WILLIAM D. GOLDEY v. REBECCA F. GOLDEY
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RENDERED: July 8, 2005; 10:00 a.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2004-CA-000102-MR
WILLIAM D. GOLDEY
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM FAYETTE FAMILY COURT
HONORABLE JO ANN WISE, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 03-CI-00992
v.
REBECCA F. GOLDEY
APPELLEE
OPINION
VACATING AND REMANDING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
BARBER, BUCKINGHAM, AND JOHNSON, JUDGES.
JOHNSON, JUDGE:
William D. Goldey has appealed from the decree
of dissolution of marriage entered by the Fayette Family Court
on December 24, 2003.
Having concluded that the family court
failed to make adequate findings of fact, and failed to comply
with the procedural requirements of KRS1 403.200 in awarding
maintenance to the appellee, Rebecca F. Goldey, we vacate that
1
Kentucky Revised Statutes.
portion of the decree of dissolution of marriage and remand this
matter for further proceedings.
William and Rebecca were married on August 22, 1980.2
There were three children born of the marriage, and at the time
of the parties’ divorce all were emancipated.
The date of
physical separation of the parties was March 2003, following a
domestic altercation.3
William filed a petition to dissolve the
marriage on March 10, 2003, and Rebecca filed her response on
March 18, 2003, and requested maintenance.
During the marriage, William was employed as a
police officer4 and also worked a second job as a security guard
at bingo halls in Lexington.
Rebecca worked part-time during
the marriage as a hair stylist.
She testified that when the
parties’ children got older, she worked five days a week.
After
the parties’ separation, Rebecca obtained full-time employment
as a receptionist at St. Joseph’s hospital,5 and continued to
work part-time as a hair stylist.
At the final hearing, William strongly contested
2
The parties were first married in June 1977, but divorced approximately one
year later. They were remarried in 1980.
3
William was charged with assault in the fourth degree, but the charge was
dismissed.
4
William received some overtime from this employment.
5
Rebecca testified that she obtained this position because she was unable to
work as a hair stylist for a few months after the injury resulting from the
parties’ altercation in March 2003, and also in order to obtain health
insurance.
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the accuracy of Rebecca’s income as shown on their joint tax
returns.
He introduced Rebecca’s appointment books for the
years 1999, 2000, 2002, and 2003.6
William argued that if
$10.00 had been charged for every service Rebecca rendered,
which was the minimum she charged for any service, then her
income during those years should have been between $23,000.00 to
$24,000.00.7
However, it is undisputed that William signed the
tax returns showing Rebecca’s income for those years.
At the time of the final hearing, William was not
receiving income from the security guard position at the bingo
halls.
After the altercation between the parties, William was
placed on light-duty status and was removed from the security
guard position.
The assault charge was dismissed on November
25, 2003, and William was reinstated to his original status at
the police department; however, by this time the security guard
position was unavailable.
William testified that he requested
the opportunity to return to this position if it ever became
available, but at the time of the final hearing it had not.
William further testified that, as a police officer, he was
restricted to what types of additional employment he could
obtain.
6
Rebecca’s appointment book for 2001 was not available for inspection.
7
Rebecca did testify that she did not keep up with how much she made in tips
each year.
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At the final hearing on December 3, 2003, the
family court made oral findings of fact, which were followed by
written findings.
The decree of dissolution of marriage was
entered on December 24, 2003.
In the decree, the family court
made a division of marital property and marital debt, assigned
non-marital debt, and awarded Rebecca lifetime maintenance in
the amount of $800.00 per month.
This appeal followed.
The family court’s oral findings8 included that Rebecca
earned a net income of $1,311.00 per month from her full-time
employment at St. Joseph’s Hospital and $800.00 per month as a
part-time hair stylist, for a total of $2,111.00 net monthly
income.
The family court found that Rebecca was “employed to
her fullest abilities and cannot reasonably earn any other
income.”
The family court found that Rebecca’s reasonable
expenses were $2,900.00 per month.
The family court also found
that William’s net income from his full-time employment at the
Lexington-Fayette Urban County Government as a police officer
8
The family court’s oral findings and the decree of dissolution of marriage
included an almost equal division of the marital property and marital debt
and assigned certain non-martial debt to William. Rebecca received, as her
part of the division of marital property, equity in the parties’ marital real
estate in the amount of $42,627.00, various items of personal property,
including a leased automobile, and one-half the value of William’s
accumulated sick pay earned in 2003, his 401k, his 457 deferred compensation
account, and his retirement benefits from his employment. Rebecca was also
awarded $3,500.00 in attorney’s fees. William was awarded a portion of the
marital real estate, and personal property, including an automobile, and onehalf the value of his 401k, his 457 deferred compensation account, his
retirement benefits, and his sick pay for 2003. Each party was assigned
various marital debts in almost equal proportions.
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was $2,329.00 per month.
The family court further found that
William had the capacity to earn an additional $10,000.00 per
year, approximately $833.00 per month, in self-employment as he
did during the marriage.
The family court found William had a
net monthly income of approximately $3,162.33.
He argues that
his income should not have been based on what he could earn if
he received income from a second job, if Rebecca’s income was
not based on what she could earn if she worked full-time as a
hair stylist, which would be more than she currently earns.9
The family court then found that because Rebecca’s
reasonable expenses exceeded her income, she was entitled to
maintenance and she was awarded $800.00 per month permanent
maintenance, except, of course, upon the death of either party,
their remarriage, or their cohabitation as contemplated by Combs
v. Combs.10
The family court’s written findings were made on a
standardized form.
The only findings significant to maintenance
were the date of the parties’ marriage and their ages.
In the
written conclusions of law, the family court stated that Rebecca
was awarded maintenance of $800.00 per month.
9
These written and
William argues that the parties’ incomes in this case should be treated as
those in Sayre v. Sayre, 675 S.W.2d 647 (Ky.App. 1984). In Sayre, the party
seeking maintenance chose to remain at a lower paying job, and this Court
held that there was “no necessary reason for her to fail to pursue a higher
paying job.” Id. at 648. Because it was a matter of personal choice, it did
not justify a maintenance award. Id.
10
622 S.W.2d 679 (Ky.App. 1981).
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oral findings were incorporated into the December 24, 2003,
decree, wherein the family court stated as follows:
It is the finding of this Court that
[Rebecca] meets the criteria of KRS
403.200(1) in her request for maintenance
and after consideration of the factors set
forth in KRS 403.200(2) this Court awards
[Rebecca] permanent maintenance in the
amount of $800.00 per month until
[Rebecca’s] death or remarriage, whichever
event occurs first.
William argues that the family court’s findings of fact are
clearly erroneous; that the amount and duration of the award of
maintenance was an abuse of discretion; and that even if the
family court awarded Rebecca maintenance, it should be a nominal
amount.11
CR12 52.01 provides that “[f]indings of fact shall not
be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be
given to the opportunity of the [family] court to judge the
credibility of the witnesses.”
“[T]he test is not whether [this
Court] would have decided [the issue] differently, but whether
the findings of the [family] court judge were clearly erroneous
or that [the family court] abused [its] discretion.”13
11
Absolute
Rebecca argues that because the maintenance award is for life, it is
modifiable and that upon retirement, William can move the family court for
modification.
12
Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure.
13
Cherry v. Cherry, 634 S.W.2d 423, 425 (Ky. 1982).
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abuse must be shown for the appellate court to disturb the
family court’s findings.14
Under the statutory scheme, the family court was
required to consider whether Rebecca had a need for maintenance
under KRS 403.200(1)(a) and (b), before determining the amount
and duration pursuant to the remainder of the statute.15
For a
party to establish a need for maintenance, both subsections of
KRS 403.200(1) must be met.16
Rebecca would have established a
need for maintenance if the family court determined that she
“lack[ed] sufficient property, including marital property
apportioned to her, to provide for [her] reasonable needs[,]”17
and, that she was “unable to support [herself] through
appropriate employment.”18
Pursuant to case law, the reasonable
needs in KRS 401.200(1)(b) are based on the “standard of living
established during the marriage.”19
The family court made findings as to the parties’ date
of marriage, their ages, the division of property, the parties’
14
Clark v. Clark, 782 S.W.2d 56, 60 (Ky.App. 1990) (citing Platt v. Platt,
728 S.W.2d 542, 543 (Ky.App. 1987)).
15
Sayre, 675 S.W.2d at 648.
16
Drake v. Drake, 721 S.W.2d 728, 730 (Ky.App. 1986); Atwood v. Atwood, 643
S.W.2d 263, 265 (Ky.App. 1982) (citing Inman v. Inman, 578 S.W.2d 266, 270
(Ky.App. 1979)).
17
KRS 403.200(1)(a).
18
KRS 403.200(1)(b).
19
Drake, 721 S.W.2d at 730 (citing Lovett v. Lovett, 688 S.W.2d 329, 332 (Ky.
1985)). See also Casper v. Casper, 510 S.W.2d 253, 255 (Ky. 1974).
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incomes or potential incomes, and Rebecca’s reasonable expenses.
In reviewing the record, we determine that there was substantial
evidence to support the family court’s findings as to the
marital property apportioned to Rebecca, her reasonable
expenses, her income, her ability to earn money, and the
parties’ standard of living established during the marriage, and
that the family court made adequate findings to support its
conclusions that Rebecca was entitled to maintenance under the
first part of KRS 403.200.
Although we defer to the family court’s findings and
conclusions of law that pursuant to KRS 403.200(1)(a) and (b)
Rebecca is in need of maintenance, we are convinced that it
erred in setting the amount and duration of the award.
After
determining Rebecca had a need for maintenance, the family court
should have then considered “all relevant factors”20 including
those set forth in KRS 403.200(2), in determining, within its
sound discretion, the amount and duration of the award.21
Factors relevant to this determination include:
(a)
20
The financial resources of the party
seeking maintenance, including marital
property apportioned to him, and his
ability to meet his needs
independently[;]
KRS 403.200(2).
21
Russell v. Russell, 878 S.W.2d 24, 26 (Ky.App. 1994); and Drake, 721 S.W.2d
at 730 (stating that the appellate court “must consider whether the amount
awarded herein constitutes an abuse of discretion”).
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(b)
The time necessary to acquire
sufficient education or training to
enable the party seeking maintenance to
find appropriate employment;
(c)
The standard of living established
during the marriage;
(d)
The duration of the marriage;
(e)
The age, and the physical and emotional
condition of the spouse seeking
maintenance; and
(f)
The ability of the spouse from whom
maintenance is sought to meet his needs
while meeting those of the spouse
seeking maintenance.22
Although the family court stated that it considered
the factors set out in KRS 403.200(2), its findings are not
adequate to permit this Court to review the propriety of the
amount and the duration of Rebecca’s maintenance award.23
The
family court fell short in conducting its analysis under KRS
403.200(2) as it failed to consider “all relevant factors.”24
There were no findings regarding the physical25 and emotional
condition of the parties.
Further, the family court made no
findings as to William’s reasonable needs.
22
KRS 403.200(2).
23
See CR 52.01.
24
While the testimony
See KRS 403.200(2).
25
Rebecca testified that she had a thyroid condition; however, she did not
testify if this affected her ability to work.
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of his monthly expenses was undisputed, the family court failed
to make findings of his ability to meet his needs.26
Additionally, there were not sufficient findings as to
William’s ability to pay $800.00 per month, as required by
statute.
William argues that the family court erred in basing
this award on the contingency that he would be disabled before
he retired, and thus under the case of Holman v. Holman,27
Rebecca would be denied any of his retirement benefits.28
This
contingency is not one of the factors to be considered under KRS
403.200(2), nor do we find it relevant, and upon remand, the
family court is instructed not to consider this contingency in
setting the amount and duration of Rebecca’s maintenance award,
if it did so previously.29
The documentary evidence as to both
26
Dotson v. Dotson, 864 S.W.2d 900, 902-03 (Ky. 1993) (noting that the family
court must consider the husband’s ability to meet his needs while at the same
time meeting the wife’s needs).
27
84 S.W.3d 903 (Ky. 2002). The Supreme Court in Holman stated that the
husband’s “future, post-dissolution disability retirement benefits, which
replace his future nonmarital earnings as a firefighter, constitute [his]
separate nonmarital property.” Id. at 904.
28
William informed the family court that he would sign away his rights under
Holman if he was to become disabled, and he would agree that Rebecca would
begin to receive one-half the monthly benefits from his retirement when she
reached age 62. Rebecca argued that she should not have to wait until
reaching age 62 to receive the benefits, should William become disabled.
29
While there was no proof that William was going to become disabled,
Rebecca’s attorney specifically asked the family court to award Rebecca
lifetime maintenance to protect her in case William did become disabled.
There is no proof that the family court based its award on this reasoning;
however, the amount of the award is essentially the same as the amount of the
monthly retirement benefits that Rebecca would receive, approximately
$800.00. However, the family court also awarded Rebecca one-half of
William’s retirement, but made no mention of reducing the maintenance award
upon his retirement.
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parties’ net pay does not support a finding that Rebecca is
entitled to $800.00 per month maintenance, which actually would
give her a greater monthly income than William.
Therefore, we
conclude that this portion of the award must be vacated and this
matter must be remanded for specific findings as to William’s
ability to pay maintenance to Rebecca and, if so, in what
amount.
William further contends that there was no
justification for the family court’s award to Rebecca of
lifetime maintenance.
Maintenance is presumed to be for life,
or until remarriage, unless rebutted.30
“The duration of
maintenance must have a direct relationship to two factors: (1)
the period over which the need exists, and (2) the ability to
pay.”31
This Court noted in Weldon v. Weldon,32 the possibility
that such presumption can be rebutted when it found that the
trial court abused its discretion in awarding the wife
maintenance past her retirement age of 65.33
The parties in
Weldon were in their forties, just as William and Rebecca.
disparity in the parties’ gross income in Weldon was
30
Combs, 622 S.W.2d at 680.
31
Id.
32
957 S.W.2d 283, 286 (Ky.App. 1997).
33
Id.
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The
approximately $53,000.00 per year.34
The disparity in net income
between William and Rebecca was found to be $12,612.00 per year.
In Weldon, the parties had been married for 22 years, compared
to the 23-year marriage of William and Rebecca.
The division of
marital property was similar.35
The wife in Weldon was awarded permanent maintenance
of $750.0036 per month for her life, until she died, remarried,
or cohabitated.37
This Court found that in the next 20 years,
before the wife reached 65, she would receive almost $250,000.00
in maintenance.38
Similarly, in this case, over the next 20
years, William would pay Rebecca almost $192,000.00 in
maintenance payments.
This Court held in Weldon that, while
being mindful that the duration of the award was in the trial
court’s discretion, the trial court “absolutely abused [its]
discretion by awarding maintenance to [the wife] past her
retirement age of 65.”39
This Court went on to state: “Assuming
that [the wife] reaches age 65 without remarrying or cohabiting,
then she will have received maintenance in a substantial amount
34
Weldon, 957 S.W.2d at 284.
35
Id. at 284-86.
36
This would be increased to $1,200.00 per month when the husband’s child
support obligation ceased. Id.
37
Id. at 284.
38
Id. at 285.
39
Id. at 286.
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for a 20-year period.
Furthermore, the parties’ income levels
will be more equal since she will be entitled to half of [the
husband’s] pension . . . .”40
In the case before us, we hold
that the abuse of discretion was great because the family court
did not consider that Rebecca would also receive an additional
$800.00 per month upon William’s retirement, nor did it
determine William’s ability to pay.
The presumption of lifetime
maintenance was rebutted by the evidence presented in this case,
just as it was in Weldon, and therefore, we conclude that the
family court abused its discretion in making a lifetime award of
maintenance to Rebecca.
There is no magic formula that the family court must
use when setting maintenance, nor is it required to quote the
language of KRS 403.200 to support its award.
However, we do
expect the family court to comply with the procedural
requirements of the statute, and we conclude that in this case
it did not.
Determination that a spouse is entitled to
maintenance under KRS 403.200 is just the first step in the
statutory process.
In this case the family court’s findings are
insufficient and its conclusions concerning the amount and
duration of a maintenance award are not supported by the record.
Thus, we are thus compelled to vacate the judgment and to remand
this matter for further proceedings and adequate findings which
40
Weldon, 957 S.W.2d at 286.
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comply with KRS 403.200(2) and for the setting of an amount and
duration of the maintenance award based upon those findings.
For the foregoing reasons, we vacate that portion of
the family court’s December 23, 2003, decree awarding Rebecca
maintenance in the amount of $800.00 per month for her life, and
remand this matter for further proceedings consistent with this
Opinion.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Donald R. Todd
Lexington, Kentucky
Martha A. Rosenberg
Lexington, Kentucky
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