrogatories
. . . .”
On March 17, 2003, a hearing was held on all pending
motions.
The court ordered as follows:
Leonard’s motions to
disqualify defense counsel, for partial summary judgment, for
lis pendens liens, and for a protective order were denied; his
motions to examine his records located at City Hall and to
compel the defendants to answer interrogatories were granted.
Leonard responded to the order with a Motion for Reconsideration
and to Reverse, Vacate, or Amend and Motion to Strike, and
Motion for Change of Venue.
Two months later, the City filed a motion for summary
judgment.
In support of its motion, the City claimed that
because Leonard was a probationary employee who was fired before
the expiration of his probationary period, he could not bring a
wrongful discharge action.
Since this was the crux of Leonard’s
complaint, the City claimed that summary judgment was the only
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appropriate remedy.
On June 3, 2003, an order partially
granting the City’s motion for summary judgment was entered.
The order granted the motion to the extent of Leonard’s claim of
wrongful discharge.
Leonard’s claims for defamation, slander,
and violation of due process remained in the litigation.
Leonard filed a motion for reconsideration and to
reverse, vacate, or amend the court’s order granting summary
judgment.
His motion was denied.
So Leonard filed a Notice of
Appeal.
Thereafter, the court ordered that the trial date in
this action be remanded.
Since Leonard had filed an appeal, the
court found that “judicial economy would be best served” if the
trial was stayed until all issues, including those on appeal,
could be addressed.
Before Leonard’s appeal, but after the order granting
summary judgment, the City submitted interrogatories to Leonard.
Leonard refused to answer.
a Motion to Compel.
On November 14, 2003, the City filed
Three days later, the Court of Appeals
entered an order dismissing Leonard’s appeal because it was
interlocutory and, therefore, not appealable.
In response to the City’s Motion to Compel, Leonard
responded with his own cross-motion to compel, and a motion for
fees and costs.
The court responded by ordering Leonard to
respond to the City’s interrogatories within thirty days.
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Leonard replied with a motion to reverse, vacate, or amend the
court’s order.
However, on January 17, 2004, Leonard tendered
his answers to the interrogatories.
In response to the City’s
questions, Leonard initially objected but then stated that “all
allegations have been duly set forth in the complaint duly filed
in this cause of action in this instant case and defendants are
referred to the complaint.”
The City responded with a Motion to Dismiss and a
Supplemental Motion to Dismiss.
The original motion was based
on Leonard’s continued failure to comply with the court’s order;
however, after receiving Leonard’s answers, the City filed a
supplemental motion to dismiss based also on the insufficiency
of his response.
On February 2, 2004, the court entered an order
granting the City’s motion to dismiss.
The court stated that
after viewing the record and considering Leonard’s failure to
comply with CR 37.04, the action should be dismissed with
prejudice.
In its subsequent findings of fact, conclusions of
law, and judgment, the court held that Leonard had failed to
object to the City’s interrogatories; that his answers to the
interrogatories did not comply with CR 33.01; that his refusal
to answer was conscious and intentional; and that he failed to
provide the court with any reason for the delay.
follows.
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This appeal
Leonard argues that the Bullitt Circuit Court abused
its discretion when it dismissed his action with prejudice.
We
disagree.
CR 37.04 states that if a party fails to answer or
properly object to interrogatories, the court may take any
action authorized under CR 37.02(2)(a), (b), or (c).
Under
CR 37.02(2)(c), it is within the court’s discretion to dismiss
an action or proceeding or to render a judgment by default
against the “disobedient” party.
The involuntary dismissal of an action is undoubtedly
a severe sanction to impose upon a party; in Polk v. Wimsatt,2
the Court held that “[b]ecause of the grave consequences of a
dismissal with prejudice . . . [it] should be resorted to only
in the most extreme cases.”3
The rule permitting a court to
involuntarily dismiss an action “envisions a consciousness and
intentional failure to comply with the provisions thereof.”4
Since the result is harsh, “the propriety of the invocation of
the Rule must be examined in regard to the conduct of the party
against whom it is invoked.”5
2
689 S.W.2d 363 (Ky. 1985).
3
Id. at 364, 365.
4
Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Company v. Carrier, 426 S.W.2d 938, 940
(Ky. 1968).
5
Id. at 941.
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Nonetheless, there are cases where dismissal of an
action may be the most appropriate remedy.
The standard of
review in such circumstances is whether the trial court’s
decision was an abuse of discretion.6
The court’s discretion is
not “unbridled” but, rather, rests “upon a finding of
willfulness or bad faith on behalf of the party to be
sanctioned.”7
Because “reasonable compliance” with the Civil
Rules is necessary for the “effective administration of
justice . . . [t]he proper application and utilization of those
Rules should be left largely to the supervision of the trial
judge.”8
So we must respect the trial court’s “exercise of sound
judicial discretion in [its] enforcement”9 of the rules.
In Ward v. Housman,10 this Court suggested six factors
that trial courts should consider before involuntarily
dismissing an action.
Those factors, which were originally
proposed by the United States Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit, are:
the extent of the party’s personal
responsibility; the history of dilatoriness; whether the
attorney’s conduct was willful and in bad faith; meritoriousness
6
Greathouse v. American National Bank and Trust Co., 796 S.W.2d 868,
870 (Ky.App. 1990).
7
Id.
8
Naïve v. Jones, 353 S.W.2d 365, 367 (Ky. 1961).
9
Id.
10
809 S.W.2d 717 (Ky.App. 1991).
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of the claim; prejudice to the other party; and alternative
sanctions.11
To determine the propriety of the dismissal of
Leonard’s action, we will discuss the matter pursuant to the
factors enumerated in Ward.
1.
The extent of the party’s personal responsibility.
Because Leonard represented himself, his personal
responsibility with regard to this case was extensive.
It
would, in fact, be impossible for us to hold that Leonard was
not totally responsible for his failure to answer the City’s
interrogatories.
Leonard filed his own complaint, all of his
own motions, and represented himself at hearings before the
court.
He affirmatively chose not to answer the
interrogatories; therefore, we feel that the extent of his
personal responsibility has been fully established and do not
believe that further discussion of this factor is warranted.
2.
The history of dilatoriness.
The record does not reflect a broad history of
dilatoriness in this action.
Although this case has been
pending for over two and a half years, it does not appear that
blame for the delay can necessarily be placed with either party.
11
Scarborough v. Eubanks, 747 F.2d 871, 874-878 (3rd Cir. 1984); see
also, Ward, supra at 719.
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For the most part, the delays were the result of scheduling
conflicts—both with the parties and the court.
Therefore, we do
not believe this factor is significant to the disposition of
this case.
3.
Whether the attorney’s conduct was willful and in bad faith.
Because Leonard was acting as his own attorney, the
question is whether Leonard’s own conduct was willful and in bad
faith.
We believe it was.
The City’s interrogatories were originally filed on
August 5, 2003.
After three months without a response from
Leonard, the City filed its motion to compel.
Leonard claimed
the interrogatories were improperly submitted because the case
was originally set for trial on June 21, 2003; so he argued
discovery had ended, and the City’s interrogatories were
untimely.
Specifically, Leonard stated, “defendants seek to
reopen discovery and this is not appropriate.
This would be the
equivalent to one party wanting to reopen discovery in the
middle of a trial.”
We note that Leonard never filed objections to the
City’s interrogatories under CR 33.01, and he failed to take
into account the fact that the case was not tried in June 2003
because of his pending interlocutory appeal.
The purpose of
setting a date for the conclusion of discovery is to prevent
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delays in the trial date.
Since a new trial date had not been
set, there was no reason that discovery could not continue.
Therefore, the City’s submission of interrogatories was proper;
and the reasons stated for Leonard’s refusal to answer were
without merit.
After the court entered its order compelling Leonard
to answer the City’s interrogatories, Leonard responded with a
motion to reverse, vacate, or amend the court’s order.
Apparently still miffed by what he considered to be the City’s
insufficient responses to his own interrogatories, Leonard
stated:
Defendants have wrongfully filed objections
and claimed objections and, for the most
part, refused to answer Plaintiff’s
Interrogatories in violation of the Kentucky
Rules of Civil Procedure. Plaintiff is
rightfully entitled under the rules to
require defendants to make proper answer to
the interrogatories propounded to them.
Plaintiff has rightly, properly and legal
[sic] refused to answer further
interrogatories improperly propounded to him
by Defendants, et al, in violation of the
rules of discovery and in as much as
discovery has long since ended since the
above styled case was originally set for
trial in July [sic] 2003 and this case was
continued upon the motion of the court due
to its schedule.
The gist of Leonard’s argument is that because the
City did not respond to his interrogatories the way he wanted
them to respond, he should not be required to answer the City’s
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interrogatories.
By consciously refusing to answer the City’s
interrogatories and failing to comply with the court’s order, we
conclude that Leonard’s conduct was willful and in bad faith.
4.
Meritoriousness of the claim.
Summary judgment was granted in this case on Leonard’s
claim of wrongful discharge; however, the matters of defamation,
slander, and violation of due process were reserved.
The
circuit court did not make any findings with regard to these
issues.
In Scarborough, the Court stated:
For purposes of dismissal, a claim will be
considered meritorious when the allegations
of the pleading, if established at trial,
would support recovery by plaintiff. The
meritoriousness of the claim for this
purpose must be evaluated on the basis of
the facial validity of the pleadings, and
not on summary judgment standards.12
Looking solely at the facial validity of the
pleadings, we do not believe that the reserved issues in this
case have any merit.
Leonard repeatedly argues that his
termination was unlawful because the City failed to follow the
requirements of KRS 15.520.
Leonard’s termination.
But KRS 15.520 does not apply to
That statute specifically applies to the
manner of investigation and hearing required when a complaint is
filed against an officer.
12
Scarborough, supra at 875.
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Although a complaint was filed against Leonard, he
again fails to take into consideration the fact that he was a
probationary employee.
As such, he could be fired at will,
without reason, during the first six months of his employment.
Leonard’s employment was terminated before the expiration of
that six-month period.
So the City was not required to adhere
to the procedures set forth in KRS 15.520.
Therefore, we do not
believe that the failure to proceed under KRS 15.520 violated
Leonard’s right to due process.
Nor do we believe that the
City’s failure to adhere to KRS 15.520 prompted claims of
defamation and slander.
KRS 15.520 states that no public
statements may be made regarding alleged violations while a
complaint is pending.
Leonard claims that the City made public
statements about his termination in violation of this statute.
But because KRS 15.520 does not apply to Leonard’s termination,
any alleged public statements made about the conditions of his
termination would not violate the statute.
In his complaint,
Leonard specifically states:
38. Notwithstanding KRS 15.520, that prior
to Officer Leonard’s termination of
employment by Chief Oller, that Council
Member Billy Maraman did make public
statements on the charges and further stated
that Mayor Halk was going to terminate
Officer Leonard’s employment, thereby
defaming Officer Leonard and causing damages
to the Plaintiff in his person and his good
name and reputation and standing in the
community.
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We do not believe that this, or any other allegation
regarding alleged defamatory or slanderous remarks made by the
City, is meritorious.
Therefore, based on this factor, the
court’s dismissal of the action was proper.
5.
Prejudice to the other party.
The examples of prejudice cited by the Court in
Scarborough include “irretrievable loss of evidence, the
inevitable dimming of witnesses’ memories, or the excessive and
possibly irremediable burdens or costs imposed on the opposing
party.”13
The City does not claim that Leonard’s failure to
answer interrogatories caused it any quantifiable prejudice.
Likewise, we do not see that any prejudice resulted.
So this
factor weighs in favor of Leonard.
6.
Alternative sanctions.
Admittedly, there were other, less severe sanctions
the court could have imposed on Leonard.
Under CR 37.02(2),
other available sanctions include “[a]n order refusing to allow
the disobedient party to support or oppose designated claims or
defenses, or prohibiting him from introducing designated matters
in evidence”;14 “[a]n order striking out pleadings or parts
13
Id. at 876.
14
CR 37.02(2)(b).
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thereof”;15 or “an order treating as a contempt of court the
failure to obey any orders . . . .”16
However, as previously discussed, the decision to
impose a sanction on a party is within the discretion of the
trial court.
In this case, the court opted for the harsher
alternative of involuntarily dismissing Leonard’s action.
We
find no abuse of discretion in this decision.
CONCLUSION
Taking into consideration the totality of the factors,
we believe Leonard’s claims were properly dismissed with
prejudice.
Leonard was personally responsible for his failure
to answer the interrogatories; his delay in responding was
willful and in bad faith; his remaining claims appear to be
without merit; and the court, in its discretion, chose to impose
the harshest sanction.
Based on these factors, we hold that the
order of the Bullitt Circuit Court involuntarily dismissing
Leonard’s complaint with prejudice was not an abuse of
discretion.
So we affirm.
ALL CONCUR.
15
CR 37.02(2)(c).
16
CR 37.02(2)(d).
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BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEES:
Jerry W. Leonard, Pro se
Ekron, Kentucky
Mark E. Edison
Shepherdsville, Kentucky
Marvin P. Nunley
Owensboro, Kentucky
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