AND ERIC P. LIGHT AND CONNIE LIGHT, ON BEHALF OF THEMSELVES AND ALL OTHERS SIMILARLY SITUATED v. CITY OF LOUISVILLE, KENTUCKY; LOUISVILLE/JEFFERSON COUNTY METRO GOVERNMENT; HON. DAVID L. ARMSTRONG, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS MAYOR OF THE CITY OF LOUISVILLE, KENTUCKY; AND HON. JERRY E. ABRAMSON, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS MAYOR OF THE LOUISVILLE/ JEFFERSON COUNTY METRO GOVERNMENT
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MODIFIED:
JULY 1, 2005; 2:00 P.M.
TO BE PUBLISHED
SEPTEMBER 9, 2005; 2:00 p.m.
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2004-CA-000101-MR
AND
NO. 2004-CA-000177-MR
ERIC P. LIGHT AND CONNIE LIGHT,
ON BEHALF OF THEMSELVES AND ALL
OTHERS SIMILARLY SITUATED
v.
APPELLANTS/CROSS-APPELLEES
APPEAL AND CROSS-APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE LISABETH HUGHES ABRAMSON, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 00-CI-001660
CITY OF LOUISVILLE, KENTUCKY;
LOUISVILLE/JEFFERSON COUNTY METRO
GOVERNMENT; HON. DAVID L. ARMSTRONG,
IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS MAYOR OF THE
CITY OF LOUISVILLE, KENTUCKY; AND
HON. JERRY E. ABRAMSON, IN HIS OFFICIAL
CAPACITY AS MAYOR OF THE LOUISVILLE/
JEFFERSON COUNTY METRO GOVERNMENT
APPELLEES/CROSS-APPELLANTS
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
BUCKINGHAM, JOHNSON, AND SCHRODER, JUDGES.
JOHNSON, JUDGE:
Eric P. and Connie Light, on behalf of
themselves and all others similarly situated, (collectively “the
Lights”) have appealed from orders entered by the Jefferson
Circuit Court following remand from this Court 1 for the trial
court to consider the appellants/cross-appellees class action,
seeking declaration of rights and refunds from the City of
Louisville (the City).
This Court concluded that the Lights had
properly exhausted all administrative remedies and the Jefferson
Circuit Court was the proper forum in which to bring this
action.
The Lights have appealed the trial court’s order
following appeal, as it denied the Lights’s motion for summary
judgment and granted the City’s motion for summary judgment.
Based on the language of KRS 2 132.285 and KRS 132.0225 and the
statutory construction of the two statutes, the trial court
found that the City did not charge excessive ad valorem property
taxes in 1998 and 1999 to its citizens, and did not owe the
Lights a refund.
The City has filed a protective cross-appeal
in which it argues that the trial court erred in certifying the
taxpayers as a class, determining the City was a taxing district
under KRS 132.0225, and determining that KRS 132.0225 was
unambiguous.
For reasons other than those stated by the trial
court, we affirm. 3
1
The prior appellate case numbers were 2001-CA-001310-MR and 2001-CA-001402MR and this Court’s Opinion is published as Light v. City of Louisville,
Kentucky, 93 S.W.3d 696 (Ky.App. 2002).
2
Kentucky Revised Statutes.
3
See Haddad v. Louisville Gas & Electric Co., 449 S.W.2d 916, 919 (Ky. 1970).
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The Lights own real estate in the City.
The City
issued its tax bills separate from Jefferson County (the
County), but used the annual county assessment of property
situated within the City as the basis for the levy of its annual
property taxes for the 1998 and 1999 tax years. 4
For both years,
the City adopted tax rates at the 4% increase tax rate.
In 1998
the City filed its 1998 tax rate ordinance 69 days after
certification of the Jefferson County tax roll and 52 days after
certification in 1999.
The Lights timely paid their real
property taxes for both tax years.
On December 15, 1999, the Lights filed a class refund
claim with the City for the overpayment on their 1998 and 1999
city real property taxes, pursuant to KRS 134.590 and common
law.
The City responded by denying the claim.
On March 9,
2000, the Lights filed this action in the Jefferson Circuit
Court, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly
situated, seeking a declaratory judgment that the taxes levied
by the City in 1998 and 1999 were excessive, and seeking class
action refunds of the taxes.
On March 24, 2000, the Lights
filed an amended complaint, in order to plead common law
remedies.
The trial court dismissed the action by order entered
4
Cities may assess property under KRS Chapter 91 or elect to use the county
tax base under KRS 91A.070 to collect their ad valorem taxes. If a city
adopts a county’s assessment, the Revenue Cabinet controls the process under
KRS 133.220.
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May 22, 2001, finding that the Lights had failed to exhaust
their administrative remedies before filing the action.
The
Lights appealed to this Court on June 19, 2001, and the City
cross-appealed. 5
This Court rendered its Opinion on September
20, 2002, reversing and remanding the case for further
proceedings, holding “that [the Lights] fully exhausted their
administrative remedies by seeking a refund of the property
taxes paid from the city, and that the trial court erred by
dismissing this action on the ground that the KBTA 6 had exclusive
jurisdiction over this dispute.” 7
On November 20, 2002, the City answered the Lights’s
complaint.
On January 9, 2003, the Lights filed a motion for
class certification and on May 9, 2003, the trial court entered
an order granting the Lights’s motion as to declaratory judgment
relief, but denied certification to obtain refunds.
The trial
court certified the classes as follows:
1.
All persons who owned an interest in
real property located in the City of
Louisville on the January 1, 1998
assessment date and paid ad valorem
taxes thereon to the City of
Louisville; and
5
The City argued to this Court on its previous cross-appeal that the Lights
did not have the right to seek refunds by class action. This issue had not
been addressed by the trial court, so this Court declined to address this
issue until the trial court had an opportunity to do so on remand. See
Light, 93 S.W.3d at 699.
6
Kentucky Board of Tax Appeals.
7
Light, 93 S.W.3d at 699.
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2.
All persons who owned an interest in
real property located in the City of
Louisville on the January 1, 1999
assessment date and paid ad valorem
taxes thereon to the City of
Louisville.
The trial court found that the prerequisites of CR 8 23.01 and CR
23.02 were met and that the action could be maintained as a
class action, and also appointed the Lights as class
representatives.
Then, on June 10, 2003, the Lights moved for
summary judgment asserting that the City’s levies of taxes in
1998 and 1999 were excessive because the levies were not timely
assessed in violation of KRS 132.0225.
On June 11, 2003, the
City filed a cross-motion for summary judgment arguing that KRS
132.0225 did not apply to the City, or in the alternative, that
the City met the statute’s requirements.
Oral arguments were
held on July 14, 2003, and the trial court entered an order on
December 18, 2003, granting the City’s cross-motion and denying
the Lights’s motion for summary judgment.
Due to the
restructure of the City’s governmental system, and upon the
Lights’s motion, the trial court entered an order on January 13,
2004, naming the Louisville/Jefferson County Metro Government as
a party to this action, as well as the City’s new mayor, Jerry
E. Abramson.
8
On January 13, 2004, the Lights filed their notice
Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure.
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of appeal and on January 26, 2004, the City filed its notice of
cross-appeal.
The Lights’s arguments to this Court have several
subparts, but consist of essentially two underlying issues.
First, the Lights argue that the trial court erred in
interpreting KRS 132.0225 and KRS 132.285, and by doing so, (1)
incorrectly found the two statutes could not jointly govern the
City’s levy of real property taxes, (2) misapplied the rules of
statutory construction, (3) failed to resolve any
inconsistencies in the two statutes in favor of the taxpayers,
and (4) misconstrued the policy and purposes behind the two
statutes.
Second, the Lights argue that the trial court
erroneously denied class refund relief based on statutory and
common law.
The City argues in its protective cross-appeal (1)
that KRS 132.0225 does not apply to cities that issue their own
tax bills; (2) that KRS 132.285 exempts the City from the
requirements of KRS 132.0225; (3) that the City has
substantially complied with KRS 132.0225; and (4) that this
class of taxpayers is not entitled to any refunds on taxes paid.
In addressing these arguments, we will discuss the two
statutes at issue in this case, i.e., KRS 132.285 and KRS
132.0225.
Cities may establish their own assessor and make
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their own assessments of property subject to city taxation. 9
In
1942 the General Assembly partially integrated 10 county and city
property valuation by authorizing all cities to elect to use
their county’s assessment of property within the city. 11
KRS
132.285 provides in part as follows:
(1)
9
Except as provided in subsection (3) of
this section, any city may by ordinance
elect to use the annual county
assessment for property situated within
such city as a basis of ad valorem tax
levies ordered or approved by the
legislative body of the city. Any city
making such election shall notify the
Revenue Cabinet and property valuation
administrator prior to the next
succeeding assessment to be used for
city levies. In such event the
assessment finally determined for
county tax purposes shall serve as a
basis of all city levies for the fiscal
year commencing on or after the county
assessment date. . . . Notwithstanding
any statutory provisions to the
contrary, the assessment dates for such
city shall conform to the corresponding
dates for the county, and such city may
by ordinance establish additional
financial and tax procedures that will
enable it effectively to adopt the
county assessment. The legislative
body of any city adopting the county
assessment may fix the time for levying
the city tax rate, fiscal year, due and
delinquency dates for taxes and any
other dates that will enable it
KRS 91.310.
10
This effort has been popular with 95% to 98% of Kentucky cities currently
using their county assessments.
11
KRS 132.285.
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effectively to adopt the county
assessment, notwithstanding any
statutory provisions to the
contrary. . . .
If a city so chooses to use its county’s assessment, it must (1)
conform its assessment date to that of the county and (2)
establish its rates only after the Revenue Cabinet certifies the
county tax role. 12
Upon certification, the Revenue Cabinet
notifies the counties and the Department of Local Government
(the DLG) of the certification. 13
In 1979 the General Assembly placed limitations on
taxing districts that chose to use this method of property
valuation.
The General Assembly enacted House Bill 44, known as
the “Rollback Law,” which was codified in KRS 132.017 and KRS
132.027, and had the purpose of reducing the impact of inflation
of property taxes. 14
This law has three tiers of taxing rates:
Tier I Rate – a rate equal to or less than the Compensating Tax
Rate; Tier II Rate – a rate in excess of the Compensating Tax
Rate but equal to or less than the 4% Increase Tax Rate; Tier
III Rate – a rate in excess of the 4% Increase Tax Rate.
12
This provision was added to KRS 133.185 in 1949.
Sess.).
1949 Ky. Acts 2 (Ex.
13
The City states that it has, as a matter of practice, levied its tax rate
in time for the bills to be received by taxpayers at the beginning of
November. The City claims it was not notified by the Revenue Cabinet, the
DLG, or the County when certification was made during 1998 or 1999. Nor, did
the DLG certify the City’s tax rates during 1998 and 1999.
14
1979 Ky. Acts 25 (Ex. Sess. preamble); Kling v. Geary, 667 S.W.2d 379, 381
(Ky. 1984).
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The “compensating tax rate” allows the City the same tax
revenue from real property that was produced in the preceding
year. 15
As assessments rise, the tax rate is “rolled back” so
that revenue from real property that was in existence and taxed
the previous year remains the same.
The “4% Increase Tax Rate”
is that rate which when applied to the current year’s assessment
of existing property will produce no more than 4% additional
revenue from that property.
compensating tax rate.
No limitations apply to the levy of
A Tier II Rate, however, requires public
notice and a hearing before it can be levied by a taxing
district.
Before a Tier III Rate can be levied, a taxing
district must issue public notice and hold a public hearing, and
10% of the voters can petition that the increase above 4% be put
to a recall vote. 16
In 1994 the General Assembly enacted KRS 132.0225
which provides as follows:
(1)
A taxing district that does not elect
to attempt to set a rate that will
produce more than four percent (4%) in
additional revenue, exclusive of
revenue from new property as defined in
KRS 132.010, over the amount of revenue
produced by the compensating tax rate
as defined in KRS 132.010 shall
establish a final tax rate within
forty-five (45) days of the cabinet’s
certification of the county’s property
15
KRS 132.010(6) and (8).
16
KRS 132.017(1) and (3).
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tax roll. Any taxing district that
fails to meet this deadline shall be
required to use the compensating tax
rate for that year’s property tax
bills.
(2)
A taxing district that elects to
attempt to set a rate that will produce
more than four percent (4%) in
additional revenue, exclusive of
revenue from new property as defined in
KRS 132.010, over the amount of revenue
produced by the compensating tax rate
as defined in KRS 132.010 shall follow
the provisions of KRS 132.017.
Thus, a taxing district governed by this statute must
establish a final tax rate within 45 days of the Revenue
Cabinet’s certification of the county’s property tax roll, if it
intends to set the rate higher than the compensating tax rate
for that year’s property tax bills.
According to the undisputed
facts of this case, the City established its 1998 and 1999 tax
rates after the 45-day deadline set in KRS 132.0225, and in both
years the City set the tax rates above the compensating rate for
that year, i.e., Tier II of the “Rollback Law.” 17
In
continuation of the integration attempt, the General Assembly in
1982 authorized cities to collect taxes through the county ad
valorem property tax bill and to engage the county sheriff as
17
The City argues that, even if KRS 132.0225 applied, it had substantially
complied with the statute and this language was directory. The Lights argue
that KRS 132.0225(1) is mandatory, and thus, substantial compliance was
insufficient.
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tax collector. 18
During the years in question, the City did not
opt to use this provision and issued its 1998 and 1999 tax bills
independently of the County.
The City argued, based on the legislative intent of
the statute, that it was not a taxing district under KRS
132.0225 because the term “taxing district” was not defined.
Further, because the City issued its own tax bills, it argued
that it was not subject to KRS 132.0225 because the statute’s
purpose is to make taxing districts who shared tax bills with
the county timely set their rates.
The trial court found,
contrary to the City’s arguments, that KRS 132.0225 was
unambiguous, refused to consider the legislative intent of the
statute in its interpretation, refused to insert language into
the statute, and found the City to be a taxing district.
However, the trial court found the 45-day deadline in KRS
132.0225 did not apply to the City, when viewing KRS 132.0225
simultaneously with KRS 132.285.
The trial court focused on the
freedom given to the City under KRS 132.285 to set “the time for
levying the city tax rate . . . and any other dates that will
enable it effectively to adopt the county assessment,
notwithstanding any statutory provisions to the contrary.”
The
trial court stated, “[t]he latitude granted to the City by this
statute is obviously greatly undercut if KRS 132.0225 is deemed
18
KRS 91A.070 (1982 Ky. Acts 434, sec. 12); KRS 134.140.
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to limit the City’s ability to levy taxes to a forty-five (45)
day window immediately following certification of the county
property tax roll.” 19
The Lights argued that KRS 132.285 and KRS 132.0225
can be harmonized because KRS 132.285 relates to the time of the
tax, while KRS 132.0225 relates to the amount of the tax.
The
trial court rejected this reasoning and found that KRS 132.285
was the more specific statute, applying specifically to cities,
while KRS 132.0225 applied to any taxing district.
The trial
court also found that, in addition to KRS 132.285, KRS 132.027
specifically addressed city ad valorem tax role limitations, 20
and it did not include the 45-day deadline set out in KRS
132.0225.
Finding that the 45-day restriction in KRS 132.0225
had no apparent meaningful purpose except to “assure the orderly
dissemination of county tax bills,” the trial court found that
19
While the trial court made it clear that its decision was
the language of the statutes in question and the principles
construction, it noted that its decision is consistent with
administrative policies and interpretations of the Kentucky
20
KRS 132.027 provides in part as follows:
(1)
No city . . . shall levy a tax rate which
exceeds the compensating tax rate defined
in KRS 132.010 until the city . . . has
complied with the provisions of
subsection (2) of this section.
(2)(a)
Cities . . . proposing to levy a tax
rate which exceeds the compensating tax
rate defined in KRS 132.010 shall hold
a public hearing to hear comments from
the public regarding the proposed tax
rate. . . .
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based solely on
of statutory
the
Revenue Cabinet.
giving effect to KRS 132.0225, in light of KRS 132.285 and KRS
132.027, would create an illogical result.
This review of the
proceedings below brings us to the issues on appeal and crossappeal.
“Taxing laws should be plain and precise, for they
impose a burden upon the people.” 21
Before analyzing the
applicability of KRS 132.0225 to the City, this Court must
determine whether the statute is ambiguous. 22
“[A]ny language
used by the legislature must be given its clear and commonly
accepted meaning” [footnote omitted]. 23
In reviewing other
portions of KRS Chapter 132, it is apparent that the Legislature
intended to include cities as taxing districts in KRS 132.0225. 24
Further, the Supreme Court of Kentucky has recognized and
adopted the construction of taxing districts to include cities. 25
21
George v. Scent, 346 S.W.2d 784, 789 (Ky. 1961).
22
The City argues that KRS 132.0225 is ambiguous because it does not define
the term “taxing district” and because it is in conflict with KRS 132.285.
23
SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Revenue Cabinet, 40 S.W.3d 883, 887 (Ky.App.
2001).
24
KRS 132.027(2)(a) requires the City and other cities seeking to levy a rate
in excess of the compensating tax rate to hold a hearing “in the principal
office of the taxing district” [emphasis added]. A number of statutes in KRS
Chapter 132 apply to a “city, urban-county government, consolidated local
government, or other taxing district” [emphasis added]. KRS 132.017(1)(a)
and (b). See also KRS 132.010(6).
25
Kling, 667 S.W.2d at 382 (holding that “KRS 133.185 . . . relates to the
imposition of a tax rate for a taxing district, such as a city, county or
school” [emphases original]).
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Thus, we conclude that the term “taxing district” as found in
KRS 132.0225 includes cities.
We must determine whether applying KRS 132.0225 to all
cities makes KRS 132.0225 ambiguous.
“Ambiguity of a statute or
other writing may exist on its face, i.e., there may be
confusion, doubt or uncertainty of meaning within itself.
It
may develop when the statute is brought into contact with
collateral facts, as where the consequences or results of a
literal application of the language would be absurd or
unreasonable.” 26
KRS 132.285 specifically addresses cities and
gives them the discretion to determine when to set their tax
rates.
In looking at the plain meaning of KRS 132.0225, it
cannot be determined how this latter enacted statute affects the
broad power given to cities by KRS 132.285.
If KRS 132.0225
applies to all cities, then the statute requires the City to set
its real property tax rates no later than 45 days after the
Revenue Cabinet’s certification of the county’s property tax
roll, regardless of the fact that the City issues its own tax
bills, which we conclude would yield an unreasonable result.
“[S]tatutes always have some purpose or object to
accomplish . . . and imaginative discovery is the surest guide
26
Fidelity & Columbia Trust Co. v. Meek, 294 Ky. 122, 171 S.W.2d 41, 48
(1943); see also Kentucky Industrial Utility Customers, Inc. v. Kentucky
Utilities Co., 983 S.W.2d 493, 500 (Ky. 1998).
- 14 -
to their meaning.” 27
“In construing statutes the courts may look
to the reasons for, the purpose back of, and the circumstances
surrounding, the enactment of a law in order to arrive at its
proper construction.” 28
“[T]he policy and purpose of the statute
will be considered in determining the meaning of the words
used.” 29
Because of its ambiguity, we turn to the legislative
intent of KRS 132.0225 and look at the legislative history of
the statute, 30 which indicates that the 45-day deadline in KRS
132.0225 was enacted to prevent taxing districts that use the
county tax bill from delaying the bills. 31
Because the City does
not use the county tax bill, it could not delay the issuance of
the tax bills, and thus would not frustrate the stated intent of
KRS 132.0225.
27
The Lights argue that KRS 132.0225 does not
Cabell v. Markham, 148 F.2d 737, 739 (2d Cir. 1945).
28
Swift v. Southeastern Greyhound Lines, 294 Ky. 137, 171 S.W.2d 49, 50
(1943).
29
Kentucky Region Eight v. Commonwealth, 507 S.W.2d 489, 491 (Ky. 1974); see
also Kentucky Industrial Utility Customers, 983 S.W.2d at 500.
30
Dougherty v. Kentucky Alcoholic Beverage Control Board, 279 Ky. 262, 130
S.W.2d 756, 760 (1939)(stating that “the entire act is to be considered with
the judicial eye upon the historical setting, the public policy, the objects
to be accomplished, the mischief intended to be remedied, and all other
attendant facts and circumstances which throw intelligent light upon the
intention of the law-making body” [citation omitted]).
31
The Lights argue that KRS 132.0225 makes it probable that all taxing
districts, including cities issuing their own tax bills, will issue their
bills timely and that taxpayers receiving multiple tax bills will receive
them at roughly the same time. The Lights also argue that KRS 132.0225
removes any disincentive from electing to use combined city or county tax
bills by denying unlimited time to set tax rates to taxing districts which
issue their own bills and seek to levy Tier II rates. With support, we are
not persuaded by this argument.
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infringe upon the City’s authorization under KRS 132.285 to set
real property tax rates when it desires, but only limits the
amount the City can set in compliance with the Rollback Law.
Otherwise, the Lights argue that the Rollback Law would have no
effect.
We disagree.
Regardless of when the City sets its tax
rates, it must comply with the timing requirements of the
Rollback Law.
The City complied with the Rollback Law in both
1998 and 1999 when the City set tax rates at more than 4% over
the amount of revenue produced by the compensating tax rate. 32
Thus, we are not persuaded that the Rollback Law will lose its
effect if the City does not have to comply with the 45-day rule
set out in KRS 132.0225.
We agree with the City that if the
Legislature had intended for KRS 132.0225 to apply to cities
32
The City in its brief states that the Revenue Cabinet certified the
County’s property tax roll for the January 1, 1998, assessment date on August
11, 1998. In 1998 the City did not receive notice from the Revenue Cabinet
or the DLG that the Revenue Cabinet had certified the county tax roll.
Consequently, the City followed its usual practice and began the procedure
for adopting the ad valorem tax rate in time for the City to levy a rate and
send out its tax bills in a timely manner. The City published two notices on
October 3, 1998, and October 5, 1998, in The Courier-Journal regarding the
hearing at which the ad valorem tax rate would be adopted. The Board of
Aldermen passed Ordinance No. 230, Series 1998 on October 13, 1998, adopting
the ad valorem tax rate, and the Mayor signed the Ordinance on October 19,
1998.
Similarly, the Revenue Cabinet certified the County’s property tax roll for
the January 1, 1999, assessment date on August 13, 1999. Again, neither the
Revenue Cabinet nor the DLG notified the City that the county tax roll had
been certified. In accordance with its usual procedure, the City began the
process of adopting an ad valorem tax rate so that the property tax bills
could be sent out in the beginning of November. The City published notices
in The Courier-Journal on September 18, 1999, and September 20, 1999,
regarding the date of the hearing at which an ad valorem tax rate would be
considered. The Board of Aldermen passed Ordinance No. 135, Series 1999 on
September 28, 1999, and the Mayor signed the Ordinance on October 4, 1999.
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that issued their own tax bills, then there should have been a
procedure in place for notifying the cities of the Revenue
Cabinet’s certification of the county tax roll, so the cities
would be aware of when the 45-day period set out under the
statute began to run.
It is also important to note that KRS
132.285 was amended subsequent to the enactment of KRS 132.0225
and no change was made to the provisions permitting cities to
fix their own time for levying a tax rate.
The Lights also argue that this Court must first
attempt to reconcile any conflict between the statutes as they
are written, 33 and that any doubts or ambiguity in the
application of these statutes must be construed in favor of the
taxpayer. 34
Having concluded that KRS 132.0225 is ambiguous on
its face, in accordance with Kentucky law, we have looked to
legislative intent and determined that this statute does not
apply to cities who issue their own tax bills.
is no conflict between the two statutes.
Therefore, there
This Court’s
interpretation of KRS 132.0225 does not void the Rollback Law,
but rather prevents an absurd result under the statute, and
33
Sumpter v. Burchett, 304 Ky. 858, 202 S.W.2d 735, 736 (1947)(stating that
“any apparent conflict between [the statutes] must be reconciled, if
possible, so as to give effect to both” [citations omitted]); see also
Commonwealth v. Martin, 777 S.W.2d 236, 238 (Ky.App. 1989).
34
Owens-Illinois Labels, Inc. v. Commonwealth, Revenue Cabinet, 27 S.W.3d
798, 803 (Ky.App. 2000)(noting that it is well settled that when there is
confusion, ambiguity or doubt about the meaning of a tax statute, such doubt
must be resolved in favor of the taxpayer).
- 17 -
allows KRS 132.0225 and KRS 132.285 to be construed consistently
to the greatest extent possible.
If we had determined that both statutes applied to the
City, we would have been required to determine which statute
would have prevailed over the other in this case.
We
acknowledge that the general rule of statutory construction
provides, “[w]here two statutes deal with the same subject
matter, the one treating it in a particular manner is preferred
over the general.” 35
However, we conclude that because KRS
132.285 specifically addresses cities and based on the law of
Kentucky that “[t]he legislature is presumed to be aware of the
law at the time of the enactment of any statute[,]” 36 we hold KRS
132.285 to be more specific. 37
Furthermore, while we find no
Kentucky law on point, we find the view of the USRCA 38
persuasive.
The USRCA provides that “an earlier enacted
specific . . . statute prevails over a later enacted general
statute unless the context of the later enacted statute
35
Schooler v. Commonwealth, 628 S.W.2d 885, 886 (Ky.App. 1981).
36
Id.
37
In this case, the City argues that KRS 132.285 is the more specific statute
because it deals directly with the time given to cities to establish their
real property tax rate. The Lights argue that KRS 132.0225 ought to control
in this case because it is the most specific and that it was enacted later in
time.
38
Uniform Statute and Rule Construction Act.
- 18 -
indicates otherwise.” 39
There is no such indication in KRS
132.0225, and thus, we affirm the trial court’s finding that the
45-day deadline of KRS 132.0225 is not applicable to the City
and hold that the trial court correctly granted the City’s
cross-motion for summary judgment and denied the Lights’s motion
for summary judgment.
Because we find KRS 132.0225 inapplicable to the City
and uphold the trial court’s ruling in its favor, the Lights’s
and the City’s arguments regarding the taxpayers’ class status
and common law remedies are moot and we will not address them
further. 40
For the above reasons, we affirm the order of the
Jefferson Circuit Court.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANTS/CROSSAPPELLEES:
BRIEFS FOR APPELLEES/CROSSAPPELLANTS:
Timothy J. Eifler
Walter L. Sales
Kenneth L. Sales
Louisville, Kentucky
Thomas J. Luber
Mitzi D. Wyrick
Louisville, Kentucky
ORAL ARGUMENT FOR
APPELLANTS/CROSS-APPELLEES:
Kenneth L. Sales
Louisville, Kentucky
39
ORAL ARGUMENT FOR
APPELLEES/CROSS-APPELLANTS:
Thomas J. Luber
Louisville, Kentucky
USRCA § 10(a).
40
We do point out that the Supreme Court of Kentucky has just recently ruled
that class action refund relief is proper in taxpayer refund actions. See
City of Bromley v. Smith, 149 S.W.3d 403, 406 (Ky. 2004).
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